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Summary.
A legal system is a defective one if it does not "adopt a conscious 
attitude to the problem of non performance of contracts in consequence of 
events beyond the control of the parties.".1
However, legal systems differ in their consideration of the problem of 
non performance of contracts. Thus early English law considered that the 
right attitude was to disregard cases of subsequent impossibility of 
performance whereas French law takes the opposite view and discharges 
debtors when a case of impossibility is involved.
The narrowness of the concept of impossibility of performance as an 
excuse from liability, which is also a matter of difference between the 
considered laws, led other legal systems to adopt an extended concept of 
release, by considering cases of onerousness as a valuable plea to 
discharge a debtor from his contractual obligations.(e.g. Algeria, 
Germany etc)
In this study we try to give an overview of the position of English and 
Scottish laws regarding cases of subsequent impossibility of performance. 
We have therefore studied the doctrine of frustration which covers the 
above instances and compare it with its counterpart under French and 
Algerian laws in similar cases.
The doctrine of frustration covers two set of circumstances; those 
which put the debtor into a real impossibility of performance and those 
which do not, though the debtor is released. Force majeure under French 
and Algerian laws covers cases of real impossibility only. Hence, we 
divided our study into two parts.
The first part deals with cases of impossibility of performance in 
which the principles of the doctrine of fmstration and force majeure are 
studied and compared with each other. It will be seen that in many cases 
where the contract was held frustrated under English and Scottish laws, 
the same solution, that is the release of the debtor, can similarly be
1 Schmitthoff C. M, "Frustration of International Contracts of Sale in English 
and Comparative Law" In. Some Problems of Nonperformance and Force Majeure in 
International Contracts of Sale (Helsinki Conference.l961).127., at p. 127. Emphasis 
is mine.
reached by using principles of force majeure. However, this is not always 
true especially for cases involving a delay in the performance of 
contracts. The second part deals with the other types of frustration such 
as those of the performance having become valueless or onerous. It will 
be seen in studying cases of performance having become valueless, that 
French courts (and Algerian law) release the debtors, and yet their 
decisions cannot be founded on the principles of force majeure but on 
those of "Cause". As to the instances of onerousness, the English and the 
Scottish doctrine of frustration is compared with the one of imprevision 
as admitted under Algerian and other laws.
Our study covers mainly these two instances of impossibility and 
possibility. The study and the comparison of the legal concepts used 
under the considered laws to release a debtor from his contractual 
obligations might reveal or suggest a sound attitude to be taken when 
dealing with cases of subsequent impossibility of performance.
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General Introduction.
Frustration, force majeure and imprevision. These terms are very 
well known and many articles have been written on them some of which 
dealt with one of these terms, whereas others have treated them in a 
comparative way. The question is what is meant by these three terms?. 
Certainly from what has been written, a lawyer can give a general 
definition, however, to bring these terms close to each other and to give a 
comparative judgment, such as to say one term is similar or dissimilar to 
the other, is more difficult. Such a judgment certainly needs a more 
detailed study of these expressions taken from their original sources 
rather than relying on general ideas concerning frustration, force 
majeure and imprevision. This in fact is what we want to derive from the 
study of these doctrines. This is not to say that all what has been said on 
these different concepts will be discussed in this work. Our effort is more 
modest than that.
We have tried to study these principles in totally different systems of 
law viz common and continental laws and in detail. The study includes a 
discussion of cases, laws and doctrines related to this subject. We have 
also tried to bring the terms of fmstration, force majeure and imprevision 
close to each other and to see whether what has been said about them can 
be supported or not.
It is worth noting that this study is limited in several ways, it is 
confined to contractual obligations only. This means that even though 
these terms are used in other types of obligations (e.g., in delictual ones 'if 
speaking of French and Algerian laws') they will not be studied. Furthermore, 
the comparison of frustration with force majeure and imprevision will be 
carried on following the same plan as when studying the doctrine of 
fmstration. Thus for example the reported French cases are -in general- 
those which are similar to a certain extent to those of English or Scottish 
instances of fmstration. Furthermore, our study concerns cases of 
subsequent impossibility only.
It can be said that perhaps the principle which is common to all legal 
systems is the one of pacta sunt servanda which means that the one who 
concludes a contract should perform it or pay damages instead. It is
1
therefore of interest to see how this principle is understood under 
English, Scottish, French and Algerian laws. Under certain laws -as will 
be seen- the principle is considered as absolutely sacred (see under force 
majeure the requirement of absolute impossibility.). Others are less strict in its 
consideration. An example of the first is French law, and of the latter 
Algerian law. English law might be said to occupy a middle position 
between the above two laws.
Under French law, any question of performance having become 
impossible should be dealt with in relation to the principles of force 
majeure. The yardstick of it is that, no release is allowed for the debtor 
unless his performance has become absolutely impossible. The fact that 
the performance has become ruinous is no plea for release.
English law, before the development of the doctrine of frustration, 
was more strict than French law. The impossibility was not a sufficient 
reason to discharge the debtor from his contractual obligations. 
However, this attitude has changed, and consequently the strictness has 
been lessened.
Under other laws (e.g., Algerian and other Arab laws, as well as under Swiss 
and German laws) though the concept of impossibility of performance is not 
substantially different from the one under French law, nevertheless the 
fact that certain obligations may become ruinous for the debtor or even 
for the creditor, is not ignored. In such cases, a modification of the 
contract is conceived in order to restabilise it and to prevent it from 
becoming a source of injustice.
Therefore, it appears that the common point between the different 
laws under consideration is that, the subsequent impossibility of 
performance discharges the debtor from his obligations. The problem is 
therefore with the case where the performance has become more onerous 
only. It is at this point that two principles emerge. These are pacta sunt 
servanda and rebus sic stantibus. The latter means that the contract is 
binding as long as the situation under which it was concluded has not 
radically changed. A. Richard (in Semaine Internationale de Droit. (Paris. 1937), 
at p.206) says that it is a mistake to juxtapose these two maxims. However, 
it is thought that, it is possible to say that rebus sic stantibus means that 
the pacta sunt servandaprmciple cannot be maintained as it was initially
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conceived (ie at the time the contract is concluded) when those major changes 
occur. That is to say, another solution (other than the performance of the 
contract) should be adopted with the clausula rebus sic stantibus . This 
solution is the revision of the destabilised contract.
Many questions can be asked when dealing with this last solution. For 
example, what does the revision of a contract mean ? who will revise the 
contract ? is it the legislator or the judge ?.
It can be said that no one is against the intervention of the legislator to 
revise the destabilised contracts. The real controversy is about the 
competence of the judge for the revision of contracts. For certain 
authors, such a power should not be given to a judge, especially if it is 
done by a general stipulation in the law leaving him therefore with a total 
discretion in considering cases of hardship. For others there is no reason 
to fear his intervention. It is even said that the judge is in fact in a better 
position to consider such cases than the legislator himself.
It has previously been remarked that many authors have compared the 
English doctrine of frustration with the French concept of force majeure 
and imprevision. Some of them are quoted below.
Aubrey says that force majeure is much more limited than 
frustration.1 Later on the same author says that the strictness of force 
majeure is not so narrow as it at first sight appears.(Id) Puelinckx (at 
p.50)2 says that force majeure is narrower than frustration, and that 
frustration is closer to imprevision and the German doctrine of 
Geschaftsgrundlage.(Id) However, another author says that force majeure 
is no doubt as narrow as frustration.^ It is further opined that 
frustration is sometimes close to force majeure and sometimes to 
imprevision, but it never coincides completely with either of them.4 So
1 Michael D. Aubrey, "Frustration Reconsidered- Some Comparative Aspects" 
(1963112 International & Comparative Law Quarterly. 1165. at p. 1174.
2  Puelinckx A. H, "Frustration, Hardship, Force Majeure, Imprevision, Wegfall 
der Geschaftsgrundlage, Unmoglichkeit, Changed Circumstances. A Comparative 
Study in English, French, German and Japanese Law" (1986) 3 Journal of 
International Arbitration.47.
^ Neville Maryan Green, "Force Majeure in International Construction 
Contracts" (1985) 13 International Business Lawyer (U.K).505, at p. 505.1.
4  Henri Lesguillons, "Frustration, Force Majeure, Imprevision, Wegfall der 
Geschaftsgrundlage" (1979) 5 International Trade Law & Practice.507.. at pp.508-09.
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we see that some of the writers are of the opinion that force majeure is 
narrower than fmstration, whereas others consider fmstration to be as 
narrow as force majeure. It is interesting therefore to know which of 
these opinions are the more accurate.
Thus, since strictly speaking, the occurrence of outside events has two 
effects, viz putting the contractor in a real impossibility to perform his 
contract, or the contract is still capable of being performed, this study will 
be carried out under these two headings. The first part of this work will 
be devoted to cases of impossibility, and the second to the other instances, 
viz the possibility of performance in which the debtor or the creditor is 
claiming release (these instances are the performance having become valueless and 
onerous).
In this study we start with a general statement of principles to be bome 
in mind when dealing with the cases and instances discussed. This is 
provided in the preliminary chapter. The other chapters are a study of 
cases illustrating the application of those principles. These cases may also 
help in illustrating the development of those principles.
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PART ONE 
WHERE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT IS 
IMPOSSIBLE.
PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. GENERAL IDEAS ON FORCE 
MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION.
Before dealing with cases involving the application of frustration and 
force majeure, it is necessary to define these two terms. Then the 
conditions under which they can be claimed, and when a party is barred 
from such a claim will be determined. Having done that, it will be a 
matter of applying those ideas to the different instances of frustration and 
force majeure which will be studied in the following chapters.
It is worth noting here that this study will mainly focus on English law. 
As regards Scots law, it can generally be said that its conception of the 
doctrine of frustration, is not radically different from that of English 
law.1 However, because of the difference in sources of the two laws2, 
some cases might be decided differently under the two laws. In the course 
of this study such clear differences between them will be pointed out.
Section One. Definition of Force Majeure and Frustration.
Fmstration is the doctrine by which a contract is terminated when its 
performance through no fault of either party and for which no sufficient 
provision was made, becomes either impossible or fundamentally 
changed, as a result of certain events which the parties could not have 
reasonably contemplated at the time the contract was made. These events 
must occur after the making of the contract but before or during its 
performance.
As to force majeure A. H. Puelinckx defines it, following the 
definition given by Lord Radcliffe of the doctrine of fmstration in the
1 See also William McBryde, The Law o f Contract in Scotland (Edinburgh. W. 
Green & Son.Ltd. 1987), at pp. 343-44.
2  Scots law is said to be influenced by Roman law. See Lord Cooper, 
"Frustration of Contract in Scots Law ", Jou. Comp. Legis. 28 (1946) 3rd S. Part 3 &
4. 1, at p. 1. As regards English law see Walker R. J, The English Legal System (6 th 
ed., London Butterworths. 1985) at p. 74 (English law he says is not directly 
influenced by Roman law).
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case of Davis Contractors ([1956] A.C.696),thus:
"Force majeure occurs when the law recognises that without default of 
either party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed 
because the circumstances in which the performance is called for would render 
it impossible. I promised to do this but I cannot due to some irresistible 
unforeseeable and uncontrolable event
The expression italicised by Puelinckx replaces the English common 
test to the effect that 'performance would be radically different from that 
undertaken1.3
In addition to this it can be said that a general statement concerning 
force majeure and cas fortuit can be found in art.l 147 and art. 1148 of the 
French Civil Code. Thus art.l 147 states that:"A debtor is judged liable, the 
case arising, to the payment of damages, either by reason of the inexecution of the 
obligation or by reason of delay in the execution, at all times he does not prove that the 
inexecution came from an outside cause which cannot be imputed to him, and further 
that there was no bad faith on his part.".'!
Therefore the obstacle which may excuse the debtor's non 
performance and releases him from any liability must be "an outside 
cause", which should not be "imputed" to the debtor. The further question 
which can be asked is what does "an outside cause" mean?. This may 
partially be answered (regarding French law only5) by reference to 
art.l 148 which disposes : "No damages arise when, as a result of an [event of 
force majeure] or a fortuitous event, the debtor was prevented from giving or doing that 
for which he had obligated himself, or did what was forbidden to him.". With 
regard to art 1148 the 'outside cause' is force majeure or fortuitous
3  See A. H. Puelinckx, at p. 50.
4 See for a similar provision art. 176 Alg.C.C. It is to be noted that the 
translation of French articles into English is from. John H. Crabb, The French Civil 
Code (as amended to July 1 1976) Fred. B. Rothman & Co New Jersey. 1977 (2nd 
printing 1985). For a brief discussion of the Algerian Civil Code, see Georges Berlioz, 
"Le Code Civil Algerien de 1975 et les Contrats Intemationaux" (1978) 4 International 
Trade Law & Practice.81.
3  This is because under Algerian Civ. C, the outside event may be a case of force 
majeure or a fortuitous event, or the act of the debtor himself, or the act of a third party. 
All these are formulated in the Civil Code. See to this effect art. 138/2 & art. 127. See 
Nour-Eddine Terki, Les Obligations.Responsabilite Civile et Regime General (Algiers. 
O.P.U. 1982) at p. 179.
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event.6 However, as has been said this answer is only partial since 
force majeure or a fortuitous event can be one of the outside causes which 
release the debtor from his contractual obligation. The other causes are 
the fault of the debtor (or the defendant) and the acts of a third party .7
Since this study will be restricted to the case of force majeure and the 
fortuitous event, it is necessary to define these terms. Most contemporary 
authors, consider force majeure and the fortuitous event as 
synonymous.8 The French 'jurisprudence' [in its French sense] also does 
not differentiate between the two terms.9 Neither does the French 
'Code Civil' make such a distinction. 10 The question which remains is 
what does force majeure mean?.
No definition of force majeure is given in the Civil Code.11 As to art.
6  See Barry Nicholas, French Law o f Contract (London. Butterworths. 1982), 
at pp. 194-95.
7 See Leontin-Jean Constantinesco, Inexecution et Faute Contractuelle en Droit 
Compare (Bruxelle, W. Kohlmar Verlay. Stuttgart/Librairie Encyclopedique. 1960) at 
p. 403, and see art. 127 Alg.C.C.
8 See Leon Marre, Essai sur les Notions de Cas Fortuit et de Force Majeure . 
Etude Critique de Quelques Opinions Nouvelles (Paris. L.G.D.J. 1910), at p. 5, El 
Sanhoury, El Wassit volume. 1 (Beirut. 1951), at pp. 876-77, and El Sanhoury, El 
Moudjez.The General Theory o f Obligations (Beirut), at page 300, and Anouar 
Soltane, The Sources o f the Obligation. The General Theory o f the Obligation. A  
Comparative Study o f Egyptian and Lebanese Laws. (1983), at p. 337, and see 
Mouhy-Eddine Ismail Alam Eddine, The General Theory o f the Obligation at p. 459, 
and see Jean Quesnel, De quelques Applications de la Notion de Force Majeure en 
Temps de Guerre. 1930-1940 (Caen. 1945), at p. 1 footnote. 1.
9 See Andre Besson, "Cas Fortuit et Force Majeure dans les Accidents 
d'Automobiles", (1931) Revue Generale des Assurances Terrestres. 272, at 272, and 
see Mahmoud Djamel Eddine Zaki, The General Theory o f the Obligation (3rd ed., 
Cairo. 1978), at p. 360 and see Ahmed Salama, The Theory o f the Obligation, at p. 
296, and see Mohamed Hassanine, El Wadjiz. The General Theory o f the Obligation. 
The Sources o f an Obligation and their Effects in the Algerian Civil Law. (Algiers.
S.N.E.D. 1983), at p. 120.
^  See Weill, Droit Civil. Les Obligations (Dalloz. 1971), at p. 436, and Barry 
N. at p. 196, and Frangois Chabas, "Force Majeure" (1978) 4 Encyclopedic Dalloz. 
Repertoir de Droit Civil., at para. 3. The Algerian Civil Code too does not make such a 
distinction.
11 See Pierre Ghiho, Cours de Droit Civil Vol. 4. Les Obligations (2eme ed., 
Editions L'Hermes. 1983), at para. 640. Neither the Algerian civil code nor the 
Egyptian one did define the concept of force majeure. See Houcine Amer et Abd
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1147, it gives the conditions of force majeure, ie not to be imputed to the 
debtor. From this condition the French 'jurisprudence* deduced two 
other conditions viz, the unforeseeability of the event of force majeure 
and its irresistibility (inevitability) . 1 2  Therefore from what has been said 
above we may define force majeure as any event which has the three 
conditions stated above and which prevents the debtor from performing 
his contract (or obligations).13
Generally speaking it might be said that in principle both definitions (ie 
of force majeure and frustration) are very similar. This is true even for the 
requirement that there should be no contractual provision dealing with the 
event in question. This is because under French or Algerian laws too 
there should not be such a provision in the contract (See post force majeure 
and contractual clauses). However, this similarity in the wording of the two 
doctrines does not mean a similarity in the application or the 
consideration of the requirements put in the definition. An illustrating 
example is the condition of unforeseeability. Thus under French or 
Algerian laws, there can be, in principle, no force majeure unless the
Arrahim Amer, Delictual and Contractual Civil Liability (2nd ed., 1979), at p. 389. 
The roman jurist Ulpien defines force majeure as what cannot -in human sense- be 
foreseen, and even if foreseen cannot be resisted. Houcine Amer, op.cit at p. 391 and 
see Abd Essatar Etelili, The Conditions o f Liability o f Airline Carriers and the Causes 
o f Exoneration. (Algiers. S.N.E.D. 1976), at p. 97, and see Leon Marie, Du Cas 
Fortuit et de la Force Majeure (Caen. 1896), at p. 61 who says that this was intended, 
and see Encyclopedic (1978) "Force Majeure" at para. 4.
1 2  Henri et Leon Mazeaud & Jean Mazeaud et Francis Chabas, Legons de Droit 
Civil Tome. 2. ler Vol. Obligations Theorie Generate (7eme ed., Editions 
Montchrestien. 1985), at p. 633, and Rene Fiatte, Les Ejfets de la Force Majeure dans 
les Contrats (Paris. 1932), at p. 8 . In the Algerian Civil Code the condition of 'not to 
be imputed to the debtor' is stipulated in several articles such as arts. 127, 139, 176, 
208/2, 307. However, it can be said that the conditions of unforeseeability as well as 
of the impossibility of performance of the contract, are provided in the Code. As to the 
unforeseeability see art. 138/2 (although it concerns the delictual responsibility, but no 
reason prevents its application to contractual responsibility.). As to the impossibility of 
performance see arts. 176 and 307. See El Sanhoury, El Wassit vol. 1 at p. 878.
See Encyclopedic Dalloz "Force Majeure" (1978), at para. 1, and see P. Kahn, 
"Force Majeure et Contrats Intemationaux de Longue Duree" Friedmann Collection 
181-200, at p. 182, and see El Sanhoury, El Moudjez at p. 301, and see Abbas Helmi, 
Maritime Law. (Algiers. O.P.U. 1983), at p. 30, and see Hamdi El Ghenimi, Studies 
o f the Algerian Maritime Law (Algiers. O.P.U. 1983), at p. 93.
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event is unforeseen. Whereas under English law a contract might be 
frustrated even if the frustrating event is foreseen. See for instance the 
case of Tatem (See post).
Following these definitions, it can be said that three conditions are 
commonly required under English, Scottish, French and Algerian laws. 
Thus the event which may exonerate a debtor from his obligation must not 
be due to the fault of the debtor. It should also put him into an 
impossibility of performing his contract. The event in question should be 
unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract. But this 
condition is to be taken with some reserve as regards English law. 
However, what is noticeable is that French and Algerian laws speak only 
of impossibility of performance whereas English law speaks of 
impossibility of performance and of the fact that an obligation has become 
radically different from the one undertaken. This may suggest that 
English law is wider in its concept of release from a contractual obligation 
than French law.
Section Two. Conditions of Force Maieure and Frustration.
Having given a definition of the two concepts, in what follows, we will 
focus on each condition as stated in the definition (ie non imputability, 
unforeseeability and impossibility of performance), and try to make a comparison 
between English law on one hand and French and Algerian laws on the 
other.
In this respect it is of interest to note that under Quebec law -its Code 
Civil is based on the French Civil Code 14- in order that a debtor can claim 
exoneration from his obligation, the event hindering his performance 
should be irresistible (insurmountable), unforeseeable, not imputable and 
the performance of the contract must have become impossible.15 The 
fact that the performance has become onerous is no plea for a release.
!4 See Wasserman G, "Impossibility of Performance in the Civil Law of Quebec" 
(1952) 12 Revue du Barreau de la Province du Ouebec.366. at p. 366
G. Wasserman pp. 370 & 379, and Claude Fabien et Ejan Mackaay, "Le Droit 
Civil aux Prises avec l'lnflation" (1983) 28 Me Gill Law Journal.284. p. 317, and 
Maurice Tancelin, Des Obligations. Contrat et Responsabilite (4eme ed., Montreal, 
Wilson & Lafleur Ltee. 1988), pp. 364-65.
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Thus article 1072 of the new Quebec Civil Code 1988-89 states that:"The 
debtor is not liable to pay damages when inexecution of the obligation is caused by a 
fortuitous event, or by irresistible force, without any fault on his part, unless he has 
obliged himself thereunto by the special terms of the contract. " . 16 Thus Quebec 
law is not different from French law.
Under Louisiana Civil Code too, the debtor who is prevented from 
performing his contract will not be held liable if the frustrating event, 
which should be unforeseeable and irresistible, puts him in a real 
impossibility of performance17, and not merely that his obligation has 
become more difficult or more onerous (S. Litvinoff p. 2, and Tul L.Rev pp. 
609-10). Another condition is that the debtor must not be at fault in the 
happening of the event in question (Tul.L.Rev p. 607). Louisiana law 
therefore -which is also influenced by the French Civil Code- is not different 
from French and Quebec laws.
Swiss law -see article 119 Code of Obligations- requires an impossibility of 
performance not imputable to the debtor, in order that he can be 
discharged from his obligations.18
German law is not different from the previous laws. Thus the debtor 
will be discharged from his obligation where the performance of the 
contract is rendered impossible due to supervening events not related to 
his fault.19
^  See Edward Veitch, 'Comments1 (1976) 54 Canadian Bar Review. 161. at p. 
163.
17 Saul Litvinoff, "Force Majeure, Failure of Cause and Theorie de l'lmprevision 
: Louisiana Law And Beyond" (1985) 46 Louisiana Law Review. 1. at p. 1, and Martin 
Hunley, "Supervening Impossibility as a Discharge of an Obligation" (1946-47) 21 
Tulane Law Review.603. at p. 607.
See Pierre Van Ommeslaghe, "Les Clauses de Force Majeure et d'Imprevision 
(Hardship) dans les Contrats intemationaux" (1980) 57 Revue de Droit International et 
de Droit Compare.7. at p. 33, and Dessemontet F. & Ansay T., Introduction to Swiss 
Law (Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers. 1983), at p. 113.
1 9  See Henri Lesguillons, at p. 523, and Cohn E. J, "Frustration of Contract in 
German Law" (1946) 28 3rd.S. Parts 3 & 4 Journal of Comparative Legislation & 
International Law. 15. at p. 15, Norbert Horn, "Change in Circumstances And the 
Revision of Contracts in Some European Law and in International Law" (1985) 3 
Studies In Transnational Economic Law (Netherlands!. 15-29. at p. 18, 'Comments' 
"Commercial Frustration: A Comparative Study" (1967) 3 Texas International Law 
Forum.275. at p. 293, Rene Rodiere & Denis Tallon, Les Modifications du Contrat au 
Cours de son Execution en raison de Circonstances Nouvelles (Paris, Ed. Pedone.
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As to the United States law, the English rule as formulated in the case 
of Paradine V. Jane (infra), that is the impossibility of performance 
cannot discharge the debtor from his contractual obligations, was at first 
adopted by American courts.20 This rule however, was mitigated in the 
English case of Taylor V. Caldwell (infra), American courts too followed 
this authority (Berman p. 33, and Texas p. 278). Generally speaking it can be 
said that the American doctrine of impossibility of performance is similar 
to that of the English one.21
§.1. The Event Must Not be Imputable to the Debtor.
This means that the debtor should not provoke the event of force 
majeure22 or be at fault, whether previous or subsequent to the event of 
force majeure, otherwise there will be no case of force majeure, which 
means he would not be exonerated, (even partially if speaking of French law as 
will be seen later on). More generally this means that the debtor should not 
have any connection with the event of force majeure which hinders his 
performance of the contract.23
1986), p. 123, P. V. Ommeslaghe pp. 21 & 22, Ernest J. Shuster, The Principles o f 
German Civil Law (London, Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 1907), at p. 168, and 
Puelinckx A. H., at p. 59.
2 0  See Harold J. Berman, "Non-Performance and Force Majeure in International 
Trade Contracts" In. International Association of Legal Science Conference in Helsinki 
1960. Some Problems of Non-Performance and Force Majeure in International 
Contracts of Sale. Helsinki 1961. n:2 (1961).31, at p. 33, and Texas p. 278.
2 1  John J. Gorman, "Commercial Hardship and the Discharge of Contractual 
Obligations under American and British Law" (1980) 13 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law. 107. at p. 108 footnote. 6 . For a detailed study of the American 
doctrine of impossibility and frustration, see John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, 
The Law Of Contracts (2nd ed. West Publishing Co. 1977), and Ronald A. Anderson 
& Ivan Fox & David P. Twomey, Business Law U.C.C Comprehensive Volume. 
(Revised Edition. South-Western Publishing Co. 1987).
2 2  Henri Mazeaud & Francois Chabas, Exercises Pratiques de Droit Civil Tome. 
2 Obligations. Droit Reels Principaux (Editions Montchrestien. 1986), at p. 102, and
see Gerard Thery, De la Notion d'Exteriorite dans la Force Majeure et dans la 
Responsabilite (Lille. 1948), at p. 47. It is for this reason that the bankruptcy of the 
debtor which prevents him from performing his contract, cannot be considered as a 
case of force majeure, since it is not an outside cause. See Pierre Dupont Delestraint, 
Droit Civil. Les Obligations (lOeme ed., Dalloz. 1986), at p. 105.
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Thus for example if some goods were stolen in a railway station, by the 
enemy, and this was due to the delay of the company running the carriage 
by rail, this company could not ask for exoneration, since it was its fault 
which facilitated that theft.24
Though we are speaking of French and Algerian laws, it seems that 
English and Scots laws are not different in this respect from what has been 
said. Thus it is well established under English law25 that where 
fmstration is caused by one's own default or by those who are under his 
responsibility, one cannot claim frustration in order to be released from 
his obligation.26
The leading case in this connection under English law is, Maritime 
National Fish. Ltd v. Ocean Trawlers. Ltd.27 The charterers in this case,
23 See for e.g. arts .1302/1, 1881, 1882 Fr.c.c., and art. 544/2 Alg.c.c. Jean 
Radouant, Du Cas Fortuit et de la Force Majeure (Paris. 1920) at pp. 186-87, and see 
Rene Fiatte at p. 91, and Edouard Bourgoing, Essai sur la Distinction du Cas Fortuit et 
de la Force Majeure (Lyon. 1902), at pp. 92-93, and see art. 1807 Fr.c.c., Jean 
Carbonnier, Droit Civil. 4/ Les Obligations (6eme ed., P.U.F. 1969), at p. 244, Leon 
Marre, op.cit. at pp. 23- 24.
2 4  See Carbonnier, op.cit (1969), id, and see Mahmoud Djamel Eddine Zaki,
op.cit at p. 367. For an example of a fault subsequent to an event of force majeure see: 
Gerard Thery at p. 102.
2 6  For Scots law see Gloag w .  rq , Introduction to the Law o f Scotland 
(9th ed., Edinburgh. W. Green & Son.Ltd. 1987), at para. 11.2 & 11.17, and see 
McBryde, The Law o f Contract op.cit. at p. 352.
2 6  Under English law a contracting party is also precluded from alleging 
frustration, if his own breach was one of the factor among others which caused 
frustration . Or that frustration occurred by his own breach and the other party's 
breach. See Treitel G. H, The Law o f Contract (6 th ed., London, Stevens & Sons. 
1983), at 682. Cf what Treitel says with "partial exoneration under French law" infra. 
(The French case (concerning theft) cited in p. 11 above might be decided similarly 
under English law.). As to the question whether a sentence of imprisonment imposed 
on an employee, constitutes self-induced frustration or not, some authors took the 
second view see Chitty, On Contracts Vol. 1. General Principles (24th ed., London, 
Sweet & Maxwell. 1977), at 1447. Whereas others took the first view, and said that, 
to say an imprisonment for a criminal offense frustrates the contract, is inconsistent 
with that frustration must not be self-induced. Thus an employer can for example plead 
frustration in an action brought by his employee for unfair dismissal. But the employee 
is barred from claiming frustration relying on his imprisonment. See Treitel G. H, The 
Law o f Contract (7th ed., London, Stevens & Sons. 1987), at p. 700. As regards 
French law, as we will see, imprisonment is considered as involving the fault of the 
debtor and therefore cannot constitute a case of force majeure.
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chartered a steam trawler called the St Cuthbert which was "fitted with an 
otter trawl" . 2 8  Both parties to the contract when entering into the contract 
knew that it was prohibited under Canadian law "to fish with a vessel that 
uses an otter or other similar trawl for catching fish"2^, unless under a licence. 
The charterers operated four otter trawlers in addition to the St Cuthbert. 
When they asked for the licences, they were granted only three. They 
were therefore asked to name the ships for which the licences would be 
granted. The charterers did not name the St Cuthbert within the named 
ships. Then they alleged that, the charter of the St Cuthbert was 
frustrated and that, they were not liable to pay the hire due.
The Privy Council held that, the contract was not frustrated, since the 
charterers were at fault, because they had elected the St Cuthbert not to be 
licenced to fish with an otter trawl.30 Hence a party cannot rely on a 
self-induced frustration. (The National V. Trawlers case at 530.)
It is to be noted that in the National V. Trawlers case, the defendants 
owned three vessels and chartered the St Cuthbert and the other vessel. 
However, if charterers charter two trawlers and only one licence is 
granted to them, would the act of naming one of the two trawlers, be 
considered as an ’election’ as defined in this case?. If it is considered as
2 2  [1935] A.C.524, and see Mertens V. Home Freeholds Co [1921] 2 K.B.526,
(a licence was to be obtained in order that further work could be allowed. The licence
was refused and the builder was held liable because he deliberately (ie his fault
involved) delayed his work which prevented him from getting the licence.). Cited in 
Roy Glanville Me Elroy & Glanville L. Williams, Impossibility o f Performance. A 
Treatise on the Law of Supervening Impossibility o f Performance o f Contract, Failure 
o f Consideration, and Frustration (Cambridge, At The University Press. 1941), at 36.
See also the case of Ocean Tramp Tankers Co V. V/O Sovracht The Eugenia [1964] 2 
Q. B. 226, (a clause in the contract of charterparty states that the charterers should not 
enter into a dangerous zone. The charterers breached it and entered into that zone. The 
ship was trapped as a consequence of this in the Suez Canal. It was held that the 
charterers could not rely on the frustration of their contract since this was self-induced. 
See the speech of Lord Denning at p. 237. See also David M. Walker, Vol 2. 
Principles o f Scottish Private Law (3rd ed. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1983), at p.
136.
2 8  Anson's, Law o f Contract (25th ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1979), at p. 
512.
29 The National V. Trawlers case, per Lord Wright at p. 526.
3 0  The National V. Trawlers case at p. 529.
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such then they cannot claim frustration of the contract of the trawler they 
did not name. Treitel rightly points out that in such a case the charterers 
having elected one of the trawlers could plead frustration for the second 
which cannot be licenced, and there would be no self-induced frustration 
as in the National V. Trawlers case. (See Treitel (1983), at 683). Whereas if it 
is supposed that a person owns a vessel and charters another one, but is 
granted one licence only, if he names his own vessel for the licence 
granted, he cannot claim -relying on the National V. Trawlers case- 
frustration for the chartered one; since it is his election. In other words it 
is a self induced frustration.
The question of election may also be involved in the case where there is 
a contract of sale. Suppose that a seller entered into two contracts, to 
deliver 1000 tons of sugar to (A) and 1000 tons to (B). A subsequent 
restriction on export prevented him from performing his two contracts in 
full, since 1000 tons only was allowed. Therefore if he elected to perform 
one of the two contracts, one may say that he cannot claim frustration for 
the unfulfilled one, because it was his own election, and this is the rule in 
the National V. Trawlers (see supra).31
Schmitthoff (Helsinki., p. 141), says that there would be no difference in 
the solution already given if the seller has divided that 1000 tons between 
the two buyers (ie 500 tons, each). But it is thought that even relying on the 
National V. Trawlers case, the seller would not be liable for such an act. 
Because in the National V. Trawlers case the defendants had a certain 
election by which they could avoid the breach of their contract, whereas 
in the above example, there is no such choice; since in both possibilities (ie 
to divide the quantity or to perform one contract in full) there would be a breach of 
the contract.
But now the solution to such a hypothetical example is provided in the 
case of Intertradax S.A.V. Lesieur-Tourteaux s.a.r.l.d 19781 2 Lloyd's 
Rep.509.). There it is stated that where one party enters into several 
contracts, and subsequently, without being aware that he would be 
prevented from performing them all, he is so prevented, then he can rely 
on the frustration of those not performed. The only requirement is that 
he has to act in a "fair and reasonable" manner.32
31 Schmitthoff C. M, Helsinki Conference, at p. 141.
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The question which was left open until it comes directly in issue'33 is, as 
stated by Lord Russel of Killowen, in the Joseph Constantine case ([1942] 
A.C 154, at 179.), where he said :
"No question arises on this appeal as to the kind or degree of fault or default 
of the contractor which will debar him from relying on the frustration. The 
possible varieties [of fault3^] are infinite, and can range from the criminality of 
the scutter who opens the sea cocks and sinks his ship, to the prima donna who 
sits in a draught and loses her voice..."
So it was left open whether negligence only or a more deliberate act 
was required to constitute self-induced frustration.35
32 To this effect Lord Denning in the Intertradax case at p. 513, referred to the 
speech of Donaldson J (court of first instance) where he said:"...If the seller 
appropriated the goods in a way which the trade would consider to be proper and 
reasonable -whether the basis of appropriation is pro rata, chronological order of 
contracts or some other basis- the effective cause is not the seller’s appropriation, but 
whatever caused the shortage". See Schmitthoff C. M, Export Trade The Law and 
Practice o f International Trade (8th ed., London, Stevens & Sons. 1986), at pp. 160- 
61. It is to be noted that no moral commitments are to be taken into account when 
making such appropriation.CPancommerce S.A. V. Veecheema B.V. [1983] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep.304, 307) ibid at 161, and see David Green, "Force Majeure Clauses and 
International Sale of Goods-Comparative Guidelines for the Common Lawyer" (1980) 
8 Australian Law Review.369. at p. 375.
33 Per Lord Porter in Joseph Constantine [1942] A.C.154., at p. 206.
34 Cheshire Fifoot & Fumuston , Law o f Contract (11th ed., London, 
Butterworths. 1986), at p. 565. As to the question of onus of proof of frustration it 
can be said that under French and Algerian laws, it is the debtor who alleges that he is 
released by force majeure to prove force majeure. See art. 1315/2 Fr.c.c, and Henri De 
Page, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil Beige Tome. 2 (3eme ed., Bruxelle. 1964), at 
p. 602. English law is not different. However, the onus of proof of default (ie the 
frustration was self-induced) is not on the party alleging frustration, but on the party 
who denies the existence of frustration.(Joseph Constantine [1942] A.C.154., and see 
Chitty, On Contracts Vol. 1. (24th ed., 1977), at para. 1446.
35 Fifoot ibid. However, it has been suggested that 'fault' includes "deliberate act 
and negligent destruction or damage to property without which the contract cannot be 
performed.". See Atiyah P. S, An Introduction to the Law o f Contract (3rd ed., 
Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1981), at p. 206, and see Christine Mogridge, "Frustration, 
Employment Contracts And Statutory Rights" (1982) 132.2 New Law Joumal.795. at 
pp. 796-97. The question which might be worth asking is whether illness caused by 
one's own carelessness can amount to frustration?. Viscount Simon in the Joseph
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As to French law , when the fault of the debtor prevents him from 
claiming an event of force majeure, that fault should have some influence 
on the damage caused. This explains why in the case where a debtor 
having borrowed something, is ’mis en demeure' (which means to ask the 
debtor in a legal form, to perform his contract at the agreed t i m e ) 36 to restore it, 
but does n o t, and the thing perishes, he will not be liable for such loss if 
he can prove that that thing would have perished even if it had been 
delivered in time to the creditor.(See art. 1302/2 French C.C and art. 168/2 
Alg.C.C).37 This proves therefore that the debtor has nothing to do with 
the destruction of the thing borrowed.
Another case is worth discussing. This is C. Czamikow Ltd v. Centrala 
Zagranicznego " R o lim p ex " .3** Rolimpex a Polish state trading company, 
entered into a contract with an English company (Czamikow), by which 
Rolimpex should export 200,000 tons of sugar to Czamikow. The 
making of the contract by Rolimpex was authorised by the Polish 
authorities, because the production of sugar in that year, was estimated to 
be over domestic needs. However, the production failed owing to a 
natural event. Because the remaining product could not suffice the 
domestic needs in full, the government of Poland issued a regulation 
prohibiting export of sugar. Rolimpex was therefore unable to fulfill its
Constantine case [1942] A.C 154, said at p. 166, that:"Some day it may have to be 
finally determined whether a prima donna is excused by complete loss of voice from 
an executory contract to sing if it is proved that her condition was caused by her 
carelessness in not changing her wet clothes after being out in the rain...provided, of 
course, that it has not been deliberately induced in order to get out of the engagement.". 
Cited in F. C. Sphepherd & Co Ltd V. Jerrom [1986] 3 A11.E.R.589, pgr Lawton LJ at 
p. 596.
Atiyah on his part suggests that in "view of the way in which courts treat negligence 
as something almost akin to a breach of the moral code, it would not be surprising if 
they were to deny that a contract was frustrated in such circumstances. But it is very 
doubtful if this would be a useful or desirable result from the point of view of social 
policy." An Introduction., at p. 206.
36 For more explanation of this see Carbonnier (1969), at pp. 251 et seq.
37 Radouant at pp. 189-90.
38 [1978] 1 A11.E.R.81. Although this case was cited in Schmitthoff, Export 
Trade (1986), at p. 153 as an illustration of the question of licences, it can in fact be 
related to self-induced frustration. In this case there was a clause dealing with the event 
in issue, ie 'government intervention', but it is possible to deduce that the contract 
would be frustrated in the case where there is no such clause at all.
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obligation, therefore it claimed to be released relying on the force 
majeure clause, which reads that:
"Should delivery in whole or in part.., be prevented or delayed..by
government intervention bevond the seller's control...,the contract shall be
void..without penalty payable or receivable."(Per Lord Denning M.R at p. 88)
Before the court of Appeal, one of the questions dealt with was 
whether Rolimpex could be treated as a separate body from the 
government, and not as a department of it. Because, if it was proved that 
it was a department of the government, then Rolimpex could not rely on 
the force majeure clause, where it was stated "government intervention". 
Because it "cannot rely on a self-induced 'intervention' any more than it could rely on 
a self-induced frustration..." (Lord Denning id.)
But it was found in this case that:
"As a matter of Polish law Rolimpex is treated separately from the Polish 
state and government of Poland for the purpose of considering whether an act
of the government of Poland constitutes force majeure.".(Lord Denning p. 90.)
Therefore Rolimpex was not liable for its non performance.
Under French law a similar question was raised in two cases viz, 
Greard V. Cie Air France (lere espece) and Cie Air France V. Tremoulet 
(2eme espece) (Ch. Soc. April 15th. 1970. 2 arrets. D. 1971.107 C. Cass). A 
contract was concluded in 1958, and approved by the government, 
between Air France and its employees (the air-crew). It was agreed that the 
employees would benefit from any advantage given to the personnel 
working on land. In 1963 an indemnity called "de rattrapage" was given 
to the personnel working on land, whereas the personnel of navigation 
was refused that indemnity from the A.F and this following an order 
issued by the government deciding not to grant that indemnity to them. 
Five years later the personnel of navigation brought an action against the 
decisions issued by the government, which were abrogated. A.F was 
therefore obliged to pay that indemnity to the personnel of navigation. 
What was further required by Gerard & Tremoulet was the damage for
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the late payment of the indemnity. This is called under French law 
'dommages-interets moratoires'.
A.F claimed force majeure. That is to say the late payment was due to 
the government and that its decision was insurmountable and therefore it 
was not liable for those damages resulting from the late payment.
In the two decisions of the Court of Cassation, it was held that the 
condition of an event not imputable to the debtor making the performance 
of the contract impossible, was not met in this case. This is because A.F 
was considered to be the state itself. Even the conditions of 
unforeseeability of the decisions issued by the government, and the 
condition of being insurmountable were not met. It was indeed established 
that A.F did not take any measure such as to make those decisions void. 
What it did in fact was to follow the order of the government (ie not to pay 
the indemnity). However, in two subsequent^ cases decided in 1980 
(EPF V.Soc.Anon.Gaillon.Lvon.Nov 8th.1979JD.1980.IR.441, and June.4th.J.
C.P. 19411. Concl. P. Besnard), a strike of the employees of EDF (which is a 
public enterprise) which was declared because of certain decisions taken 
by the government, was held to constitute force majeure for EDF, for its 
non performance of the contract it concluded (see these cases infra under 
"strike"). In another subsequent case viz Ste Boulonneries (see infra under 
"strike") decided in 1984 by the Court of Cassation, it was held that EDF 
was exonerated from liability for non performance, although the 
frustrating event (strike) was a result of certain decisions taken by the 
government. As to the conclusion which can be inferred from what has 
been discussed above and concerning the possibility of exoneration of a 
public enterprise, because of unforeseeable measure taken by the 
government, it might be said that French courts do not pay attention to the 
fact that a public enterprise -in cases of strike- might be argued to be the 
state itself. Therefore, a case like Rolimpex may probably be regarded as
39 in fact even in the case of Bouvier V. E.D.K decided in 1963, the court did not 
base its decision on the fact that EDF was to be considered as the state itself, but it 
based it on the condition of unforeseeability which was not met. Similarly in the case 
of Ste Anon-Musee Grevin V. E.D.F (C.Cass) 1968, EDF was exonerated on the 
ground of the unforeseeability of the strike although this was due to the government. 
No question was raised about the possibility of considering EDF as the government. 
(Both cases are cited under ’Strike' infra).
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one involving a case of force majeure without reference to the nature of 
Rolimpex.
But generally speaking English, French and Algerian laws regard 
imputability as a limitation to the doctrine of frustration and force 
majeure.
Under Algerian law a question like the one involved in the Rolimpex 
case has not -as far as we know- been raised. Under Egyptian law, and in 
the context of the doctrine of imprevision, El Fazary40 is of the opinion 
that where a state company concludes a contract, but the performance of 
the contract is rendered onerous for that company, because of passing of a 
law in order to decide whether that company can claim the revision of its 
contract or not, one should distinguish between two situations. If the 
company is administratively and financially separate from the 
government, then it is entitled to claim the revision of its contract, 
otherwise -and this is the second situation- it should be barred from using 
this right. This seems to be not fundamentally different from English law.
§.2. The Event Must be Unforeseeable.41
Under French and Algerian laws the event must be unforeseen at the 
time the contract is concluded 42 Because if the event was foreseen at that 
time, the debtor would have to do all that is possible in order to perform 
his contract and to take more precautions to this end. Or at least he should 
have refused to make that contract.4  ^It is even possible to say that the
40 Hassbou El Fazary, The Effects o f Changed Circumstances on Contractual 
Obligations in Comparative law (Alexandria. 1979), at p. 325.
44 Hamed Zaki, said :"...il faut dire qu'il n’ y1 a pas d'evenement qui echappe par 
sa nature, a toute prevision humaine..". Hamed Zaki, Ulmprevision en Droit Anglais 
Etude de Droit Anglais (Paris. 1930), at p. 226.
42 See Mahmoud Djamel Eddine Zaki, op.cit at p. 363. Under American law too 
the frustrating event must be unforeseen otherwise the one who invokes impossibility 
would be considered as having taken the risk of its happening. See Texas., at pp. 279 
& 283, and Berman at p. 36, and Richard W. Duesenberg, "Contractual 
Impracticability : Courts begin to Shape §.2-615" (1977) 32 Business Lawyer. 1089, at 
p. 1095.
42 See Carbonnier (1969), at p. 243. Therefore the debtor who makes a contract 
and knows from the beginning that he will be prevented from performing his contract, 
would be at fault in entering that contract. See Alain Benabent, Droit Civil. Les
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debtor should have stipulated what should be done in the case of an event 
of force majeure. In the absence of such precautions and since the event 
was foreseen the debtor will be considered as having taken the risk of that 
non performance. This is so even if it is said that the bearing of the risk of 
force majeure (speaking of French law) is not presumed; because this is true 
in the case where the debtor has not foreseen the event in question.44
Under English law the weight of the foreseeability of an event 
regarding the release of a debtor, is not very clear. For example in Davis
Obligations (Montchrestien. 1987), at para. 251, and see Ali Bencheneb, Theorie 
Generale du Contrat (2nd ed., Algiers. O.P.U. 1982), at p. 107, and see El Sanhoury, 
El Wassit vol. 1 at p. 878, and Mahmoud Djamel Eddine Zaki, op.cit at p. 362.
The same solution is also held under English law. Thus where one party only was 
aware of the contingency, and did not disclose it to the other party, there the contract 
will not be frustrated if claimed by the former. The illustrative case of that is Walton 
Harvey. Ltd v. Walker And Homfravs. Ltd [1931] 1 Ch.274, where the defendants let 
a hotel in order that the plaintiffs could "fix or exhibit" (per Lord Hamworth M.R at 
277) "electrical illuminated advertisements" (id at p. 274). Subsequently the local 
authority under statutory power acquired the hotel and demolished it. When being sued 
for damages, the defendants claimed their non-liability relying on that event on which 
they had no control. Lord Hamworth M.R (at 280) made the point that the defendants 
were aware of that contingency and they could provide for it, but they did not, so they 
were bound by their contract. Therefore they were liable to pay damages to the 
plaintiffs. See also Wade H. W. R, "The Principle of Impossibility in Contract" (1940) 
56 Law Quarterly Review.519. at pp. 534-35.
Moreover, under English law where the contract is a speculative one, even if the 
change in the circumstances which brought change in the obligation is unforeseen this 
cannot frustrate the contract. An example is given in the case of Larrinaga And Co. Ltd
V. Societe Franco-Americaine Des Phosphate De Medula Paris (39 T.L.R.316), in this 
case shipowners undertook to provide steamships in order to carry cargoes for the 
charterers. Owing to the first world war, charterers did not ask the owners for the 
ships. After the war was over, and being asked to perform the contract, the owner 
claimed that "the war and its incidents" (per Viscount Finlay at p. 318.1) put an end to 
the contract. It was held that the contract was not frustrated, because:
"the charteiparty was a speculative [one] and both parties took the risk that different 
conditions might prevail when the charterparty came to be performed...". Id This 
means that since the contract was a speculative one it "negatives any presumption of the 
parties' implied agreement to terminate the contract in the event of some unforeseen 
events...". See Arnold D. McNair, "Frustration of Contract by War" (1940) 56 Law 
Quarterly Review. 173. at p. 186, and see Thiis And Others V. Bvers (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 
244.
44 Cf USA law footnote.42 supra. For English law see p. 20.
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Contractors etc ([1956] A.C. 696,731.), it was said that:
"Two things seem to me to prevent the application of the principle of 
frustration to this case. One is that the cause of the delay was not any new state 
of things which the parties could not reasonably be thought to have foreseen.
On the contrary, the possibility of enough labor and materials not being 
available was before their eyes and could have been made the subject of special 
contractual stipulation. It was not made so."(Per Pearson J in Sidermar [1961]
2 Q.B.278 at 303.)
Hannel J in Bailv V. De Crespignv46 said that:
"Where the event is of such a character that it cannot reasonably be in the 
contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract was made, they will 
not be held bound by general words which, though large enough to include, 
were not used with reference to the possibility of the particular contingency 
which afterwards happens.".
Thus it might be inferred from the fact that, an event was foreseen or 
foreseeable at the time the contract was made, that parties to the contract 
took the risk of its happening. Therefore they cannot claim to be released 
from their obligation to perform the contract.46
In the Scottish Navigation 47 A.T.Lawrence said :
"No such condition should be implied to hold that reasonable man could 
have contemplated the circumstances as they exist and yet have entered into the
bargain expressed in the document."4**
46 (1869) L.R.4 Q.B.180, at p. 185, and see Denmark Productions Ltd V. 
Boscopel Productions Ltd [1969] 1 Q.B.699, at p. 725 p£i Salmon L.J, and see 
Chandler V. Webster [1904] 1 K.B.493, and Cricklewood [1945] A.C.221.
46 Treitel (1983), at p. 679. This is also the case under USA law, see supra.
4^ [1917] 1 K. B. 222. 249., approved in the Bank Line case [1919] A.C.435, 
466.
4** The fact that foreseen events preclude frustration from being applied, can be 
inferred a contrario from a number of cases: Chandler [1904] 1 K.B. 493, per Romer 
L.J. at p. 501, Cricklewood [1945] A.C. 221, 228., cited by Streatfield J. in Morgan 
V. Manser [1948] 1 K.B. 184, at 188-89, and see the speech of Lord Brandon in Paal 
Wilson & Co. A/S V. Blumenthal [1983] 1 A.C.854, at 909., cited by McBryde, The 
Law o f Contract (1987), at p. 345. See also F. C. Sphepherd & Co Ltd V. Jerrom 
[1986] 3 All.E.R 589 (C.A) where Lawton LJ, speaking of the frustrating event
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However, a totally different conclusion was reached in the case of 
W.J.Tatem.Ltd v. Gamboa ([1939] 1 K.B.132.) In this case, although the 
risk that the ship may be seized was foreseen, nevertheless it was held that, 
the contract was frustrated. Goddard J said:
"...if the true foundation of the doctrine [of frustration] is that once the 
subject-matter of the contract is destroyed, or the existence of a certain state of 
facts has come to an end, the contract is at an end, that result follows whether or 
not the event causing it was contemplated by the p arties. "49
In this respect it is interesting to note that in one French case an actress, 
made a contract to play in a theatre during her holiday knowing that her 
holiday (conge) might be revoked and therefore she might be in the 
impossibility to perform the contract she made (ie to play). Such 
revocation did happen in fact, but the court decided that the revocation 
constituted a case of force majeure and that she was exonerated from her 
performance and was not liable for such non performance. (See G. Thery p. 
78) But this should not induce one to say that even under French law the 
condition of unforeseeability is not very clear. This is because it is an 
established rule under French and Algerian laws that unforeseeability is a 
condition of force majeure.
Having discussed the question whether unforeseeability is a required 
condition under English, French and Algerian laws, it is of importance to 
know how this condition is considered. It can be said that the test used in 
deciding whether there is unforeseeability or not is that ’'the event must be
involved in this case (viz imprisonment), said at p. 595 para, b., that the event was 
neither foreseen nor provided for in the contract at the time the contract was concluded. 
This may suggest that he considers unforeseeability as a condition of frustration.
However, it is always possible that the inference that where an event is foreseen, 
parties took the risk of its happening, can be rebutted by proving the contrary intention. 
See Treitel (1983), at p. 681.
49 Tatem V. Gamboa at p. 38., and see Treitel (1987), p. 697. See also Me 
Elroy, op.cit at p. 246, the same writer says that even in Tavlor V. Caldwell the 
decision would not have been changed if the plaintiff showed that the defendant had 
insured against fire, which in other words means that the destruction of the premises 
was foreseen. This is in fact a mere probability. Whereas foreseeability means 
whether there has been any fact which may induce saying that the frustrating event 
would happen. See for this test Mazeaud, Legons (1985), at para. 576, p. 633.
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one which any person of ordinary intelligence would regard as likely to o c c u r." .50 
Under French law it is similarly required that we have to see whether an 
ordinary person in the place of the debtor could have foreseen the event in 
question, or not.5* (ie a consideration in abstracto). The consideration in  
a b s tra c to  of the condition of unforeseeability means that we will not 
concern ourselves with the question whether the debtor himself has not 
foreseen the event, rather we have to see whether he should have foreseen 
that event or not.52 It is further required under French law that there 
must be an absolute unforeseeability, that is the event has to be 
unforeseeable for any one and not only with regard to the debtor.
But it is not necessary, for an event of force majeure to have never 
happened, to be considered as unforeseen. Therefore it would be 
sufficient if at the time the contract was concluded, there was no reason to 
believe that that event would happen.53 The criteria used is therefore 
objective, such as whether the event is rare or frequent in its 
happening.54 Furthermore, the unforeseeability should be appreciated in 
a reasonable manner (notice that English courts too use the word 'reasonable' p. 21
50 Treitel (1983), at p. 680. Which in other words means the 'reasonable man 
test'. See the Davis Contractors case... [1917] 1 K.B.222, 249, approved in the Bank 
Line case (see supra), and see the Bailv case...(1869) L.R. 4 Q.B.180, per Hannen J at 
p. 185.
51 Mazeaud, Legons (1985), at p. 633. For Algerian law see art. 138/2 Civ.C.
52 See Mazeaud, Legons (1985), at p. 633, and see Gabriel Marty & Pierre 
Raynaud, Droit Civil Tome 2. ler Vol. Les Obligations (Sirey. 1962), at p. 530, and 
Mahmoud Djamel Eddine Zaki, op.cit at p. 361, and Anouar Soltane, op.cit at p. 337, 
and Mouhye Eddine Ismail Alem Eddine, op.cit at p. 459. Where the creditor did have 
an idea about the event which prevented the debtor from performing his contract, but 
such an idea was vague or a pure hypothesis, in such a case he would not be prevented 
from claiming the performance of the contract by the debtor. Or to ask for damages in 
case of non performance, if the event in question was not considered a case of force 
majeure. See G. Thery at p. 79.(Implicitly this means that there should be a certainty in 
the happening of the event.), and Jean Quesnel, op.cit at p. 14 ("la possibilite de la 
realisation d'un evenement qui peut passer a l'esprit, n'enleve pas a cet evenement son 
caractere de force majeure s'il se realise vraiment". Quesnel referred to a case decided 
by the Court of Cassation in 1842).
55 Mazeaud, Lemons (1985), p. 633, and see El Sanhoury, El Wassitwol. 1. at p. 
878.
54 Radouant at p. 153, reference to cases are cited there.
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supra). Because as an abstract notion it can be said that any event is 
foreseeable.55 What Hamed Zaki says (supra footnote. 41) might be 
regarded as an adherence to this abstract view. It is for this reason that the 
French jurisprudence uses the word "normally1', ie an event which is 
normally unforeseeable.56 In order that an event can be considered as 
normally unforeseeable, it should be appreciated in abstracto, ie by the 
diligent man etc.(Borris Stark (1985), at p. 261)57
What should be noted is that A. Vialard in commenting on art. 138/2 
Alg.C.C, in which the word 'normally' was used, deduces that this article 
has revolutionised the French traditional concept of force majeure. That 
is to say the requirement of an absolute unforeseeability.58 Another 
author criticises the deduction of A. Vialard. He suggests that 'normally' 
means that the test in considering the unforeseeability is subjective and not 
objective.(Ali Bencheneb, Theorie Generale du Contrat (1982), at pp. 106-07). 
What can be said is that the use of the word 'normally' does not appear in 
the arabic version of that article, and it is known that 'Arabic' is the 
official version. Apart from this it is not correct to say that the use of the 
word 'normally' has revolutionised the French traditional concept of 
force majeure; since -as has been said above- the French jurisprudence 
used that word before. This would mean that it is not a new word. On the
55 Alex Weill & Francois Terre, Droit Civil. Les Obligations (4eme ed. Dalloz. 
1986), at p. 432.
56 See Veuve Jolv V. Grimault Civ.2eme.june 29.1966.D. 1966.645. Boris 
Starck, Droit Civil. IResponsabilite Delictuelle (2eme ed., Paris, Librairie Technique. 
1985), at p. 260
57 The standard of foreseeability is as has been well expressed "... halfway 
between the inveterate pessimist who foresees all sorts of disasters and the resolute 
optimist who never anticipates the least misfortune.". See Bianca C. M. & Bonell M. J. 
(et al), Commentary On The International Sales Law. The 1980 Vienna Sales 
Convention (Giuffre. Milan. 1987), at pp. 580-81. For a recent case where the term 
'normally unforeseeable' was used see: Svndicat etc V. Soc.Maurice etc Cass. Civ. 
3eme.Oct 10th.l972.D. 1973.378. See Guy Raymond & Pierre Billard, Droit Civil. 
Concours des Fonctions Publiques (Paris, Librairie Technique. 1986), at para. 353. 
But the notion of 'normally unforeseeable' is not recent. For examples of its use see 
Fiatte (1932^ at p. 9. See also Neville Maryan Green (1985) op.cit. at p. 505 col. 2.
58 See Antoine Vialard, Droit Civil Algerien. La Responsabilite Civile Delictuelle 
(2nd. ed., Algiers. O. P. U. 1986), atpp. 149-50. This idea was previously suggested 
by the same author in Revue Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques.f19791 at p. 290.
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other hand, saying that ’normally1 means a subjective test, does not appear 
to be true. Either French authors as well as jurisprudence and arab 
authors are of the opinion that the appreciation of the unforeseeability is 
objective ie in abstracto.(See for example El Sanhoury, El Wassit vol. 1 at p. 
878)
What is further to be noted under English law is that there is always the 
general exception by which the contract will be held frustrated, 
notwithstanding the fact that the contingency was or was not foreseen by 
both parties to the contract. This is so where the performance of the 
contract would involve the act of trading with the enemy, which is 
illegal.59
We may conclude from what has been said that under French and 
Algerian laws, it is an established rule that in order that an event 
constitutes a case of force majeure, it must be unforeseen at the time of 
conclusion of the contract. As to English law we may say that no clear 
rule of law is settled upon which it can be said, with certainty, that the 
foreseeability of an event, does or does not prevent frustration from 
application. It is perhaps for this reason that the test of the foreseeability 
of the subsequent event was criticised, as being "very vague (and) elusive" 
and that,:
"It is common learning that the thought of a man is not triable, for the Devil
has not knowledge of man’s thoughts".^
59 Treitel (1983), at p. 679. It is thought that under French and Algerian laws, 
such an act would also be considered as illegal; since it is contrary to public order 
(ordre public).
60 Arnold D. McNair, "War-Time Impossibility of Performance of Contract" 
(1919) 35 Law Quarterly Review.84. at p. 96. Another author says that it does not 
matter whether the frustrating event was or was not foreseen. The conditions of 
frustration in the writer’s view, is that, by the occurrence of the event, further 
performance of the contract would be a thing radically different, and that parties did not 
provide expressly or impliedly that they would be bound by their contract, 
notwithstanding the occurrence of that event. 56 L.O.Rev (1940), at p. 178. This may 
be supported by what the House of Lords held, in British Movietonews V. London and 
District Cinemas Ltd.fl9521 A.C.166, 185: it is not any uncontemplated turn of events 
which may frustrate the contract, but only if there has been a fundamental change in the 
situation. But it should be noted that this does not mean that the test of unforeseeability 
-as it is said above- has no weight at all. The only thing is that Viscount simon in the 
British Movietonews case was emphasising the essential test of the obligation having
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However, these conflicting views regarding this test, might be solved 
by saying that the test of foreseeability of a frustrating event, is only one 
factor to be taken into account when deciding whether or not a contract 
can be fmstrated. In other words it is:
"one of the surrounding circumstances to be taken into account in 
construing the contract, and will of course, have greater or less weight 
according to the degree of probability or impossibility and all the facts of the 
case."(Per Pearson J in Societe Franco-Tunisienne d'Armement V. Sidermar
G.P.A. [1961] 2 Q.B. at 303.)
Nevertheless, the unforeseeability of a frustrating event is of interest 
to be considered as a condition, in order that a contract can be frustrated. 
Otherwise, dismissing this condition and requiring the condition that the 
obligation has become radically different, would provide an easy way of 
release for a contracting party. An illustration can be found in the French 
case of Ste Bata (infra under Fait du Prince*), where a passing of legislation 
was foreseen but it can be said that it had made the contract radically 
different. Therefore by requiring the latter condition only, the debtor 
would be released, whereas with the former one no release would be 
allowed to him.
O . There Should be an Impossibility of Performance ( Irresistibility or 
Insurmountability)61
Under French and Algerian laws the event must be insurmountable and 
having put the debtor in an absolute impossibility to perform the 
contract.62 Therefore if the impossibility concerns the debtor only and
become radically changed, by the occurrence of the frustrating event. See De Cruz S. 
P, "A Comparative Survey of the Doctrine of Frustration" (1982) 2 Legal Issues of 
European Integration.51. at p. 52. But see Schmitthoff, Helsinki., at p. 151, who says 
that it is not 'a decisive test*, (ie the unforeseeability of the event).
61 It should be noted that both French doctrine and jurisprudence use the concept 
of irresistibility and impossibility as synonymous. See Henri et Leon Mazeaud & Jean 
Mazeaud, Traite Theorique et Pratique de la Responsabilite Civile Delictuelle et
Contractuelle Tome 2. (6eme ed., Paris, Editions Montchrestien. 1970), at p. 688. 
para. 1573.
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the methods of performance he uses, he will not be released, since that 
impossibility will not constitute a case of force majeure.63 Thus if a 
lessee could not live in the house he leased because of a subjective reason 
such as his nationality, he cannot allege that his nationality is a case of 
force majeure. In the case of Durlach V . Grand-Gerard. (Req. July. 3rd. 
1918. Gaz. Trib. Aug 18th. 1918), the jurisdiction before which that case was 
brought emphasised the objective impossibility -and not the subjective 
one- which gives the debtor the possibility to claim force majeure, and
6^ See El Sanhoury, El Wassit vol. 1 at p. 879 and the case cited there, and see 
to the same effect art. 307 Alg.C.C. Therefore if other methods of performing the 
contract are still available, the debtor will not be released, since he has to use the other 
methods. This is true unless a special method of performance is stipulated in the 
contract. Therefore if that method becomes impossible by an event of force majeure, 
the debtor will be released even if the contract could be performed by using other 
methods. See Radouant at p. 36, and Fiatte at p. 33, and see El Sanhoury, El Moudjez 
at p. 301, and Mahmoud Djamel E. Z, op.cit at p. 363, and Jean Quesnel at p. 11. It 
seems that this is also true for English law. See page 194 infra what Viscount Simonds 
pointed out, and see p. 196.
63 Although in general cases the impossibility is material, there could be however, 
other kinds of impossibility which may constitute a case of force majeure. See El 
Sanhoury, El Wassit vol. 1 at p. 879 and Houcine Amer, op.cit at p. 394, and see 
Mohamed Hassanine, El Wadjiz, op.cit at p. 121. This is true for example for the 
writer who has been prevented from writing the book he promised because of a dental 
sickness. In other cases there was a risk of death in performing the contract. Such 
danger constituted a case of force majeure. Thus an actor contracted to give a play in a 
certain city. Because of an epidemic in that city he breached his promise. That 
epidemic was considered as a case of force majeure. See Radouant at p. 23 and see 
Weill (1986), at p. 433 footnote. 254. In other cases when there is a real danger, this 
may constitute a case of force majeure. Thus a lessee abandoned the premise he leased 
because he was afraid of the bombardment during the French war. In the case of Hue 
V. Hailaust. Trib.Com.Nantes.July.23rd. 1870.D. 1870 .3. 115, a captain of a ship 
refused to perform his contract of carriage because of a real danger in passing along an 
enemy coast (this was during the French war of 1870). It was decided that he was not 
liable for his non performance. See Radouant at p. 24. This may be explained by the 
fact that the debtor of an obligation is not obliged to risk his life in order to honour his 
obligations (see infra under French requisition cases). An example of moral 
impossibility given by some arab authors, is where a singer who undertakes to give a 
show but one of his relatives (parents or friends) died and this event affected his moral 
ability to sing at the presumed day. In this case the death may constitute for him a case 
of force majeure exonerating him from giving that show. See El Sanhoury, El Wassit 
vol. 1 at p. 879 and see Mohmoud Djamel E. Z, op.cit at p. 366.
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declared that
"No event forced the lessee into the impossibility to live in the house, since 
there was no destruction of the house or other causes which may have 
prevented the debtor from living in it and that other persons than the debtor 
could have lived in the leased premise".(See Radouant at p. 55)
The United States law is not different here; since the impossibility must 
be objective.64 However, under German law the debtor would be 
discharged whether the impossibility is objective or subjective (ie 
concerning the debtor only)65 as long as this impossibility was not foreseen 
by him at the time of the conclusion of the contract. (P. V. Ommeslaghe p. 
22)
The irresistibility has to be considered in abstracto and this by 
reference to the criterion of the 'bon pere de famille1. That is to say the 
debtor being a bon pere de famille' could not have resisted the event or its 
consequences.66 From this condition it can be seen that where the 
performance is rendered more difficult or more onerous than expected, it 
would not constitute a case of force majeure. This was affirmed by the 
French civil jurisdiction a long time ago when it rejected the theory of 
'im prevision '.67 Therefore if the contract remains materially 
executable, there cannot be a case of force majeure even if its execution 
has become valueless or useless (but see infra Chapter. 1, Part.2). For example 
if a person buys a premise (fond de commerce) in order to run a business and 
then he becomes ill and cannot therefore continue that business, he will
64 See Texas., p. 279, Alphonse M. Squillante & Fellice M. Congalton, "Force 
Majeure" (1975) 80 Commercial Law Joumal.4. at p. 8 col. 1, Tul.L.Rev (1946-47) at 
p. 604.
65 J. Cohn p. 15, Cohn E. J, Manual o f German Law vol. 1. G enera l 
Introduction. Civil Law (2nd ed., London. Oceana Publication, Inc. 1968), para. 224, 
P. V. Ommeslaghe p. 22.
66 See Mahmoud Djamel E. Z, op.cit at p. 365. This means the objective 
consideration of the irresistibility, and not the one of the 'strongest and the more 
diligent person'. See Weill (1986), at p. 433. Or as it has been expressed by another 
author who says that 'the law does neither ask the debtor to be a superman nor a man 
who makes no effort at all to perform his contract.'. See Philippe Malaurie & Laurent 
Aynes, Cours de Droit Civil. Les Obligations (Ed. Cujas. 1985), at p. 334. English 
law does not seem to be different in this respect from what has been said above.
67 See A. Bencheneb, Theorie ... at p. 107.
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still be asked to pay the price of the fond de commerce. (See Com.January 
23rd. 1968.J.C.P.68.ii. 15422), and see Benabent 1987 at para. 251) The same 
principle (ie concerning cases of onerousness) is also held under English law. 
Thus where the performance has become onerous, no release is provided 
to the debtor (see infra). American (ie under impracticability), German and 
Swiss laws are different in this respect (see infra). But Quebec and 
Louisiana laws are similar to French law.
However, it appears that under English law the concept of 
impossibility is wider than in French law. This is because the contract - 
under English and Scottish laws- may be held frustrated either when it has 
become impossible of performance (e.g. the destruction of the subject matter of 
the contract (infra)), or where because of a frustrating event the performance 
of the contract under the new circumstances, would be a performance of a 
fundamentally different obligation from that undertaken (e.g. the coronation 
cases, or cases involving a long delay in the performance of the contract (infra) though 
the performance is still possible.).
Similarly under German law where because of a delay in the 
performance of the contract, not imputable to the debtor and due to 
supervening events, the performance, if enforced, would be radically 
different from that undertaken, then the debtor will be discharged from 
his obligation and the case would be considered as one of impossibility.68
But comparing the concept of impossibility as understood under 
French and English laws, it should be said that German law is less 
rigorous than these two laws.
As to the conditions already studied, it might be said that although the 
condition of non-imputabilitv is very similar under English, French and 
Algerian laws, nevertheless we see that ’imprisonment' for example 
frustrates a contract under English law whereas it is considered as an 
imputable event under French law. Another difference is that whereas 
French law pays little attention to the fact that a state company (or a public 
enterprise) is or is not separate from the government, under English law, 
this appears to be very essential otherwise the alleged frustrating event 
would be considered as self-induced. The illustrating example can be
68 See J. Cohn at p. 17 (citing a case decided before the first world war), and see 
P. V. Ommeslaghe at p. 22.
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found in the case of Rolimpex (see supra).
Again considering the condition of unforeseeability, we see that 
although the test used under English, French and Algerian law, is an 
objective one "persons of ordinary intelligence", nevertheless unforeseeability 
has not similar weight under the two systems. Thus under French and 
Algerian laws it is a condition without which no force majeure can be 
pleaded. Whereas under English law it is still an unresolved question 
whether this condition is or is not necessary for the application of 
frustration.
As to the condition of impossibility, it is clear -as will be seen- that 
English law is wider in its conception of impossibility than French law. 
This is because of the test used by English courts. That is to say the one 
that 'performance if enforced would be a totally different thing from that undertaken'.
What has been said suggests -as has already been pointed out- that 
although English and French laws require the same conditions, 
nevertheless their application to different cases may sometimes differ.
Having studied the conditions under which a contract may be 
terminated (or suspended under French and Algerian laws as will be seen) because 
of an event of force majeure, what will be discussed in what follows is an 
illustration of these requirements. Under French and Algerian laws there 
are already clear settled mles that an event, in order to constitute a case of 
force majeure, must not be imputable to the debtor, and should be 
unforeseeable and having put the debtor into an absolute impossibility to 
perform his contract. Under English law on the other hand, the cases to 
be studied will show how English law courts have developed the doctrine 
of impossibility of performance and frustration. Therefore we will see 
whether in a given circumstance it is easy to ascertain the possible 
conclusion reached by a court in deciding a case, in holding it frustrated 
or not. In other words, whether it is possible to forecast a court's decision 
in holding a contract frustrated or not, bearing in mind the principles 
which will be settled.
Under English law instances of frustration can be classified into two 
categories.69 One is where performance of the contract is impossible,
69 Under Algerian and French laws force majeure is confined to cases of absolute
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the other is when performance of the contract is possible, but nevertheless 
the contract is frustrated. But this does not mean that the first category is 
only where the performance is strictly speaking impossible, because later 
on it will be seen that a contract is not impossible as has been said, 
although it is included under the first category. For this reason it must be 
borne in mind that in dealing with cases of impossibility, a wide 
meaning70 is given to this word but not included within the second 
category. There are instances such as, the destruction of a subject matter, 
death and illegality which are clearly cases of impossibility.
The usefulness of this classification, is first of all, to gather English 
cases which have some similarities into one category, and others in the 
other category, rather than to enumerate instances of frustration without 
making any classification . Secondly, this classification will allow us to 
compare this common law doctrine ie frustration, under its two headings 
(impossibility and possibility and more accurately frustration in stricto sensu)7 * 
with the equivalent doctrine used in other legal systems, viz French and 
Algerian laws, in other words the doctrines of force majeure and 
imprevision.
The fact that performance becomes impossible, can be subdivided into 
several headings, but we have preferred to classify it into three. The first 
is where a thing essential to the performance of the contract is destroyed 
whether stricto sensu or lato sensu. The second is where the 
impossibility concerns the person who has to perform the contract such as 
his death or or incapacity. The last one is where the performance is illegal 
(or legally impossible or restricted).
impossibility. Where the performance is possible, no release is allowed under French 
law, whereas such a release is provided under Algerian law; since the doctrine of 
imprevision is admitted.
70 See Wade, 56 Law Quarterly Review (1940) pp. 548-49, where he says: 
"...there is no rigid principle which the courts can pray in aid to delimit the respective 
spheres of possibility and impossibility. The fixing of the dividing line is a matter for 
judicial discretion, and it is for the courts to declare what they are prepared to consider 
impossibility and what they are not."
7 1 See Arnold D. McNair, "The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943" 
(1944) 60 Law Quarterly Review. 160. at p. 162, where this term was used to describe 
the coronation cases(see post).
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CHAPITER TWO. IMPOSSIBILITY AS REGARDS THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT OR A 
THING ESSENTIAL TO ITS PERFORMANCE.
As has been said above, the doctrine of frustration covers instances 
where the performance of the contract is impossible, and those where the 
performance is possible but the contract is nevertheless frustrated.1 
French and Algerian laws will also be treated under these two headings.
The impossibility which will be discussed in what follows is the one 
which concerns either the destruction of the subject matter of the contract, 
or a thing although not the subject matter of the contract is considered 
essential to its performance. An example of the latter is the requisition of 
a ship or its stranding or its seizure etc.
Section One. Destruction and Deterioration of the Sub ject Matter of the 
Contract or a Thing Essential to its 
Performance.
In the following subsections, we will study the leading English and 
Scottish cases illustrating the subject under discussion. These cases as well 
as the principles they involve will be -as far as possible- compared with 
the French and Algerian principles. Sometimes French cases are 
provided as a probable similar application of those principles. Our study 
is mainly -as regards English and Scottish laws- based on common law 
cases (§.1). However, two important Acts involve the question of 
impossibility of performance, therefore, they will be included in this 
study of the doctrine of frustration. (§.2 &3)
1 It is to be noted that to say that the "contract is frustrated" is inaccurate, since 
what is frustrated is the further performance of the contract, and not the contract. See 
Hevman V. Darwins [1942] A.C.356 at p. 400, cited by W illiam W. McBryde, 
"Frustration of Contract" (1980) Juridical Review. 1. at p. 16, and McBryde The Law 
o f Contract (1987), at p. 343, and see Lord Atkinson in the Larrinaea case (1923) 29 
Com. Cas. at p. 12. Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance (1940), at p. 219.
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§. 1. Common Law Cases Compared With French and Algerian
Principles.
Before discussing this subject, it is necessary to say that in early 
English law, impossibility of performance was not a good plea for release 
of a party from his liability of non performance of the contract. In this 
context the case of Paradine V Jane (1646 Aleyn 26) is generally referred 
to. This is a case where the plaintiff let to the defendant a piece of land. 
Being sued for the rent, the defendant pleaded that an enemy alien had 
expelled him from the land, therefore he was not able to pay the rent, 
since the profits expected from it were defeated by the expulsion. This 
plea was rejected as:
"Where the law creates a duty or charge and the party disabled to perform it 
[without any default in him] and hath no remedy over, there the law will excuse 
him...but when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon 
himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident 
by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his 
contract".^
This was based on the idea that such a party could provide in the 
contract for that contingency and if he did not then he is supposed to have 
assumed the risk.3 Therefore, the party who enters into a contract, is 
not undertaking to do his best for the accompletion of his obligation, but 
he has to do it whatever may be the circumstances.4 So following this 
rule, the non performing party has to pay damages for his failure to 
perform the contract.
Thus, although the defendant's "purpose of enjoyment [of the house] 
and profit taking had been 'frustrated'" by that event, nevertheless the 
contract was not held frustrated.5 Furthermore, in Paradine. the
2 Chitty Vol. 1 (24th ed., 1977), para. 1401, and see Salmond J. & Perce H. 
Winfield, Principles o f the Law o f Contracts (London. Sweet & Maxwell. 1927), p. 
294.
3 (1946) 21 Tulane Law Review p. 603, and see Sen G. M, "Doctrine of 
Frustration in the Law of Contract" (1972) Journal of the Indian Law Institute Special 
Issue. 132, at p. 146.
4 Salmond p. 292.
5 Corbin A. L, "Frustration of Contract in the United States of America" (1947) 
29 3rd.S. Parts 3 & 4 Journal of Comparative Legislation & International Law.l. at p.
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defendant did not plead that his obligation to perform the contract, viz to 
pay the rent was impossible, since payment of money cannot be 
impossible. But he alleged that his obligation was conditional on the 
continued use of that house (since he was expelled). (See (1940) 56 Law 
Quarterly Review at p. 524). That plea was rejected since "there is no implied 
covenant that the premises -[in leases]- shall continue in a fit state for habitation.". (Ibid 
at 525 footnote 20).^
Despite the harshness of this mle it is still good law; because parties to 
a contract may undertake absolutely to perform the contract or to pay 
damages instead.7
As to French law, speaking of the contract of ’Louage de choses' and 
more precisely of ’Baux de maisons’, art. 1719 C.C, states that amongst 
the obligations of the lessor is "d'en faire jouir paisiblement le preneur pendant la 
duree du bail.". Therefore if this obligation cannot be performed by the 
lessor because of an event beyond his control (e.g, a Prince having expelled the 
lessee) this might constitute a case of force majeure ('fait du prince' for its 
definition see infra). Therefore the lessor is exonerated from his obligation 
(ie to provide a quiet enjoyment of the house leased). Since the debtor in 
synallagmatic contracts is exonerated where he is prevented from 
performing his obligation because of an event of force majeure (fait du 
prince "the prince having expelled the lessee"), therefore the other party viz the
2 .
6 This case would have been decided differently under Scots law. See W. 
McBryde, Juri. Rev, at p. 7. In the case of The Tav Salmon Fisheries Co. Ltd V. 
Alexander Speedie 1929 S. C. 593, Lord Sands at p. 604 said that under Scots law, in 
the relation between landlord and tenant, the payment of rent is conditional on the 
eniovment of possession of the leased premises. Where that enjoyment is impossible, 
no rent is payable. See also McBiyde, The Law of Contract (1987), at p. 350.
7 See for an example Anson (1979), p. 495, and see also Gloag (1987), at para. 
11.3. Lord Justice Bowen in Jacobs.. V. Credit Lyonnais (1884), 12 Q.B.D. said at 
p. 603- and approved by Lord Atkinson in Matthev V. Curling. [1922] 2 A.C. at p. 
234- that:"... a person who expressly contracts absolutely to do a thing not naturally 
impossible, is not excused for non-performance of being prevented by vis major.". 
Cited by Me Elroy, Impossibility of Performance at p. 6 , and see David M. Walker, 
Vol. 1. Principles o f Scottish Private Law (2nd ed. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1975), 
at p. 672, and Vol. 2 of the (3rd ed., 1983 ) at p. 134, and see Schmitthoff, 
Helsinki... at p. 131 footnote. 10. This is also true for French and Algerian laws. See 
infra 'force majeure & contractual clauses’.
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lessee, is also exonerated from his obligation, viz to pay the rent during 
the period of the deprivation of the enjoyment of the thing leased.8
As to Algerian law, art. 486 C.C concerning the contract of lease (bail) 
States:"Where the enjoyment of the leased premise is substantially reduced by an act 
legally issued by an administrative authority, the lessee can either ask for the 
termination of the contract or the reduction of the rent.". Therefore it can be said 
that a fortiori when the lessee was expelled by an act of an enemy 
authority, he can ask for a termination of the lease if the prohibition was 
for a permanent period. If temporary only, it is possible to say that the 
judge might hold the contract suspended. The suspension of the contract 
of lease can also be applied under French law. All this is in fact an 
application of the general principles of force majeure.
In the case of Cie L'Union-Vie V. Regnard. (Civ.Soc.May 20th. 1954.
D.1954. 615. C. Cass) the Court of Cassation decided that where the 
deprivation of the lessee of enjoying the leased house is due to a 'fait du 
prince', the lessor could not be held liable for that deprivation. The 
eviction here was due to a passing of a law subsequent to the contract of 
lease. The lessee was expelled from the house he leased, and consequently 
the lessee was also exonerated.
The rule as settled in Paradine: has some exceptions^ one of which is 
where a party expressly provides in his contract that he will be released in 
case of impossibility.10 Another exception is where the contract 
involves personal services (as will be seen), and one of the parties dies or 
becomes permanently incapacitated! 1, or where performance becomes 
illegal by a change in the law.!2
8 See Henri et Leon Mazeaud & Jean Mazeaud, Legons de Droit Civil Tome. 3. 
Vol. 2. Principaux Contrats (3eme ed., Editions Montchrestien. 1968), at p. 206, and 
see Encyclopedic Dalloz (2nd.ed., 1978), Tome. 1. Repertoir de Droit Civil, under 
"Bail" para. 306 to 310
9 See Lihazur Rahman Khan, "Frustration Legislative or Administrative 
Intervention" (1982) 6 Cochin University Law Review.91. at p. 92.
1° Salmond p. 294.
11 Treitel (1983), p. 648. and see Hvden V. Dean of Windsor (1597) Cro . Eliz . 
552 cited by Me Elroy, op.cit. at p. 5, this case concerned death. As to temporary 
incapacity, see post.
12 Frederic C. Woodward, "Impossibility of Performance as an Excuse for 
Breach of Contract" (1901) 1 Columbia Law Review.529. p. 529., and see Me Elroy,
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The rule in the Paradine case (ie the impossibility of performance is no plea 
for release) has been also changed through a number of cases, which dealt 
with the destruction of a particular thing essential to the performance of 
the contract. Some of them are discussed below. The position of French 
courts (when making the comparison or in similar cases) will be shown by 
discussing some French cases.
An example where a contract was terminated by the destruction of its 
subject matter is Taylor V. Caldwell13: where the defendants gave to the 
plaintiffs the use of the Surrey Gardens and the music hall, for a number 
of concerts to be given there. Before the first concert took place, the Hall 
was destroyed by an accidental fire. It was held that parties to the contract 
are discharged from liability. The defendants were not liable to give the 
use of the Hall and the plaintiffs to pay the price for the use of the Hall.14 
This is because the continued existence of the Hall was the foundation of 
the contract!5, or its existence was a condition to the obligation to pay the 
agreed sum of money (called there rent)!6, and such condition is so obvious 
that to provide for it expressly in the contract "appeared to the parties 
superfluous.". 17 By this case a new concept was introduced into English
op.cit p. 5, and see Abbot of Westminster V. Clerke. 73 Eng.Rep.59 (K.B.1536), 
illegality caused by a subsequent Act of Parliament., cited in (1980) Vanderbilt etc at p. 
109 footnote 10.
13  (1863) 3 B & S. 826. This decision which can be said to have revolutionised 
the rule as established in Paradine. has induced one author to saying that English law 
did not have an established doctrine of frustration until 1863. See McBryde, The 
Juridical Review at p. 6. However, this remark should not concern cases of 
impossibility in personal contracts or case of subsequent changes in law; since the cases 
in which the promisor was released dated earlier than 1863. As regards Scots law, it 
has dealt with problems of frustration as early as 1549. See McBryde id-
14 See also Beale H. G. & Bishop W. D. & Furmston M. P, Contracts. Cases 
and Materials (London, Butterworths. 1985), pp. 286-87
1 5  (1919) 35 LI2JL- P- 86-
16 (1901) 1 Col.L.R p. 529, although parties in Tavlor used the terms 'rent' and 
'letting1, nevertheless this contract was not one of landlord and tenant, but one of 
"licensor and licensee". Per Blackburn J. in the Taylor case, cited in National Carriers 
V. Panalpina..J19811 A.C.675 by Lord Hailsham at pp. 686-87.
!7 It may be said that if it were Caldwell who sued Taylor for the rent, the latter 
could plead "frustration of his purpose of enjoyment and profit taking, not the 
impossibility of making payment." (1947) 29 Jou of Comp Legis at p. 2. This would 
make the claim similar to that in Paradine. It might be said that, looking at the Paradine
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law ie where in a contract the continued existence of a thing (like the Hall 
here), or a person (as will be seen later), is the foundation of the contract then 
an implied condition is to be read into such a contract, releasing both 
parties, if that thing or person ceases to exist18 without fault of either 
party.
Under French law, this case might be decided on the basis of art. 1722 
C.C, which states "If, during the period of the lease, the thing leased is wholly 
destroyed by a fortuitous event, the lease is terminated as a matter of law (see to the 
same effect art. 481/1 Alg.C.C) if the thing leased is destroyed in part only, the 
lessee can, depending on the circumstances, ask either for a reduction of the price or the 
termination of the lease (see to the same effect art. 481/2 Alg.C.C).19 No
and Tavlor cases, they are very similar. See G. M. Sen (India), at p. 149. This is 
because in Paradine the purpose was defeated by the expulsion, and in Tavlor by the 
destruction of the hall. Would this logically make any difference in deciding whether 
the contract is frustrated? Not in our view. See also Jeffrey Price, "The Doctrine of 
Frustration and Leases" (1989) 10 Journal of Legal Historv.90.. at p. 104.
18 (1946-47) 21 Tul. L. Rev, p. 603. It has been observed that the principle of 
Taylor V. Caldwell viz the implication of a condition in a contract to dissolve it, was 
understood -in subsequent cases- wider than it really was. Because it was thought that 
such implication is possible merely by the fact that, had the frustrating event been 
brought to the partie's intention, they would have agreed that such a term or condition 
should be read in their contract. "Read as wide as this the decision in Tavlor V. 
Caldwell constitutes a grave threat to the general principle of sanctity of contract." 
McElroy R. G, & Glanville Williams, "The Coronation Cases I" (1940-41) 4 Modem 
Law Review.241. at p. 243. This criticism appears to be directed to some subsequent 
cases especially those called the coronation cases. Because in those cases the principle 
of the Tavlor case viz the perishing of a thing, was extended to cover cases where an 
expected event being the foundation of the contract, was defeated by the cancellation of 
that event, and this was held to put an end to the contract
19 The rule under Scot s law seems to be similar to that of art. 1722 Fr.C.C, and 
art. 481 Alg.C.C. See infra., see also to this effect David M. Walker, The Law o f 
Contracts and Related Obligations in Scotland (London. Butterworths. 1979), at p. 
477.
It is to be noted that the doctrine of frustration can also apply to leases of land (see 
National Carriers Ltd V. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [1981] 1 ALL.E.R.161), and see 
Fifoot (1986), at 567, and Treitel (1983), at 672, and Evans David Lloyd, The law o f 
Landlord and Tenant (2nd ed., London. 1985), at p. 192. Their Lordships in 
Panalpina however, said that it is very rare that a lease of land could be frustrated. 
Fifoot (1986), at p. 567. An example of such rare circumstances is "some vast 
convulsion of nature which swallowed up the property altogether, or buried it in the 
depths of the sea.". Chitty Vol. 1 (24th ed., 1977), at 1442.
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damages are to be granted in the above two situations.". Therefore it is possible to 
treat the Tavlor case, as falling into the second stipulation of this 
article.20
A similar case, in that it dealt with the deterioration of the subject 
matter of the contract, is the French case of Credit Lvonais V. Kintz etc, 
(Req. February 11th. 1946. J. 365). The belongings of (K) were kept in the 
bank of (C). Due to an 'infiltration' of water from the underground of the 
bank, those belongings deteriorated. (C) in order to be exonerated 
invoked the inundation as a case of force majeure since -as he alleged- it 
was caused by the war. (C) also remarked that he installed a machine to 
remedy such events as inundation, but that the electricity was interrupted 
and the work of the machine was paralysed as a consequence and this 
facilitated the inundation. The Court of Appeal decided that the 
interruption of the electricity was foreseeable. For the question of 
inundation the court declared that this did happen continually in the past, 
and that (C) should have remedied the situation a long time ago, but no 
special measure had been taken for that purpose, therefore the inundation 
was not unforeseen. For these reasons the Court declared the debtor 
responsible for what happened. The Court of Cassation did confirm that 
judgment (called 'arret' under French law).
In the English case Appleby V. Myers ((1867) L.R 2.C.P.651.), a similar 
conclusion as the one of Taylor (above) was reached. The plaintiff 
contracted to erect certain machinery upon the premises of the defendant 
for a fixed sum to be paid on completion of the work. After the
Under Scots Law it is an established rule that the destruction of the subject of a 
lease by a frustrating event, liberates both the landlord and the tenant. (See to this effect 
the case of Cantors Properties (Scotland! Ltd V. Swears & Wells Ltd. 1978 S. C. 310. 
In such a case the contract is at end (see the speech of Lord Johnston at p. 324, and 
similarly of Lord Cameron at pp. 318-19, and Lord Brand at p. 326). The maxim 
applied here is res perit domino. (Per Lord Cameron at p. 319).
In the case where there is a partial destruction of the subject of the lease the tenant 
can claim an abatement (ie a reduction) of the rent. See to this effect Lord Cooper 
(1946) 28 Jou. Comp. Legis. at p. 4, and see William McBryde, (1980) The Juridical 
Review, at p. 7.
20 Cf Constantin Stoyanovitch, De VIntervention du Juge dans le Contrat en cas 
de Survenance de Circonstances Imprevues. Theorie de VImprevision (Aix Marseille. 
1941), at p. 382, who referred to article 1302 Fr.C.C when invoking the case of Taylor 
V. Caldwell.
38
(machinery) was partially installed, a fire broke out without the fault of 
either party, and destroyed the premises (factory) as well as the machinery. 
It was held that the contract was terminated. To this end Blackburn J, in 
giving his judgment said:
"...it appears that the work which the plaintiff agreed to perform could not 
be performed unless the defendant's premises continued in a fit state to enable 
the plaintiffs to perform the work on them..."(Appleby Ibid p. 659.).
But in this contract the plaintiffs will not be discharged if the fire 
destroyed a part of the machinery only and not the factory, although the 
machinery was the subject matter of the contract. Blackburn in this case 
said:
"Had the accidental fire left the defendant's premises untouched, and only 
injured a part of the work which the plaintiff had already done, we apprehend 
that it is clear the plaintiffs under such a contract as the present must have done 
that part over again, in order to fulfill their contract..".( Appleby Ibid 660.)
This is because the factory was necessary for the performance of the 
contract ie to erect the machinery2!, that is the reason of the discharge of 
the plaintiffs. Itis thought that if all the machinery were destroyed, but 
the premise was untouched, the plaintiff would have been discharged.
Comparing this case with principles of French law, it might be said 
that the French principle which can be relied on in deciding such a case is 
to be found in arts. 1787-88-89-90 Fr.C.C. It is declared that where a 
person undertakes to do a piece of work and the materials are provided 
either by the person for whom that job is to be done or by the worker 
himself, if the thing before it is finished and delivered is destroyed, the 
worker cannot ask for a remuneration for the work he has provided in 
making that thing.(Weill (1971), at p. 519, and Dupont (1986), at p. 116, and 
Benabent (1987), at para. 259)
Thus a garage keeper who is working on a thing given to him, cannot 
be remunerated for the work he has done when that thing as well as the 
garage itself are destroyed by an event of force majeure. (See also art. 1741
Treitel (1983), p. 653.
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Fr.C.C. See Fiatte at p. 102).
As to Algerian law, article 568 /I C.C (which is the same as art. 665 
Egypt.c.c., as well as arts. 1788 et seq Fr.C.C) stipulates that if the thing which 
(A) for example has undertaken to perform, has perished by force 
majeure and this before it was delivered, the risk in this case is on the 
worker. In other words he cannot ask for remuneration for his work (or 
for the material he has provided, if he did provide it). If the material ('matiere') is 
provided by the person for whom the work was to be done and the worker 
provides his work only, the risk is always on the worker; since he cannot 
ask for remuneration for his work. But that person also bears the risk of 
the destruction since that thing was provided by him and he did not get 
anything. In the two situations the worker has no right to remuneration 
since the person for whom the work was to be done did not get anything 
from that work. (See to this effect El Wassit Vol. 7 part. 1, pp. 93 to 96).
In the case where the work has not been finished because of the death 
of the worker and the contract is one of intuitu personae the heirs 
(heritiers) of the worker are not allowed to ask for remuneration for what 
has been done, unless the person for whom the work was to be done, has 
benefited from that work. The sum of remuneration in this last case 
would be equal to the benefit got by that person. Therefore if that person 
did not get any benefit whatsoever from the work done, no remuneration 
is allowed, and this even if the worker has in fact done some work or has 
made some expenses.22
What has been said is true unless there has been a 'mise en demeure' 
either from the worker (in this case the 'mise en demeure' is made to the person to 
take delivery of the thing done) or the person for whom the work was to be 
done (in this case made to the worker to deliver the thing already done), in such a 
case the worker can ask for a remuneration for his work (the first case), or 
that person is allowed to claim damages (as in the second case).(See to this 
effect art. 568/2 & 3 Alg.C.C).
As can be seen from the Appleby case, the work (ie the machinery being 
installed) as well as the premises which were destroyed, put an end to the
^2 See to this effect arts. 569 & 570 Alg.C.C., and see El Sanhoury A, El Wassit 
Vol. 7 part. 1 (Beirut. 1952), pp. 257 to 265, and see pp. 236 to 239 (cf. Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, and cf Scots law rules infra under 'Effects of 
frustration'.
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contract and both parties were released from further performance and 
were not liable for what happened. Under French or Algerian law - 
following the cited article- both parties may be released and no liability 
would arise. Thus the solution under English, French and Algerian laws 
in a case like Appleby is similar in principle. Where the destruction 
concerns the thing to be done then the contract might be held frustrated 
under English law23, and certainly will be so held under French and 
Algerian laws. Whereas if the destruction concerns a part only of the 
thing to be done then under English law he debtor has to do the work 
again. Under French and Algerian laws, the solution would be different.
The last English case in connection with the subject under discussion 
(ie where parties are discharged because of destruction of the subject 
matter of the contracts Howell V Coupland.24 This was a case where the 
defendant agreed to sell 200 tons of potatoes to the plaintiff to be grown 
on his own lan d :MThey are to be grown there and delivered to the plaintiff provided 
they are grown there" said Me&ish LJ.25 Because of a disease, potatoes were 
destroyed and all the defendant could provide was 80 tons, and 120 tons 
remained undelivered. It was held that the seller (defendant) was not 
liable for the remainder. Melish L.J said:
"...it is an agreement to sell what will and may be called specific
things".(HoweU p. 262.)
In fact regarding the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (now 
1979) the goods in that case were not specific as Melish L.J said, but 
"unascertained goods taken from a specific bulk".26 To that effect S.
23 But see Treitel (1987), at p. 669.
24 (1867) 1 Q.B.D.258. See also D. M. Walker, Principles... Vol. 2 (3rd ed., 
1983), at p. 135. In the Scottish case W. Leitch V. Edinburgh Ice And Cold Storage 
Cop. Ltd (1900) 2 F. 904, it was agreed that Leitch would receive some old materials 
in order to erect a new stable with them. Before delivery, the materials were destroyed 
by fire and this without fault of either party. It was decided that the other party to the 
contract (ie Edinburgh..) was not liable in damages.
23 Howell ibid p. 262, and it was thus provided in the contract. See p. 262 in the 
Howell case.
26 See A. P. Dobson, Sale o f Goods & Consumer Credit (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell. 1975), at para. 4.11. For a distinction between specific and unascertained
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61(1) defines specific goods as "identified and agreed on at the time the contract of 
sale is made.".(Treitel (1983), p. 693, and Anson (1979), p. 522, and Chitty Vol. 1 
(1968), para. 1319.)
However Lord Coleridge L.J in giving his judgment explained the 
ground upon which this case was decided saying that:
“...there should be a condition implied that before the time for the 
performance of the contract the potatoes should be, or should have been, in 
existence, and should still be existing when the time came for the 
performance."22
Because goods were destroyed therefore the condition was not fulfilled 
and parties were accordingly discharged. The case of Howell V. Coupland 
is now to be treated not as being an application of S.(7) (agreement to sell 
specific goods) but an application of either S. 5(2) or to be explained by
common law principles in S. 62(2).28 This Act is to be studied later, in
goods see post p. 46.
22 The Howell case p. 261., emphasis is mine. It is to be noted that this case was
decided on the basis of the Tavlor principle. See Me Elroy, op cit at p. 25.
28 S.5 (2) of the S.G.A 1979 reads:
"There may be a contract for the sale of goods, the acquisition of which by the 
seller depends on a contingency which may or may not happen".
S.62 (2) reads:
"The rules of the common law , including the law merchant, except in so far as 
they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and in particular the rules relating 
to the law of principal and agent and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or 
coercion, mistake, or other invalidating cause, apply to contracts for the sale of 
goods.".
See Chalmers', Sale o f Goods Act 1979 Including the Factors Acts 1889 & 1890 
(18th ed., London, Butterworths. 1981), p. 101, and see Me Elroy, op cit at p. 27 
footnote. 2, citing to that effect the case of Re Waite (1927) 1 Ch. 606 [and now the 
case of H. R. & S. Sainsburv V Street [1972] 1 W.L.R.834, where Atkin LJ said -as 
expressed by Chalmer’s- that the "plain language of the Act now prevents so wide a 
meaning being given to "specific goods" so far as concerns the application of the 
statute:an unascertained or unapropriated portion of a larger designed mass,whether the 
latter is "existing goods" or "future goods" must be outside the statutory definition."(he 
meant S. 61(1)). Chalmers p. 107, and see Me Kenna J in the same case (Sainsburv) at 
p. 837, he also said that the Howel case cannot be an application of S.6 or 7 of the 
S.G.A 1893, since both sections are dealing with existing goods, and a crop not yet 
grown is not within this meaning. See also Thomely J. W. A, "Seller’s liability for
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this section.
Treitel ((1987), p. 673) bases this decision on the fact that, though the 
goods were unascertained or not specific they were to be taken from a 
particular source viz the land, and if that source failed then the contract 
would be at an end. This might be considered as a convincing ground 
upon which the decision of Howell can be based, taking into account what 
will be said thereafter. However, it should not be understood from what 
has been said that where in a contract parties contemplated a particular 
source, they will be discharged if that source fails. This is not the case, 
because to have this result (ie the discharge) there must be an express 
provision (not a mere contemplation) that the contract is to be performed 
using exclusively that source. (See post pp. 4 7 -4 8 ).2^
Comparing this case with principles of French and Algerian law of 
contract, it can be said that the Howell case can be considered as a sale of 
future goods. This sale of 200 tons of potatoes should also be considered 
as a sale of unascertained goods (it is thus under English law). This is because 
the land where potatoes were to be grown might produce more than 200 
tons. Therefore this quantity should be individualised (ie ascertained) from 
the whole quantity produced. As a consequence of this, no property and 
no risk is transferred to the buyer until the act of individualisation has 
been made. Therefore the seller is always considered as the owner, and 
any destruction of the goods rests with him. However, though it is said 
that the sale is of unascertained goods (chose de genre., which means that the 
seller is always responsible to provide the promised goods) nevertheless the seller 
is exonerated from his liability for non performance viz the non delivery 
of the contracted quantity. This is because the source of supply was 
determined (see the speech of MeHish J. supra). However, if the seller 
promises a quantity of goods (ie future crop) but without determining any 
source of supply, a bad harvest, as in this case, cannot be considered as an
partial failure of crop to be grown on specified land" (1973) Cambridge Law 
Journal. 15. at p. 16., and see Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1st ed., London. Sweet & 
Maxwell. 1974), at 427.
29 But see Greig D. W, Sale o f Goods (London, Butterworths. 1974), p. 215, 
where he says that although goods in that case were not specific, but it is not 
unreasonable to treat goods from a special source as being the equivalent of specific 
goods for the purpose of S. (7).".
43
impossibility of performance, and he will not be exonerated for his non 
performance of the contract.30
It can be seen therefore from the illustrations given in these cases that 
where the subject matter of the contract, as in the Howell case or an object 
(e.g a factory) essential for the performance of the contract as in the 
Appleby case is destroyed, then the contract will be frustrated or 
terminated. This is in fact the principle involved in Taylor V. Caldwell.
The harsh rule in the Paradine case being now mitigated, it is no longer 
possible to say that even impossibility of performance under English law 
is no plea for release (excluding cases of contractual risk bearing). Therefore 
English law is in accord now with the one of French and Algerian laws. 
The solution under T avlor. can also be reached under French and 
Algerian laws. That is to say the contract might be terminated or the rent 
being reduced under French or Algerian principles, and both the lessee 
and the lessor would be released from further performance of the 
contract.
Howell may also be terminated by force majeure, as explained above, 
if it is based on the fact that it was a sale of unascertained goods to be 
provided from a contractually determined source of supply which failed.
Again Applehv as has been seen is similar to cases under French and 
Algerian laws. It should be noted here that when we say that the solution 
is similar, we do not mean that the same principle is admitted under these 
laws, but that the release is allowed under these laws notwithstanding the 
principle applied to reach that conclusion as far as we are concerned with 
the doctrine of impossibility.
Having seen the different instances under which a contract can be 
frustrated or being considered as involving an event of force majeure, it 
can be said that under English, Scottish, French and Algerian laws the 
destmction of the subject matter of the contract or a thing essential to its 
performance puts an end -in principle- to the contract and releases both 
parties from further performance without being at fault.
30 Radouant p. 35 and pp. 38-39, and see Mazeaud, Legons. Principaux 
Contrats Tome. 3. Vol. 2 (1968), p. 149.
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§.2. The Sale of Goods Act 1979 (S.7).
As has already been said, it may be interesting to study the provisions 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The only Article dealing with cases of 
frustration is section 7. This concerns the destruction of the subject 
matter of the contract.(Chitty, Specific Contracts Vol. 2 (1983), at 4122, and see 
Schmitthoff, Helsinki., p. 130.)
Section 7 reads:
Where there is an agreement to sell specific goods and subsequently the
goods, without any fault on the part of the seller or buyer, perish before the risk
passes to the buyer, the agreement is avoided.
Under French as well as Algerian laws it suffices to say that where 
there is a contract of sale of a specific thing (corps certain., Mazeaud, 
Legons.Principaux Contrats.Tome. 3, Vol. 2 (1968), p. 95) and that thing has 
perished by an event of force majeure, before the risk of its destruction 
passes to the buyer by the making of the contract (under French law) or by 
the delivery (under Algerian law) then the contract is to be held terminated 
by force majeure, and both parties are released.
As may be seen under section 7 Sale of Goods Act, there are six 
requirements to be met in order for it to apply.
Firstly. There must be an agreement to sell goods, and not a contract of 
sale.
Section 2, of the Act provides:
(1)- A contract of sale of goods is a contract by which the seller transfers or 
agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money
consideration, called the price.
(2)- There may be a contract of sale between one part owner and another.
(3)- A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
(4)- Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred 
from the seller to the buyer the contract is called a sale.
(5)- Where under a contract of sale the transfer of the property in the goods 
is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition later to be 
fulfilled the contract is called an agreement to sell.
(6)- An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses or the 
conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to 
be transferred.
Secondly The goods in question must be specific goods. This is defined
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by S. 61(1) as being "identified and agreed on at the time the contract is made".3! 
The example given below may differentiate specific goods from 
unascertained goods. Thus:
"Where a farmer sells his flock of sheep he sells specific goods, but where
he sells a lamb out of his flock he sells unascertained goods, where he sells the
lamb marked A.B.120, assuming that the lambs carry different identification
numbers, he sells again specific goods.".32
As this section requires that goods must be specific in order that the 
contract of sale can be frustrated, the question which may be asked is 
whether under the Common law rules the sale of unascertained goods can 
be frustrated. Russel J. in Re Badische ([1921] 2 Ch.331, at p. 382) said that 
it is possible that frustration applies to cases of unascertained goods 
although this may be rare. An example of such rare circumstances is 
where the obtaining of the contractual goods from a named country of 
supply was interrupted by that country becoming an enemy country. 
((1940) 56 L. O. Rev, pp. 194-95). However, in Blackburn Bobbin. Ltd v. 
T.W.Allen. Ltd ([1918] 1 K.B.540; affd.[1918] 2 K.B.467, C.A)33, although 
there was war which prevented the delivery of goods nevertheless, the 
contract was not frustrated, and the seller was held liable for damages. 
This was explained by the fact that the seller could perform his contract 
by delivering goods from any other source, since no particular source was 
contemplated.
Therefore, it can be said that, where the goods are purely generic 
goods34, for example expressed as 200 tons of potatoes, the contract 
cannot be frustrated by the destruction of those goods. The seller is
31 Schmitthoff C. M, The Sale o f Goods Including the Hire-Purchase Act.1965 
and Other enactments (2nd ed., London, Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1966), at p. 86. 
However, mere identifiable goods are not specific goods. See Kursell v. Timber 
Operators &Contractors. Ltd.\19271 1 K.B.298, per Sargant L.J. at p. 314.
3^ Schmitthoff (1966), op.cit at p. 86, for a similar determination of specific and 
unascertained (chose de genre) goods, see Mazeaud, Principaux Contrats (1968), at p. 
95.
33 Cited by MacLeod J. K, Sale and Hire Purchase (London, Butterworths. 
1971), at p. 255.
34 This was defined as where the contract may be satisfied by any out of the 
world supply of those goods. See MacLeod J. K (1971), op.cit. at p. 256.
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required to deliver the goods from any other source.35 This is an 
application of the maxim genus numquam perit.36 Under German law 
too when the promised goods are defined in kind only, then the maxim 
genera non perunt is applicable. In this case as long as the species of 
those goods are available, the debtor will not be discharged even if he has 
to buy them from abroad. Thus if a seller promised to deliver a certain 
quantity of 'leather bags' but due to a fortuitous event his stock was totally 
destroyed, he will not be released from his obligation since; although the 
leather was for example rare, it can nevertheless be found in stocks of 
other merchants.37
The same rale is held under Swiss law with the difference that if the 
performance of the contract in such a case would involve an 
insurmountable difficulty and costs, then the debtor can be discharged. 
(See the comment under art. 97.C.O.).
However, under English law there are other types of unascertained 
goods such as those in Howell v. Coupland 38, ie the sale of potatoes to be 
grown on a particular piece of land, where the contract can be held 
frustrated, by the failure of the crop.39
It has been suggested that a sale of unascertained goods can be held 
frustrated if there is a common assumption of the parties that the 
contracted goods are to be taken from a particular source. (See Benjamin's, 
Sale o f Goods (1974), at para. 430 (emphasis is of Benjamin). However, it should 
be added to what is said above that there should be an express provision 
concerning that contemplated source.(See Benjamin's Sale o f Goods (3rd ed., 
1987) p. 1103). In general terms the rale can be settled as follows:
35 Dobson, Sale of Goods and Consumer Credit (3rd ed., London, Sweet & 
Maxwell. 1984), at 4.11.
36 Atiyah P. S, The Sale o f Goods (5th ed., Pitman Publishing. 1975), at p. 
171.
37 See P. V. Ommeslaghe at p. 23, T exas., at p. 293, J. Cohn at p. 15, 
Lesguillons at p. 512, R. Rodiere & D. Tallon at pp. 128-29, Konrad Zweigert & Hein 
Kotz An Introduction to Comparative Law Vol. 2 The Institutions o f Private Law . 
Translated from the German by Tony Weir (2nd ed., Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987), 
p. 213.
38 (1876) 1 Q.B.D.258.
39 Atiyah, Sale ofGoods(\915), at p. 172.
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(a) If parties by express provisions intend the goods to be taken from 
that particular source exclusively, then the contract can be frustrated by 
the failure of that source. This is an application of Howell V. Coupland 
(supra).
(b) If no provision is made related to that particular source, then:
1- if one party only contemplates to get the goods from that source, 
then the contract cannot be frustrated by the failure of it. (See Blackburn 
Bobbin Co.Ltd V. T.W.Allen Ltd [1918] 2 K.B.467, and see Benjamin's, Sale o f 
Goods (1974), at para. 430).
2- if both parties contemplate that source and no provision is in the 
contract, there is no clear English authority settling this point. As to the 
case of Re Badische. where parties to the contract contemplated Germany 
as the source of supply and subsequently by the war it became an enemy, 
and the contract was held fmstrated, this has to be explained as a case of 
illegality, and not because the mutually contemplated source failed. (See 
Treitel (1987), at pp. 673-74).
Thirdly The goods must have perished. That is to say destroyed 
accidentally.40 Or "so damaged as no longer to answer to the description under 
which they were sold.".4 ! But mere deterioration in the quality of the
40 Schmitthoff, Sale o f Goods (1966), at p. 54, but this does not mean complete 
physical destruction. See Glanville L. Williams, The Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943. (London. 1944), at p. 89. In one case the requisition of a 
specific parcel of wheat was considered as having perished. Re Shipton Anderson & 
Co.and Harrison Bros.& Co [1915] 3 K.B.676, cited in Glanville, The Law  
Reform .., at p. 89. Under French or Algerian law, the goods sold might be 
completely destroyed or partly destroyed or deteriorated. In the last case the solution - 
whether to terminate the contract or to hold it as still continuing in its effects and to 
reduce the original contractual price according to what perished- depends -under 
Algerian law- on whether that destruction was substantial enough as if it was known to 
the buyer before the conclusion of the contract, he would not have contracted at all or 
not. The question whether the destruction is substantial or not, is left to the discretion 
of the judge. (See infra for more explanations).
4 1 Chitty, Specific Contracts (1983), at 4123, and see Benjamin’s, Sale o f  
Goods (3rd ed., London. Sweet & Maxwell. 1987), at p. 257. See also the case of 
Asfar & Co. v. Blundell & Another (1896) 1 Q.B.123, goods are also to be treated as 
having perished where" the nature of the thing is altered, and...becomes for business 
purposes something else, so that it is not dealt with by business people as the thing 
which it originally was...". Per Lord Esher M.R. at p. 128. Therefore the word 
"perish" is to be understood in a commercial sense.
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goods, cannot be treated as ’perishing goods'.(Chitty, Specific Contracts 
(1983), at 4123.)
We are therefore left with the conclusion that an agreement of sale of 
specific goods will be held frustrated when the whole promised quantity 
of goods is destroyed. Or that the goods are badly damaged as to alter 
their nature and become something else in a business sense.
Fourthly The perishing of the goods must be through no fault of either 
party.
Fifthly The perishing of the goods must be subsequent to the 
agreement to sell the goods.
Sixthly The risk in goods must not have been passed to the buyer. So if 
the goods were sold and perished after the risk has passed to the buyer, 
then the contract would not be frustrated.42 To this effect S. 20 (1) 
provides:
"Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the
property in them is transferred to the buyer, but when the property in them is
transferred to the buyer the goods are at the buyer’s risk whether delivery has
been made or not".4^
When these requirements are met, then the contract can be frustrated, 
or avoided, as expressed in this Act.44 Both parties are discharged from 
liability, that is, the buyer to pay the price, and the seller for non­
delivery.(Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), p. 170.)
What is to be noted is that, S. 7 applies to all agreements to sell specific 
goods as required above. But it also applies in the case of S. 18 r. 2 & 3, 
and S. 19.45
42 Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), at p. 171.
42 It is to be noted that under French law too, the risk passes with the ownership 
and not with the delivery of the thing sold. The opposite rule is held under Algerian 
law. That is to say the risk of a destruction passes with the delivery and not with the 
ownership.
44 Dobson, Sale o f Goods and Consumer Credit (1975), at 4.08.
4^ Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (3rd ed., 1987), at p. 258.
S. 18. r.2 provides:" Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods and the 
seller is bound to do something to the goods, for the purpose of putting them into a 
deliverable state, the property does not pass until the thing is done, and the buyer has
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What is further to be noted is that, S. 7 of the S.G.A, can be negated or 
varied by parties according to S. 55 (l).46
It has to be borne in mind that a contract of sale can be frustrated by 
events other than the perishing of the goods, for example by requisition 
see Re Shipton ([1915] 3 K.B.676), but the frustration here is under 
common law rules and not under this Act. (See Schmitthoff, Sale o f Goods 
(1966), at p. 55, and Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at para. 430). 
Schmitthoff (id.) suggests that the frustration of the contract by the 
requisition is possible where the goods are specific. If they are not 
ascertained there can be no frustration unless those goods are assumed bv 
both parties (reference is made here to the case of Re Badische see above) to be the 
subject-matter of the contract ie the contracted goods. But it is to be noted 
-as has been said- that where both parties contemplate a source of supply 
of goods, and this fails to materialise, then there can be no excuse for the 
non performance of the contract. It should not be inferred from what 
Schmitthoff says that frustration may occur simply by the fact that the 
contracted goods were mutually assumed by both parties to be such.(What 
has been said in p. 43 & pp. 47-48 supra, are applicable here.).
We may conclude from what has been said that under English, 
Scottish, French and Algerian laws, that when in a contract of sale of
notice that it has been done."
S.18. r.3 provides:" Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods in a 
deliverable state but the seller is bound to weigh, measure, test, or do some other act or 
thing with reference to the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the price, the property 
does not pass until the act or thing is done, and the buyer has notice that it has been 
done.".
S .19 provides:" Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods or where 
goods are subsequendy appropriated to the contract, the seller may, by the terms of the 
contract or appropriation, reserve the right of disposal of the goods until certain 
conditions are fulfilled,
and in such case, notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to the buyer, or to a 
carrier or other bailee or custodier for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, the 
property in the goods does not pass to the buyer until the conditions imposed by the 
seller are fulfilled.".
As is seen this section deals with what is called the right of disposal. That is to say, 
where the seller reserves the right to property, until some conditions are fulfilled, for 
example until he gets the purchase price. See Schmitthoff, Sale o f Goods (1966), at 
92.
46 Schmitthoff, Sale o f Goods (1966), at p. 196.
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goods, the subject matter of the contract is accidentally destroyed before 
the risk passes to the buyer (by the conclusion of the contract. But by the delivery 
under Algerian law), the contract would be held fmstrated or as involving a 
case of force majeure. Thus without considering the details involved in 
Section 7 of the S.G. Act 1979, the rule under the above laws is 
substantially the same.
0 .  Frustration under the Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967 
(art. 74) or the 1964 Convention and under The 1980 U.N Convention on
International Sale of Goods (art. 79).
Having studied S. 7 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, it is worth noting 
that, there is another provision related to the doctrine of frustration. This 
is Article 74 of the Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967 
(U.L.I.S). its historical background, its application and its main provision 
viz, art. 74 will be discussed. Since the 1980 convention has replaced the 
old one, it is therefore of importance to study it. It should be however, 
noted that the United Kingdom adhered to the old one but not to the new 
one, whereas France adhered to the new one only.47
1. Frustration under The Uniform Laws On International Sales Act 1967
(or the 1964 Convention)
A. The Historical Background of U.L.I.S
In order to unify the substantive law48, relating to international sales, 
two Conventions have been signed, at the Hague in 1964.
One of them is the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 
(abv.U.L.I.S). The second is the Uniform Law on the Formation of the
47 it is remarked by Barry Nicholas (at p. 202), that there is no reported case 
either in Scottish or English courts which involve the 1964 Convention. This might be 
explained by the fact that British businessmen do not refer to this Convention in their 
dealings. See Barry Nicholas, "The Vienna Convention On International Sales Law" 
(19891105 Law Quarterly Review.201.
It should further be noted that the U.K ratified the 1964 Convention under the 
reservation that it will be applied only in the case where the parties choose it as the law 
of their contract. Barry Nicholas (1989), at p. 202.
48 Schmitthoff, Sale o f goods (1966), at p. 37.
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contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
The two Conventions, have been ratified by the United Kingdom, and 
statutory effects is given to them by "The Uniform Laws on International 
Sales Act 1967". This Act came into force on August 18th,1972.49
B. The Scope of Application of U.L.I.S.
1. When U.L.I.S Applies.
U.L.I.S applies to contracts for the international sale of goods. 
Therefore domestic contracts are excluded.50 Two conditions are 
necessary for the application of U.L.I.S.
(a)- Parties to the contract have to carry out their business in different 
contracting states.
(b)- An element of intemationality51 must be involved in their 
contract. This is so in three instances:
1- Where the goods are in the course of carriage, or will be carried 
from one state to another.
2- Where the acts constituting the offer and the acceptance are effected 
in different states.
3- Where the goods are to be delivered in a state other than the place 
where both offer and acceptance were effected.(Atiyah, Sale o f Goods{\915) 
p. 239.)
2. When U.L.I.S is Excluded.
U.L.I.S, is not applicable in the following instances:
(a)- Where contracting states do not consider themselves as different 
states, since U.L.I.S applies to contracts between different states.52
49 Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), at p. 239, Kenneth C. Sutton, "The Draft 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. Part.1" (1976) 4 Australian Business 
Law Review.269. at p. 269 footnote. 1.
50 But it is possible for parties to a home contract, to adopt U.L.I.S. Or that the 
state may apply it to home as well as to international transactions. See Schmitthoff 
(1966), at 323. Parties may also exclude the application of Art. 74 from their contract, 
or to provide for excusable circumstances not provided for in this article. See 
Graveson R. H., Cohn E. J., Diana Graveson, The Uniform Laws on International 
Sales Act.1967. A Commentary (London, Butterworths. 1968), at p. 96.
5 1 Feltham J. D, "Uniform Laws on International sales Act 1967" (1967) 30 
Modem Law Review.670. at p. 671.
52 This is especially so where the contracting parties have similar provisions
related to sales law. An example of this is the U.K and the Commonwealth countries.
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(b)- Some contracts are excluded from its application, such as sales of 
securities -sale of negotiable instruments or money- sale of any ship- 
vessel or aircraft which is or will be subject to registration- sale of 
electricity- sale by authority of law or execution or distress.55
C. Article 74 of U.L.I.S.
This is the main provision concerning the subject under discussion, ie 
frustration and impossibility. Under the heading of "Exemptions", it 
reads that:
1- Where one of the parties has not performed one of his obligations, he shall not 
be liable for such non-performance if he can prove that it was due to circumstances 
which, according to the intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, he was not bound to take into account or to avoid or to overcome; in the 
absence of any expression of the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to what 
reasonable persons in the same situation would have intended.
2- Where the circumstances which gave rise to the non-performance of the 
obligation constituted only a temporary impediment to performance, the party in default 
shall nevertheless be permanently relieved of his obligation if, by reason of the delay, 
performance would be so radically changed as to amount to the performance of an 
obligation quite different from that contemplated by the contract
The provision of the Act appears to be in accord -with some 
reservations54- with English doctrine of discharge of contractual 
relationships by impossibility or frustration.
From that provision, we can say that, there are two sets of 
circumstances which prevent a contracting party from the performance of 
his obligations. The first one is where that party is permanently 
prevented, the second one is where he is temporarily prevented (or 
delayed).
See Schmitthoff (1966), at p. 37.
55 Art. 5 of the Act, see Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), at p. 241, and similarity 
see art. 2 of the 1980 Convention. It is also to be noted that, where U.L.I.S applies the 
rules as to private international law are excluded, (Art. 2 of the Act) see Schmitthoff 
(1966), at p. 323.
54 This is because as it will be seen later on, this provision is not totally similar to 
English law as it appears at first sight.
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1. Where the performance is permanently prevented.
In this case the contracting party is not liable for the non-performance, 
but only if he can prove that, he was not bound to take those circumstances 
into account, or to avoid, or to overcome them, at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. In other words, this means that, those 
circumstances were not contemplated 55 (ie unforeseen), and that he 
could not avoid or overcome them.
In order to determine whether such requirements are met or not, it is 
necessary to refer to the intention of the parties to the contract, at the time 
of its conclusion.
If such intention cannot be ascertained.56 Then reference is to be 
made to the objective57 test provided by that Act. This test is the 
"reasonable person in the same situation", taking into account the trade practices 
in relation to the contract in question.(Legal Issues., p. 58.)
2. Where the performance is temporarily prevented.
When the impediment is only temporary, then the permanent release 
from further performance is only possible where the delay caused by such 
circumstances, is such as to render the performance of the contract an 
entirely different obligation from that contemplated by the contract.58 
Or as it is stated in this Act
"So radically changed as to amount to the performance of an obligation quite
different from that contemplated by the contract"5^
This test is in fact similar to that used in the English doctrine of 
frustration of a contract.(Schmitthoff, Sale o f Goods{ 1966) p. 327, and Legal 
Issues etc p. 59.)
As to the reservations already expressed, that is, this provision is
55 (1982) 2 Legal Issues of European Integration at p. 58.
56 As parties may, for example, not have contemplated such an event.Ibid.
57 Michael G. Rapsomanikis, "Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law 
and Comparative Law" (1980) 18 Duquesne Law Review.551. at p. 573.
58 See Schmitthoff, sale o f Goods (1966), at p. 327.
59 Art. 74 (2) U.L.I.S. The test of "radically different.." reflects Common law 
rules whereas the conditions stated in art. 74/1 might reflect Civil law principles.
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similar to that of the English doctrine of discharge of contract by 
frustration.60 Generally speaking, the criticism made to the wording of 
Art 74, is about the difficulty in giving an accurate definition for the 
different terms used in it. In other words, using concepts, which cannot 
bear the same legal meaning in different legal systems, especially common 
law and continental law (mainly French law). For example in para 1. it is 
stated:MWhere one party...one of his obligations...". This implies that, a 
contract creates a lot of obligations, and that, a party to a contract, may 
fail to perform one or more of his obligations. This is comprehensible to 
a civil law lawyer, but certainly not, to a common law lawyer. This is 
because; obligations which are -under civil law- created by law, are, in 
common law created simply by way of implied terms.
An example which may clarify this idea, is to be found in the Sale of 
Goods Act 1893. The duty of the seller, as stated there, is only to deliver 
the goods, and of the buyer is to pay the price. All other duties are 
implied terms, in the contract.( (1979) Am.Jou.Comp.L pp. 234-35.)
Another aspect of the difficulty for a common law lawyer is that, his 
doctrine of frustration applies to the contract as a whole or to nothing. So 
he cannot see how one or more obligations can be frustrated, while the 
contract as a whole is not.
Another observation is that, whereas para 1, speaks in terms of release 
from liability, para 2, speaks in terms of release from obligations.((1979) 
Am.Jou.Comp.L p. 234.)
Also where the article reads "due to circumstances..to take into account.." 
this in fact is in accordance with the civil law approach. This is because 
the liability is based on 'fault', and the non-performing party has to prove 
that the frustrating event was beyond his control and foresight. However, 
the common law approach is different since the non-performing party has 
to prove that his obligation is rendered impossible or that it becomes 
radically changed from that undertaken. (V1979) Am.Jou.Comp.L p. 237.)
Another remark is that Art. 74/2 speaks of 'change in the obligation', and 
this is inconsistent with the common law approach, because the 'fundamental 
change' under the common law covers the performance of the contract as a
60 See generally Barry Nicholas, "Force Majeure and Frustration" (1979) 27 
American Journal of Comparative Law. 231, at pp. 231 et seq.
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whole and not a change in one or more obligations, which is in fact a civil 
law approach.6!
But it may be noted that the Act uses the word 'obligation', therefore it 
is expected that the change will be in the obligation. It has already been 
said that under common law -the example of the sale of goods- there is 
only one obligation whereas the others are implied. However, in civil law 
many obligations are stated in the statute and some of them may be 
implied. This is the opposite of the common law. To this effect, saying 
that there is a change in the contract, is only another way of saying that 
there is a change in the obligation. Even common law lawyers use the 
term 'obligation' in relation to frustration. For example Chitty says that 
there must be a 'radical change in the o b lig a tio n ' and not in the 
circumstances.(See Vol. 1 (25th ed., 1983), at para. 1526-27). Another 
example is given in the speech of Sir John Donaldson in Marshall V. 
Harland ([1972] 1 W.L.R.899, at 904), where he said -in defining the 
doctrine of frustration-
"... all that the lawyer means by "frustration" of a contract..[is where] a 
contract...cease[s] to bind the parties if, through no fault of either of them 
unprovided for circumstances arise in which a contractual obligation becomes 
impossible of performance or in which performance of the obligation would be 
rendered a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the 
contract.". (See also C. M. Schmitthoff, Helsinki (1961), at p. 128).
On the whole these remarks show the difficulty in drafting an accurate 
uniform law for all merchants, and at the same time fitting all legal 
systems. It is for this purpose that a new Convention had been drafted in 
order to improve the previous one. This Convention is "The 1980 U.N 
convention on contracts for the international sale of goods".
n . The 1980 United Nations Convention On Contracts For The 
International Sale Of Goods.
In order to understand the reason of drafting this new Convention, 
general comments should be made concerning the old one.
61 (1979) Am. Jou. Comp. L at p. 241.
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A. General Remarks on the 1964 Convention.
The first remark is that very few countries participated in the 1964 
convention. The participants in the preparatory work of this convention 
were mainly from civil law tradition.62 This is so even if its wording 
reflects conceptions of the Common law.63 This fact was one of the 
reason which made France not ratify it.(Plantard p. 312) Only nine states 
ratified this Convention. (Plantard p. 313)
Among the criticisms directed to the 1964 Convention is that this 
Convention was too complex and it used abstracts, artificial and vague 
concepts.(See Sutton p. 269, and Ndulo p. 4) It concerned regional rather 
than global trade. It took little account of the developing countries.(Sutton 
p. 269, and Ndulo p. 3) This may be due to the fact that very few of the third 
world countries participated in its preparation.64 As a result, concepts 
used in this Convention were familiar to western countries but unclear for 
non-westem ones.65
Thus it appears that substantial modifications of the 1964 Convention 
were necessary in order that it could attract countries of different legal, 
social and economic systems.(Sutton p. 269, Nicholas B. (1989), p. 203) To 
this end, a working group of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was set up in 1968. It took it 7 
years (from 1969 to 1976).(Sutton p. 269, and Ndulo pp. 2 & 3) During the 
preparatory works of this convention many countries of different legal,
62 Michael Joachim Bonell, "La Nouvelle Convention des Nations-Unies sur les 
Contrats de Vente Internationale de Marchandises" (1981) 7 International Trade Law 
& Practice.7. at p. 8, and Muna Ndulo, "The Vienna Sales Convention 1980 and the 
Hague Uniform Laws on International sale of Goods 1964: A Comparative Analysis" 
(1989) 38 Part. 1 International & Comparative Law Quarterly. 1. at p. 1, Nicholas B. 
(1989), p. 203.
63 Jean Pierre Plantard, "Un Nouveau Droit Uniforme de la Vente Internationale: 
La Convention des Nations Unies du 11 Avril 1980" (1988) 115 Journal du Droit 
Intemational.311. at p. 313.
64 See Martin L. Ziontz, "A New Uniform Law for the International Sale of 
Goods: Is it Compatible with American Interests?" (1980) 2 North Western Journal 
of International Law & Business. 129. at p. 134.
65 See Ziontz at p. 134. For other criticisms pointed out by an American 
delegation at that time, see Ziontz pp. 137 et seq.
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social and economic systems were represented (ie Western countries, 
Eastern ones, others from Africa, Latin America.).(See Ziontz p. 147 
footnote. 120, and Ndulo pp. 24-25)
As to the 1980 Convention it is less complex, less abstract and shorter 
than the previous one.(Sutton p. 270) There was in fact a reduction of one 
third of the articles compared with the old one.(Bonell p. 10) Among the 
countries which ratified this convention, there are France and the United 
States of America.
This convention came into force on January 1 1988.(See Plantard p. 311, 
and Ndulo p. 1, Nicholas B. (1989), p. 201) Parties are allowed to exclude the 
application of this convention to their contract.(Bonell p. 12, and Ndulo p. 8)
B. The Sphere of Application of the 1980 U.N. Convention.
The sphere of application of this new Convention is substantially 
different from the old one. Thus it is no more a question of goods sold 
having to move from one state to another, or that the offer should have 
been made in one state and the acceptance in another. The 1980 
Convention applies either when the parties have their place of business in 
different contracting states (ie states having ratified this convention), or that by 
application of private international law, the law of one contracting state 
will be applied (ie the application of this convention as a consequence). This 
would mean that if one of its conditions is met, it will apply even if the 
contract of sale is formed (ie offer and acceptance) and executed in one single 
state.66
C. Article.79.67
This article reads :
"(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that
the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control, and that, he could not
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the
66 Ndulo pp. 7-8, Ziontz p. 151, Bonell p. 11, Sutton pp. 271 et seq. and see 
"The 1980 Vienna Convention On The International Sale Of Goods" Lausanne 
Colloquium Of November 19-20, 1984. Publications De L'Institut Suisse De Droit 
Compare. (Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag Zurich 1985. (Reprint 1987)), at pp. 26 
et seq. For more details and examples of application see Plantard at pp. 318-19 et seq.
67 For an interesting and detailed study of this article see C. M. Bianca, M. J. 
Bonell. Commentary., at pp. 572 et seq.
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conclusion of the contract or to have avoid or overcome it or its consequences.
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has engaged to 
perform the whole or part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability only if:
(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and
(b) the party whom he has engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that 
paragraph were applied to him.
(3) The exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during which the 
impediment exists.
(4) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment 
and its effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other 
party within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to 
have known of the impediment, he is liable for damages resulting from such non­
receipt.
Thus it can be seen that a new requirement is added. This is that the 
impediment must be beyond the control of the party invoking the 
exoneration. In other words it must not be imputable to him.68 The 
other modification is that, regard is to be given to what cannot reasonably 
be expected to be taken into account (ie unforeseen. Bianca & Bonell p. 578 and 
pp. 580-81), or be avoided or overcome concerning either the event itself 
or its consequences. Under the old Convention, we have seen that regard 
is to be made first to the intention of the parties and then to the reasonable 
person. We also note that the word "consequences" is a new addition in 
this Convention. This is because sometimes the event itself is foreseen 
whereas its consequences are not.69 The other modification is that the 
word "circumstances" as used in the old Convention is substituted in this 
new Convention by the word "impediment", which appears to be more 
precise. (See also Bianca & Bonell p. 579)
68 See Bruno Oppetit, "L'Adaptation des Contrats Internationaux aux 
Changements de Circonstances: La Clause de 'Hardship'" (1974) 101 Journal du 
Droit International.794. p. 808, Marcel Fontaine, "Les Clauses de Hardship. 
Amenagement Conventionnel de l'lmprevision dans les Contrats Internationaux a Long 
Terme" (1976) 2 International Trade Law & Practice.7. p. 21, Michael D. Aubrey, 
(1963) 12 Int'l & Comp. L. P .. at p. 1182, and see Bianca & Bonell pp. 579-80, 
Schmitthoff, Export Trade (1986), p. 150
69 Cf with what El Fazary is suggesting under the theory of imprevision (the 
condition of unforeseeabilitvl.Infra.
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It has also rightly been pointed out that para.l, reflects to a certain 
extent the principle of force majeure of Civil law countries.70
The other modifications are the question of performance being made 
through a third party, and the one of notification. This may reflect what 
is said to the effect that this Convention was drafted "with much greater regard 
for international commercial practice than was the ULIS".(Ziontz p. 177) The 
exoneration under this new Convention has its effect during the time of 
the impediment. The solution under the 1964 Convention is more 
practical than this one. This is because it may happen that after a long 
delay, the performance, if enforced, would be radically changed. 
Normally in such a case the contract should be terminated rather than 
enforced as it is the case under this new Convention.7!
Section Two. The Non Availability of the Subject Matter of the Contract 
or a Thing Essential to its Performance.
Under this section we will study the cases where the subject matter of 
the contract or a thing essential to its performance is no longer available 
in order to be used for the purpose for which the contract was concluded. 
This non availability may take the form of a requisition or a seizure or a 
damage caused to the subject matter of the contract or to a thing essential 
to its performance which make it unfit for the purpose of the contract. In 
other circumstances that non availability will have the effect of altering 
the nature of the contract.
§.1. Requisition.
The cases discussed below, will show how courts deal with the event of
70 See Plantard p. 360, and Anna Kamarul (et al), "The 1980 U.N. Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" IN. Meeting on International Trade 
Law.7th, Australian Academy of Science. Caruberra, 1980. 7th International Trade 
Law Seminar. Canberra. 1980., at p. 260, Nicholas B. (1989), p. 235, and see Bianca
& Bonell p. 578.
7 1 See also Barry Nicholas (1989), p. 236. It might be said that the suspension 
of the contract as the only solution to problems of nonperformance, is also a "short 
sighted view" or "an all or nothing solution", just as the termination of the contract is, 
when it is the only solution to problems of frustration. See p. 168 infra. But see 
Bianca & Bonell at p. 591.
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requisition when it concerns a subject matter of a contract or a thing 
essential to its performance.
Cases of English and French laws will be given separately and then 
some comments will be made on them. Before dealing with these cases, it 
can be said that under English law, when the goods -if speaking of a 
contract of sale- are specific, and if before the ownership of them passes 
to the buyer, they are requisitioned, then the contract of sale may be held 
frustrated since there is a real impossibility of performance.72
As to the question whether the contract can be frustrated by requisition 
where the goods are unascertained, it can be said that since the requisition 
might be a frustrating event, what has been said supra -concerning the 
question of frustration of unascertained goods- applies here. But 
Benjamin suggests that normally there can be no frustration unless it was 
the common intention of the contracting parties that those goods would be 
-in whole or in part- the contracted goods. (Benjamin (1974), para. 438 
referred to the case of Re Badische).7^
French law is not different in this respect. Thus, where the requisition 
concerns a specific thing, the seller can plead force majeure (this solution 
can also be applied under Algerian law).(See Fiatte (1932), p. 11). However, force 
majeure cannot be pleaded for the sale of unascertained goods (chose de 
genre) and this by application of the maxim genera non permit. But 
where the source of supply is stated in the contract, and that source fails, 
the debtor might claim his exoneration. This in fact is also the position 
taken by the English courts. Because when we have said that frustration 
can apply to a sale of unascertained goods although in rare circumstances, 
one of the examples given was that the goods were to be provided from a 
named country which became an enemy. Thus we see that the source of 
supply here too was determined. Therefore the general principle to the 
effect of genus nunqzm pemnt is applicable for the other cases.
72 See Re Shipton Anderson & Co V. Harrison Bros [1915] 3 K.B.676. 
Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at para. 438, and see Rudolf Gottschalk, 
Impossibility o f Performance in Contract. With a Supplement for the years 1938-1944 
(London, Stevens & Sons. 1945), at p. 11 footnote (i), and Treitel (1987), at p. 670.
72 What has been said in supra about the comment made on the question of the
contemplated particular source (p. 43 & pp. 47-48 & p. 50) can be applied here.
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I- Requisition of Ships under English Law.
Three English cases are given here, where the main question was 
whether the interruption in performance of the contract, caused by that 
event (ie requisition), was such as to put an end to it. It should be noted 
that when discussing the French cases, we will not look at the question of 
interruption caused by the requisition and whether it puts an end to the 
contract. This is because under French or Algerian law, the question is 
whether the event itself (ie requisition) can be treated as a case of force 
majeure or not. If it is so considered, then there is a consideration of the 
effect of this event, in other words whether the court will terminate the 
contract (as it is the solution and the only one under English law, where such an 
event is considered as a frustrating event) or suspend it (such a solution cannot be 
found under the English doctrine of frustration).
In two cases; viz F.A.Tamplin Steamship Co Ltd V. Anglo-American 
Petroleum products Co Ltd ([1916] 2 A.C.397.), and Port Line Ltd V Ben 
Line Steamers Ltd ([1958] 2 Q.B.146.), the contract was not frustrated. In 
Tamplin there was a contract of time charterparty for five years. After 
being used for two years the ship was requisitioned and twenty two 
months remained before the expiry date of the contract. This made the 
Lords decide that, the contract was not frustrated, since the interruption 
was not such as Mto make it unreasonable to require the parties to go on.". Many 
months are left in which the ship can be used before the five years 
expired.(Lord Lorebum in the Tamplin case p. 408.) So the interruption period 
was not sufficient enough to put an end to the contract.
There was an opinion amongst their Lords that time charterparty (as 
opposed to voyage charterparty) could not be frustrated , since it: "..does not
contemplate any definite adventure or object to be performed or carried ou t.." .^
In the case of Port Line (above), there was a time charterparty for
74 See Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), at para. 1554. However, in Anglo Northern Trading 
Co V. Emelvn Jones & Williams [1917] 2 K.B.78, Bailhache J. said at p. 84 that 
frustration can apply to a time charterparty. The test he proposed is the probable length 
of deprivation compared with the unexpired duration of the contract of charterparty. 
And see National Carriers V. Panalpina..ri9811 A.C.675, where it is approved that 
frustration applies to all kind of charterparties including time charterparties. Per Lord 
Roskill at 712.
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thirty months, after seventeen months the vessel was requisitioned and 
remained in that state three months. This was held not to frustrate the 
contract, (notice that ten months were left in which she could be used). Diplock J. 
in giving his judgment, and in deciding whether such requisition or 
interruption caused by it, would frustrate the contract or not, referred to 
Lord Lorebum's test in Tamplin , where he said that if:
"the requisition is likely to last for substantially less than the remaining 
period of the charterparty, the contract is not frustrated"
Diplock also referred to the test of Lord Dunedin in the Metropolitan 
case (1918), where he said:
"Was the interruption one which was likely to be so long as to destroy the 
identity of the work or service, when resumed, with the work or service when
interrupted?"( See the Port Line case p. 162.)
Applying these to the case before him he concluded that the contract 
was not frustrated.
However, in Bank Line Ltd V. Arthur Capel & Co ([1919] A.C.435.), a 
time charterparty for twelve months was held to be frustrated by the 
requisition of the ship. The parties agreed that the ship should be 
delivered on April 30th, 1915, but beyond the owners’ control, delivery 
was impossible at that date. Subsequently the ship was requisitioned, and 
three months later the owners sold their ship although it was on 
requisition; because they treated the contract as frustrated and also 
because they gave the charterers the option to cancel the contract if the 
ship was not delivered at the agreed date. At that time the charterers 
brought an action for non-delivery of the ship, and they did not use their 
right of cancellation.
The House of Lords held that the contract was frustrated. Lord Finlay 
LC said:
"A charter for twelve months from April is clearly very different from a 
charter for twelve months from S e p te m b e r " ^
75 Bank Line at 442. Cf with what Bramwell B. said at p. 75 infra. Although the
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and that if that charterparty -after this delay- is to be enforced, it 
would be a totally different thing and the owners could say Non haec in 
foedera veniJG
In cases of interruption of this type (ie requisition) as Lord Shaw of 
Dunfermline said parties have to wait:
»l
... a little before definitely treating the contract ..as at an end..(and) this
tt *7*7
was exactly what they did. J '
Because in fact the owners waited three months to see whether there 
was any prospect of release, and this did not appear to be so, they were 
therefore justified in treating the contract as frustrated. Another 
guidance was given by Lord Sumner; referring to the speech of Bailhache 
J in the case of Anglo Northern Trading Co V Emlvn Jones & Williams 
([1917] 2 K.B.78), where Bailhache J said that in deciding whether a 
contract is frustrated or not, we have to look at the probable duration of 
the deprivation (e.g. requisition) and the period left for the expiry of the 
charterparty.78
case concerns a damage to a ship, but they are very similar. More accurately it might be 
said that the test in the Jackson case (see p. 75 infra) was applied here (ie in Bank Line 
).
7^ The Bank Line case p. 442 'that is not what I promised to do'.
77 The Bank Line case at 449. But it is not necessary that the length of the delay, 
estimated by the party who treats the contract as frustrated, was subsequently proved to 
be as he forecasted. To this effect Bailhache J in Anglo Northern [1917] 2 K.B.78, 
said:" The question will ...be what estimates would a reasonable man of business take 
of the probable length of the withdrawal of the vessel from service with such materials 
whether his anticipation is justified or falsified bv the event.". Cited by Me Elroy, 
op.cit at p. 174 (emphasis is of Me Elroy). Lord Atkinson in Horlock V. Beal [1916] 
1 A.C 486, said at 502 :"It is not necessary, therefore, in such a case to wait till the 
delay has occurred. It is legitimate to come to the conclusion that the delay [caused here 
by war] will be so long and so disturbing to commerce as to defeat the adventure and to 
act accordingly at once. Cited by Mustill J. in Finelvet A.G. V. Vivana Shipping Co 
Ltd [1983] 1 W.L.R.1469, at p. 1479. Cf with what is said under imprevision (infra at 
p. 258) to the effect that whether a party can claim imprevision before his performance 
becomes onerous if he knows that by his performance, the contract would be ruinous to 
him.
78 But Cf with Lord Sumner's speech in Bank Line at p. 458 where he said 
"Delay even of considerable length and of wholly uncertain duration is an incident of
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From the cases given above, it can be said that in cases of requisition, 
one should look at the probable duration of the interruption and at the 
same time take into account how long is left before the expiry date of the 
charterparty. If the probable duration was to last a long time as to make 
performance of the contract, if enforced, a thing radically different from 
what was undertaken, then the contract might be fmstrated.
II- Requisition under French law.
Normally under French law -and this may also be applied under 
Algerian law- the requisitioning of a thing is considered as a case of force 
majeure, since it is what is called a 'fait du prince' (an act of prince).79 But 
it is possible -as will be seen- that the requisitioning will not constitute a case 
of force majeure. It depends therefore on the circumstances of each case. 
The requisitioning can occur during war-time or peace-time.80 The 
cases given below will illustrate the position of the French jurisprudence.
The first principle to start with in dealing with cases of requisition is 
the one held in Chavenon V. Espie (Soc.Feb 28th. 1947.D. 1947.212) where 
the Court of Cassation decided that the requisition constituted for the 
debtor a case of force majeure "exonerating him from his obligations every time it 
has put him in an impossibility to perform his obligations.". Such an impossibility 
is illustrated in Coulbeaux V. Gautier (Paix-Mantes sur-Seine, June 24th 1941, 
Gaz.Pal. 1941.2.205), (C) lent his motorbike to (G), this is called a 'loan for
use' (pret a usage ou commodat) (see art. 1875 French C.C).81 A
maritime adventure, which is clearly within the contemplation of the parties... so much 
so as to be often the subject of express provision. Delays such as these may very 
seriously affect the commercial object of the adventure, for the ship's expenses and 
overhead charges are running on.... None the less this is not frustration.". See Anson 
Law o f Contract (25th ed., 1979), at p. 503.
79 Fait du prince* can be defined as any intervention of the authority, in the 
performance of the contract. See Guy Fraikin, Traite de la Responsabilite du 
Transporteur Maritime (Paris L. G. D. J. 1957), at para. 247. The debtor who is 
prevented from performing his contract because of a fait du prince will be excused for 
his non performance (ie the non delivery of the thing promised) and will not be liable to 
pay damages (ie dommages-interets). The payment of damages is normally due when 
there is a breach of contract, ie a fault of the debtor, but not in the case where the non 
performance is due to a case of force majeure.
80 G. Fraikin at para. 248.
81 This article provides that "A loan for use...is a contract whereby one of the
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military officer took the motorbike from (G) for the purpose of a 
connection with another department of the army. (G) was therefore in the 
impossibility to restore the motorbike to (C). Before the court, (C) 
claimed that (G) was liable and that he should have asked the military for a 
written order of requisitioning. The court rejected his claim saying that 
(G) was right in his act of giving the motorbike to the officer since it was a 
military order, ie from an authority. Even if the order was irregular, this 
would be sufficient to constitute a case of force majeure. Therefore (G) 
was exonerated from his obligation to restore the motorbike.
In the case of Cie du Midi V. Dausse (Cass.Chambre Civ.Sept 29th. 1940. 
Bulletin des Transports, Jan-Feb.l941.p.ll. See Guy Fraikin para. 248), before the 
second world war and because of an inundation the ’maire' of the city in 
which the event took place, requisitioned a quantity of goods (eggs), in 
order to be sold to the population of that city. The Court of Cassation 
considered the requisitioning as a case of force majeure and therefore the 
debtor was exonerated from his obligation to deliver the goods he 
promised. Here again the case involved an impossibility (or an irresistibility) 
of performance.
It is worth noting that the question of requisitioning does not only 
concern the case of a contract of sale or a loan for use or even a contract 
of carriage82, but it may also apply to a contract of employment. Thus in 
the case of Dame Tiffon V. Ste Souistre etc (Soc.May 31st 1945.D. 1946.21), 
the contract of employment of (T) was terminated by the requisitioning of 
the plant of the employer (D). When (T) claimed damages, her action was 
rejected because it was impossible for (D) to employ her (which means to 
perform his obligation). Since this impossibility was not due to the fault
parties delivers a thing to the other to make use of it, on the responsibility of the 
borrower to return it after having used it.". The borrower will be liable for the loss of 
the thing borrowed even if it is caused by force majeure, and this if he employs the 
thing for another use or for a longer time than he should. (See art. 1881 French.C.0 
and see art. 538 Alg.C.C) Furthermore, art. 544/2 Alg.C.C (and similarily art. 1882 
Fr.c.c) states that: "If the thing loaned perishes through a fortuitous event against which 
the borrower could have guaranteed by employing his own, or if, being able to 
preserve only one of the two, he preferred his own, he is liable for the loss of the 
other."., and see El Sanhoury, El Wassit vol. 1 at pp. 1546-47.
82 See to this effect Ste Saltier V. Etat Fran9 ais et S.N.C.F. Trib. Orleans. 
Oct. 10th & 17th. 1946. D.1947 somm. 23.
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of (D) but to a case of force majeure, he was not responsible for the 
termination of the contract. The Court of Cassation confirmed this 
judgment.83
It can be deduced from these cases that the requisitioning is generally 
considered as a case of force majeure, if it is legal, even if it is irregular, 
as is the case where it is made without a written form (as in the first case).84 
But in all these circumstances there must not be any fault of the debtor 
connected with the occurrence of the event of force majeure.85 
However, when the requisitioning is illegal this cannot constitute a case of 
force majeure.86
The legal effect in a case of requisition is that the contract can be 
terminated where the requisition is permanent. However, when it is 
temporary the contract will be held suspended.87
We may note from the cases discussed under both laws, that English 
courts are always using the common test to the effect that the performance 
of the contract if enforced after the interruption caused by the requisition, 
would be a performance of a totally different thing from that undertaken. 
French courts on the other hand, require the traditional conditions of 
force majeure. Thus it has been seen that the requisition was in several 
cases insurmountable for the debtor. It may also be treated as a fait du 
prince. It may also be said that French or Algerian courts would consider 
cases like Tamplin or Port Line as constituting force majeure, and would 
probably suspend the contract. Whereas English courts treated them as 
still binding. The Bank Line case too would be considered under French 
and Algerian laws as a case of force majeure and the contract would be 
either terminated or suspended depending on the delay. This dissimilarity
83 In the case where the plant of an employer is destroyed by fire and this was not 
due to his fault, this event may constitute a case of force majeure. See Ibrahim Zaki 
Akhnoukh, The Algerian Law of Employment (2nd ed., Algiers. O. P. U. 1988), at p. 
47.
84 See Mazeaud, Responsabilite(l970), at para. 1580 footnote. 2.
85 See the comment made on the case of Coulbeaux V. Gautier.
86 See Civ.May 16th.1922.D.P.1922.1.130. See also Marty, Droit Civil Les 
Obligations (1962), at p. 531, para. 487.
87 See Georges Pequignot, "Requisition" (1959) 2 Encyclopedic Dalloz. 
Repertoir de Droit Public et Administratif.765, at para. 127-28.
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would not have existed if suspension were used under English law in cases 
of frustration. English courts -if they were given the possibility of 
suspending a contract in a cases of frustration when this is met- would 
probably have treated cases in which the interruption in performance was 
not so long as to terminate the contract, as suspended only. This would 
therefore make the position of French and Algerian laws on one hand and 
the one of English law on the other very similar.
As to the two tests used in both laws, it is easier -under Algerian or French 
laws- when bearing in mind the traditional conditions of force majeure, to 
decide whether a contract will be treated by courts as a case of force 
majeure or not. Such a forecast is very difficult (in certain cases) when 
dealing with cases of frustration.88 This is because, although the English 
test cited above, is an objective one, nevertheless it lacks the precision as 
that under French law. Thus under English law, we do not really know 
what is this 'fundamentally different obligation' after the requisition. But in 
other cases such as in the cases of Tatem and the coronation cases (e.g. Krell 
infra) this test is clear; because by the frustrating event the purpose of the 
contract was defeated, and if the contract was enforced, it would have 
been a contract of a different character. In other words what is to be done 
with a room viewing nothing interesting, whereas it was let for the 
purpose of viewing the procession of the king.
§.2. Seizure of Ships and Confiscation.
The question of seizure of ships under English law is similarily treated 
by courts as the one of requisition. That is to say, English courts base 
their decisions on whether the interruption caused by that event is long 
enough to make further performance of the contract totally different 
from that undertaken. French courts on the other hand look at events 
closely related to seizure such as the confiscation of goods in deciding 
whether it can constitute a case of force majeure by having the traditional 
conditions. Since these events are differently treated under both laws, 
they will be studied separately and then some comments of a general 
character will be made.
88 See Jeffrey Price, op.cit at p. 91 who holds the same opinion.
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I- Seizure of Ships under English Law.
As will be seen English courts are always using the common test as 
stated above (ie performance if enforced would be a totally different thing 
from that undertaken). This test was also used in the case of W.J.Tatem 
V. Gamboa. ([1939] 1 K.B.132.) This was a time charterparty for one 
month, made for the purpose of evacuating civilians from Spain to 
France. The charterparty was to run from July 1st, 1937. On July 14th - 
because of the war in Spain- the ship was seized and kept till September 
11th. Charterers on August 18th,1937 wrote to the owner saying that they 
disregarded that charterparty, since the purpose of it viz the evacuation of 
civilians could not be realised by its seizure for a long time. The owners 
then brought an action claiming the hire from August 1st till September 
11th,1937.
The question which the court had to answer was whether that seizure 
frustrated the contract, bearing in mind that both parties contemplated 
such an event ie the seizure, at the time they contracted.
In giving his judgment Goddard J referred to the case of Larrinaga & 
Co V. Societe Franco-Americaine (39 T.L.R.316.), where Viscount Finlay 
said that where in a given contract, risks are foreseen, parties may 
provide that in the case of their occurrence they will be released. But if 
parties did not so provide 'it may be clear' that parties contracted on the 
basis of the continued existence 'of a certain state of facts'.8^
If that foundation or basis is defeated then the contract is at an end. 
Then Goddardjcommented on the speech given by Viscount Finlay, saying 
that if the basis of the doctrine of frustration is that it depends on the 
continued existence of a state of facts, then there is no difference whether 
the frustrating event was or was not foreseen; because:
"If the foundation of the contract goes [-by the destruction of the subject
matter, or by a long delay-] it goes whether or not the parties have made a
provision for it..".(Tatem p. 138)
and therefore the contract is frustrated, because by such interruption 
its performance would be performance of a different contract. (Tatem p.
89 Tatem p. 137.
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139.)
All this discussion brings us to the conclusion that although an event is 
foreseen, this does not rule out frustration ; because if the foundation of 
the contract (like to evacuate civilians) is destroyed (by seizure) then the 
contract is at an end; in other words frustrated.
We may note that seizure in this case was temporary, the ship was 
seized on July 14th, and was released on Sept 7th 1937. Under French 
law, confiscation, as will be seen in the following cases, is permanent. 
The traditional conditions of force majeure were used.
II- Confiscation under French Law.
Before studying the cases on this subject it is of interest to quote a 
judge in the first case. "... in order to save [the goods] delivered to the [debtor] the 
debtor was not obliged to risk his life or his freedom for that purpose.".9^ This has 
certainly been applied in the second case but apparently not in the first. 
This will be appreciated after having studied that case.
The first case viz Wilck V. Dlachasse (Fontainebleau.March 20th.1946.Gaz. 
Pal. 1946.1.217), concerns a contract of bailment (depot) in return for a
remuneration (salarie).91 The bailee (depositaire) in the performance of 
his contract (ie keeping the thing bailed) has to use normal care. This is called 
in French law an 'obligation de moyens' (see art. 1927 Fr.C.C, and see art. 
592/2 Alg.C.C. See El Sanhoury, El Wassit vol. 7 part 1 pp. 704-05). In that case 
(W) gave on bail some goods (meubles) to (D). During the war the 
German authorities, confiscated all those goods which belonged to (W) 
who was a jew. (D) argued that the confiscation was a case of force 
majeure and was therefore exonerated from his obligation to restore the 
goods. Another argument he gave was that the association to which he is a 
member, sent him a notice that all the members were ordered by German 
authorities to give a list of all the goods in their possession which belong 
to jewish people. Any refusal were to be declared to the authorities. (D)
90 Under English law too "the law will not compel a man to risk his life" in 
performing his contract. See Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance op.cit. at p. 18.
91 Art. 1915 Fr.C.C defines bailment as: "an act whereby one receives the thing of 
another, with the duty of keeping it and returning it in kind."., and similarly art. 590 
Alg.C.C.
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therefore gave that list (ie of (W)) and as a result these were confiscated. 
The question was therefore whether (D) could be considered as having 
breached his obligation to conserve the goods of (W) when he gave that 
list?.
The tribunal after having cited the sentence quoted above decided that 
(D) was liable for the confiscation; since he could either not send a list at 
all to the Germans or send a partial list of the goods in his possession only. 
Since he did not act that way he was liable and should pay damages to (W).
The second case is Goujon V. Goujon (Trib. Paix. Cande. Nov. 27th. 1945. 
Gaz. Pal. 1946.1.17). It concerns a contract of loan for use. Henri Goujon 
(HG) lent to Louis Goujon (LG) a shot gun, and (LG) gave his gun on loan 
to (HG). After France has been occupied by the Germans, an order was 
issued to those who possessed arms to the effect they should return them to 
the German authorities otherwise they would be sanctioned; one of the 
sanction being the death of the possessor of any arms not returned. (HG) 
returned the arm of (LG) to the Germans, whereas (LG) retained the gun 
of (HG) during the whole period of occupation. After the war ended, 
(HG) asked (LG) to restore his gun. The latter refused arguing that (HG) 
should restore (LG) gun in order to receive his.
The tribunal decided that (HG) was not at fault through his act since he 
was ordered by the Germans to do so. He also risked his life by refusal. 
Therefore he was exonerated from any liability, whereas it was decided 
that (LG) should return the arm of (HG).
The comment which can be made on the first case, depends in fact on 
our assessment of the notion of risk. In other words is it possible and 
acceptable to say that the refusal of giving the list of that jewish person, 
was not really dangerous. We have also to take into account how the 
Germans considered the jewish people, and what consequences do we 
expect in the case where a person protects a jew.92
92 See to this effect Henri & Leon Mazeaud, cases and comment (1950) n:18 
Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil.501. at p. 501. These authors note that the court 
referred to arts. 1927 & 1929 Fr.C.C, to decide whether there was a case of force 
majeure or not, and this as if the bailee has to prove the event of force majeure, and that 
his proof that he had no fault, was not sufficient to exonerate him from his liability. 
This conception is not exact; because the obligation of the bailee is one to use a general 
care (ie obligation de moyens). This means that it is for the creditor to prove that the 
debtor was at fault when performing his contract, and this in order that he can be liable.
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In another case viz, (Cour de Paris. May 3rd.l950.Gaz.Pal.2.71), the 
German authorities in 1940 , during the occupation of France, opened the 
"safe in a bank" of a customer which contained bars of gold. The gold was 
not taken out until 1944. The customer sued that bank claiming damages, 
because the bank, as he alleged, could have hidden the gold between 1940 
and 1944, so that the Germans could not find it. The Court of Paris 
rejected these allegations because, it is said, the order of that authority to 
leave the gold as it was in the safe was irresistible and put the bank in an 
absolute impossibility to do otherwise. Therefore that order was a case of 
force majeure, which exonerated the bank from any responsibility 
concerning the act of the Germans in confiscating that gold. The Court 
also noticed that the bank could refuse to apply the order but it risked the 
life of its employees and that "we are not obliged to behave as heros".
It is to be remembered that if the debtor -who has to restore a thing 
delivered to him- was at fault before the event of requisitioning took 
place, that event would not be considered as a case of force majeure. In an 
illustrative case93 a garage-keeper was liable for the requisitioning of a 
car which was in his garage, and did not rest or.e that car to its owner 
although the latter asked him to do so by the French (as well as the Algerian) 
procedure called the "mise en demeure". After the garage-keeper refused to 
restore the car it was requisitioned.
§3. Ships Trapped.tShatt-al-Arab cases)
The following cases involved the problem of ships being trapped in the 
waterway Shatt-al-Arab, as a result of the war between Iran and Iraq. 
What will be discussed here is the effect of such an event on ships which 
were in this area. The question was whether,being trapped, there could be 
frustration of the contract.
In the case of Finelvet A.G.V. Vivana Shipping Co Ltd ([1983] 1 W.L.R 
1469.)> there was a time charterparty, where a vessel had to carry goods
This is also true for both Algerian and Egyptian laws. See art. 592 Alg.C.C., and see 
El Wassit vol. 7. part. 1 pp. 701 to p. 705.
93 Nogaret V. Charoulet Civ April 7th.l954.D.1954.385. See also Henri Lalou, 
Traite Pratique de la Responsabilite Civile (5eme ed., Paris, Librarie Dalloz. 1955), at 
para. 291.
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from North America to the Persian Gulf. Having discharged the cargo at 
Basrah, the vessel was prevented by Basrah port's administration, from 
leaving the port, because of the outbreak of war. Because of the war, as 
Mustill J said (Finelvet A.G at 1473.e.):
"..the obstacles were such that vessels were unlikely to be able to leave for
several more months at best, and probably much lo n g e r ." .94
Therefore the charterers cancelled the charterparty. When this case 
came before Mustill J he upheld the decision of the arbitrator, that the 
contract was frustrated.fFinelvet A.G at 1471.)
But the problem which remained was whether the war itself or the 
detention consequent to war which frustrated the contract. Having agreed 
with the arbitrator that it was not the war itself which prevented 
performance and therefore put an end to the contract, he said:
"In my judgment..., it is the acts done in furtherance of the war which may
or may not prevent performance..".( Finelvet A.G at 1481.)
Those acts can be explained in this case by the fact that the ship was 
trapped, and because this act is related to the probable duration of the war 
itself, therefore the contract may or may not be fmstrated, depending on 
such duration of war.
Two points have to be made here before discussing the second case. 
The first is that, even if war does not in itself frustrate a contract, 
nevertheless it does frustrate a contract if it has as a consequence, a 
supervening illegality, such as trading with the enemy.("Finelvet A.G at 1481) 
In such a case the contract is frustrated by the simple fact of war. The 
second point is that, in the reported case and in the subsequent one, the 
main question was not the frustration itself, but the specific time of 
frustration. This is not studied here, because we are concerned with
94 This suggests that the test put by Lord Lorebum in Tamplin , and the one put 
by Lord Dunedin in the Metropolitan case (both are cited in pp.62-63 supral will be 
applied in this case.
73
instances of frustration and not the time at which it occurs.
The second case is International Sea Tankers Inc V. Hemisphere 
Shipping .Co Ltd (The Wenjiang) ([1983] 1 Lloyds Rep.400.). This case is 
similar to the first one because here again, in a time charterparty for 
twelve months, a vessel was chartered to carry goods from Basrah to 
India, but she was trapped, and was prevented by the authorities from 
sailing. The detention lasted a long time. As a result of this, the 
charterers treated the contract as frustrated. The arbitrator as well as the 
court held that the contract was frustrated since the vessel was retained 
over two months, and what remained was only four months, which means 
that if the contract was enforced it would be a contract radically different 
from that undertaken.(The Weniiang at 404.) Bingham J in deciding whether 
or not the contract was frustrated in this case, used the test o f:M..the probable 
length of the total deprivation of the use of the vessel as compared with the unexpired 
duration of the charterparty.”95, and said that a "short delay" cannot frustrate 
the contract. (The_Weniiang at 406.)
So it can be seen from the two cases above, that war itself is not a 
frustrating event. However, when it involves trading with the enemy, or 
when the duration of the delay, such as ships being trapped, is such as to 
make further performance of the contract a thing radically different from 
that undertaken, then the contract is to be held frustrated.96
Under French as well as Algerian law, such an act (ie ships being trapped) 
would be considered as a ’fait du prince’. Therefore if it meets the 
conditions of force majeure, then it may exonerate the debtor from his 
liability for non performance of his obligations. As to the effect of this 
event of force majeure, it may either suspend the contract or terminate it 
if there is a long delay as to be intolerable for the creditor.
95 The Weniiang at 406., as in the case of requisition.
96 Therefore whether a contract can be frustrated by delay depends on the length 
of the delay. David M. Walker, Vol. 2 (3rd ed., 1983), p. 137. So it is a matter of 
degree depending on the surrounding circumstances of each case. See Schmitthoff, 
Export Trade (1986), at p. 148, and see Schmitthoff, Helsinki., at p. 142, where he 
rightly pointed out that the disadvantage of this is that it would be uncertain to hold 
when a contract is frustrated, that is to say when the delay frustrates a contract, and this 
is difficult to state. It is for this reason that some contracts state the length of the delay 
beyond which the parties are allowed to treat their contract as at an end. See for a 
clause of this kind infra p. 115.
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§.3. Ships Damaged {break down, going aground)- 
The non-availability of a ship through damage caused by an event 
outside the control of the parties, may also frustrate the contract. It is not 
the event itself, but what results from it (ie the delay). In the cases 
discussed under this heading, the long delay caused by a ship going 
aground was held to frustrate the contract. Here the impossibility 
concerns a thing essential to the performance of the contract.
The first case is Jackson V. Union Marine Insurance Company 
Ltd.((1874) L.R.10 C.P.125.) In this case the defendant chartered a vessel in 
order to transport a cargo of iron rails from Newport to San Francisco. 
On January 2nd,1872 the ship sailed from Liverpool for Newport, a day 
later she went aground. Her repairs were not completed till the end of 
August 1872 (ie seven months). Meanwhile the charterers, chartered 
another ship for the same purpose, and treated the first contract as 
terminated (ie frustrated) because of the delay.
The question to be answered was whether such a delay frustrated the 
contract and justified the charterers in treating the contract as such. The 
jury were asked by BrettJ whether:
"The time necessary to get the ship off and repairing her so as to be a cargo- 
carrying ship was so long as to put an end in a commercial sense to the 
commercial speculation entered into by the shipowners and charterers".
The jury having answered in the affirmative, BrettJ held the contract 
as frustrated.97 The Court of Appeal affirmed that decision. Bramwell 
B in giving his judgment, said that the jury found that the contract if 
enforced after the ship being repaired, it would impose on the parties a 
different voyage, because parties
"intended (it) to be a spring voyage, while the one after the repair would be 
an autumn v o y a g e " 9 **, which means a new adventure, a new
97 Jackson, cited by Bramwell B. at 141.
98 Jackson 141. It may be noted that a "...marked similarity" existed between 
saying -in this case- that the contract would be something different (ie from a spring 
voyage to an autumn one ) and the test used by Lord Dunedin in Metropolitan at p. 
128; where he said that, the interruption must be "so long as to destroy the identity of
75
agreement. "99
It has also been said that the non-availability of the ship for the voyage, 
means the non-performance of a condition precedent viz, that the "Ship 
will arrive in time (or) shall arrive in a reasonable time.".(The Jackson case (above) at 
145.)
The contract being frustrated, both parties were released; the owner 
from giving another vessel and the charterers from paying the rent.(Fifoot
(1986), p. 569.)
The second case is Nickoll & knight V Ashton, Edridge & Co ([1901] 2 
K .B.126.). The defendants agreed to sell to the plaintiffs a cargo of 
cotton-seed. This was to be shipped in a steamship called "Orlando". The 
loading was to be made at an Egyptian port on January 1900 and goods 
were to be shipped to the U.K. On December 1899 and owing to perils of 
the sea, and without fault of either, the ship was so badly damaged as it 
could not arrive at the loading port at the agreed time (ie January 1900). 
The buyers therefore brought an action claiming damages for failure to 
ship the goods. The question to be answered was whether such an event 
(stranding) frustrated the contract and released the sellers from their 
obligation. It was held that the contract was frustrated, because an 
implied condition was to be read into that contract, which is that where 
performance of the contract depends on the continued existence of a thing 
(here the ship), and that thing ceases to exist, then the contract is at an end. 
This is because it was agreed that shipment should be made by the 
"Orlando" and not any other ship. Therefore parties knew from the 
beginning that performance would become impossible unless that
the work or service when resumed with the work or service when interrupted”. Me 
Elroy, Impossibility o f performance (1940), at p. 166.
99 Per Bramwell B at p. 148., cited by Anson (1979), at p. 497. It is to be noted 
that there was a provision in that contract "excepting dangers and accidents of 
navigation”. However, the frustration in this case can be explained by the fact that 
although dangers and accidents of navigation were excepted, which clearly shows that 
"the parties were contemplating and providing for the case of some delay arising from 
these causes, but they were evidently not contemplating a delay so great that the spring 
voyage would become altogether impossible.”. Per Lord Parker in Tamplin case [1916] 
2 A.C.397, at 424 referring to Jackson V. Union etc, and see the speech of Lord 
Justice Scrutton in the Acetylene case at footnote. 7 chapter four.
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steamship continued to be in a fit state "down to and during the month of 
January, 1900". (Pgr A L Smith M R., the Nickoll case p. 132).
So the foundation of that contract viz, the continued existence of the 
ship, has disappeared, and the obvious consequence was the fmstration of 
the contract.
The concept "ceases to exist" has to be understood in a commercial 
sense; because it was explained as to mean that the ship ceases to be a 
"cargo-carrying" ship, which rendered the performance impossible. An 
example was given by A.L.Smith MR (in the court of Appeal) when he said 
that a "ship being at the bottom of the sea" is the same thing as the one "being 
stranded upon a rock in the Baltic, as the Orlando was, thereby wholly unable to take in 
a cargo pursuant to the contract.".^
What can be said -concerning English law- after having discussed the 
question of impossibility regarding the subject matter of a contract or a 
thing essential to its performance (this would include cases of destruction of 
subject matter as Caldwell. Applebv. Howell and those of requisitioning and seizure as 
well as those involving the fact that ships have been trapped or damaged) is that two 
tests are used to base the frustration of contracts. These are that the 
foundation of the contract would go by the destruction of a subject matter 
or a thing essential to its performance. The second one is that 
performance of the contract after the delay caused by a frustrating event, 
would render the performance a thing radically different from that
100 The Nickoll case at 133., here the principle of Tavlor was applied. See also 
Gloag op.cit at para. 11.5 (London & Edinburgh Shipping Co V. The Admiralty. 1920 
S.C.309., a ship so injured as to be totally unfit for the purpose for which it was 
chartered). So the delay involved in the cases of requisition, seizure, stranding -apart 
from Nickoll -, ships being trapped, all these must have some qualifications, like for 
example to"render the adventure absolutely nugatory" [see Bensaude & Co V. Thames 
and Mersev Marine Insurance Co.fl8971 1 Q.B.29, per Lord Esher M.R. at 31, 
[1897]A.C.600 at 611-12-14]. Or to "make it unreasonable to require the parties to go 
on, [see Metropolitan Water Board..\ 19181 A.C. 119, per Lord Atkinson at p. 131]; or 
to "destroy the identity of the work or service when resumed with the work or service 
when interrupted" [see Metropolitan., above , Lord Dunedin at p. 128]; or "to put an 
end in a commercial sense to the undertaking" [see Jackson V. Union...(18741 L.R.10 
C.P. 125]. Cited by Anson, op.cit (1979), at 503. Or that the delay defeats the 
"commercial venture" of the contract. Cited by John Tillotson, Contract Law in 
Perspective (London, Butterworths. 1981), at p. 144.
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undertaken. It is possible to use these two tests interchangeably -although 
it might be inaccurate to use one test in one case rather than the other- in 
the different cases studied above. Thus in the Jackson case -where the 
radically different test was used- it can be said that by the damage of the ship 
the foundation of the contract viz the spring voyage was defeated. Or that 
the availability of the ship (ie its continued existence) at the time of the 
performance, was the foundation of the contract and this in order to 
perform the contract at the agreed time. The delay (by the fact of the ship 
being damaged) has defeated that foundation and would make as a 
consequence the performance of the contract after the delay a thing 
radically different from that undertaken.
Again in the case of Tatem (seizure) -where the test of the disappearance of the 
foundation of the contract was used- it can be said that the performance of the 
contract after the seizure (ie after being released) would be a performance of 
a different thing.
The interchangeability between these two tests might seem clear in the 
speech of Goddard J. in the Tatem case (supra p. 69) where he said that 
the foundation of the contract goes by the destruction of the subject matter, or by a long 
delay...". Thus he used the test of the "foundation" for cases involving 
long delay w hich as we have seen were generally based on the test of "a 
thing radically different". We may also notice that in the same case it was said 
that after the interruption the performance of the contract would be one 
of a different thing.(See supra p. 69)
As to French law, suffice it to say that any case involving the release of 
the debtor from his obligation is based on the traditional conditions of 
force majeure. However, holding a contract terminated or suspended 
only, may depend -in certain circumstances e.g.'illnessYinfra)- on the length of 
the interruption involved.
Generally speaking, it can be said that under English, Scottish as well 
as French or Algerian laws, requisition, seizure, ships being trapped, can 
all be considered as force majeure or frustrating events if they meet the 
conditions required under both doctrines, in other words, the English test 
of 'performance if enforced would be a thing totally different from that 
undertaken', and the traditional conditions of force majeure. The main 
difference between the two systems is that whereas English law decides
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for the radical solution (ie the termination of the contract) French or Algerian 
law provide two solutions viz, the termination and the suspension of the 
contract. Thus if the impediment is permanent the first solution would be 
adopted, whereas if it is temporary then it would be the second which 
would be adopted, unless the delay or the interruption is very long as to be 
intolerable. In this last case, courts may held the contract terminated. 
Another important remark should be added which is that, the English 
cases already discussed and which were held not to be frustrated simply 
because the common test was not met, would be decided under French or 
Algerian law as involving cases of force majeure if its traditional 
conditions are met. This is so even if by the interruption the English test 
is not met.
Thus Tamplin or Port Line in which the contract was not frustrated 
and the freight was to be paid during the period of requisition, might be 
considered under French or Algerian law as involving force majeure and 
the contract may be held suspended during the time of requisition which 
would mean that the effects of the contract are also suspended. This 
difference -as has already been pointed out- is due to the fact that the English 
and the Scottish doctrine of frustration provides an "all or nothing" 
solution that is to say, either the termination of the contract if the common 
test is met, or its enforcement if the test is not met. Whereas if -under the 
English and the Scottish doctrine of frustration- the suspension of the contract 
were provided for cases where the delay for example was not so long as to 
make further performance, if enforced, a different thing, then such a 
contract might probably be suspended. This would make the decisions of 
French and English courts similar in a similar set of facts of a given case.
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CHAPTER THREE. IMPOSSIBILITY AS REGARDS PARTIES TO
THE CONTRACT
The impossibility of performance involved in a contract is not always 
related to the subject matter of the contract but it may concern its parties. 
It is this type of impossibility which will be discussed in this chapter. The 
impossibility here is the one dealing with the non availability of one of the 
parties to the contract. These instances are death, incapacity, mobilisation, 
imprisonment and strike.
Section One. Death.
A contract which requires specific skills from a party to a contract, 
may be frustrated by his death or incapacity.! Such a contract is called a 
personal contract2, or a contract for personal services3 (commonly 
called under French and Algerian laws 'contracts intuitu personae' ie those which 
cannot be performed unless by the debtor himself).^
Under English law a general mle is laid down by Pollock C.B in the 
case of Hall V. Wright5, where he said:
"All contracts for personal services which can be performed only during the 
lifetime of the party contracting are subject to the implied condition that he shall 
be alive to perform them; and, should he die, his executor is not liable to an 
action for the breach of contract occasioned by his d eath . "6
1 See David M. Walker, Vol. 2 Principles o f Scottish Private Law (3rd ed., 
1983), at p. 135, and see Hudson's, Building and Enginering Contracts Including the 
Duties and Liabilities o f Architects, Engineers and Surveyors (by I. N. Duncan Wallace 
10th ed., 1970), at p. 360, and see G. M. Sen at p. 144 .
2 Treitel (1983), defines it as a contract where:"one party relies on the skill and 
judgment of the other" p. 567.
3 Chitty Vol. 1 (1968), para. 1287.
4 As to French law see Marty (1962), at p. 529, and Mazeaud, Responsabilite 
(1970), at p. 712, and Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil 
Frangais Tome 6. Obligations lere Partie. (2eme ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. 1952), at p. 
514, and Christian Larroumet, Droit Civil. Les Obligations lere Partie. Tome 3. (Ed 
Economica. 1986), at pp. 699-700, and G. Thery (1948), at p. 98.
5 (1858) E. B & E. 746, 793. Death is also a frustrating event under Scottish 
law. See J. Smith V. Mre Ann Riddell (1886) 14. R. 95, and see D. M. Walker, 
Principles.. Vol. 2 (3rd ed.) at p. 135.
6 Approved by Kelly C.B. in Robinson V. Davison (1871), 6 E.X.269, see
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Therefore the contract would be frustrated in such a case.
A judgment in the same direction was given in the case of Stubbs V. 
Holly well Rv Co (Y18671L.R.2 EX. 311.), where the judges were of the 
opinion that the contract was one for personal services and that it was 
terminated by the death of the employee (Stubbs). In the case of Graves V 
Cohen and others ((1930) 46 T.L.R.121.), the defendant (Cohen) engaged 
the plaintiff to ride his horses for the "flat racing season" of 1928. But the 
defendant died before that date. It was held that the contract was 
frustrated by the death of the defendant. MR Justice Wright in giving his 
judgment said that this contract was either a personal one or that its 
performance depended on the existence of both parties/Graves V Cohen at 
p.123.)
Obviously if the contract is not one which depends for its performance 
on the skill of a particular person then it will not be terminated by 
frustration. This is what was decided in Phillips V. Alhambra Palace 
Company ([1901] 1 Q.B.59.), where the plaintiffs, a troupe of four music- 
hall performer, entered into a contract with the proprietors of a music- 
hall called Alhambra.. This company was in fact a partnership of three 
persons, this fact was not known to the plaintiffs. After performing the 
first part of their engagement, they were told that their contract was 
terminated by the death of one of the partners. The question to be 
answered was, as Alverstone CJ (in the court of Appeal) said, whether the 
contract depended on "the personal conduct of the deceased party".7 If 
that is so then the death is to put an end to the contract.".(Phillips V. 
Alhambra pp. 63-64).
The court found that this contract was not one for which personal skill 
was required, because plaintiffs did not know who were the partners. 
This was further explained by Kennedy J.8 where he said that it does 
not matter to the plaintiffs, by whom they were to be paid, since as the 
counsel of the plaintiffs said "all the defendants had to do was to pay money, and
Gottschalk Impossibility o f performance at p. 12., and see H. Lesguillons at p. 511. 
But see Me Elroy, op.cit at p. 17, where he says that it is not necessary to base the 
discharge of personal contracts on an implied condition, since such excuse was 
recognised a long time ago.
7 Phillips V. Alhambra pp. 62-3.
® Phillips V. Alhambra p. 64.
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that could be done equally well by any one else.", therefore the contract was not 
frustrated.
Under French and Algerian laws the death of the debtor is also a case 
of force majeure9 especially when the contract is concluded in 
consideration of the person of the debtor, (ie a contract intuitu personae). 
Some authors say that there is a tacit clause included in these contracts to 
the effect that the contract will be terminated by the death of the person in 
consideration of whom the contract was concluded.10 (Cf with the principle 
put by Pollock supra in the case of Hall V. Wright )
Therefore it may be seen that English French and Algerian laws, 
consider the death of a debtor as an event putting an end to the contract. It 
is possible to say that the rule laid down by Pollock C.B, is a good 
theoretical basis for the solution held under French and Algerian laws in 
cases of death.
Section Two.HIness or Incapacity.
It has already been said that a general mle was laid down by Pollock C 
B in the case of Hall V. Wright (above). There it was said that in personal
9 However, this is not always true. Bourn an V. La New York . (Ch. des 
Requetes. June 15 th.l911.D.1912.1.181), was a case concerning a contract of 
insurance. The insured party was subject to an apoplexy (stroke) at the due date of 
payment of the premium. The death of that person followed immediately his attack, 
and therefore he was unable to pay the premium. His death was not considered as a 
case of force majeure. See Radouant, op.cit at p. 147, and Barry Nicholas, French 
Law o f Contract, at p. 197.
10 See Marc Vericel, "La Consideration de la Personne dans les Contrats Civils" 
(1982) 4 Travaux Juridiques de HJniversite de Saint-Etienne.185. at p. 193. 
However, where the contract is not concluded on this consideration, the death will not 
terminate the contract. See to this effect: Paris May 30th. 1969. Gaz. Pal. 1970. 2. 
somm.78. For other examples where the death of one of the parties to the contract puts 
an end to the contract see:art. 2003 Fr.C.C and art. 586 Alg.C.C. (contract of agency), 
and see art. 1795 Fr.C.C and art. 569 Alg.C.C (contract of hire of work,"contrat 
d'enterprise"), and see art.439 Alg.c.c (contract of partnership). See Travaux 
Juridiques op.cit at p. 194 (for the French articles only). It is also to be noted that 
where a worker (as in the case of art. 568 Alg.C.C which is almost similar to art. 1787 
Fr.C.C et seql undertook to do a work, died or was incapacitated by an event of force 
majeure after he begun the work, in such a case his death or incapacity may put an end 
to the contract he made, if that contract was intuitu personae.
82
contracts the death of either party puts an end to the contract. The same 
principle applies also where one of the parties is incapacitated by 
illness.11
Under French law the illness cannot be treated as a case of force 
majeure unless it meets the conditions of force majeure, that is, being 
unforeseeable, irresistible12 and not imputable to the debtor. This is in 
fact an application of the principle which states that: "one does not have to 
promise a thing unless able to do it.".13 Thus if a debtor knew that he would 
be ill but nevertheless made a contract to do (perform) a thing, he cannot 
thereafter invoke his illness which prevented him from performing his 
obligation, as a case of force majeure.(G. Thery at p. 100.) (See supra under 
’unforeseeability1)
An English example of the type of impossibility under discussion is the 
case of Boast V Firth ((1868) L.R.4 C.P 1.), where the defendant agreed to 
serve the plaintiff (Boast) as an apprentice for five years. Later the 
defendant could not perform the contract since he was prevented by 
permanent illness.14 It was decided that the contract was terminated; 
because it was for personal services and the continued state of health of the 
apprentice which enabled him to perform the contract must be implied. 
To that effect Montague Smithjsaid:
"It must be implied from the nature of the contract that the continued
existence of the apprentice in a state to perform his part of it, was understood by
the parties; and that, if prevented by the act of god, the performance was to be
excused.'YBoast V Firth p. 8.)
Brett J. said in the same case both parties considered that the 
performance of the contract depended on the continuing state of health of
11 See Anson (1979), p. 499, and Fifoot (1986), p. 559, and Treitel (1983), p. 
654, and see Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz (1987), at p. 221.
12 G. Thery, op.cit at p. 132.
13 Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), op.cit at p. 713.
14 Where the illness is temporary only it was held that the contract cannot be 
frustrated, Patten V Wood (1887) 51 JP 549, cited in Dix & Crump, On Contracts o f 
Employment (6th ed., London, Butterworths. 1980), para. 3.54. For a different 
conclusion see post. Normally under French and Algerian laws, when the illness is 
permanent, this would terminate the contract if the conditions of force majeure are met 
(for more details see infra).
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the apprentice.
In this case, the incapacity was permanent. What is the position when 
the incapacity is only temporary?. Two cases can illustrate the position 
taken by courts. These are Poussard V Spiers & Pond ((1876) 1 Q. B. D. 
410.), and Hart v. A.R.Marshall & Sons.(Tl9771 1 W.L.R.1067.) In the first 
case the plaintiff was engaged by the defendants to play in an opera, the 
engagement was for three months, from November 28th. On November 
23rd the plaintiff ie Poussard fell ill, and on November 25th the 
defendants entered into a contract with another person to play at the 
opera. On December 4th, (ie about the eleventh day of the illness of Poussard) 
the plaintiff recovered and was ready to take her place, but she was 
refused. The court held that the contract was frustrated by her failure to 
attend the opera for the play. In arguing this decision Blackburn J said 
that:
”... the failure on the plaintiffs part went to the root of the matter and
discharge the defendants.”. ^
This is because the illness of Poussard was "serious and of uncertain 
duration". 16
The second case is Hart V. A.R.Marshall & Sons ([1977] 1 W.L.R. 1067.) 
Hart in this case was employed in 1968. In April 1974 he fell ill, and on 
August 1974 his employer took another employee replacing Hart for a 
permanent period.17 In 1976 Hart recovered and offered to take his
16 The Poussard case p. 415. It may be noted that the principle has changed 
here, it is neither a question of ’performance depending on the continued existence of a 
person’(as in cases of death), nor is it a question of 'performance depending on the 
continued state of health' (as in cases of permanent incapacity). The question involved 
in the category of the present case is one of delay; in other words how long do we have 
to wait before treating the contract as frustrated. This is only possible where the delay 
is so long as to go to the root of the contract, or that further performance of the contract 
would render it a thing radically different from that undertaken.
16 Treitel (1983), p. 583 see the Poussard case p. 415 and this is because as it is 
thought, courts cannot speculate as to the duration of incapacity, and this -as will be 
seen later- is the same principle where contracts have been frustrated because of a delay 
caused by war, because there too courts cannot speculate as to the duration of war.
17  Colin Manchester, "Frustration or Dismissal?" (1978) 128.2 New Law 
Journal. 674 at p. 675. col. 1.
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place, but he was refused. In bringing his action for unfair dismissal
(which entitles him normally to compensation) the court of Appeal (EAT) held
that the defendant was justified in not accepting him, and treating the
contract as frustrated. In giving his judgment Phillips J. said:
"It is..impossible to say that unless the employee is dismissed the contract 
must always be taken to continue. To do so would be tantamount to saying that 
frustration cannot occur in the case of short-term periodic contracts of 
employment. ".18
A further argument is that Hart was a "key worker", therefore the 
employer could not continue during the illness of Hart by engaging other 
employees temporarily. It was not reasonable "to continue with temporary 
arrangements".19 Such unavailability destroys the "business purpose of the
contract".20 it should be added that during the illness of Hart (the 
employee) he was always sending medical certificates to his employer. In 
reply to this the court said:
"We do not think that these acts are inconsistent with the contract having 
come to an end. Employees like to keep in touch and employers are content that 
they should in case in the future there may be some opportunity of re­
employment.".
What has been said about the employer might be true, but certainly not 
of the employee. This is because the employee treated the contract as still 
continuing, and the sending of the certificates is an evidence of that. 
Although the employer's intention to terminate the contract was made 
clear by his engagement of another person, what the employee claimed 
was that since the employer has accepted those certificates, by this act he 
showed that he treated the contract as still binding. This act has the effect 
to estop him from claiming frustration of the contract. The Tribunal 
rejected this, saying that:
The Hart case p. 1070. It is interesting to note that under Algerian law -as will 
be seen- the illness of an employee, when it is considered as a case of force majeure, 
can suspend the contract for one or two years as a maximum duration. See infra.
19 The Hart case p. 1071.
20 Dix & Crump para. 3.49.
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"there is no evidence whichever that the employee acted upon such 
representation, if there was one, whether to his detriment or otherwise.".
But this cannot be sustained, because if we look at the definition of 
estoppel, Lord WL-tL-gery C J~in Norfolk C.C V. Secretary of State for 
the Environment ([1973] 3 ALL.E.R.673, at 677), said:
"The whole point of estoppel... as I understand it is that if a man has been
induced to act to his detriment, he ought to be protected.".
In the case of Hart it can be said that Hart has acted to his detriment 
since he did not look for another job, relying on the assumption that his 
contract was still binding. (See Colin M., (1978) 128.2 N.L.J at p. 675 col. 2 & 
3).
The two cases above show that even a short period of illness (eleven days 
in the Poussard case) may frustrate the contract. Again in the Hart case an 
illness of four months put an end to the contract. This may suggest that 
long duration of illness is likely to frustrate the contract. However, in 
another case, an illness which lasted eighteen months did not frustrate a 
contract, this was the case of Marshall V. Harland2! which was decided 
in the court of Appeal and the contract was held as still binding. Sir John 
Donaldson said that to hold a contract as frustrated, we have to ask 
ourselves whether the illness was of such a nature -this is before dismissal- or 
"appear likely to continue for such a period"22 that the performance of 
the contract becomes either impossible or radically different from that 
undertaken when making the contract. As to the present case, he said that, 
further performance of the contract was not impossible and would not be 
a thing radically different from that undertaken.(The Marshall case p. 905.)
Further guidance necessary in dealing with cases of illness, in order to 
know whether it will frustrate the contract or not, are laid down in 
Marshall V Harland (above) by Sir John Donaldson such as "how long 
employment was likely to last in the absence of sickness" and the "nature 
of performance" (perhaps he meant whether he is a key worker or not) and the;
21 [1972] 1 W.L.R. 899, cited by Dix & Crump ibid.
22 The Marshall case p. 904.
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'’nature of illness and how long it has already continued and the prospects of 
recovery- the period of past employment".(The Marshall case pp. 903-04.)
We may summarise what has been discussed by saying that in cases of 
illness we have to distinguish between two situations. The first one is 
where the illness is permanent. In this case the principle upon which 
courts base their decisions is the one put by Pollock C B in the case of Hall 
V. Wright. In such cases the continued existence of the debtor in a state of 
health to perform his contract is an implied condition to be read. The 
second is where the illness is temporary only. In this case the commonly 
used test of "the contract if enforced after the delay would be a thing radically 
different" is the one to be relied on in deciding cases of that type.
Under French law, in the following case the contract was not 
terminated because there was a lack of unforeseeability. Thus in Herviers 
et autres V. Ste Buffalo etc. (Dijon. July. 19th. 1945. Gaz. Pal. 2.139) a number 
of persons who were carried in a vehicle, were injured in an accident 
caused by a cerebral haemorrhage of the driver. The carriage was 'a titre 
onereux'.23 The court decided that the driver’s company (ie the Ste) was 
liable for damages. The argument of the court was that the illness could 
be known by a simple medical examination. This measure was not taken, 
therefore the (Ste) could not allege that the illness, which cannot be 
considered as unforeseeable, constituted a case of force majeure. It 
should be added that in addition to the unforeseeability of the illness, it 
must also be irresistible, or really dangerous as to put the debtor in an 
impossibility to perform his contract.24
23 In such a contract the carrier has to cany the passengers to their destination in a 
safe condition and they should arrive as such. This obligation is called under French 
law as obligation of 'resultat'. In the case of breach of this obligation, the driver would 
be liable unless he can prove a case of force majeure -considering only our subject of 
study- which has prevented him from performing that obligation. (See this case). For a 
brief discussion of such an obligation as compared with English principles, see David 
Pugsley, Le Droit Contemporain des Contrats. Bilan et Perspectives Loic Cadiet. 
(Edition Economica. Paris. 1987), at pp. 160 et seq .
2^ Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 713. See also Epoux Damiette V. 
Epoux Fournier (Civ. Com. Jan 23rd. 1968.D. 1968. somm.65 and see Alain Benabent
(1987), at para. 251. The illness of a buyer of a bakery which prevented him from 
using it did not constitute force majeure since it could not be considered as 
unforeseeable or insurmountable). The condition of insurmountability should be
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In addition to the conditions cited above, ie that the illness should be 
unforeseeable and insurmountable, another condition is also required 
which is that it must not be due to the fault of the debtor, (e.g. 
alcoholism)25 (cf with prima dona) But this is thought to concern cases where 
that fault was deliberately made in order to be released from the 
contractual obligation and does not appear to concern cases of illnesses 
caused by carelessness.
It should not be concluded from the cases above that the illness of a 
debtor could never constitute a case of force majeure. In two cases for 
example the jurisprudence was considered as indulgent.26 Thus dental 
problems of an author who promised to write a book did constitute a case 
of force majeure exonerating him from his liability for non 
performance.27 In another case an actor who promised to give a play in 
a city did not perform his obligation because of an epidemic 'qui regnait 
dans cette ville'. He was therefore exonerated from his obligation and was 
not liable for his non performance since that epidemic was considered as a 
case of force majeure.28
It is to be noted that in a contract of employment when the illness of an 
employee is temporary only, this will suspend his contract and not 
terminate it. The employee as well as the employer will not perform their 
obligations. That is to say the first will not provide his work and the latter 
will not pay him his salary, but the contract will be performed as soon as 
the employee is able to work. However, if the illness continues for a long
understood in a broad sense. That is to say "dans un large esprit d'humanite". See 
also Planiol & Ripert (1952), at p. 515 where it is said that the debtor who is ill is not 
obliged to perform the work he has promised, if that performance would be harmful to 
his health.
25 Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 712, and G. Thery at p. 100, and 
Radouant at p. 184.
26 Jean Carbonnier, Droit Civil 4/ Les Obligations (9eme ed., P.U.F. 1976), at 
p. 267 , and Marty (1962), at p. 530.
27 See Paris Jan.7th.l910.D.10.2.292, and see Carbonnier id, and Marty id, and 
Radouant at p. 23, and Barry Nicholas, French law., at p. 197. This is also the case 
under English law, see Treitel (1987) at p. 669.
28 See Trib.Civ.Seine Apr. 17th. 1869.D.P.69.5.221, and see Alex Weill (1971), 
at p. 439 footnote. 1, and the (1986 edition) at p. 433 footnote. 254, and Marty (1962), 
at p. 530, and Ghiho (1983), at para. 643, and Fiatte at p. 14.
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time as to affect the activity of the plant, it will be considered as a cause 
for the termination of his contract without the employee being paid what 
is called the indemnity of termination "licenciement".29
It can be said that under French as well as Algerian laws, permanent 
illness is likely to be considered as a case of force majeure (bearing in mind 
the exception under Algerian law, ie the incapacity due to the work itself). Here 
again, the principle put by MontagueWtHij(above) is a good theoretical 
explanation for cases of release because of permanent illnesses. Where 
the illness is temporary, we have seen that English courts use the test 
whether performance after the recovery of the employee would be a performance of a 
radically different thing from that undertaken'. Theoretically, it can be said that a 
similar consideration is also taken, although not discussed, by French and 
Algerian courts, when deciding cases of temporary illness which lasts for 
a long time, either for the suspension or the termination of the contract. 
Under Algerian law an illness which exceeds one and two years (see supra) 
puts an end to the contract. This is because further performance of the 
contract of employment, would be intolerable for the employer, since it
29 Cameriynck G. H & Gerard Lyon-Caen, Precis de Droit du Travail (6eme ed., 
Librairie Dalloz.1973), at p. 156, and Carbonnier (1976), at p. 267. The illness which 
lasts for such a long time is a case of force majeure exonerating the employee. See also 
Brun A. & Galland H, Droit du Travail (Sirey. 1958), at p. 522, and Planiol & Ripert 
(1952), at p. 518, and P. Malaurie (1985), at p. 335 who says that the jurisprudence 
considers the illness of an employee as a case of force majeure where it is 'grave' or 
lasts for a long time., and see Encyclopedic Dalloz "Force Majeure" (1978), at para. 
59.
Under Algerian law the illness of an employee -in the private sector- may either 
suspend his contract of employment or terminate it. Three situations should be 
distinguished. The first one is where there is what may be called an ordinary illness. If 
it does not exceed one year its effect would be to suspend the contract only. (See art. 
20/1 Ordonnance n:75-31 du 29 Avril 1975 relatif aux Conditions Generales de Travail 
dans le Secteur Prive. J.O.R.A. n: 39 du 16 Mai 1975). The second one is where there 
are a certain type of illnesses the contract would also be suspended if the period does 
not exceed two years. (See art. 20/2 Ord.id). In the two situations mentioned if the 
illness exceeds one and two years, this would terminate the contract of employment. 
The third one is where the illness is due to an accident which happens during the work, 
or the illness is due to the work itself. In this case it would suspend the contract until 
the employee becomes able to continue his activity. (See art. 21 Ord id) See Ibrahim Z. 
A., op.cit at pp. 33-34. The contract would also be suspended in the case of a 'femme 
en couche'(pregnancy).( See art. 24/1 Ord id), and see Ibrahim Z. A. at pp. 34-5.
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would be radically changed from that undertaken at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, what has been said only applies when deciding 
either for the termination or the suspension of the contract, and not when 
deciding whether there is or there is not a case of force majeure, since this 
last decision is based on the settled conditions of force majeure.
Section Three. Imprisonment or Internment
The cases which will be discussed will show how this supervening 
event may discharge the contract.
In Horlock V. Beal ([1916] 1 A.C.486.) a British ship was detained in 
Germany after the war broke out between the two countries. The 
detention was for an indefinite period and the crew of the ship was 
imprisoned. The wife of the plaintiff (one of the crew) claimed his wages. 
The House of Lords in deciding this case held that the crew could not 
claim the wages, after the detention of the ship30’ since the contract was 
frustrated and further performance of it was impossible; because the ship 
was detained. Furthermore, the impossibility of Beal to perform his 
contract ie to serve on board the ship for the voyage was "so indefinite and so 
long that the adventure which was the whole basis of the contract has failed.".3 * 
Here the principle of Taylor was applied.32 So we see that the adventure 
which was the foundation of the contract has failed, and its purpose
33defeated by the interruption.
On the other hand, it was decided in the case of Nordman V. Ravner & 
Sturges L .T .R .(7l9161 33 T.L.R.87.), that an internment which lasted one 
month did not frustrate the contract, because such internment was not 
sufficient as to destroy the basis of the contract, as was in Tamplin ([1916] 
2 A.C. 397.) where it was laid down that "the interruption of business must be 
serious before the contract failed.".3^
30 (1919) 35 L.O.R. p. 91.
3 1 Per Lord Wrenbury at p. 526. Cf this with 'illness' supra (ie the illness was of 
uncertain duration.).
32 Lord Wrenbury p. 526.
33 Fifoot (1986), p. 559. In Unger V. Preston Co [1942] 1 ALL.E.R.200, Cassel 
J. at 203 said that the internment of the plaintiff was so long as to "frustrate the 
business purpose of the contract.". It has to be borne in mind that it is not the 
imprisonment itself which frustrates the contract, but the delay caused by it. See 
Christine Mogridge, (1982)132.2 New.Law.Joumal.. at p. 798 col. 3.
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The last case which can be cited here is Chakki V. United Yeast 
Co.Ltd. ([1982] 2 ALL.E.R 446.) In this case an employee was sentenced to 
eleven months imprisonment, and was released on bail, pending an appeal
against the sentence.^ At the hearing he was placed on probation. 
When the employer was informed of the sentence of Chakki, he engaged 
another person instead of him. When the employee brought an action for 
unfair dismissal, the Industrial Tribunal held that the contract was 
frustrated at the date of the sentence. The employee appealed, and the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal, held that the contract was not frustrated. 
To that effect Neill J. said that the previous decision "erred in law in deciding" 
the contract as being frustrated "immediately on the imposition of the sentence of 
imprisonment.."(The Chakki case p. 450.)
The test to be used therefore, in deciding whether in such 
circumstances the contract is frustrated, is as Neill J said (The Chakki case 
id ), referring to the speech of Evershed MR in the case of Atlantic 
Maritime Co Inc V. Gibbon ([1953] 2 ALL.E.R. 1086 at 1095-6.):
"Would a reasonable man in the position of the party alleging frustration, 
after taking all reasonable steps to ascertain the facts then available, and without 
snapping at the opportunity of extricating himself from the contract, come to the 
conclusion that the interruption was of such a character and was likely to last so 
long that the subsequent performance of the contract would amount to the 
performance of a new contract ? ".
When this test is applied to the aforementioned case, it is clear that the 
engagement did not comply with it. Especially when the employer 
engaged another employee at the same time when he knew of the sentence 
of his employee. Further guidance was suggested in the case of 
Harrington (above) such as the employment period as a whole and the 
length of time the employee is expected to be absent from his work, and 
"the importance of getting someone else to do his job meanwhile" (ie 
whether he is a key worker or n o t ) . 36 Jt may be noted that there is some
34 The Nordman case p. 88.
35 The fact that there is an appeal against a sentence imposed does not prevent 
frustration from being applied. Per M.R.Justice Talbot in Harrington V. Kent Countv 
Council [1980] I.R.L. 353, at 355 col. 2.
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similarities between the guidance already cited and the one cited in cases 
of illness.
However, both Harrington (contract held frustrated by imprisonment) and 
Chakki (see above), were held to be of 'doubtful authority' in Norris V. 
Southampton City Council ([1982] I.R.L.R.141), because it is said in this last 
case that an impossibility caused by one's own conduct cannot be treated as 
fmstration but as repudiation, which entitles the employer to dismiss the 
employee.37
All this means that imprisonment for a criminal offence cannot amount 
to frustration, since it is inconsistent with the mle that frustration must 
not be self-induced. However, Lord Denning M.R took another view in 
the case of  Hare V. Murphy Bros Ltd ([1974] I.C.R. 603 (Court of Appeal)). 
In this case a sentence of 12 months imprisonment was held to put an end 
to the contract of employment. His Lordship said:
"If Mr Hare had been grievously injured in a road accident -due to his own 
fault- and incapacitated for eight months the contract would be frustrated. If a 
prima donnathoughtlessly sits in a draught and loses her voice, the contract may 
be frustrated by illness even though it may be said to be self induced frustration.
So also here, where the man committed an unlawful act and was sentenced to 
12 months imprisonment, the event was so unforeseen and the delay so long 
that the contract of employment was brought automatically to an end when the 
sentence was imposed.". (Cited in (1982) Solic Jou at p. 651).
But Lord Denning's arguments were met with doubt by Mr . Justice 
Kilner Brown in Norris (see above). He said that it was Lord Denning only 
who declared -in Hare- that the contract was frustrated. The other two 
judges viz Stephenson L.J. "left open the question whether it was frustration or 
repudiatory breach." (ie the imprisonment), whereas Lawton L.J. "made no 
reference to the question at all.". (Per Kilner Brown at 142 col. 2). However, in F 
C Sphepherd & Co Ltd V. Jerrom ([1986] 3 A11.E.R 589 (C A)), Lawton L.J. 
speaking of Hare -in which he was himself a judge- said that "Since it is not clear
36 Cited in Keith Gibson, "The Effect of Imprisonment on Contract of 
Employment" (1982) 126 Solicitors* Joumal.651. at p. 651, and see further (1982) 
132.2 N.L.J at p. 795 col. 2.
37 See (1982) Soli.Jou at 651 col.b., and this means that it is a self-induced 
frustration. See (1982) 132.2 N.L.J at pp. 795 col. 1, & 797 col. 3. This is also the 
opinion of Treitel (1987), at pp. 700 & 703.
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on what grounds the court as such decided Harre’s case I do not regard it as a binding 
authority".
But it cannot be doubted now that imprisonment can constitute a 
frustrating event. In Jerrom (above), it was held that the imprisonment of 
an employee can constitute a frustrating event, though in this case there 
was no frustration because the test of the "performance would be radically
different" after the interruption caused by the imprisonment was not met.
We may conclude from what has been said that imprisonment can be 
treated as a case of frustration if it fulfills the test that the performance of 
the contract after the delay caused by imprisonment, would be a 
performance of a radically different thing from what was undertaken. 
The allegation that imprisonment itself is a self induced frustration was 
not convincing and this relying on the cases cited above.
As to French law it seems that an imprisonment of a debtor can never 
constitute a case of force majeure; since it supposes a fault in the part of 
the debtor. Thus in Diagola V. dewinter. (Civ.May 14th. 1969 .D. 1970. 
somm.44) (contract of lease of houses), a lessee who had to pay the rent, 
invoked his imprisonment as a case of force majeure exonerating him -as 
he alleged- from his obligation to pay the rent. This allegation was rejected 
because an event of force majeure supposes its unforeseeability and its non 
imputability to the debtor, whereas the imprisonment supposes a fault in 
the part of the debtor38, and therefore could not constitute a case of force
38 When the supposed event of force majeure is due to the fault of the debtor there 
cannot be any exoneration. It is for this reason that the bankruptcy of the debtor cannot 
constitute a case of force majeure. A shortage of both materials or personnels (used in 
the performance of the contract), are not cases of force majeure for the debtor who 
invokes them. As to the question of unemployment, the Court of Cassation in Epoux 
Levy V. Soc. Cooperative. Civ. 3eme Ch. April 19th. 1972. D. 1973. 205 C. Cass, 
made it clear that unemployment can constitute a case of force majeure. In this case the 
Court of Cassation quashed a judgment which did not consider the possibility of 
exoneration because of unemployment. When this case was reheard in the Court of 
Appeal of Orleans October 25th. 1973. D. 1974.66. the Court decided that the 
unemployment of a debtor in this case could not constitute a case of force majeure 
unless it has the traditional conditions of non imputability, unforeseeability at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract, and irresistibility. That is to say that unemployment 
had put the debtor in an absolute impossibility to perform his contract. These 
conditions were not met -said the Court of Appeal- therefore the debtor was not 
exonerated. See the comment of H. Souleau under both cases. See also Alex Weill
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m a j e u r e .
Section Four. Mobilisation.
As we will see, since mobilisation or calling up involves an 
interruption on the part of the debtor of his obligation to perform the 
contract, English courts mainly use the common test of 'performance if 
enforced would be a radically different thing from that undertaken'. 
Where this test is met then courts may hold the contract frustrated. 
French courts on the other hand require the traditional conditions of force 
majeure in order to decide whether there is a case of force majeure or not. 
It is even possible to say that French courts consider the length of time in 
which the debtor is unavailable and this in order to opt for the appropriate 
effect of force majeure. That is to say either the suspension or the 
termination of the contract.
§.1. Mobilisation Under English Law.
In this context two cases can be cited viz Marshall V. Glanville ((1917) 
33 T.L.R.301.) and Morgan V. Manser ([19481 1 K.B.184.). In these cases 
the contract was held to be frustrated when the employee was called up 
for military service (compulsory). In the first case MR Justice Me Cardie 
said:"... the operation of the Conscription Act was to sweep away the basis of the 
arrangement between the parties.."39, the basis of that contract was that parties 
made their agreement on the footing that performance of the contract 
would continue to be lawful, and this was defeated by that Act.40
(1986), at p. 431, and see Carbonnier (1976), at p. 266, and see P. Ghiho (1983), at 
para. 640, and P. Malaurie (1985), at p. 334. It has already been said that 
unemployment should not be imputable to the debtor. H. Souleau gave an illustration 
of this. Thus if an employee by breaching his contract is sacked, his unemployment 
cannot be considered as a case of force majeure. See also C. Larroumet (1986), at p. 
700 footnote. 299. But even if the unemployment constitutes a case of force majeure, 
it would exonerate the debtor temporarily. See Georges Durry, cases and comment 
(1976) n: 21 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil. 151. at p.151.
39 The Marshall case p. 302.
40 See McNair (1940) 56 L.O.R. p. 189 where he says that it was sufficient for 
Me Cardie in that case to say that the contract was frustrated, as the performance was 
unlawful, instead of referring to Tamplin (the ground upon which that case was decided 
was that the war will be so long as to put an end to the contract), but he did not say that
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Moreover, the interruption in the performance of the contract caused by 
the conscription, was so indefinite as to destroy the purpose of the 
contract.41
The same thing can be said for the second case42; because the 
conscription was of an indefinite duration, to enforce the contract would 
be to impose upon the parties a new contract. Streatfield -in that case- put 
the question whether the contract after the calling up would be radically 
different "having regard to the prospective delay" as to put an end to the 
Contract.(The Morgan case p. 192.)
It can be said that in a case of calling up, a contract can be frustrated on 
the base of illegality. But since this illegality might be temporary only, 
another test should be added. Thus if the interruption caused by the 
calling up is of an indefinite duration, the contract should be held 
frustrated where performance after the delay would be radically different 
from the one undertaken.
§.2. Mobilisation Under French Law.43
In the case of Ste Dumas V. Pile TiberghieniSeine Feb. 14th. 1941.Gaz. 
Pal. 1941. 1.355), an employee of the (Ste) was mobilised. The (Ste) 
stopped as a consequence of this its activity and sacked 18 of its employees 
arguing that the mobilisation of an employee did put it in the impossibility
it was incorrect to refer to that case, but that it was sufficient to say that performance 
was illegal. This is in fact what Me Cardie -inter alia- held in that case. He said that 
parties made their contract on the footing "... that it would continue to be lawful to 
perform and to accept the contemplated service..". See Me Cardie in the Marshall case 
(above) p. 302, and see Me Elroy and Williams, Impossibility o f performance (1941), 
pp. 92-3.
41 Fifoot (1986), p. 559, and Treitel (1983), p. 656. Notice the similarity with 
cases of temporary illness supra.
42 In that case the contract was entered into in 1938 for 10 years. In 1940 the 
defendant was called up, and was demobilised in 1946. The question before the court 
was whether such calling up frustrated the contract. It is to be noted that both parties 
during the period of the calling up treated the contract as still subsisting. See R.E.M 
"notes" (1948164 Law Quarterly Review. 179 at 180.
43 Under Algerian law the calling up is a cause of suspension of the contract of 
employment and this during the period of that service (two years). See art. 16 Ord.75- 
31., and see Ibrahim Z. A. at p. 32.
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to continue its activity. The tribunal declared that the (Ste) should prove 
that it was in a real impossibility to continue the activity in question, that 
the event was insurmountable and that it actually stopped the production. 
None of these were proved, therefore it was decided that the (Ste) should 
pay damages for the termination 'licenciement' of Dlle.44
However, where the mobilisation puts the debtor in an impossibility to 
perform his contract, this constitutes a case of force majeure.45 As to the 
effect of this event, it will either suspend the contract or terminate it.46
In Nord-Sud V. Robert. (Trib. Civ.Seine. March 2nd. 1915. Rec. Gaz. des 
Trib.1915. 2. 158., and see Fiatte at p. 81), an employee was mobilised on 
August 11th 1914, and was freed on August 22nd (ie 11 days). The 
tribunal declared that such an event should only suspend the contract. 
Which means that there is a case of force majeure, but that its effect would 
be to suspend the contract.
In another case (Trib.Civ.Seine.Apr.21st.l915.Rec.Gaz.des.Trib.l915.2.158), 
a director of a plant was mobilised by mistake, and shortly after was 
freed. The tribunal decided that his contract was suspended and not 
terminated. Here again the effect of force majeure is the suspension of the 
contract.(Fiatte p. 81)
In the case of Ste des Hauts Foumeaux V. Couturier. (Cour de Caen. Feb. 
2nd.1916.Gaz.des Trib. 1916.2.413)47 the court decided that the mobilisation 
of an employee should suspend his contract. The argument was that 
during the event, the employee was not replaced by another person, which 
proved that the employer himself treated the contract as suspended only 
and not terminated.
Possibly when French or Algerian courts decide either on the
44 In Begnier V. Legion Proust. (Trib.Civ.Melle.Oct.23rd.l915.D.1916.2.83) a 
farmer was not exonerated from her obligation, regarding her customers, when she 
invoked the mobilisation of her husband and sons, it was decided that this could not 
constitute a case of force majeure because she could get the help (farming) of the army 
who received such instructions. (Lack of irresistibility). See Radouant at p. 34.
45 p. Ghiho (1983), at para. 461.
46 Fiatte at pp. 80-81 and the reference to cases cited there.
47 See Fiatte at p. 83 and see also Balland Y. Kahn,Trib.Com. Nancy. Dec 
6th. 1915. Gaz. Pal. Nov 4th. 1916 (in this case the contract was suspended). Fiatte at 
p. 83, and see Acquitaine V. Ravaud. (Cour de Bordeaux.Jan 10th. 1917. Gaz. Pal. 
Feb 7th.l917 (contract was also suspended in this case), see Fiatte at p. 84.
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termination or the suspension of the contract, the English test of 
'performance after the interruption would be a thing totally different 
from that undertaken' may be a good element to be used when opting for 
one of the two solutions cited above.
Regarding the question of impossibility as regards parties to the 
contract, as it can be seen under English, French and Algerian laws, death 
is a frustrating event (a case of force majeure). As to permanent illness, 
under French law it appears that the traditional conditions of force 
majeure are also required otherwise no release would be allowed. 
However, under English law such a requirement (ie requiring the conditions of 
frustration, e.g being self-induced or the common test) does not appear to be 
necessary. As to temporary illness. English courts, as we have seen, 
require the common test of 'performance if enforced..’. As to French 
courts they also require the traditional conditions of force majeure. Thus 
English law as regards cases of illnesses appears to be less rigorous than 
French law.
As to the case of imprisonment, the solution is totally opposite in the 
two systems. Whereas English law treats it as any other frustrating event, 
French law considers it as lacking the condition of non-imputability. As 
to the case of mobilisation. English courts decide for the termination of 
the contract when the common test is satisfied, whereas French courts 
base the decision on the conditions of force majeure. The French cases in 
which one of the parties to the contract was mobilised for a short period 
and was freed later on, would not be considered as frustrating events 
under English law, and the contract of employment would be treated as 
still in force (ie during the time of mobilisation). This is true unless time is of 
essence.
It can be said that in all cases where the performance of the contract is 
hindered because of a legal impossibility (which under French or Algerian law 
would be considered as a 'fait du prince') but that prevention is short, the 
contract will not be held frustrated under English law, whereas it would 
be considered as suspended by force majeure under French and Algerian 
laws. This would include cases of requisition, seizure, ships being 
trapped, calling up or mobilisation.
As has already been pointed out, if English courts were allowed to
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suspend contracts in cases of temporary frustrating events, ie those which 
involve some delay, then they would probably hold them as frustrated and 
opt for their suspension rather than their termination. This would have 
made the solution of English, French and Algerian laws similar.
Section Five. Strike.48
A strike in a company may stop its production of goods, or the 
delivery of the promised goods to the creditors (e.g. buyers). In general
^ W 'l l i o N  o r
terms it can put the owner of a plant in thevimpossibility to perform his 
contract. The question to be decided is therefore whether a strike can be 
considered as a case of force majeure and in what circumstances.
The strike is not in itself a case of force majeure.49 Therefore it has 
to be unforeseeable as well as irresistible50 and not imputable to the 
debtor.5! An example of the last condition is where the employer for 
example did not care about the revendications of his employees, although 
he was able to satisfy them [reasonably].52
48 Under Algerian law strike is allowed in private companies only. This right is 
affirmed in art. 61/2 of the Constitution of 1976 (and see art. 54 of the Decret 
Presidentiel n:89-18 28 Fevrier 1989 relatif a la publication au J.O.R.A. de La Revision 
Constitutionnelle adoptee par referendum du 23 Fevrier 1989. J.O.R.A. n: 9 du ler 
Mars 1989). See also art. 21 of the 'Loi.n:78-12 of august 5th. 1978'. The effect of 
the strike is to suspend the contract of employment and not to terminate it (see art. 27 of 
the Ordonnance n:75-31 du 29 Avril 1975 relatif aux Conditions Generales de Travail 
dans le Secteur Prive. J.O.R.A. n: 39 du 16 Mai 1975.). See to this effect Ibrahim 
Zaki Akhnoukh, op.cit at p. 40, and see Rached Rached, Studies o f the Algerian Law 
o f Employment (Algiers. O. P. U. 1985), at p. 102.
49 Lalou, Responsabilite at para. 285.
50 See Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 710.
5 ! See Mazeaud, Legons (1985), at p. 637, and Carbonnier (1976), at p. 266.
52 Carbonnier (1976), p. 266, and see Radouant at p. 141 with reference to cases. 
It is in fact Carbonnier who uses the word 'reasonably1. This may presume that the 
employer is not obliged to give satisfaction to the revendications of his employees. It is 
in this respect that the court of Poitier decided the case of M orel V. Ste St 
Gobin.(Jan.l2th.l903. D.1903. 2. 389). However, such conception will in fact 
dismiss the condition of irresistibility. This is because in order that an event constitutes 
a case of force majeure, the performance of the contract has to be absolutely 
impossible. Therefore the employer should always satisfy the revendications of his 
employees, and this in order that he can perform the contract he may conclude with a 
customer (creditor). The same opinion is hold by Radouant at p. 143, and see Fiatte at
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The cases which w ill be studied concern the conditions of 
unforeseeability and irresistibility. It is important to say that these two 
conditions have to be met together. In other words they are not 
alternative but cumulative.53
In the case which will be studied below it was decided that the strike 
did not constitute force majeure because it was not unforeseeable. But in 
two other cases it was considered as constituting a case of force majeure.
In Bouvier V. E.D.F.fTrib. Gde Instance April 29th. 1963.D. 1963. 673) (E) 
in Feb 16th 1961 concluded with (B) a contract for the supply of 
electricity. In May 29th 1962 the employees of (E) went on a strike which 
covered the whole territory of France. In other words it was a general 
strike. (B) sued (E) for damages since he suffered damages by the 
interruption in the supply of electricity. The tribunal remarked that the 
strike was in fact irresistible for (E) since it concerned all the employees 
and covered the whole territory. It also remarked that it was impossible 
for (E) to provide the electricity during the period of the strike. 
However, it was decided that (E) was not exonerated because the strike 
was not unforeseeable. This is due to the fact that before that strike, there 
was some dissatisfaction (mecontentement) amongst the employees of (E)
p. 10.
53 See Trib.Gde Instance de Lavale. April 29th. 1963.D. 1963.673 at 673 col. 2. 
Almost all the decisions require the two conditions, and this in eveiy case and not only 
in the case of a strike. See Larroumet (1986), at p. 702. It was decided in 
(lere.Civ.March 7th.1966.Bull. Civ. 1966.1.130.n:166.Gaz.Pal. 1.409) that "the 
irresistibility of an event is sufficient to constitute force majeure, where its 
foreseeability would not have changed the situation of the debtor.". This in other 
words means that where the event of force majeure is unforeseeable when the contract 
was made, but that event became foreseeable at the time of the performance of the 
contract, and that foreseeability could not help the debtor when performing the contract, 
such as to prevent the damages which that event may cause, in this case the 
foreseeability of the event would not prevent it to constitute a case of force majeure.See 
P. Ghiho (1983), at para. 642, and see Henri Mazeaud et F rancis Chabas, Exercises 
Pratiques de Droit Civil (1986), at p. 102, and see Encyclopedic Dalloz (1978), under 
"Force Majeure" at para. 80-81. However, if the promisor foresees the impossibility of 
performing the contract, but nevertheless makes the contract, in this case he will be 
presumed to have taken the risk of its non performance. Therefore it is rightly decided 
when the courts require that the event of force majeure must be unforeseeable as well 
as irresistible.
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and that the negotiations (pourparlers) between the representatives of 
both the employer and the employees were negative. The consequence of 
this is that the strike cannot be considered as a case of force majeure.
What should be noted is that the unforeseeability of an event should be 
considered at the time of the conclusion of the contract and not at the time 
of its performance. In this context the Court of Cassation declared that an 
event cannot constitute a case of force majeureMwhere the debtor could 
normally foresee the event (of force majeure) at the time he concluded the 
contract.". (See the comment of G. Durry, (1966) R. T. D. C p. 823, n:27). What 
can be said about the reported case (ie Bouvierl. is that although the 
unforeseeability should be considered at the time the contract is concluded 
(in this case 16th Feb.1961), at that time the strike was unforeseeable, but not 
at the time of its performance (in this case May 29th 1962). Nevertheless the 
Tribunal referred to the last date.
The Tribunal remarked that when the strike occurred EDF could not 
do anything to prevent it or its consequences, therefore it was irresistible. 
Following the principles of force majeure, the Tribunal should not base 
its decision (liability of EDF for the strike) on the fact of the foreseeability of 
the strike at the time of performance of the contract. Therefore it can be 
said that since the strike was unforeseeable at the time the contract was 
concluded, and it was irresistible when it did happen and therefore put 
EDF in an impossibility to perform its contract, EDF should have been 
exonerated from its liability for non performance.
However, in the following case the condition of unforeseeability was 
met. Thus in Ste Anon. Musee Grevin V. E.D.F. (Civ. Com. Nov. 21st. 1961 
.D.1968. 279.C.Cass) (E) in 1958 concluded a number of contracts with 
(SA) for the supply of electricity. In 1961 a strike of the employees of (E) 
interrupted that supply. (SA) sued (E) for damages. The Court of Appeal 
decided that the strike constituted a case of force majeure, therefore (E) 
was not liable for any damages caused to (SA). In this case the only 
question dealt with was the unforeseeability of the strike. It was decided 
that the strike was unforeseeable for (E) since "the situation depended on 
the government.". The Court of Cassation confirmed this decision.
What can be said about the unforeseeability of the strike in this case,
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although its consideration was not explained in the law report, is that at 
the time the contract was made "there was not any reason which may 
suggest the eventuality of a strike".54 The Court of Cassation itself has 
deduced the unforeseeability of the strike at the time the contract was 
concluded, from what the Court of Appeal decided when it remarked that 
until the occurrence of the strike, (E) could not foresee its happening, and 
this means (as it appears to the C.Cass) that at the time the contract was 
made, the strike was certainly unforeseeable for (E).55
It was during the performance of the contract (not at the time of its 
conclusion) that the strike occurred and this was due to government's 
decisions. It was therefore impossible for (E) to prevent that strike; since 
every thing depended on the government. It can be said for example that 
the government reduced the wages of the employees of (E), and this if the 
revendication concerned the problem of wages.56
This judgment was commented upon by Helene Sinay (see Ste Anon. 
Musee Grevin V. E.D.F. supra), who considered it as one of principle. That is 
to say, every time the solution of such problems depends on the 
government, any strike would be considered as unforeseeable for (E). 
However, it is submitted that it may be the case that at the time the contract 
of supply of electricity between (E) and a customer was concluded, there 
was already a conflict between the representatives of the two parties 
(employer-employee) concerning for example the wages. This situation 
would probably, as a result, induce the occurrence of a strike. This means 
that the strike could not be said to be unforeseeable, even if it is supposed 
that the policy concerning the wages was within the competence of the 
government alone. This would mean that there was a reason to expect, 
sooner or later, a strike.57
54 Mazeaud, Legons (1985), at p. 633.
55 This was the deduction of the Court of Cassation of the unforeseeability of the 
strike. See to this effect the comment of G. Durry, (1968) R. T. D. C p. 733 n:25.
56 See Larroumet (1986), at p. 701. This author, in citing the decision in 
Ch.Mixte. Feb 4th. 1983.3 arrets.J.C.P.1983.iv.l23, says that one of these decisions 
noted that the cause of the revendications of the employees was unforeseeable at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract of supply of electricity.
57 See P. Ghiho (1983), at para. 644, who says that the industrialist who 
promised to supply some goods to his creditor, cannot invoke a strike which stopped 
the production, if it is proved that the strike was in preparation when the contract was
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In Ste Boulonneries etc V. E .D .F .(P.1984.IR.165.C.CASS) after (E) 
concluded a contract with (Ste) for the supply of electricity, the 
government took certain measures concerning the wages of the 
employees. A strike of the employees followed those measures. In this 
case the government's decisions were unforeseeable at the time the 
contract was concluded. For this reason the Court of Appeal decided that 
the strike constituted a case of force majeure for (E) exonerating it from 
any liability. This is because the strike was unforeseeable and it was 
impossible for (E) to get other employees.
This case was concerned only with the question of unforeseeability of a 
strike. Other cases however, considered the other conditions of force 
majeure, such as the irresistibility of the strike. This condition may or 
may not exonerate the debtor depending on the circumstances of each 
case.58
In two other cases viz, Alibert V. Cie des Forges etc (Trib. Civ. 
Montluson. Feb.21st. 195l.D. 1952.279) and Cie des Forges V. Bardonnet. 
(Civ.Soc.Oct 18th. 1952.D. 1953.149) an employee was prevented from 
working in the plant in which he was employed because of a strike, since 
the entry to the plant was blocked by some bars brought by the strikers. 
The employee sued therefore his employer for the wages due to him for 
the days in which he was prevented from working (ie during the strike). In 
the two cases (above) it was decided that the employer should pay the 
wages to the employee, since the strike was not insurmountable. It was 
also pointed out that the employer could obtain by a special procedure59 
the expulsion of the strikers, which would give the employee the 
possibility of providing his services.
concluded.
58 In one case a carrier by sea, who had to carry passengers, was prevented from 
doing so because of a strike. Nevertheless it was decided that he was liable, since he 
could charter a plane to perform his contract of carriage. See Cass.Com.Nov 
12th.l969.J.C.P.1971.ii.l6791. Mazeaud, 'Legons ' 1985 at p. 634. For other 
examples see Jacques Flour et Jean-Luc Aubert, Droit Civil.Les Obligations vol. 2. 
Sources: Le Fait Juridique (Armand Colin. 1981), at para. 779. See also for a case 
where the condition of insurmountability was not met Epoux ButinV. E.D.F..G.D.F.. 
(Trib.d'Instance.Saint-Denis, August 25th. 1983.D. 1985. 26).
59 For more details on this procedure see Camerlynck G. H & Gerard Lyon- 
Caen, Droit du Travail (1 leme ed., 1982), at pp. 989-90-91.
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This decision was confirmed in the second case by the Court of 
Cassation.
In this case the employer did ask for the help of the authorities (the 
attorney general and of the 'prefet'). But the court decided that no real measure 
was taken in order to clear the plant of the strikers. In general what the 
employer did was insufficient to exonerate him from his liability. As is 
seen in this case, it is the condition of irresistibility which was not met. 
Therefore the strike could not constitute a case of force majeure.60
A less rigorous position is manifested in the case of Dunlop V. 
Dumarcav. (Civ.Soc.Oct.28th.l957.D.1958.somm.88). Since the strikers who 
occupied the plant of the employer put him in the impossibility to control 
the entry to the plant, it was decided that this event constituted a case of 
force majeure exonerating the employer from his obligation to pay the 
wages of the non strikers.61
In another case (Com.Beziers.Dec 5th. 1938.Gaz.Pal. 1939.1.306)6^ an
60 It is interesting to note the comment made by Pierre Mimin on this case. The 
tribunal -said that author- was considering the question of force majeure regarding the 
employer, whereas it was the employee who has to prove that he was in an absolute 
impossibility to provide his work. That is to say that he was in a case of force majeure 
exonerating him from performing his obligation to work. The argument of this author 
was that the employer is not under the obligation (in a contract of employment) to bring 
the employee to his work.[" L'obligation d'amener l'ouvrier a pied d'oeuvre..."]. see 
this case at p. 282.2. This in other words means that the plant was there and it was 
open, therefore it was for the employee to get in.
61 It might be said that the obligation of the employer is to pay the salary of the 
workers. The natural deduction from this concept would be that there cannot be any 
impossibility for the employer to perform his obligation even in cases of strike. 
Because paying money (the wages) can never be impossible. However, the 
jurisprudence has not accepted such a concept. The obligation of the employer as well 
as of the employee should be considered as inter-related. This means that the employer 
is not obliged to pay the wages unless the employee provides his work. This is called 
in French law the connection of the promises in synallagmatic contracts. It is for this 
reason that the employer in such cases should be exonerated. See Radouant at p. 19 
reference to cases are cited there, and see G. H. Camerlynck etc, Droit du Travail 
(1982), at pp. 978-79.
6^ See Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 711 footnote. (4 bis). In another 
two cases viz, E.D.F V. Ste Anon.Gaillon Nov 8th. 1979 D.1980. IR. p.441, and 
June 4th. 1980. J.C.P. 1980. 19411. concl. P. Besnard, a strike was considered as a 
case of force majeure, and therefore exonerating the E.D.F from its obligation to supply
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owner of a garage who promised to repair a vehicle, was prevented from 
so doing, because his employees were occupying his garage. It was 
decided that such an event constituted a case of force majeure for the 
debtor (the owner).
the electricity. Because that strike was unforeseeable and inevitable. See the comment 
of G. Cornu, (1981) R. T. D. C. p. 171 n:4. What should be noted in this case is that 
the strike was certainly exterior to the debtor -although not discussed in that case-, 
because it was due to a blocage of salary decided by the government. However, it can 
also be said that this character was not met if we consider E.D.F as a part of the 
government (a public enterprise!.(Cf the Rolimpex case supra under the condition of 
non-imputability). See also the case of Ste Boulonneries etc. V. E.D.F. (supra), where 
EDF (which is a public enterprise) was exonerated from its obligation to supply 
electricity because of the strike of its employees. The strike was in fact due to some 
decisions taken by the government concerning the wages of employees. Here it can be 
said that there should not be any exoneration, if we consider EDF as the state itself (ie 
the condition of 'cause etrangere' was not met.). See to this effect the comment of J. 
Goineau under this case. A similar question can be found in the case of Greard V. Cie 
Air France (lere espece) and Cie Air France V. Tremoulet (2eme espece) (Ch. Soc. 
April 15th. 1970. 2 arrets. D. 1971.107 C. Cass, this case is discussed under "non- 
imputability" supra).
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CHAPTER FOUR. LEGAL IMPOSSffilUTY and ILLEGALITY (OR
'FAIT DU PRINCE1)1
The performance of the contract may become illegal after the contract 
is made. What are the effects therefore of such an illegality on the whole 
contract. From the cases discussed hereafter two types of illegality will be 
seen. One is where performance is prevented by a subsequent 
government prohibition which may result from an outbreak of war or for 
other reasons. The other is where such illegality arises when there is a 
state of war, which involves trading with the enemy.
In the first type there is no intercourse with the enemy, but it is the 
legislator who intervenes and prohibits the performance of the contract. 
Although legal restrictions can be studied together with government 
prohibitions, it is here preferred to treat these two subjects seperately 
under three headings; the first is government prohibitions, the second is 
legal restrictions and the last is trading with the enemy.
In what follows we will see that English courts usually use the common 
test of ’performance if enforced would be a thing different from the one 
undertaken'. This is so when the prohibition is for an indefinite period. 
In some cases public policy is the reason of holding a contract frustrated
1 Fait du Prince is the equivalent concept of legal impossibility. Under English 
law it has been suggested that the discharge of a contract by illegality is based on public 
policy, and not upon impossibility in performance, or that the circumstances have 
become radically changed. See John Tillotson, Contract Law In Perspective (1981), at 
p. 144. However, this may be true for certain cases but not all cases of illegality, 
otherwise those contracts would be frustrated at once. But as will be seen, this is not 
true for the Cricklewood case (post). In that case the "radical change in the obligation" 
test was used to decide the non frustration of the contract. See also Me Elroy op.cit 
(cited at footnote. 7 this chapter) when commenting on the Metropolitan case says that 
both the question of illegality and the "radical change" were involved and neither alone 
would have been sufficient to frustrate the contract. Apart from this nothing seems to 
prevent one from saying that in cases of illegality there is an imposssibility of 
performance. The only difference with the other cases of impossibility is that it is here 
a legal one though materially it can be done. We will note that under French law, even 
in cases of illegality, courts require the conditions of impossibility of performance, that 
is, whether the intervention of the authorities has put the debtor in an absolute 
impossibility to perform the contract. This could with benefit be adopted by the 
Algerian law.
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(such as the act of trading with an enemy). It should be said that French courts 
will treat any case involving a prohibition by an authority as a 'fait du 
prince', in other words as constituting force majeure. However, all the 
traditional conditions of force majeure should be met even in the case of a 
'fait du prince'. In the following Section we will study government 
prohibitions as understood in English and French laws.
Section One. Government Prohibitions
§.1. English Law Regarding Government Prohibitions.
In the cases discussed here it will be seen that the interference of 
government in the undertakings of parties may frustrate the contract they 
have made. This depends in each case on whether the performance, if 
enforced, would be something different or not (as in Metropolitan and Baily), 
or whether the probable length of the prohibition will destroy the basis or 
the identity of the performance of the contract (as in the Crickelwood 
case).(which in fact means the previous test.)
In the case of Bailv V. De Crespignv2. premises were leased for a 
period of 89 years. The lessee covenanted that : "..neither he nor his 
assigns.."3 would permit anyone to build on the land which joined those 
leased premises. By an Act of Parliament and being empowered to do so, 
a railway company acquired compulsorily that land and built a railway 
station. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant (the lessee) breached his 
covenant by assigning the title to land to the railway company. Before the 
court, the question to be answered was whether the defendant was 
discharged or not by that Act of Parliament.
Hannen J. in applying the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia4,
2 (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B.180. See Me Elroy, op.cit. at pp. 34-35.
3 Ibid.
4 Which means "The law does not compel the impossible" Osborn's, Concise 
Law Dictionary (7th ed., London. Sweet & Maxwell. 1983). The same judge held 
that the assignment created by the subsequent legislation cannot be in the contemplation 
of parties when the contract was made, because the defendant could not compel the new 
asignee (the company) not to build on the premises, as he could with an ordinary 
assignee. See the speech of Hannen J at 186. See also Atiyah, Introduction to the Law 
o f Contract (1975), at p. 202 who explains the termination of a contract because of 
illegality (by change in the law) on the ground that "there cannot be default in not doing 
what the law forbids to be done.", and see D. M. Walker, Principles.. Vol. 2 (3rd ed.)
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h e l d  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t  w a s  t e r m i n a t e d  a n d  t o
"..hold a man liable by words, in a sense affixed to them by legislation 
subsequent to the contract, is to impose on him a contract he never made." o r " 
an entirely new contract for the parties".6
The second case where the contract was held frustrated by a 
government prohibition is Metropolitan Water Board V. Dick Kerr 
Company Ltd ([1918] A.C.119.). This is a case where reservoirs were to 
be built within six years. The contractors had started the work in 1915, 
but in 1916 they were ordered by the Ministry of Munitions to cease the 
work. Therefore they treated the contract as at an end, whereas the 
plaintiff (Metropolitan..) treated it as still binding.
Before the House of Lords, Lord Finlay affirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal, as the contract had become impossible of 
perform ance.6 It is to be noted that there was a provision in the 
contract which extended the time of performance if supervening events 
hindered further performance. But Lord Dunedin said that such a 
provision was intended to deal with temporary difficulties and could not 
cover circumstances, where:
"...a set of occurrences...would make the contract when resumed a really
at p. 136, and Gloag (1987), op.cit at para. 11.12.
6 Bailv at 186-87. Hannen J. refered to the case of Brewster V Kitchel ISalk 
198, where it was said:" Where H covenants not to do an act which was lawful to do, 
and an Act of parliament comes after and compels him to do it, the statute repeals the 
covenant. And where H covenants to do a thing which is lawful, and an Act of 
parliament comes in and hinders him from doing it, the covenant is repealed. For cases 
illustrating this see Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance op.cit at pp. 33-34, and 
see, for another suggested ground of release in cases of illegality as in the Bailv case, 
(1940-41) 4 Modem Law Review at p. 243.
6 Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), para. 1540, and see Me Elroy, Impossibility o f 
Performance p. 166, where he says that the prohibition here was temporary, if 
permanent the contract would be illegal. But it is thought that if an act is prohibited, it 
is in fact, illegal, therefore impossible of performance. See also David Walker, Vol. 1. 
(2nd ed., 1975), at p. 673. In another case viz Penny Mott & Dickson V. James B 
Fraser & Company [1944] A.C.265, there was a contract for the sale of timber, and 
with the outbreak of the war that trading became illegal. The House of Lords held that 
the contract was frustrated by that event.
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different contract from the contract when broken off'7
So the delay caused by that order will make the performance of the 
contract, a performance of a different contract, and this is because the 
interruption was likely to last for a long period.8
However, a different conclusion was reached in the case of 
Crickelwood Property & Investment Trust Ltd V. Leighton*s Trust Ltd 
((1945) A.C.221.), where a building lease for 99 years was at issue, in 
which there was a covenant to build a number of shops on the land 
"forming part of a building estate".(Crickelwood A.C.221.) Subsequently, 
an order was issued by the government, suspending building and making 
the erection of shops, as intended by the lessees, impossible.
7 Metropolitan ibid 130 and see Lord Atkinson's speech at p. 136, and of Lord 
Parmoor at p. 139 in the same case. Lord Justice Scratton in Acetylene V. Canada 
Carbide Co (1921) 8 L.L.L R.456 said at p. 460 :"It may be put there is an implied 
term in any contract with any clause in the nature of suspension clause, excepted peril 
or allowances of extra time, which may extend the performance of the contract, that the 
suspension which is an ancillary to the main contract, shall only be valid for a 
reasonable time: and that a time is unreasonable which makes the resumed contract an 
entirely different one from the interrupted contract.". Cited in Me Elroy, Impossibility 
o f Performance op.cit at p. 211 (emphasis is mine). See also (1919) 35 L.O.Rev at 
pp. 93-94., and see Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance op.cit at p. 166, where he 
says that this case involved the application of two principles viz illegality and 
frustration, and says:"Neither alone would have been sufficient.". This may be true 
because if the prohibition was permanent, the contract would be frustrated at once.
But since the prohibition was temporary- if it is supposed to be so- this does not 
frustrate the contract, because it may last for a short period only. Therefore illegality 
itself as a test of frustration is insufficient, and another test viz "whether the interruption 
would last for a long period as to make the performance of the contract a thing radically 
different from that undertaken", is necessary in order to decide whether the contract can 
be frustratedor not. In this case illegality was reinforced by the second test as 
expressed above.
It is also worth noting that where the performance of the contract becomes unlawful 
by a change in the foreign law, where the contract is to be performed, then the contract 
would be dissolved. See Ralli V. Compania Nviera Sota Y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287. 
Cited in Me Elroy, Impossibility of Performance op.cit at p. 44.
8 Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), para. 1540, and see P. S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the 
Law o f Contract (3rd ed.) at p. 201 who says that "businessmen must not be left in 
indefinite suspense.". This principle seems to be of a general application and might be 
similar to what was already said by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline at p. 64 supra, and see 
footnote. 7, chapter two supra esp. the speech of Lord Atkinson.
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The question to be answered in this case was, whether the lessees were 
excused from not paying the rent agreed (for the demised premises ie the 
building). That is to say whether the lease was frustrated or not.(Per 
Viscount Simon at 227.)
This in fact depended on whether the event which occured or the 
change in the circumstances was:
"so fundamental as to be regarded by the law both as striking at the root of 
the agreement, and as entirely beyond what was contemplated by the parties 
when they entered into the agreement. ".9
The fact was that the prohibition may last for a long period and 
therefore destroy the basis of that contract, Viscount Simon L.C said that 
the government regulation was "presumably a small fraction of the whole 
term"10, and this is true; because the lease was for 99 years.
So what can be said as an explanation for that decision, differing from 
the precedent cases, is that the interruption here was not such as to destroy 
the basis of the contract after the prohibition was over and even though 
the interruption lasted for ten years Lord Goddard said"..that is very small 
part of the lease".11 As a resuk it was decided that the base was not 
frustrated and the lessee was not discharged from his obligation to pay the 
rent.
Having studied the cases dealing with the question of illegality it may 
be interesting to draw the general idea or principle underlying them. It 
might be said that they are all concerned with doing or not doing an act. 
Therefore the principle as already expressed at footnote.5- to the effect 
that:
"Where H covenants not to do an act [as in Bailv ] which was lawful to do, 
and an act of Parliament comes after and compels him to do it, the statute 
repeals the covenant. Where H covenants to do a thing [as in Metropolitan, or
9 Crickelwood 231 emphasis is mine. What is emphasised is in fact similar to 
what Blackburn J said in Poussard case (1876) at p. 84 supra. It might be said that this 
is similar to saying that performance if enforced would be a radically different thing 
from that undertaken.
10 Crickelwood p. 232.
11 Crickelwood p. 243.
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in Cricklewood (to build shops), or in Denny (to provide goods)] which is 
lawful, and an Act of Parliament comes in and hindered him from doing it, the 
covenant is repealed",- is applicable to them.
However, this principle will have its full effect when the prohibition is 
permanent only and by the prohibition the contract is frustrated 
immmediately (see Bailv). But where the prohibition is temporary then 
another test is to be added to the one of illegality in order to decide for the 
frustration of a contract. This is that the interruption caused by the 
prohibition was to last for a long time or for an indefinite period and if 
the contract were enforced after that interruption, it would make the 
performance a radically different thing from that undertaken. This test 
was for example used in the Metropolitan case.
In fact the test of 'performance if enforced would be a different thing' 
may also be used in cases of permanent illegality. Thus in Bailv , we may 
say that if the defendant were held liable, this would mean that we have 
imposed on him a contract to the effect that he has agreed to pay damages 
when an order of an authority -without his fault- compeled him to do what 
he covenanted not to do. Such an agreement is surely one which he never 
made not even thought about.
As to the position where parties provide in their contract for the 
contingency, then the pinciple as stated by lord Parmoor in the 
Metropolitan case ([1918] A.C.119, at 137) to the effect that:
"If the parties have provided...in the contract for their mutual rights or 
liabilities, [if a certain contingency occurrs] then it would be the duty of any 
court to give effect to such provision.", is applicable.
An exception, which is expressed in the same case, is that the provision 
of parties may not be adequate and cannot be held to cover what happens 
and its effects. This can be illustrated by the speech of Lord Parmoor 
(above) in Metropolitan, from which we have extracted some words to 
state the general principle. But the full text is thus:
"If the parties have provided by apt words in the contract for their mutual 
rights or liabilities, in the event of the contract works being stopped, or 
indefinetlv hindered by the operation of a subsequent law and such provision is
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not contrary to public policy, then it would be the duty of any court to give 
effect to such provision."
Looking at the case of Cricklewood. it may be said that although the 
prohibition was similar to that involved in the three other cases, the 
difference here is that the contract was for a long period (99years). 
Therefore the prohibition cannot make further performance of the 
contract if enforced after the delay a thing radically different. This means 
that the basis of the contract cannot be said to have been destroyed as in 
Metropolitan or in Bailv.
It may be noted that several cases already studied under different 
headings involve some similarities. Temporary incapacity, imprisonment, 
mobilisation, requisition as well as the seizure and the damage of ships and 
trapped ships, and even some cases of illegality like the one involved in 
Metropolitan and Cricklewood. all involved the question of delay in the 
performance of the contract. Looking at the principle upon which those 
cases were decided (being frustrated or not) it can be said that the courts 
relied mainly on whether the performance of the contract if enforced, 
would be a thing radically different from that undertaken. The other test 
used in certain cases is that the delay was of an uncertain duration and that 
it was not possible for them to speculate as to the duration of that delay. 
Therefore it can be said that these are the two tests used by courts when 
dealing with cases of delay.
$.2. French and Algerian Laws Regarding Government Prohibitions.
We have already pointed out that questions of illegality are known 
under French or Algerian law as a 'Fait du prince1. 'Fait du prince' can be 
defined as any order issued by a public authority which prevents the 
performance of a contract.12 This clearly shows that what has been 
studied under English law would under French as well as Algerian laws be 
treated as involving the question of a 'fait du prince'. The 'fait du prince' 
should, as any event of force majeure, have the conditions of 
unforeseeability, irresistibility and non imputability to the debtor.13
12 Or "tout empechement qui resulte des commendements ou des prohibitions de
la puissance publique.".(See Com.Oct 26th. 1936.Gaz.Pal. 1936.2.845). Lalou defines 
it as "un ordre de l'autorite legitime". Id at p. 237.
I l l
The cases given below will illustrate the impossibility of performance 
which may result from this event.
In Ste Bata V. Farge, (Caen.Oct 11th. 1937.Gaz.Pal. 1937.2.797.) (B) leased 
a premise in order to carry on a business of sale of shoes. The contract 
was entered into on March 18th 1936. (B) established himself in the 
premises on March 20th 1936, and continued to trade until May 24th 
1936. On this date, (B) was notified he was in default in continuing his 
activity of selling shoses; since a law had been issued on March 22nd 1936 
to the effect that: "during two years no new shops are allowed to be open, without 
an authorisation of the ministry of commerce". (B) argued therefore that, taking 
into account the fact that the law was subsequent to the conclusion of the 
contract of sale, it was impossible for him to continue his activity as it was 
intended. (B) alleged that the contract should be terminated because of an 
event of force majeure viz the passing of that law.
The court remarked that a subsequent law which prevents the carrying 
on of the business of (B) cannot constitute a case of force majeure, unless 
it was unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract. It has 
been proved that (B) foresaw the passing of that law and that the contract 
of lease was entered into at that date exactly (ie 18th /03 /1936), in order not 
to be subsequent to the passing of the law of 22nd /03/ 1936. It was 
therefore decided that (B) should perform his contract (ie the paying of 
the rent).
In the second case viz, Lamv V. Bailies. (Paris.June 9th.l961.D.1962.297. 
C.d'App) (L) concluded on October 1953 a contract of hire of services 
(louage de service) with (B). (B) was engaged to make arrangements 
between persons involved in road and railway accidents (ie victims and 
responsibles). This is called "demarchage". At the time the contract was 
concluded there was a law which regulates such contracts. (L) concluded 
that contract relying on a certain interpretation of that law which made
13 See Radouant at p. 183 (who cites the non imputability only.), and see Aguado 
V. de Beam.. Cour de Paris, May 1st. 1875. D. 1875. II. 204. Cited by J. Denson 
Smith "Impossibility of Performance as an Excuse in French law : the doctrine of Force 
Majeure" (1936) 45 Yale Law Journal 452, at pp. 456-57, and see Seine.March 
24th. 1905.G. des T. 1905.2.2.436. See Fiatte at p. 15, and Houcine Amer, op.cit at p. 
403 both cases will be discussed later on.
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such contracts legal. However, it was known or at least foreseeable to (L) 
that this 'interpretation' was controversial, and that there was a possibility 
that a subsequent 'interpretation' by the jurisprudence would render the 
contract he made illegal. This last 'interpretation' was what the Court of 
Cassation decided on on November 26th 1953. Therefore the contract 
between (L) and (B) became illegal. (See Marie p. 41.)
(L) alleged that the decision of the Court of Cassation constituted a case 
of force majeure, and consequently, notified (B) that his contract should 
be treated as being terminated. (B) sued (L) for damages because of that 
breach. The court declared that the subsequent 'interpretation' of the 
legislation which made the contract illegal was foreseeable to (L). 
Therefore the condition of unforeseeability was not m et. It has also been 
remarked that even with that subsequent 'interpretation' the performance 
of the contract did not become impossible, since (L) could use (B) for 
other services. That is to say other than those prohibited. This would 
mean that the other condition of force majeure viz the impossibility of 
performance was not met. For these reasons the court decided that (L) 
was liable in damages since he terminated the contract with (B).14
In the case of Maiano V Simard (Bordeaux Nov. 26th. 1940. Gaz. Pal. 1941 
.1.29.) (M), an Italian, contracted to build a number of houses for (S). 
Five months later and before having finished them, he was expelled from 
France. It was held that (M) was liable to pay damages since his expulsion 
was foreseeable because of the international situation which prevailed at 
that time. (See Mazeaud, Responsdbilite (1970), at p. 704).
The condition of irresistibility was also involved in Ste d'Assur etc V. 
Dumesnil. (Civ.lere Civ. May llth.1954. D. 1954. 611. C. Cass)15 (D) leased
14 However, a debtor would be liable even if an event is one of force majeure 
when the promise of the debtor is unconditional. That is to say he has taken the risk of 
his non performance. Id [cf this with imprevision].
15 In Boix V. Boutles etc. Com.Oct 26th. 1936.Gaz.Pal. 1936.2.845, by a 
contract of charterparty BX promised to carry goods from Italy to France. It happened 
that a prohibition was imposed on all goods which may come from Italy. This made 
further perfomance of the contract impossible. This was held to constitute a case of 
force majeure, and the charterparty was terminated. In another case viz, Union des 
Proprietaires etc V. Trufault Le Havre December 14th. 1929.Gaz.Pal. 1930.1.346 an 
authorisation to be obtained from the authorities in order that any construction (which 
constituted the promise of the debtor) can be carried out, was considered not to 
constitute a case of force majeure, since it makes further performance of the contract
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his apartment to (Ste) which was the insurer of the proprietor of that 
apartment. Because of the war, (D) was ordoned to leave the apartment, 
and therefore could not perform his obligation which was to look after the 
apartment. A fire destroyed it after (D) left it. It was decided and 
affirmed by the Court of Cassation that (D) was not liable for that fire. 
Therefore he was exonerated since his non performance of the obligation 
viz to look after the apartment was due to force majeure (ie the order).
It has already been said that ‘fait du prince’ should be unforeseeable 
and irresistible. Another condition is also required, which is that the 
event must not be due to the fault of the debtor. Thus a lessee (locataire) 
expelled from a country because of his attitude, cannot invoke that event 
as a case of force majeure exonerating him from his obligation to pay the 
rent.16 The same logic should be applied for the employer who employs 
more foreigners than allowed by law. Therefore if the authorities oblige 
him to sack some of those to bring their number to its legal limit, he 
cannot allege that the event constitutes a case of force majeure, since this 
was due to his fault. I7
It can clearly be seen from what was studied above that courts always 
require the conditions of force majeure. We may say that English cases 
already discussed may be regarded by French or Algerian courts as 
involving a 'fait du prince'and therefore releasing the debtor from his 
obligations. The principle stated by Hannen J. (footnote. 5 supra this chapter) 
might also represent the French as well as the Algerian law, but we have 
to add to it the traditional conditions of force majeure.
more onerous only. In Lyon March 1st. 1943.S. 1944. chr p. 46, it was decided that 
the prohibition of construction without an authorisation could not constitute a case of 
force majeure. The only effect it had is that it delayed the performance of the 
obligation. See Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 704.
16 Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 703.
17 See Ste des Etabli Barmone V. Fritz Civ. Soc. Dec 30th. 1954. D. 1955. 
somm.77, Mazeaud, Responsabilite id. A person who leased a 'fonds de commerce' 
in order to carry on a business, cannot invoke the order of closing down of that premise 
as a case of force majeure exonerating him from paying the rent due, if this was due to 
his fault. See Civ.3eme.Nov 20th.1985.Bull. iii. n:148, see A. Benabent, Droit Civil 
(1987), at para. 252.
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Section Two. Legal Restrictions (Import and Export Prohibitions).
Sometimes, as will be seen, the performance of the contract is 
restricted ie, the obligation of one or both parties to the contract is 
effected according to statutory regulations. One example of this is the 
licencing system. These are cases where the performance of the contract 
and more specifically the importing or exporting of goods where the 
contract so provides, cannot be undertaken unless the concerned party 
obtains such a licence from the authorities.(See Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods 
(1987) p. 1002)
In this respect it is to be noted that under French law the debtor who 
does not promise a specific thing, cannot invoke a prohibition of export to 
exonerate him from his performance, and this especially if those goods 
can be bought from elsewhere. 18
The following English cases will illustrate the effect of such 
restrictions on the contract and whether parties are excused if they do not 
perform their contract, on the ground that such a licence was not granted.
In the case below, after parties had made their contract, and intended 
the goods to be exported, a government order was issued and prohibited 
such exports. In Walton (Grain & Shipping) Ltd V. British Italian 
Trading Company Ltd ([1959] 1 Lloyd's. Rep.223.), a contract for the sale of 
goods was entered into between the two named parties, on October 11th, 
1956. The goods were to be shipped on December 1956 and January 1957 
from India to Genoa. There was a force majeure clause (15-b) which 
provided that:
"Should shipment be d e l a y e d ^  by fire, strikes, lockouts, riots, 
revolution, prohibition of export or any executive or legislative act done or on 
behalf of the government of the territory where the port and/or ports of 
shipment named therein is or are situate, or any cause comprehend in the term
18 See Com. Marseille. March 18th.1927. Rec. Marseille.1927. 1. 322. Mazeaud 
, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 703, see also Pelliot V. Gaillard. Trib. Com. Seine. July 
6th. 1915.D. 1917.2.47, Radouant at p.34, and see Fiatte at p. 11 (an export prohibition 
-he says- constitutes a case of force majeure). A prohibition of export is to be 
considered as a 'fait du prince'. See also to this effect Jean Virole "Incidence des 
Mesures d'Embargo sur les Contrats Intemationaux" (1981) 7. n:3 International Trade 
Law & Practice.311.
19 The word delay here was construed by the court as to mean 'impossibility'. 
The Walton case p. 235.
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"force majeure" other than the reasons given in clause (a)20 the time of 
shipment shall be extended by two months. Should shipment not be possible 
within these two months contract be void.".
When parties made their contract, they knew that goods cannot be 
shipped unless a licence was obtained, which was possible. But on 
November 21st, 1956 the government of India issued a notice making 
export impossible, and no licences were to be granted, and in fact they 
were not granted during December, January and March. Therefore every 
shipment was illegal. The sellers then claimed that they were entitled to 
rely on the force majeure clause.
Before the court Mr Justice Diplock treated the matter by asking 
himself whether the refusal of granting any licence was covered by that 
clause, bearing in mind that the performance was illegal by that 
prohibition notice. He then concluded that it did, and therefore sellers 
could rely on it in order to be excused from their failure to perform the 
contract. As to the question whether the contract was fmstrated, he held 
that it was because performance became unlawful, therefore an implied 
condition is to be read into this contract to the effect that performance 
should be legal in the place where it had to be performed. He added that 
even if there was no force majeure clause, the contract would still be held 
frustrated because the sellers had not undertaken an absolute obligation to 
perform the contract.21
Two other cases commonly called "soya bean meal" cases (soya bean 
meal hereafter called goods), involved the same problem of export being 
prohibited. The first is Bunge S.A. V. Deutsche Conti Handelsgesellschaft 
M.B.H22. which was about a contract entered into on August 17th, 1972,
211 Which reads: "In the event of war, hostilities or blockade preventing shipment 
during the period, this or any unfulfilled part thereof shall be cancelled.".
2 1 The Walton case p. 237. As may be seen the release in this case can be based 
on the fact that the force majeure covered what happened. Alternatively, it can be said 
that if there was no force majeure clause, the performance of the contract would have 
been illegal.
22 [1979] 2 Lloyd's. Rep 435. In Bremer Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H V. SL 
Mackprang. J.R. T19791 1 Lloyd's Rep.221, shipment of goods was imposssible due 
to an embargo imposed by the U.S government. The court of Appeal held that the 
sellers were in default and that they could not rely either on the export prohibition
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for the sale of goods, to be shipped in April, May, June and July, 1973. It 
contained a clause dealing with the event where the export is prohibited, 
which reads as follows:
"In case of prohibition of export..or in case of any executive or legislative 
act done by..the government of the country of origin..preventing fulfillment, 
this contract or any unfulfilled portion thereof so affected shall be 
cancelled.".(The Bunge case [1979] 2 Lloyd's. Rep 435.)
In June 1973, the U.S government prohibited the export of the goods, 
but with two exceptions viz, where the goods were "already on lighter destined 
for an exporting vessel"23 or were in the course of being loaded. Sellers 
then contended that performance was impossible through the embargo 
which was imposed and which was total, and claimed their release under 
the aforesaid clause.
Before the Court of Appeal it was held that sellers were in default and 
could not rely on that clause to be released, because"to say that it was 
impossible for them to perform the contract, they ought to prove that they could not 
have got the goods through either of the loopholes"2^ (ie the two exceptions above). 
This means that the embargo should put them into a situation of 
impossibility, and this was not the case here, because the embargo was not 
absolute but subject to the two exceptions stated in the embargo. They had 
not proved not to be within the two exceptions, therefore they were not 
excused for their non-performance.
Lord Denning in Bremer V. Mackprang (footnote. 22 this chapter) said 
that if the embargo was total ie without exceptions, then sellers would be
clause or the force majeure clause. They were held liable because they could not show 
that "the shipper had no goods on lighter and none in course of loading." (per Lord 
Denning at p. 223 col. 2). These were the two loopholes in the embargo.
In another case viz Congimex Companhia Geral De Comercio Importadora E 
Exportadora. S.A.R.L. V. Tradax Export S.A. [1981] 1 Lloyd's.Rep.250 (C.A), a 
buyer of goods claimed frustration of his contract, because importing goods into his 
country was prohibited. This plea was rejected, because the buyer could accept the 
goods and divert the ship to another port (here France) where there is no such 
prohibition.
23 The Bunge case., per Lord Denning ibid 436. col. 2.
2^ The Bunge case., pgr Lord Denning ibid.
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released by proving the existence of the embargo. For the sellers reliance 
on the force majeure clause his Lordship said that the same thing -as in the 
prohibition clause- would apply here; because they had to give good reasons 
to justify their failure and this could not be done since there were the two 
exceptions.25
As may be inferred from the two cases the sellers failed to prove not to 
be within the loopholes, because they might have in fact goods on lighter 
or in the course of being loaded, but nevertheless they had not asked for a 
licence.26
Some questions might be asked when dealing with cases of export 
prohibitions, or restrictions. These can be stated as follows: who is under 
the duty to obtain such a licence, whether such a duty (or obligation) is 
absolute or a party could be discharged if he uses due diligence only, and 
whether such a duty is wholly imposed on one party only, or it is shared 
ie, the other party is also under the duty, of what is called, to "co-operate" 
in order to obtain such a licence (3). These three questions will be dealt 
with below.
1- Whose Duty is it to Obtain the Licence.
To know that we have to look first at the provision of the contract, 
whether it imposes on one party, such a duty or not. If it does, then no
25 But cf. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H V. Van den Avenne Izegem 
P.V .B .A . [1977] 1 Lloyd's.Rep 133 (Q.B.D) and Affd in the H. L [1978] 2 
Lloyd's.Rep. 109. This is an s.b.m case, with two clauses as in the two s.b.m cases 
above. Here goods were to be shipped in June 1973. In June 27th, 1973 an embargo 
was imposed which prevented the sellers from delivering the goods. It was held that 
the sellers were released, since they proved that there was an absolute impossibility. 
Case cited by Lord Denning [1979] 1 Lloyd's.Rep at 223., emphasis is mine.
26 Lord Denning in the Bremer case at p. 224 said:"Such being the burden of 
proof, I'am quite clear that the sellers did not discharge it. For aught that appears, it 
may well be that the shippers had already loaded, on or before June 27, 1973, goods 
which they could have appropriated to the contract; or, it may be that they had goods on 
lighters, or in the process of being loaded, which they could have appropriated to the 
contract. In the absence of proof that the shippers had no such goods available, they 
have not discharged the burden of proof. They have not showed that they were 
prevented by the embargo from fulfilling the contract. So they have not brought 
themselves within the exemptions in cl 21.". Cited by Lord Denning in the Bunge case 
at 437 col.2.
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problem can arise. However, the situation may differ where no such 
provision is included because there is no mle of law which imposes such a 
duty on one party rather than on the other.
It can be said27 that looking at the different cases,28 such a duty is 
imposed on the party who is in the best position to get it; because he will 
be familiar with the rules of export of his country and all the 
requirements which have to be met in order to export or import the 
goods.29
2- Whether the Duty is Absolute or merely Limited to the Use of Due
Diligence.
Here also the contract may provide for the nature of the duty imposed 
on parties in obtaining the licence. The real problem arises where there is 
no such provision.
If the contract is made "subject to licence", then the party, upon whom the 
duty falls to obtain the licence, is only required to use due diligence. He 
does not therefore warrant to get it.30 But where the contract is not
27 Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at 1473.
2  ^ In one case viz, H.O.Brandt & Co. V.H.N.Morris & Co [1917] 2 K.B.784 
where there was an f.o.b contract for the sale of goods, it was held that the duty was 
upon the buyers to obtain the export licence and not the sellers.(See Benjamin's, Sale 
o f goods (1974), at 1473 ) In another case viz, A.V.Pound & Co Ltd V. M.W.Hardv 
& Co.Inc. ([1956] A.C.588. See Benjamin ibid.) there was an f.o.b contract for the 
sale of goods, and it was held that it was the duty of the sellers to obtain the export 
licence and not the buyers.
29 However, the "more naturally fitted to take the necessary steps" to get the 
licence is in practice, but not necessarily, the seller. For example in the Brandt case 
(above) it was the duty of the buyer. See Basil Eckersley, "International Sale of 
Goods- Licences and Export Prohibitions" (1975) Lloyd’s Maritime & Commercial 
Law Ouarterlv.265. at p. 266. Sometimes the duty is upon the two parties (co­
operation) as in the Cvprianou case(post). Lloyd's Maritime., ibid , Benjamin id at 
1474 adds that in a c.i.f or c & f  contract for the sale of goods, from one country to 
another, it is generally the duty of the seller to obtain the export licence and of the buyer 
to obtain an import licence.
30 Benjamin's Sale o f goods (1974), at 1478., and see Joseph D. Becker "The
Rolimpex Exit from International Contract Responsibility" (1978) 10 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics.447. at p. 451, reference is made 
to the case of Brauer Co..V. Clarke..[19521 2 All.E.R. 497,499, 500 (C.A). So if the 
concerned party fails to obtain the licence the contract is discharged. See (1975)
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made 'subject to licence', then following the construction of the contract, 
that party may be held to be under an absolute obligation to obtain such a 
licence.3! An example is given in the case of Peter Cassidy Co.Ltd V. 
Osuustukkukauppa I.L.32 A seller in Finland sold ant eggs to an English 
company, f.o.b. There was a provision in the contract which 
reads:"delivery:prompt, as soon as export licence granted". The sellers having 
used all due diligence to obtain an export licence failed in their 
application, because they were not members of the Finnish Ant Egg 
Export Orters' Association. It was held that their obligation was absolute 
and not only to use due diligence, because "as soon as", does not mean 
'subject to licence'.33 Therefore they were liable to pay damages for such 
failure.
In another case viz, J.W.Tavlor & Co. v. Laundauer & Co ([1940] 4 
ALL.E.R. 335.), there was a contract (c.i.f), for the sale of goods to be 
shipped from Madagascar to London. The contract was entered into 
before the second world war broke out. The bill o f  lading dated Oct/Nov 
1939. In September the war broke out and on the same day the Cereal & 
Cereals Products (Requisition & Control) Order 1939 was issued coming 
into force the day after introducing a licencing system on selling or 
buying cereals. After some delay the seller, asked the cereal control 
board for information on the licences, whether they were granted or not, 
and if obtainable, what was the earliest date on which they could be 
obtained. The reply was negative and no licence could be granted. Then 
the sellers claimed that they were released and excused for non­
performance (shipment).
Before the court Singleton J. in giving his judgment held that the 
contract was not terminated and the sellers were held liable. This was 
because they (sellers) did not in fact, try to get the licence,
’’Their duty -said Singleton J- was to take the steps necessary3^ to enable
Lloyd's Maritime etc at p. 266. But the concerned party has to prove that he used all his 
best, or as it is said ’’he has left no stone unturned". Ibid at p. 267.
31 Whether the duty is absolute or to use due dilligence only is a question of 
construction. See Benjamin’s, Sale o f Goods {191 A), at 436.
3^ [1957] 1 W.L.R.273. Schmitthoff, Export Trade (1986), at p. 158., and see 
Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at 436.
33 Per Delvin J. in the Cassidy case, supra.
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them to perform their contract, and to...apply for a licence (which) they did not.
They did nothing... until February 14th, 1940, and even then they did not apply
for the licence necessary - namely, a licence to enable them to deal in the
goods..".(The J.W.Tavlor & Co. case at 341.)
He later on said "... if application for a licence had been made in the proper way 
at the proper time, it would have been granted.".(The J.W.Tavlor & Co. case at 341.)
So, as is seen here, the sellers were required to use due diligence to 
obtain the licence and if they had proved that they did their best to get it 
but they nevertheless failed, then they would have been excused and the 
contract would have been frustrated.35 They would have been also 
excused if they had not asked for a licence since it would have been 
useless to do so, knowing that it would be refused.36
3- Duty to Co-Operate.
An illustrative case is Kvprianou v. Cyprus Textiles Ltd ([1958] 2 
LIoyd's.Rep.60.). This involved a contract for the sale of cotton seed to be 
shipped from Syria to the buyers in Cyprus. The seller made several 
applications to obtain an export licence, but he was refused. The reason 
was that the buyers should have sent a certificate endorsed by the Syrian 
consul in Nicosia, stating that the goods -after being exported to Cyprus-
34 What amounts to reasonable steps in obtaining the licence is a question of fact. 
Benjamin's Sale of Goods(\914), at 1479.
35 Schmitthoff, Export Trade (1986), at p. 157. What is important to note is that 
the buyer should not repudiate the contract before the seller takes any steps to get the 
licence, otherwise the buyer will be held liable in damages because of his repudiation of 
the contract, notwithstanding the fact that the seller would not have obtained the licence 
if he made such steps. See (1975) Lloyd's Maritime etc at p. 268.
36 Benjamin's (1974), 1479, and he has to prove that or that he could obtain that 
licence "on terms entirely outside the contemplation of the parties". See Brauer & Co 
(Great Britain) Ltd v. James Clark (Brush Materials! Ltd [1952] 2 ALL.E.R.497. 
Benjamin (1974) at 1480. Denning L. J in the Brauer & Co V. James case said at p. 
501 that the one who is under the duty to get the licence, has to show that he took such 
steps, or that " it was useless " to do so since " it was quite impossible to obtain a 
licence.". Cited in Schmitthoff, Helsinki., at p. 154. This may be supported by what 
Mocatta J said in Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H V. Vanden Avenne-Izegem 
P.V.B.A [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep.133 (Q.B.D.) at p. 160 col. 2, :"the law does not 
usually oblige someone to do something which is useless 'lex non cogit ad inutilia
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would not be resold to Israel. The buyers did not send such a certificate 
until the end of July, whereas the period of shipment was between June 
and July, and this made it impossible for the seller to ship the goods to 
their destination. After that the buyers claimed damages for non­
performance.
In the court of Appeal Lord Justice Parker said:
"..there must be some express or implied term in the contract which will 
excuse him. For my part, I think, on the facts of this case, that an implied term 
is to be found, to the effect that, if export takes place from a place where an 
export licence is necessary, the buyer will co-operate in getting that licence- or 
at any rate will do nothing to prevent i t  being o b t a i n e d . .".37
From the cases discussed above, we can summarise the whole question 
of government restriction through the licencing system. In the first 
category, parties make their contract, to export or import goods. At that 
time there is no licencing system, but afterwards such a system is imposed. 
The party who is -depending on the circumstances of each case- under the duty 
to obtain such a licence, fails to obtain it although he uses all due diligence. 
Then the contract might be frustrated.38 We do not have to ask ourselves 
whether the contract is made 'subject to licence' since there is none. The 
case which can be related to this first category is Taylor v. Landauer 
(above).39
37 Kvprianou at 64 col. 2 & 65 col. 1. As may be seen, the court of Appeal based 
its decision on the fact that there is an implied condition that the buyer should co­
operate to get the licence. See also Scmitthoff C. M, "Conflicting Decisions on Suez 
Frustration" (1959) Journal of Business Law.58. at p. 60, where it was said that this is 
the first case where the duty to co-operate was extended to the other contracting party, 
viz the buyer, in getting the licence. It is also to be noted that the duty to co-operate 
applies to a C.I.F contract (as in Kvprianoul as well as to an F.O.B contract (as 
A.V.Pound. Ltd V. M.W.Hardv. Inc [1956] A.C.588., Lord Simonds at 608) cited 
by Andrew J. Bateson, "The Duty to Cooperate" (1960) J.B.L.187. at pp. 187-88.
38 See (1975) Llov's Maritime etc at p. 268, here there must be no provision in 
the contract.
39 [1940] 4 A11.E.R 335 this is to be infered a contrario from this case, because 
Singleton J., said that if that party asked for the licence in the proper way at the proper 
time, he would have been granted such licence. So it can be said that, if he has fulfilled 
such an obligation; ie to apply in the proper way.., and failed, then he could be released 
and the contract be held frustrated. See to this effect the case of Ross T.Smvth & Co. 
Ltd. (Liverpool! v. W.N.Lindsav Ltd. (Leithl [1953] 1 W.L.R.1280. In that case
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In the second category there is already a licencing system and licences 
could be granted if applied for. Subsequently the prohibition of export 
becomes total ie no licence could be granted. The cases related to this is 
Walton.. V. Bntish..(1959), and also Bremer V. Izegem (1979). So in this 
situation the contract would be frustrated by that event.
In the third category there is already a licencing system and licences 
could be granted if applied for. Subsequently a prohibition of export is 
imposed, but it is not total, it is subject to some exceptions. The related 
cases here are the soya bean meal cases, viz, Bunge (1979), Bremer..V. 
Macprang (1979). Here there was a licencing system before the contract 
was made, but after that, the government prohibited the export. The 
prohibition was not absolute, but subject to the two loopholes (see above). 
If the concerned party proved that he was not under the two exceptions 
then he could claim frustration, and the contract could be held 
frustrated.40 The other case is Congimex ([1983] 1 Lloyd’s. Rep. 250), it 
might be said that the contract would have been frustrated if the buyer had 
no alternative in performing the contract, viz to divert the ship to 
France.41
The fourth category, is when there is already a licencing system and 
the concerned party applies for a licence but it is refused.42 Would a
there was a contract where the goods had to be shipped from an Italian port c.i.f. 
Glasgow, on October 20th, 1951. The government issued a regulation on October 
20th, 1951, which prohibited export unless under a licence. But such a regulation was 
only applicable from November 1st, 1951. The sellers did not ship the goods in the 
meantime, and therefore they were held liable since they could have shipped the goods 
during the ten days left. It is suggested by Schmitthoff, Export Trade (1986), op.cit at 
p. 153 that, if the prohibition was "instantaneous" ie on the same day where the goods 
were to be shipped, then the sellers would have been excused and the contract be held 
frustrated. And this may also be the case in Taylor V.Landauer (1940), ie the 
prohibition was instantaneous, and the sellers had applied for a licence and were 
refused - without any fault on their part- therefore the contract would be frustrated.
40 Schmitthoff. Export Trade (1986). op.cit at p. 153.
41 In the Congimex case the contract was not frustrated, because the buyer had 
another alternative in performing the contract (viz to divert the ship to France). But 
where it is said that the contract would be frustrated, this was infered by supposing 
that the buyer did not have such an option.
42 It is possible here to say that the refusal is a supervening event, which 
frustrates the contract. See Treitel (1983), at p. 668," This is a possible interpretation -
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contract be frustrated in this case?.43 The answer depends on whether 
the contract was made subject to licence or not. Where the contract is 
made 'subject to licence', the obligation is to use due diligence. If the 
party concerned fails to obtain it then the seller will be excused; ie not 
liable to pay damages. Where the contract is not made 'subject to licence' 
the obligation may be absolute, and if the party concerned fails to obtain it 
then he will be held liable. But if his obligation was only to use due 
diligence, and he fails to obtain it, he will not be held liable and the 
contract may be fmstrated.(Schmitthoff, Export Trade (1986), p. 157.)
Finally what is worth noting is that in order to be treated as a 
frustrating event the prohibition must last during the whole period of 
performance. But if that prohibition ceases before the time for 
performance expires, then the parties are still required to perform their 
obligations, otherwise they will be treated as having breached their 
contract, and could not rely on frustration.44
he says- of a dictum in A.V.Pound & Co. Ltd v. M.W.Hardv Inc. [1956] A.C 588, 
604.". For the other interpretation that author prefers see p. 669, and see Benjamin's, 
Sale o f Goods (1987), at p. 1000.
43 See Me Elroy, Impossibility of Performance op.cit at pp. 36-37, where he 
says that the contract would be frustrated, and this following the case of Anglo-Russian 
Merchant Traders and John Batt & Co's Arbitration [1917] 2 K.B.679. In that case 
Viscount Reading C.J., at 685 said "There was at the time of making the contract and at 
all times a prohibition against the export of [goods] except under a licence. If a licence 
cannot be obtained [goods] cannot be shipped, and I cannot see why the law should 
imply an absolute obligation to do that which the law forbids. A shipment contrary to 
the prohibition would be illegal, and an absolute obligation to ship could not be 
enforced. I cannot see that, in order to give to the contract its business efficacy, it is a 
necessary implication that the sellers undertook an obligation to ship whether a licence 
was or was not obtained.". Cited by Me Elroy, op.cit at p. 37.
44 Schmitthoff, Export Trade (1986), ibid at p. 153., and see Benjamin's, Sale
o f Goods (1974), at para. 435, and see the case of Ross..V. Lindsav.. [1953] 1 
W.L.R. 1280., and see (1975) Lloyd's Maritime etc at p. 268. It is to be noted that it 
is not open to a debtor to consider himself freed from his contract, where he expects 
that some future events will put him in the impossibilty to perform his contract. That is 
to say he should not rely on the fact that some future events will probably hinder him 
from performing his contract. See Gloag, op.cit at para. 11.13. This implicitly would 
mean that there must be more than a mere probability in the happening of that event. 
There must be a certainty as to its happening. Cf with imprevision infra.
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Section Three. Trading With The Enemv.45
Another instance of frustration of contract, is where the performance 
of the contract involves intercourse with the enemy.46 In the United 
Kingdom this is defined as being every act which is advantageous to the 
enemy country or would be to the detriment of the United Kingdom. The 
following cases will illustrate the principle although there are exceptions.
In Ertel Bieber & Co v. Rio Tinto Co47, there was a contract for the 
sale of goods, between a British company and a German one. The 
contract was entered into before the war. The seller (the British), 
delivered some instalments, but after the outbreak of war, he claimed that 
the contract was abrogated48, and that he was released from further 
performance. But the fact was that, there was in this contract a clause 
providing for such contingency, and that the contract would be suspended 
only, where war prevented its performance.
The question was therefore, whether the war put an end to the contract 
or merely suspended it.
Before the court (lower), it was held that the contract was abrogated, 
since it involved trading with the enemy which means that the contract 
was illegal.49 As to the suspensory clause, it was treated as void since it 
was against public policy. The decision was upheld in the House of Lords. 
Lord Dunedin cited Pickford L.J's speech in the case of Robson (513pm)50,
46 For a discussion on the Trading With The Enemy Act see Clive Parry, "The 
Trading With The Enemy Act and the Definition of an Enemy" (1940-41) 4 Modem 
Law Review. 161. at pp. 161 et seq. As to the definition of trading with the enemy see 
S.l (2) & (3) of this Act, and as to the definition of enemy see S. 2 (1) & (2). As to 
the term 'war* it is to be understood in its technical sense. See Arnold D. MacNair, 
"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943" (1944) 60 Law Quarterly 
Review. 160. at p. 164.
46 See Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at 431. This is because in "forbiding 
commercial intercourse with enemy subjects, the nation is particularity concerned that 
no money or intelligence pass into the enemy country, to aid and strengthen the 
opposing forces.". John M. Hall, "The Effect of War on Contracts" (1918) 18 
Columbia Law Review.325. at p. 327.
4^ [1918] A.C.260. For another case involving the act of trading with the enemy 
see Robson v. Premier Oil And Pipe Line Company (Ltdl & othersf [1915] 31 
T.L.R.420.
48 The Ertel Bieber case at 261.
49 The Ertel Bieber case at 263.
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where Pickfordlj.aid:
"The prohibition of intercourse with alien enemies rests upon public policy, 
and we can see no ground either on principle or authority for holding that a 
transaction between an alien enemy and a British subject which might result in 
detriment to this country or advantage to the enemy is permissible because it 
cannot be brought within the definition of a commercial transaction.".51
In another case viz, Badische Co. Re ([1921] 2 C h.331.), there was a 
contract for the sale of dyestuffs entered into before the first world war 
between a British company and a German firm installed in England. The 
goods were to be supplied from Germany. With the outbreak of war, the 
Board of Trade, under S .l, of the Trading With the Enemy Amendment 
Act, 1916, ordered the winding up of the German company and a 
controller was appointed. The buyer (a British subject) claimed damages 
for non-delivery of the installments due after the war. The controllers, 
on their part, pleaded that -inter alia- firstly, the performance of the 
contract would constitute trading with the enemy, secondly, that the basis 
of the contract, that is the importation of the goods, should continue to be 
possible and this became impossible by the war.
Russel J. held that the contract was illegal. This was either because it 
involved intercourse with the enemy, or that, if the contract was enforced, 
it would have created some advantages either "immediate or future benefits" to 
the enemy. Therefore the contract was void.
The same decision would have been given even if the traders were both 
British subjects, if their trade would confer a benefit to the enemy.52
[1915] 2 Ch. 124.136. Lord Dunedin referred to this Law Report.
5 1 The Ertel case at 268, and McBryde, The Law o f Contract (1987), at p. 348, 
and see Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance op.cit at p. 42, and similarly see 
Davis Primose Ltd V. The Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd. 1917, 1 S. L. 
T. 297, at pp. 298.2 & 299.1, where Lord Dewer said that where a party to a contract 
becomes an alien enemy, the contract becomes illegal.
52 The Re Badishe case at 373. in Esposito V. Bowden (1857) 7 E.X.B.763, a
charterparty contract was held to be dissolved because performance involved loading at 
an enemy port, and this although the shipowner was neutral with a British subject. See 
Me Elroy, op.cit at p. 42. Looking at the 1939 Act any benefit which is conferred to an 
enemy is to be treated as trading with the enemy. For example a contract between two 
resident in U.K, or between one in this country and the other in a neutral country, will
126
This was Russel J's answer to the first question. He also said that parties 
made their contract on the footing that peace would remain between the 
country of supply, and the one to which such goods would be supplied. 
Therefore,:
"... a term should be implied providing for the dissolution of the contract in 
the event of war breaking out between those two countries, whereby the source 
of supply became blocked for an indefinite period of time.".55
The implication of such a term was no more than what "contracting 
parties must as businessmen deemed to have intended"54, because in fact, 
the "commercial object has been fmstrated".(The Re Badishe case per Russel 
J. at 383.)
In Stockholms Enskilda Bank V. Shering ([1941] 1 K.B.424 and [1943] 2 
ALL.E.R. 486), an English company entered into a contract with a Swedish 
bank (the creditor of a German company). It was agreed that the English co 
should pay to the Swedish Bank part of the debts of the German co, by 
instalments over a period of 8 years. The Swedish Bank on its part was to 
assign the equivalent amount of that payment to the English co in the form 
of "the Swedish bank's claim against the German co". However, when the 
first instalment was due on October 1939, the English co refused the 
payment, its main allegation was that such an act would constitute trading 
with the enemy, since the payment to the Swedish Bank would be a benefit 
conferred to the enemy.
This allegation was upheld before the court, because the German co by 
such payment would be discharged of its obligation. On the other hand, 
the payment by the English co, would give it a claim against the German 
co, and since that claim could not be enforced during the war, therefore
be treated as trading with the enemy if it confered certain benefit to the enemy country. 
See S. 2 (a) of the Act.
55 The Re Badishe case per Russel J at p. 380. But see Larrinaga etc. 39 T. L. R. 
316 where Lord Atkinson at 320 said:"... I failed to apprehend...what was the 
unexpressed condition which ..., formed the foundation of the contract,.... It certainly 
was not,...that England should not be at war with any power" and this during the 
period of the contract, and how can parties made their contract on the footing of peace, 
if they did not anticipate the war at all.
54 The Re Badishe case per Russel J at p. 380.
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this constituted an advantage to the enemy (the German co). That is to say 
"to have an English rather than a Swedish creditor" was considered as an 
advantage.55
Another example of fmstration by reason of war is where the port of 
shipment in an f.o.b. contract becomes an enemy port. But a contract is 
not frustrated where no terms as to the destination was stated in the 
contract and where the buyer instmcted the seller to ship the goods to a 
port which, before shipment, becomes an enemy port. This is because 
here the buyer has to give other "fresh shipping instructions" to the 
seller.(Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at 1715)
A c.i.f. contract is also frustrated where the port of destination became 
an enemy port, and this before the seller tendered the documents.56 The 
same view was held, even where the "ultimate" port of destination was in a 
neutral territory.57
It has already been said that the principle (in cases of trading with the 
enemy) as stated above has its exceptions. These are to be found firstly in 
the case of Hugh Stevenson & Sons Ltd v. Aktiengesellschaft Fur Carton 
Nagen-Industrie ([1918] A.C.239.). This was a case of partnership between 
a German and an English company, to carry on business in England. The 
legal effect of the war which broke out between Germany and U.K, was to 
put an end to such a partnership.58 But the fact was that the English 
company continued that business, after the war, using the machinery 
which was the property of both the German as well as the English 
partners. The question raised in this case was whether, by the dissolution 
of the partnership, the German partner was entitled to the profits made by 
the British company after the outbreak of war in using the machinery or 
in continuing to carry on the business.
Before the House of Lords, it was held that, the German partner was 
entitled to such profits made by the English partner in using the
55 See Mann F. A, "Trading with the Enemy" (1943-44) 7 Modem Law Review. 
159, at p. 160.
56 See Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at para. 1585.
57 Ibid 1585, citing the case of Fibrosa [1943] A.C.32.
58 And this since it becomes unlawful for parties to continue their business as 
partners. See Schmitthoff C. M. & David A. G. Sarre, Mercantile Law (14th ed., 
London, Stevens & Sons. 1984), at p. 273.
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machinery between the outbreak of war (August 1914) and the time when 
this action was brought ie (June 1915). But on the other hand the German 
- partner had no right to profits made by the English partner, resulting 
from the use of his skill.(The Hugh Stevenson case per Lord Finlay at 245.)
However, being entitled to such profits, the German partner will be 
deprived of it during the period of war. He could only claim it during 
peace time. The question which can be asked here may be, whether such 
payment would not be a kind of trading with the enemy?. As to this 
allegation made by the counsel for the English company. Lord Atkinson 
responded in giving his judgment, by referring to what Lord Parker of 
Waddington said, in the case of Daimler Co v. Continental Tyre & Rubber 
Co ([1916] 2 A.C.307, 311, 347.),:
"..the prohibition against doing anything for the benefit of the enemy means
the doing of it while he is an enemy and does not contemplate some possible
advantage to him when peace c o m e s ." .5 9
To give an enemy rights to profits -as in the present case- is an application 
of the principle that the property of an enemy is not confiscated though his 
right to it (ie property) is suspended during war-time.60
The second exception to the rule is, where a husband by a separation 
agreement undertakes to "pay regular maintenance to his wife". Such an 
agreement will be enforced even if the wife becomes an alien enemy. This 
is because in this kind of agreement, no public policy is involved in the 
enforcement of such agreement. But the payment has to be given to the 
Custodian of Enemy Property.6!
Having studied cases of legal impossibility and 'fait du prince' it can be 
said that although under English, French and Algerian laws, government 
prohibitions are likely to constitute frustrating events (and force 
majeure), nevertheless the solution as regards certain cases may differ. 
Thus in Cricklewood because the English common test was not met, the
59 The Hugh Stevenson case at 249.
60 The Hugh Stevenson case., per Lord Finlay 245.
61 See Chitty Vol. 1 (1968), at para. 1284, refering to the case of Bevan v. Bevan 
[1955] 2 Q.B.277.
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contract was not frustrated. Under French and Algerian laws such a case 
might have been decided as involving an instance of force majeure and 
since the prohibition was temporary, the contract would probably be 
decided as suspended. Cases of legal restrictions and trading with the 
enemy may also be similarly decided, that is to say as instances of force 
majeure under both French and Algerian laws.
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CHAPTER FIVE. LEGAL EFFECTS (OR CONSEQUENCES) OF 
FRUSTRATION AND FORCE MAJEURE
It has been seen that the doctrine of frustration applies when the 
performance is strictly speaking impossible and to cases where further 
performance, if enforced, would be a thing different from the one 
undertaken. The effects of frustration are the same whether we are 
concerned with the first category or the second one. However, the effects 
of the doctrine of force majeure are concerned with the first category 
only. To avoid repetition of the effects of frustration in the second part of 
this work, it is preferred to study the legal effects of the two doctrines in 
this chapter. In the second part we will study the effects of the doctrine of 
imprevision, which concerns the cases where the performance of the 
contract has become onerous. The effects of this doctrine is totally 
different with those of the above two doctrines. But it should be noted 
that instances of frustration are also studied in the second part of this 
work.
The legal effects of frustration and force majeure, will be studied 
separately. Having understood the principles involved in cases of 
frustration and force majeure we will then give -as far as possible- a 
comparison of the principles of the common and continental laws 
including the Algerian law. We will also see to what extent these laws are 
similar or dissimilar in their treatment of cases of impossibility. Then 
conclusions might be made concerning the rigidity or the flexibility of 
one system or the other.
Section One. Effects of Frustration.
A contract being held frustrated, the question which should be asked is 
what is the position of the parties regarding further performance of the 
contract. What is to happen when one party makes advance payments in 
return for the performance of the other party?, what is the position of the 
party who performs his contract in part and then the contract is held 
frustrated?. Questions of this kind and others are dealt with in this last 
chapter of the first part of this work.
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Legal effects of frustration were formerly decided upon the principles 
of the common law rules. But they are now regulated by the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contacts) Act 1943.1 Since some contracts are expressly 
excluded from its operation, which means that they are regulated by 
common law rules, it is therefore necessary to see these rules as to the 
effect of frustration. This is also important because the Act was issued as 
a consequence of those mles.
§.1. Common Law Rules as to the Consequences of Frustration.
At common law, the frustrating event puts an end to the contract 
automatically.2
In order to show the mles stated at common law two cases can be cited 
here. These were described as harsh mles.
In Chandler v. Webster ([1904] 1 K.B.493.), a room was hired in order 
to see the procession of the king. The price was £141 15s, to be paid in 
advance, but £100 only was so paid. After that, the procession was 
cancelled. It was held that, the hirer could not recover the £100, and was 
liable to pay the balance of £41.15s, though the contract was fmstrated. 
The plea for recovery of the sums paid, on the ground of total failure of 
consideration, was rejected, because, fmstration -as it was said- releases 
both parties from further performance, and does not make the contract 
void ab initio?  Therefore what has been accmed before frustration
1 For a full discussion of this Act see Glanville L. Williams, The Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943 (1944). It should be noted that this Act does not 
apply to Scotland.
2 Lord Wright in the Joseph Constantine case [1942] A.C.154 at 187, said 
: "Frustration operates automatically. It does not depend on the choice or election of the 
parties to the contract.". But the termination of the contract does not mean that it 
becomes retrospectively void "as it had never been made". Salmond (1927), at 310. 
Under Scots law -as well as under English law- frustration puts a end to the contract at 
the time of its happening, and both parties are freed from further performance of the 
contract. However, what has been performed before frustration, should be paid for. 
See D. M. Walker, Principles... Vol. 2 (3rd ed) at p. 138.
2 Treitel (1983), at p. 685, and Fifoot (1986), at p. 569. In the Chandler case 
Collins M.R said at 499 If the effect were that the contract were wiped out altogether, 
no doubt the result would be that money paid under it would have to be repaid as on 
failure of consideration. But that is not the effect of the doctrine [of frustration]; it only 
releases a party from further performance of the contract. Therefore the doctrine of
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remains undisturbed.4
It was the second case viz, Fibrosa Spolka Akcvjna v. Fairbaim 
Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd (T19431 A.C.32), which mitigated the 
harshness of this rule. In that case, an English company agreed to sell 
certain machinery to a Polish company, and to deliver it c.i.f Gdynia. The 
price was £4800. £1,600 was payable in advance. Owing to the outbreak 
of war, between Britain and Germany (1939), Gdynia was occupied by 
Germans. The contract was therefore frustrated by that event. The 
Polish company then claimed the recovery of £1600. It was held by the 
House of Lords that, that sum was recoverable on the ground of a total 
failure of consideration.5
Therefore the rule in Chandler -as stated above- was overruled. The 
problem with this decision was expressed in that case by Viscount Simon 
L.C., where he said6 that although the present decision mitigates the 
harshness of the previous rule it nevertheless leaves the recipient who has to 
return the money at a grave disadvantage', because he may have incurred 
expenses in the partial performance of the contract,
"which are equivalent, or more than equivalent, to the money which he 
prudently stipulated should be prepaid but which he now must return for 
reasons which are no fault of his. He may have to repay money, though he has
failure of consideration does not apply.". Cited in Fifoot (1986), at p. 569. Emphasis is 
mine.
4 This is an application of the maxim that ’the loss lies where it falls'. See Chitty 
(1977), at para. 1448. Under Scots law the loss does not lie where it falls. See 
McBryde, Jurid. Rev, op.cit at p. 17, see also McBryde, The Law o f Contract (1987), 
at p. 355. As to the question of advance payment, it should be said that it is an 
established rule of law in Scotland th a t"... if money is advanced by one party to a 
mutual contract, on the condition and stipulation that something shall be afterwards paid 
or performed by the other party, and the latter party fails in performing his part of the 
contract, the former is entitled to repayment of his advance, on the ground of failure of 
consideration.". Per Lord President at p. 152 in the case of William Watson & Co. V. 
Robert Shankland & Others (1872) 10 M. 142, and see Gloag (1987), at para. 11.7 
(advance payment is recoverable if no performance is done).
5 See Glanville L. Williams, "The End of Chandler V. Webster" (1942-43) 6 
Modem Law Review.46. at 47. Under the Chandler rule such sum was irrecoverable. 
See Anson (1979), at 518. Therefore this would bring the law into accord with that of 
Scotland. See Gloag (1987), op.cit at para. 11.7 footnote. 23.
6 Fibrosa at 49, cited by Chitty Vol. 1 (1977), at para. 1451.
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executed almost all of the contractual work, which will be left on his hands.
These results follow from the fact that English law does not undertake to
apportion a prepaid sum in such circumstances...."
On the other hand, the party who seeks recovery of money paid might 
receive a small part of the performance of the contract which can be 
considered as a benefit, therefore there would be no total failure of 
consideration and he could not consequently claim recovery of his 
m on ey .7 It was for these reasons that the Law Reform etc was 
enacted.(See Cochin (supra) at p. 96)
§.2. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contacts) Act 1943
This Act came into operation on July 1st, 19438, it applies to 
contracts which: "become impossible of performance or been otherwise 
frustrated.".9 It concerns the consequences of frustration, and does not
deal with its instances. 10 This Act covers instances where the contract is 
discharged by subsequent physical impossibility (as in Tavlor). It also 
applies to contracts discharged by subsequent illegality, and to those 
where there is a fundamental change in the circumstances.11
S . 1 (2) provides that:
"All sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the contract before the 
time when the parties were so discharged ( in this Act referred to as "the time of 
discharge") shall, in the case of sums so paid, be recoverable from him as money 
received by him for the use of the party by whom the sums were paid, and, in the
7 Anson (1979), at p. 518, and see Fifoot (1986), at p. 570.
8 See Fifoot (1986), at p. 575. Therefore the common law rules apply to 
contracts in which the time of discharge is before July 1st 1943 (see S.2 (1), because 
this Act is applicable to contracts frustrated after that date). See Glanville, Law  
Reform (1944), at p. 1.
9 But not those terminated by agreement or breach. See Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), at 
1574, and see Glanville, Law Reform op.cit at pp. 20, 23. This Act applies to 
contracts governed by English law, and includes those to which the crown is a party. 
Chalmer's Sale o f Goods Including the Factors Acts 1889 & 1890 (16th ed., London. 
Butterworths. 1971), at 22. A contract governed by English law means that its proper 
law is English law. See (1944) 60 L.O.Rev at p. 162, and see Glanville, Law Reform 
op.cit at p. 18, therefore it does not apply to contracts governed by Scots law or 
Northern Ireland law. Ibid at p. 19.
10 See (1944) 60 L Q.Rev at p. 161.
11 S. 1 (1) of the Act, and see (1944) 60 L.O.Rev at p. 162.
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case of sums so payable, cease to be so payable:
Provided that, if the party to whom the sums were so paid or payable incurred 
expenses before the time of discharge in, or for the purpose of, the performance of 
the contract12, the court13 may, if it considers it just to do so having regard to all 
the circumstances of the case, allow him to retain or, as the case may be, recover 
the whole or any part of the sums so paid or payable, not being an amount in excess 
of the expenses so incurred."
So all sums which are payable under the contract, before frustration, 
cease to be so payable. Under the present Act,14 the claim to pay £41,15s 
in Chandler v. Webster, could not be upheld.
As for the sums which were already paid before frustration, these are 
recoverable.15
Since that subsection does not mention total failure of consideration, 
sums paid can be recovered even if there is partial failure of consideration 
only.16
As to the case of Fibrosa (above), it was said that the party who incurs 
expenses before the time of frustration, is thus left without remedy. 
Section 1(2), provides that remedy by giving to the party who receives the 
advance payment and which he has to return, the right to claim to be paid 
a sum of money for the expenses incurred by him, before frustration of 
the contract.
The court is not bound to order such recovery, but may -in its 
discretion- allow him to retain or recover in whole or in part those sums
12 An example of the expenses incurred in the performance of the contract is, 
where a shiprepairer, had made part of the repair, but subsequently the ship was 
destroyed by fire. An example of the expenses incurred for the performance of the 
contract, is where a manufacturer, in order to manufacture goods (which are the subject 
matter of the contract), installed some machinery for the purpose of performing the 
contract. So if he had incurred expenses in the installation he is entitled to such a 
recovery. (1944) 60 L.O.Rev at pp. 165-66, and see Glanville, Law Reform op.cit at 
p. 43.
And arbitrator S. 3 of the Act, and see Glanville L. Williams, "The Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943" (1943-44) 7 Mod.L.Rev.66. at p. 69, and see 
Glanville, Law Reform op.cit at p. 91.
14 Treitel (1983), at p. 686.
15 Treitel (1983), at p. 686., this is as in the Fibrosa case, but in Fibrosa the 
failure of consideration must be total. See Glanville, Law Reform op.cit at p. 30.
16 Treitel (1983), at p. 686, and see Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), at 1575, and Glanville, 
Law Reform., op.cit at p. 30.
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paid or payable to him before the time of discharge of the contract, 
without exceeding the amount of his expenses.
Another harsh mle is stated in the case of Appleby v. Mvers.((T867) 
L.R. 2 C.P.651) In that case the plaintiff agreed to erect machinery on the 
defendant's premises. A sum of £459, was payable on completion of the 
work. Before such termination, a fire destroyed both the premises and 
the machinery. In an action to recover £419 for "work done and materials 
supplied"17, it was held that, the plaintiffs were not entitled to such a sum, 
as frustration excuses both parties from further performance of the 
contract. Here further performance is understood to be the erection of 
new machinery (by the plaintiffs), and the payment for what was done (by the 
defendants). Therefore the payment could not be upheld, until the 
completion of the whole work. In other words, even if there is partial 
performance of the contract, nothing is recoverable for what has been 
done. This rule is well expressed by Glanville, (Law Reform op.cit at p. 2) 
where he says:
"Where a party enters into an entire contract and performs in part but fails to 
complete, otherwise than as a result of a breach of contract by the other party, 
he can recover nothing.".
The rule under Scots law where the performance of the contract is 
partial only and the contract is frustrated, is stated by Lord President in 
William Watson & Co V. Robert Shankland & Others ((1872) 10 M.142), 
where he said (at p. 152) that:
"... if [a party to a contract] perform a part and then fail in completing the 
contract, I shall be bound in equity to allow him credit to the extent to which I 
am lucratus bv his materials and labour, but no further, and if I am not lucratus 
at all, I shall be entitled to repetition of the whole advance, however great his 
expenditure and consequent loss may have been.".
We may note here that in comparing Scots law with the provision of S. 
1 (3) 1943 Act above, they are now similar.
Another rule under Scots law is that where a person was in the course
17 Fifoot (1986), at p. 573.
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of constructing a building and before terminating the construction, it was 
destroyed by a frustrating event, he is in this case entitled to claim 
remuneration for the work he did and for the materials he used. This is so 
because under Scots law, the property in the unfinished building passes to 
the owner of the ground, and consequently the risk of destmction of the 
building is upon him by application of the maxim res perit domino. (See 
Gloag (1987), op.cit at para. 11.6 and the Scottish cases cited there).
However, the harsh rule as stated in Appleby has been mitigated in the 
provision of S. 1(3) of the Act which reads:
"Where any part to the contract has, by reason of anything done by any other party 
thereto in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, obtained a valuable 
benefit (other than a payment of money to which the last foregoing subsection applies) 
before the time of discharge, there shall be recoverable from him, by the said other 
party such sum (if any), not exceeding the value of the said benefit to the party 
obtaining it, as the court considers just, having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case, in particular,
(a) The amount of any expenses incurred before the time of discharge by the 
benefited party in, or for the purpose of the performance of the contract, including any 
sums paid or payable by him to any other party in pursuance of the contract and 
retained or recoverable by that party under the last foregoing subsection, and
(b) The effect, in relation to the said benefit, of the circumstances giving rise to the 
frustration of the contract.". 18
So this section applies where one party to the contract, by his partial 
performance of the contract, has conferred a benefit to the other party.
Therefore, under this section the recovery of a sum of money is now 
possible, subject to the conditions stated above.
It may be said that, looking at the case of Appleby V. Myers, no 
valuable benefit was conferred to the defendant, since the whole work and 
the benefit were totally destroyed. Therefore no award should be given to
18 "Benefit" in this section was explained as being "not the cost of performance 
incurred by the claimant, but...the end product.". See B.P.(Exploration) Libva Ltd v. 
Hunt [1979] 1 W.L.R.783.affd [1981] 1 W.L.R.236. Cited in Treitel (1983), at p. 
688, which in other words means the end product of the services and not the services 
themselves. See Francis Rose, "Restitution After frustration" (1981) 131.2 New Law 
Journal.955. at p. 956.3. For an example of the valuable benefit see (1944) 60 
L.O.Rev at p. 166. It is to be noted that this case is the first one where the 1943 Act 
was applied. Baker J. H, "Frustration and Unjust Enrichment" (1979) Cambridge Law 
Joumal.266. at p. 268.
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the plaintiff, who erected the machinery. This is because the court in 
giving such an award must take into account "the effect, in relation to the said 
benefit, of the circumstances giving rise to the frustration.". But if part of the 
work which was erected remained untouched, then there would have been 
a valuable benefit.(Anson (1979) p. 520.)
However, such arguments are inconsistent with the provision of the 
Act viz S. 1(3), where it is provided:
"Where any party to the contract has, by reason of anything done by any
other party thereto in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract,
obtained a valuable benefit...before the time of discharge....".
Therefore in Appleby, the work which was the valuable benefit was 
conferred to the defendant before the time of discharge of contract by 
frustration. I9
§.3. Contracts to which the Act Does Not Apply.
It has already been shown that, there are some contracts excluded from 
the application of the present Act. It is provided that:
"This Act shall not apply:-
(a) to any charterparty, except a time charterparty or a charterparty by way of 
demise, or to any contract (other than a charterparty) for the carriage of 
goods by sea; or
(b) to any contract of insurance...
(c) to any contract to which section seven of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 
applies or to any other contract for the sale, or for the sale and delivery, of 
specific goods, where the contract is frustrated^ by reason of the fact that 
the goods have perished."
I-(a) 1- The mle is that, where a freight is to be paid in completion of a
19 Fifoot (1986), at p. 574, and Treitel (1983), at p. 689, and Glanville, Law  
Reform op.cit at p. 49, so if it is supposed that the defendant sold the property before 
the perishing, this would certainly have increased the price of the property as a result of 
the plaintiffs work. Glanville, Law Reform at p. 49.
20 it is to be noted that the word ’frustration' is not used in S. 7 of the S.G.A. 
1893. But it is suggested that there is no difference in saying frustration in this Act (ie 
the 1943), and in the 1893 Act. This is because in 1893 the word 'frustration1 was not 
commonly used. Glanville, Law Reform op.cit at p. 90.
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voyage, and that voyage is not completed owing to an impossibility (like 
loss of vessel or cargo), then the shipowner cannot claim the freight
2- Where that freight has already been paid for, it cannot be 
recovered, not even a part of it.21
(b) In the carriage of goods, if a vessel cannot complete the voyage, the 
shipowner cannot claim the payment of the freight pro rata22, and this 
even if the non completion was due to an excusable impossibility. As may 
be noted this is in fact an application of the common law rule as stated in 
Appleby.(Glanville. Law Reform op.cit at p. 79).
As regards 2 & (b) (above), English law is totally different from that 
of Scotland and "all the nations of trading world". The law of Scotland as well 
as of other nations is to the effect that any advance payment of freight 
made by a charterer to a shipowner is recoverable if the ship and the 
cargo were lost. The only exception is where parties expressly provide 
(or it clearly appears) that the advance freight shall not be recoverable. The 
English principle is criticised as being ’artificial and unsound’. (Per Lord 
Justice Clerk). Lord President on his part said (at p. 153) "... the law and 
practice of the other nations of the great trading community is in my judgment in 
accordance with sound legal principle, and that the English rule is not.". The two 
quotations are from the Scottish case William Watson & Co V. Robert 
Shankland ((1872) 10 M. 142).
II-As to the contract of insurance, it is also established that, once the 
risk begins to run, no apportionment of premiums under an insurance 
policy, can be allowed.(See Generally Treitel (1983), pp. 692-93.)
III-Regarding the non application of the 1943 Act to cases where S.7 of 
the Sale of Goods Act applies,23 it has ben said24 that, the only 
difference between the common law rules and that of this Act is related to
2 * Glanville, Law Reform., at p. 72.
22 See St Enoch Shipping Company. Ltd v. Phosphate Mining Company [1916] 
2 K.B.624.
23 The reason behind this extension is that "the case of impossibility by the 
perishing of goods is peculiar to the law of sale, and the special rules applicable to the 
perishing of specific goods have been long established, and are well understood by the 
commercial community, so that there is no point in disturbing them.". Chalmers Sale 
o f Goods (1971), at p. 22. The 1943 is applicable in cases other than those of the 
perishing of goods, an example is war. See Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), at p. 175.
24 Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), at p. 175.
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c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a d v a n c e  p a y m e n t  a n d  p a r t  d e l i v e r y .
1- Advance payment.
Where the buyer, for example pays for the goods in advance, but does 
not get them, he can recover what he has paid since there is a total failure 
of consideration. There is no difference in that situation, were the 1943 
Act not to apply.
The difference would be in the case where the seller has incurred 
expenses, such as to put the goods in a deliverable state.25 Under the Act 
-if it were not excluded- the seller has a right of recovery for the expenses, 
but not under the common law rules as has been seen.(See Atiyah, Sale o f 
Goods (1975), at p. 175.)
2- Part delivery.
Where the buyer, after having paid in advance for the goods, gets only 
part of them and then the undelivered part is destroyed by an event 
amounting to frustration, he cannot recover back what he has paid (ie for 
the perished quantity of goods) -under common law rules-; since the failure of 
consideration is only partial.26 Neither can he rely on the Act since it is 
excluded.
WHiere the seller delivers part only of the goods, but is not paid 
anything and then is unable to supply the remaining goods, and the 
contract is assumed to be frustrated, he can rely neither on this Act as if 
there has been a valuable benefit conferred to the buyer, because this Act 
is excluded, nor can he obtained a part of the agreed price under common 
law rules.27 However, it has also been pointed out28 that under 
common law, he can recover payment -on a quantum meruit basis29- for
26 See S. 18 r. 2 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
26 However, it has been suggested that the buyer can recover back what he has 
paid for the undelivered part. This is because in this case the risk was on the seller at 
the time of the perishing. See Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), at p. 176, and see 
Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at para. 429.
27 See Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), at p. 176., citing the case of Applebv.
28 Atiyah (1975), at p. 176, and Treitel (1983), at p. 693, and see Macleod, Sale 
& Hire-Purchase at p. 258.
29 Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), at para. 429.
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the delivered part. This is only possible if a new contract can be implied 
between the parties, arising from the acceptance of the buyer of that 
benefit, after frustration. This is even though the contract is not severable 
and the price of the goods was to be paid on the delivery of the whole 
goods. But it is required that the buyer in this case should have the option 
of retaining or returning the goods.(Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods (1974), para. 
429.)
Following the second part of S. 2(5)(c), the Act does not apply to 
contracts for the sale or the sale and delivery of specific goods, and the 
contract is frustrated by the fact that the goods have perished. This 
provision may refer to the case where the risk has passed to the buyer.30 
But it was pointed out that, it is hard to see how a contract can be 
frustrated after the risk has passed to the buyer.
The distinction brought by the Act does not seem to rest on clear 
reasons. In other words, the Act does not apply where the goods are 
specific and where frustration occurs by the perishing of the goods, 
whereas it would apply if the goods are unascertained or that the cause of 
frustration is for example requisition of goods, or where there is a 
supervening illegality.(Treitel (1983), at p. 694.)
It is suggested that, the exclusion may be to avoid disturbing the rules 
as to risk in such contracts. But even this cannot be sustained since all 
contracts for the sale of goods should have been excluded, and not only 
part of them.31
It is also to be noted that, the provisions of this Act can be excluded by 
agreement of the parties.(S. 2 (3) of the Act.)
As to the services which a party to a contract may render to the other
30 Treitel (1983), at p. 693.
31 Treitel (1983), at p. 694. It is also observed that this second part does not add 
anything. Because it is known that where there is a sale of specific goods which have 
perished, the contract cannot be frustrated unless by operation of S.7 of the S.G.A. See 
Atiyah, Sale o f Goods (1975), at p. 174. However, Macleod ((1971), p. 258) points 
out that the second part applies to cases where the risk has passed to the buyer, but not 
the ownership. It also applies to cases where the ownership has passed to the buyer 
but not the risk, and 'probably' where both the ownership as well as the risk have 
passed. Therefore in these cases the destruction of the goods may frustrate the 
contract.
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after frustration in order to protect his interests, he can claim 
remuneration for those services, under the quantum meruit principle. 
(Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), at 1585.)
Section Two. Effects of Force Maieure in Synallagmatic Contracts.32
In principle by the occurrence of an event of force majeure the debtor 
is discharged totally and permanently from further performance and will 
not not be held liable for his non performance of the contract. This 
general principle has its exceptions. An example is the cases of partial and 
temporary impossibility. In what follows the general principle as well as 
its exceptions will be studied. Since however, the creditor is also 
concerned with the question of non performance, the problem is to decide 
whether he will be exonerated as the debtor is or not. This question is also 
dealt with in this section.
§.1. The General Principle.
Article 1147 Fr.C.C. states that:"A debtor is judged liable, the case arising, to 
the payment of damages, either by reason of the inexecution of the obligation or by 
reason of delay in the execution, at all times when he does not prove that the 
inexecution came from an outside cause which cannot be imputed to him, and further
32 The effects of force majeure in synallagmatic contracts is also known as the 
"Theorie des Risques". As to the definition of a synallagmatic contract, art. 1102 
Fr.C.C, states that:"A contract is synallagmatic or bilateral when the contracting parties 
obligate themselves reciprocally towards each other.". There is no problem in the case 
of a unilateral contract. This is because in such a contract there is only one undertaking 
on the part of the debtor. An example is the contract of 'loan' (pret). Thus if the thing 
borrowed was destroyed by an event of force majeure, the debtor is exonerated. The 
risk of destruction is on the creditor since he can ask for nothing (it is the maxim res 
perit creditori which applies here or res perit domino if it is a specific thing and the 
creditor is the owner. See Henri De Page, op.cit. at pp. 609 & 811, and see Leon 
Marie pp. 8 & 177. See also art. 1884 Fr.c.c., and art. 542 /2 Alg.C.C (loan for use) 
and art. 1929 Fr.C.C (contract of bailment {depot}). Marie at pp. 179-80, and see El 
W assit Vol. 1 at pp. 725-26. But it is to be noted that where the loan is for 
consumption (art. 1892 Fr.C.C., and art. 450 Alg.C.C), as in the case of loan of 
money or things which are consumed by their use, the borrower has to return the same 
quantity and quality. In this contract the borrower becomes the owner of the thing lent 
to him, (see art. 1893 Fr.C.C). Marie at p. 178, and see El Wassit Vol. 5 at pp. 451 
et seq.
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that there was no bad faith on his part".[As to Algerian law see art. 176 C.C.]
Article 1148 Fr.c.c. states that:"No damages arise when, as a result of a force 
majeure or a fortuitous event, the debtor was prevented from giving or doing that for 
which he had obligated himself, or did what was forbidden to him.".
Following these texts, a debtor who cannot perform his obligation 
because of an event of force majeure is exonerated from his liability (ie to 
pay damages)33 for such non performance, and will not be obliged to 
perform that obligation. This is so because the damage caused to the 
creditor is not in fact a result of the debtor's act but due to the event of 
force majeure.34 The problem which arises from deciding that a debtor
33 Carbonnier (1969), at p. 242, and Ripert (1952), at p. 517, and Weill (1971), 
at p. 440, and Dupont (1986), at p. 105, and see Barry Nicholas, French Law of 
Contract (1982), at p. 196. Some authors add that where the debtor -in a case of force 
majeure- is exonerated, this does not mean that he has no other duty. His duty, 
following the principle of good faith (see art. 1134 Fr.C.C, and art. 107 Alg.C.C.), is 
to inform the creditor of the situation of impossibility. Such an act would certainly 
prevent other extra-expenses to be borne by the creditor. See Fiatte at p. 18 [cf with the 
English duty to cooperate in cases of import and export prohibitions supral A breach 
of such obligation -as these authors say- is considered as a contractual fault, and the 
debtor would have to pay any damages caused to the creditor. Id at p. 20.
This may also be the case under Algerian Civil Code. Thus art. 577 Alg C.C [and 
art. 1993 Fr.C.C] (concerning the contract of agency) disposes that the agent should 
inform the principal about the performance of the agency. See also art. 497 
(concerning the contract of lease). In the contract of insurance, the insured party 
should inform the insurer of any event which may happen in the course of performing 
the contract. (See art. 15. Loi. August 9th.l980). See to this effect Benslimane Hadj 
Mokhtar Leila, De la Theorie de VAutonomie de la Volonte et de ses Effets dans le 
Droit Contractuel Algerien (These de Magister. Oran. 1983), at p. 70. This also seems 
to be the opinion of an Egyptian author where he says that the debtor should inform the 
creditor of the impossibility and that this is an application of the principle of good faith 
in the performance of contracts as formulated in art. 148/1 Egy.C.C., see Houcine 
Amer, op.cit at p. 396.
34 Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 733, and Michel Le Galcher-Barron, 
Droit Civil. Les Obligations (3eme ed., Francis Lefebvre. 1979), at para. 463. For 
examples where there is a case of force majeure and therefore a total exoneration see 
art. 1302 Fr.C.C. (loss of the thing owing), and art. 1722 Fr.C.C [art. 481 Alg.C.C.] 
(destruction of the thing rented), and see art. 1795 Fr.C.C. (death of the worker, 
architect or entrepreneur). See Fiatte at p. 59, and El Wassit Vol. 1 op.cit at p. 880.
Under German law where there is a permanent impossibility of performance then 
the contract would be terminated. Where the impossibility is temporary only then the 
contract would be suspended. See P. Van Ommeslaghe at p. 22.
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is released because of an impossibility of performance (ie force majeure) is 
to determine whether the creditor can also be released in this case. Such a 
question is dealt with in what follows.
The following example will illustrate this question. (A) leases his 
house to (B). Subsequently that house is destroyed by an event of force 
majeure. It is established that the debtor (A) is exonerated from 
performing his obligation since this has become impossible.
Does this mean however, that the creditor (the lessee) of the obligation 
which has become impossible, is also exonerated ?. This problem is in 
fact one of risks. In other words, a decision has to be made as to, which of 
the parties will bear the risk of the obligation which has become 
impossible. Is it the lessee (creditor) or the lessor (debtor) ?. Is the creditor 
obliged to pay the rent of the house he leased although it is not in his 
possession ?.35
Two solutions to resolve this problem have been given. One is 
general, the other special.
I- The General Solution: The Principle of Connection Between 
Obligations in Synallagmatic Contracts.
In synallagmatic contracts because of the reciprocal character of 
parties' obligations, when one obligation is terminated by force majeure, 
the other disappears at the same time. In such a case the risk of the 
impossibility is on the debtor of the obligation which has become 
impossible. This means that the debtor cannot ask the other party to 
perform his obligation, since it was terminated because of that 
connection.36 This solution is the application of the rule res perit 
debitori?'!
36 Weill (1971), at pp. 518 et seq. and Benabent (1987), at para. 258. It can be 
said regarding articles of the French civil code that "the force majeure which terminates 
the obligation of one party, should terminate at the same time the obligation of the other 
party.". Fiatte at p. 104.
36 De Page at p. 808, and Henri et Leon Mazeaud & Jean Mazeaud, Legons de 
Droit Civil Tome. 2 ler Vol. Obligations Theorie Generale (5eme ed., Paris, Editions 
Montchrestien. 1973), at p. 1036, and see Carbonnier (1969), at p. 279, and Bany N, 
French Law o f Contract (1982), at p. 199, and El Wassit Vol. 1 at p. 725, and see 
Benslimane H. M. L. (1983), op.cit at pp. 65-66.
3? Weill (1971), at p. 518, and Dupont Delestraint, Droit Civil.les Obligations at
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It might be interesting to note that some authors base this solution (ie 
the termination of the creditor's obligation) on the fact that each party's 
obligation is considered as the 'cause1 of the other, and where one 
obligation is terminated because of force majeure, the other is also 
terminated but by absence of 'cause'. (See Marie, op.cit at p. 186, and Alex 
Weill (1971), at p. 519). However, the important thing to note is that this is a 
doctrinal controversy and the law itself is the same whether we base the 
solution on the concept of 'cause' or on the connection between 
obligations. (See to this effect De Page at p. 808).
Under both Quebec and German laws in synallagmatic contracts, 
where the performance of one of the parties to the contract becomes 
impossible, the other one is also terminated because of the connection 
existing between the two obligations.38
The general principle as explained above (ie the connection of 
obligations) is not expressed by the French Civil Code, but there is a large 
number of its applications.3  ^ What has been said above concerns the 
French Civil Code only. The Algerian Civil Code declares this principle 
expressly. Thus art. 121 Alg.C.C provides that in synallagmatic 
contracts, when the performance [of the contract] is impossible [due to a case 
of force majeure] the obligations of the other party (creditor) are terminated 
automatically by that impossibility. This solution is also adopted by the 
Egyptian law.40 The examples given below will illustrate the principle 
of connections between obligations.
A- Article 1722 Fr.C.C states that:"If, during the period of the lease, the
p. 116, and Benabent (1987), at para. 259, and M. Le Galcher (1979), at para. 412, 
and Radouant at p. 264, and see Henri De Page at p. 808.
38 See to this effect for Quebec law G. Wasserman at pp. 387-88, and M. 
Tancelin at p. 159, and for German law J. Cohn at p. 16, Texas., at p. 294, Manual o f 
German law., at p. 225, J. Shuster at p. 172, P. Van Ommeslaghe at pp. 22-23.
39 M. Le Galcher, op.cit at p. 411, and Mazeaud, Legons (1973), at p. 1036.
40 See to this effect El Wassit Vol. 1 pp.724 to 726, and Houcine Amer, op.cit 
at p. 398. In the opinion of these authors, there is no need for the intervention of the 
judge; since the termination of the contract is automatic. Even if he does'intervene all 
that he can do is to be sure that there is a real impossibility, and therefore the contract 
would automatically be terminated. See id. The same opinion (ie no need for the 
intervention of the judge) is expressed by Ahmed Lourdjane, Le Droit Civil Algerien 
(Editions lHarmattan. Paris. 1985), at p. 70 (he refers to art. 121 C.C).
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thing rented is wholly destroyed by a fortuitous event, the lease is terminated as a 
matter of law...", and there is no damages to be granted.41 (See art .481 
Alg.C.C). However, there is an exception -under French law- concerning 
the lease of buildings (bail d'immeubles), where the premises are destroyed 
by events related to war. This is provided for in art. 70 of the L. Sept 1st. 
1948 (under art. 1778 Fr.C.C). In this case the lease is not terminated but 
will be transferred to the premises repaired or the premises 
reconstructed, and this even if the reconstruction was in another site. This 
means that such a contract is not terminated but is suspended only. The 
contract will have its effects as soon as the reinstallation in the new 
premises is possible. (See Weill (1971), at p. 519 footnote. 1).
B- Articles 1787-88-89-90 declare that where a person undertakes a 
job (to do a work) and the materials are provided by the person for whom 
that job is to be done or by the worker himself, if the thing, before it is 
finished and delivered, is destroyed, the worker cannot ask for a 
remuneration for the work he has provided in making that thing.42
The general solution as already explained, is inferred from the 
different applications as provided for in the French Civil Code. This, 
obviously, concerns French law only. Because as has been seen under 
Algerian law, that principle is expressly formulated (art. 121.C.C). 
However, the French jurisprudence, in applying this principle, refer to 
art. 1184 C.C. which reads :"1/ A resolutory condition is always understood in 
synallagmatic contracts for the case where one of the two parties does not satisfy his 
engagement.2/  In such case, the contract is not rescinded as a matter of law. The party 
toward whom the engagement has not been executed has the choice either to force the 
other to execution of the engagement when it is possible or to ask the rescission of it 
with damages.3/ Rescission must be requested at law, and the defendant may be 
granted a delay according to the circumstances.". This article concerns the 
'judicial' resolution of the contract when the impossibility is due to the 
fault of the debtor. To base the principle on that article is an erroneous 
application of the law. This is because art.1184 c.c., speaks of the non
41 See Weill (1971), at p. 519, and P. Dupont (1986), at p. 116, and Benabent 
(1987), at para. 259, and M. Le Galcher (1979), at para. 411.
42 Weill (1971), at p. 519, and Dupont (1986), at p. 116, and Benabent (1987), 
at para. 259. What has been said supra at pp. 39-40 is applicable here.
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performance due to the fault of the debtor, whereas the principle 
concerning the 'theory of risks' in synallagmatic contracts -ie the question 
which we are discussing in this section-, is related to the non performance due 
to an event of force majeure. Another difference is that by applying that 
theory, the resolution (ie the termination of the contract) will be effected 
automatically (ie without the need for the intervention of the judge), but in the 
case of art. 1184, the resolution should be pronounced by the judge; since 
it is considered as a sanction against the d e b to r4 3  who breached his 
contract. Another argument is that art. 1184/2 C.C., speaks of 
'dommages-interets' (ie damages) to be granted when terminating the 
contract. Whereas it is known that in case of force majeure, no damages 
are granted. This means that this article concerns the non performance 
due to the fault of the debtor rather than that due to a case of force 
m a je u r e .4 4  However, these criticisms have not influenced the position 
of the French jurisprudence and the Court of Cassation. Thus in a case of 
March 12th. 1985. Bull. Civ. i.n: 94. p. 87, the first 'chambre civile' of the 
Court of Cassation reaffirmed its position by saying that art. 1184 was of 
a general application, that is, regardless of whether in a case the non 
performance is due to the fault of the debtor or due to a case of force 
majeure.
Other authors however, approve the position of the Court of 
Cassation. That is to say even if the non performance is due to a case of 
force majeure, the judge should intervene and pronounce its termination. 
The argument given is that, it is not always a question of resolution when 
there is a case of non performance due to force majeure. Thus sometimes 
the contract is to be suspended only, or that there should be a partial 
exoneration (ie in cases of partial impossibility). In these cases the judge 
should intervene to determine the position of both parties to the contract, 
or that one of the parties contest the existence of a case of force majeure. 
Therefore practically the intervention of the judge is n e c e s s a r y .45
43 gee Weill (1971), at p. 521, and De Page at p. 814. For the reason which 
induced the jurisprudence to refer to this article see De Page at p. 813.
44 See Radouant at pp. 268-69.
45 See J. Mestre (1986) R. T. D. C p. 345 n:4, and De Page at p. 814. Under 
Algerian law in the case of partial impossibility (e.g. partial destruction of the thing 
sold. See infra), the intervention of the judge is necessary in order to reduce the price or
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II- The Special Solution. ^  peril domino^,(Contracts Involving the 
Transfer of Ownership of a Specific Thing)
Where there is a contract in which a specific thing is transferred (for 
example a contract of sale) and that thing is destroyed after the contract was 
concluded and before its delivery, it is the buyer who bears the risk of its 
destruction. This principle is stipulated in art. 1138/2 Fr.C.C.47 This 
article states that:lfl /  The obligation of delivering a thing is perfect by the consent 
alone of the contracting parties. /2  It makes the creditor the owner and places the thing 
on his risks from the moment when it should have been delivered, although the 
[delivery=tradition] has not been made, unless the debtor [was 'mis en demeure'] to 
deliver it, in which case the thing remains at the risks of the latter."
This solution is based on the fact that by the conclusion of the contract 
(for e.g. of sale), the property is transferred to the buyer even if the thing 
sold is not delivered to him. Therefore the creditor (ie the buyer) is the 
owner and if that thing perishes, it is the owner who bears the risk, and 
this by application of the maxim res perit domino. Article 1138 Fr.C.C 
is therefore based on this maxim (ie to make the owner of a thing the risk-bearer 
in the case of its destruction.).48 We may notice here that under English law
to terminate the contract. As to the case of suspension it can be said that the 
intervention of the judge is necessary.
46 unless otherwise stated this solution concerns French law only.
47 Marie at pp. 239-40.
48 Weill (1971), at pp. 522-23, and Dupont (1986), at p. 117, and Benabent 
(1987), at para. 260, and Radouant at p. 262. It should not be concluded from what 
has been said that the rule res perit domino applies only to contracts of sale. Thus in 
the contract of 'loan for use (pret a usage)' the lender is always the owner (see art. 
1877 Fr.C.C). If the thing borrowed has perished by an event of force majeure, the 
risk of such destruction is on the lender. The same rule applies on the contract of 'hire 
of work and skill'(louage de service) (see arts. 1788-89-90 Fr.c.c) see Marie pp. 400 
to 407 (and see art. 568 Alg.C.C). Thus if a jeweller has to do a work on a jewel, 
which was provided by him (ie la 'matiere'). In this case he is considered as the owner 
until he delivers it to the customer. Therefore if that thing perishes by an event of force 
majeure, it is the jeweller who will bear that loss, ie the risk of that destruction, and this 
by application of the maxim res perit domino. In this case he cannot ask for a 
remuneration for the work he has done (and this as has been seen). However, the 
solution would be different where the jeweller has provided his work only and not the 
material ('matiere'). In this last case the risk of the destruction of the jewel is on the 
customer since he is the owner. But here again the jeweller cannot ask for a 
remuneration for the work he has done, (see generally supral and see Benabent (1987),
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the ownership of a specific thing in a deliverable state passes at the time 
the contract is made. The risk passes with the ownership. Therefore 
French and English laws are similar.
However, parties are allowed to stipulate in their contracts that the 
buyer will not become the owner unless the thing is delivered or unless the 
whole price is paid49 or any other clause to the same effect.
It can therefore be concluded from what has been said that, in 
synallagmatic contracts in which the property of a specific thing is 
transferred, the risk of its destmction should be borne by the owner.50
De Page says that it is open to the parties to a contract to stipulate that 
one of them will still be under the obligation to perform his contract 
although the other was prevented by an event of force majeure and even 
though he does not receive any counterpart of his performance since the 
performance of the other party has become impossible. (De Page, op.cit. p. 
817).
As has already been noted the above solutions concern French law 
only. Under Algerian law as well as Egyptian law the solution is 
different.
Under Algerian law, although the property of a specific movable thing 
as well as of an unmovable, is transferred to the buyer (if speaking of a 
contract of sale) by the conclusion of the contract, the risk of the total 
destruction of the thing is not transferred to him until the seller has 
delivered that thing to the buyer.5! This means that before the delivery 
of that specific thing, the risk rests with the seller even if the property of it 
has been transferred to the buyer. Whereas after the delivery, the risk is 
on the buyer even if the property has not been transferred (see art. 369 Alg
at para. 260. Marie (1896), (pp. 400 to 407) says -when commenting on art. 1790- 
that this proves that the legislator intends that the owner of a thing on which a work is 
carried on, is not obliged to pay for that work unless the owner has benefited 
effectively from the work done, [cf with the Appleby case, and the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, supral.
49 Dupont (1986), at p. 117.
50 The same solution would apply in the case of a sale of things which are not 
specific (’de genre') before they are individualised, because in this case no property 
has passed to the buyer. See Weill (1971), at p. 524, and De Page at p. 822.
5 1 This rule is also held under Islamic law . See El Wassit Vol. 4 at pp. 611-12, 
and under the German Civil Code. See De Page at p. 819 footnote. 2.
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c .c .) .
The only exception to this rule52 is where the seller has 'mis en 
demeure' the buyer to take delivery of the thing sold, but he did not. In 
this last case the risk of destruction of the thing sold rests with the buyer, 
although there has been no delivery (see art. 369.C.C. & 270 Alg. C.C.).(See 
Mohamed Hassanine, The Contract o f Sale (1983), pp. 121-22-24).
What has been said, is essential in understanding the mles concerning 
partial impossibility, such as the partial destruction of the thing sold 
where this is caused by an event of force majeure. Thus regarding art. 
370 Alg.C.C, where the thing sold was partially destroyed by an event of 
force majeure, the rule of 'delivery', as shown above, should be applied. 
This article stipulates that where there is a partial destruction of the thing 
sold and this happens before its delivery, and that destruction is very 
substantial as to prevent the buyer from contracting if it did happen 
before the conclusion of the contract, in this case the buyer has the choice 
between asking for the termination of the contract of sale or accepting 
what is left from the thing sold. In this last case he has to pay according to 
what he has received that is to say a partial payment.
Where the partial destruction was not very substantial, the buyer can 
ask for a reduction of the price to be paid, and cannot ask for the 
termination of the whole contract.
What should be noted is that where the destruction of the thing sold is 
total (art. 369 Alg.C.C) the contract of sale is terminated and the buyer can 
restore what has already been paid.53 In this case the termination is 
automatic. Whereas in the case of partial destruction (art. 370 Alg.C.C) the 
termination should be decided by the judge, and the buyer is also allowed
52 However, this rule is not imperative. That is to say the parties are allowed to 
provide in their contract that the risk passes with the property and not with the delivery. 
Such a stipulation would obviously make the solution similar to that under French law. 
See Mohamed Hassanine, The Contract o f Sale in the Algerian Civil Law (Algiers. 
O.P.U. 1983), at p. 124.
53 See El Wassit Vol. 4, at p. 611. Therefore the contract of sale is terminated 
by impossibility of performance (ie the destruction of the thing sold), and the buyer is 
exonerated from his obligation , and this by application of art. 121 Alg.C.C (ie the 
principle of connection of obligations in synallagmatic contracts as has been explained. 
See supra.).
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to restore what he has paid.
What is of further importance is that the answer to the question of 
whether the partial destruction is substantial or not, is left to the discretion 
of the judge.(See to this effect Mohamed Hassanine, The Contract o f Sale op.cit at 
pp. 123-24.)
HI- The Risks in Contracts of Sale made under a Condition or a Term.
A- Term: (see arts. 1185 et seq Fr.c.c, and art. 209 Alg.C.C) Under French 
law if the parties stipulate in their contract that the property does not pass 
to the buyer by the conclusion of the contract but on the day of the 
delivery, any destruction of the thing sold rests with the seller although 
the contract is formed.54 But it has been seen that under Algerian law 
the question of risks is not related to the passing of ownership but to the 
delivery of the thing sold.
B- Sale made under a Condition.55
The condition as defined, can be either suspensive or resolutory.
1 .Suspensive Conditions.56 (See art. 1181 Fr.C.C, and art. 204 et seq. 
Alg.C.C)
An example may illustrate this type of conditions. (A) promises to sell 
his car to (B) if the latter succeeds in his exams. It happens that the car is 
destroyed before the realisation of that condition. In this type of sale the 
ownership of the car is still with the seller. Therefore, the risk of the 
destruction of that car rests always with the seller and not the buyer. The 
seller cannot in this case ask for the price of the sale and this even if the 
condition was realised after the destruction of the car. This is because the 
buyer cannot become the owner of a thing - and this after the realisation 
of the condition - since the contract does not have an object (viz the car).
54 See Marty (1962), at p. 259.
55 See art. 203 Alg.C.C., and art. 1168 Fr.C.C this last states that an "obligation 
is conditional when it is made to depend on a future and uncertain event, either in 
suspending it until the event happens or in cancelling it accordingly as the event 
happens or does not happen.". See also Smith J. D., at p. 459.
5^ See Weill (1971), at p. 525, and Dupont (1986), at p. 117, and Marie at pp. 
273-74 & p. 283, and El Wassit Vol. 3 at p. 42.
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2. Resolutory Conditions. (See art. 1183 Fr.C.C, and arts. 204 et seq Alg.C.C)
To take the example which has already been given, the parties to the 
contract of sale may stipulate that the contract would be terminated if the 
brother of the buyer fails in his exams. In this type of sale, the ownership 
of the thing sold is transferred to the buyer by the conclusion of the 
contract. This would remain as such unless the condition was realised. In 
this last case the contract should be terminated. Therefore if the thing 
sold was destroyed before the realisation of the condition, the risk of such 
destruction is on the buyer since he is the owner.57 This solution is also 
applicable under Algerian law, taking into account the fact that the risk is 
transferred by the delivery and not by the transfer of the property.
§.2. The Exceptions.
The general principle already discussed under Subsection one has its 
exceptions, these are58:contractual risks, legal risks, case of 'mise en 
demeure1, partial impossibility, temporary impossibility, partial 
exoneration and partial exoneration and the predisposition of the victim.
I- Contractual Risks. It may happen that the debtor undertakes in his 
contract to perform it even though there might be a case of force 
m ajeure.59 This means that his promise is unconditional. Such 
undertaking is in general formulated as contractual clauses. Normally
57 See Weill id , and Dupont M, and Marie at pp. 284-85, and see El Wassit Vol. 
3 at p. 43.
5^ See in general Alex Weill (1971), at pp. 440-41.
59 See De Page at p. 609. See art. 1772 Fr.C.C. where it is said that the lessee 
may be made responsible for fortuitous events but that should be through an express 
stipulation. [As to Algerian law a clause which may make the debtor responsible for a 
case of force majeure is also allowed, see art. 168/2 Alg.C.C] But it should be noted 
that under French law "such a stipulation is understood only for ordinary fortuitous 
events, such as hail (grele), lightning (feu du ciel) and blight (gelee), and not for 
extraordinary fortuitous events, such as the ravages of war or a flood, to which the 
country is not ordinarily subject, unless the lessee has been made responsible for all 
fortuitous events, foreseen or unforeseen.".(See art. 1773 Fr.C.C.). See also art. 
1302/2 Fr.C.C.. However, a real exception to such clauses is art. 1811/1 Fr.C.C. 
which states that:" It may not be stipulated that the lessee bears the total loss of the live 
stock having happened through fortuitous event and without his fault."., and see 
Dupont (1986), at p. 105, and Weill (1986), at p. 434.
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such clauses should be express. However, it is always possible to infer that 
undertaking indirectly. Thus if the debtor enumerated the cases in which 
he will be exonerated, it is understood a contrario that in the other cases 
he should not be exonerated.60
II- Legal Risks. In other cases, the debtor bears the risk of an event of 
force majeure, not by a contractual stipulation but by the law itself. This 
is the case for example of art. 1881 Fr.C.C which states that :"If the 
borrower employs the thing for another use or for a longer time than he should, he is 
liable for loss occurring, even through fortuitous event.1’. Article 1882 Fr.C.C 
(and art. 544/2 Alg.C.C.) is another example since it states that: "If the thing 
loaned perishes through a fortuitous event against which the borrower could have 
guaranteed by employing his own, or if, being able to preserve only one of the two, he 
preferred his own, he is liable for the loss of the other.".6!
III- Case of fMise en Demeure'. In the case where the debtor has 
promised to deliver a specific thing, and that thing is destroyed by an 
event of force majeure, he will nevertheless be liable for such destruction, 
if he was already ’mis en demeure', to deliver it but he did not. ([see art. 
1302/1, and art. 1929.Fr.C.C], and see art. 168/1 Alg.C.C.)6^
IV- Partial Impossibility. Sometimes the performance of the contract 
is partially impossible. This means that the impossibility concerns some 
obligations but not all of them. In this case the debtor will be exonerated 
from the obligations which have become impossible, whereas he should 
perform the others.63 However, in such a case the obligations which can
60 Alex Weill (1971), at p. 440 footnote. 4, and id in the (1986 ed.) at p. 434. 
However, it should be said that his inference is open to question.
6 ! See to this effect Weill (1986), p. 434. footnote. 266, see also (art. 1825 and 
art. 1302/4) Fr.C.C., this last art. concerns the case of the thief, who will be held liable 
for the fortuitous destruction of the thing stolen, and has therefore to pay its price. See 
De Page at p. 610, and Fiatte at p. 16. This solution is also formulated in art. 168/3 
Alg.C.C.
6^ Weill (1986), at p. 435, and De Page at p. 609. However, he will not be liable 
even if he was 'mis en demeure', if he can prove that the thing would have perished 
similarly in the hands of the creditor if it had been delivered. See art. 1302/2 Fr.C.C, 
and see Weill 1971, at p. 440, and see art. 168/2 Alg.C.C.
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still be performed should be taken into account. That is to say in giving 
effect to the partial impossibility, the obligations which will have their 
effect must have some usefulness to the creditor. It should also be 
considered whether -according to the intention of both parties- they will accept 
such partial performance.64 This is because, it may happen that the 
parties to the contract, insist on the performance of the whole contract and 
do not accept its partial performance.(Radouant p. 330.)
In the case where the obligation which cannot be performed is essential 
in the intention of the parties, the contract should be terminated.65 Thus 
in Cecaldi V. Albertini. (Ch.Civ.Apr.l4th.l891.1.329.C. Cass) the Court of 
Cassation declared that, it is the duty of the tribunal to decide, in a case of 
partial impossibility, whether the non performance is important enough
65 See G. Thery at p. 94, for an example see Barry N, French Law.. (1982), at 
p. 201, and see of the same opinion Houcine Amer, op.cit at p. 399.
64 Weill (1971), at p. 441, and the (1986 ed), at p. 435, and see Radouant at pp. 
329-30, and Fiatte at p. 42. It should also be taken into account whether -in the 
intention of the parties- the contract is divisible. This is such in a contract of sale where 
the goods sold are to be delivered successively for a certain period, and if it is possible 
to consider each delivery as a distinct obligation. See Fiatte at p. 42. It has been said 'if 
it is possible', this is because the parties may consider the contract as indivisible. See 
Fiatte id- In the case where the contract is not divisible, it will either be terminated or 
suspended. See Benabent (1987), at para. 257, p. 124., and see Houcine Amer, op.cit 
at p. 399,. There is no problem where the contract being divisible, each obligation has 
its price (a sale of goods which are grouped and the price of each item can be 
determined., ie there can be a reduction). The problem arises where the value of the 
counterpart of an obligation cannot be determined.
A solution has been given in the case of a contract of 'lease of houses'. Thus 
regarding art. 1722 Fr.C.C. the judge can reduce the price of the rent when there is a 
partial destruction of the thing leased. Benabent suggests that this solution should be 
generalised to the other contracts since the jurisprudence has not given any solution 
concerning them (ie contracts). The same suggestion has already been made by Fiatte 
at p. 45. That is to say in the case of partial impossibility, the creditor can either ask for 
a reduction of the price or its termination, and it is for the judge to decide what solution 
should be adopted. Fiatte at pp. 45-46.
65 Radouant p. 330, and see Fiatte at p. 49, Houcine Amer, op.cit at p. 399 is of 
the same opinion. Regarding Algerian law, there seems to be no reason in not applying 
this solution. Because under art. 370 Alg.C.C (sale, as has been seen) and art. 481/2 
(contract of lease), the seller or the lessee can ask for a reduction of his obligation to 
pay the price (for the first) or the rent (for the second), or for the resolution 
(termination) of the contract. See El Wassit Vol. 6 part.l at pp. 294-95 (lease).
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as to be decisive for the termination of the contract.66 An example 
where there is a partial impossibility, is where a seller after having 
concluded the contract of sale, could not send the goods because their 
carriage was impossible (being blocked). The partial impossibility is the 
sending of the goods. It can be said that in this case the contract should not 
be terminated since the essential obligation viz, the transfer of the 
property, has been made. However, if the buyer proves that the sending 
or the delivery of the goods was essential in the intention of both parties, 
and that its non performance puts an end to the contract, in this case the 
contract should be terminated.67
Having seen that in cases of partial impossibility the debtor is released 
in part only, the question which may be asked is, whether the creditor is 
also exonerated in part from his obligations?. Regarding art. 1722 
Fr.C.C (art. 481 Alg.C.C. almost exactly the same, and see El Wassit Vol. 6 part.
1. pp. 288 to 291), where there is a destruction of the thing rented, the lessee 
can ask for a reduction of the rent. Therefore it can be seen here that the 
creditor of the obligation which has become partially impossible 
(destruction) is exonerated in part since he can pay a part only of the initial 
due price. Although this solution concerns the contract of lease (of leases 
of houses), it should be generalised to all the other obligations (ie to do or to 
give a thing). (See Fiatte p. 115, and Smith J. D. p. 462).
But it should be noted that where there is a contract of sale concerning 
a specific thing and not a ('chose de genre'), and that its ownership (or 
delivery under Algerian law) has been transferred to the creditor, any 
destruction, whether total or partial, is to be borne by the creditor (ie the 
owner) who should pay the whole price. (See Fiatte p. 111). This seems to be 
in accord with what S. 7 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 states because if the 
risk passes to the buyer no question of frustration arises. (See Chitty, Vol. 2. 
Specific Contracts (1983), para. 4189. As to the passing of risk see S. 20 (1) of the 
Sale of Goods Act. Chitty id para. 4209).
66 Radouant at p. 333.
67 Radouant at p. 335. It has been has suggested that the judge should terminate 
the contract if in treating it as still existing would in fact substitute a new contract in 
place of the initial one. This may mean that it would fundamentally change the contract 
already made if the contract after the partial impossibility occurs, is treated as still 
existing. See Fiatte at p. 53.
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In the case where the ownership (or delivery under Algerian law), has not 
been transferred, and the thing is partially destroyed, the creditor (ie the 
buyer) has the choice between accepting a part only of that thing and 
obviously paying the equivalent of what he receives, or rejecting the 
whole and ask for a termination of the contract as a whole. (See Fiatte p. 
115).
However, this solution seems to have an exception formulated in art. 
1182/3 Fr.C.C.(conceming obligations made under a suspensive condition) which 
States that:"If the thing deteriorates without the fault of the debtor, the creditor has the 
choice either to rescind the obligation or to demand the thing in a state in which it is 
found, without diminution of the price.". This exception seems to concern 
French law only. (Fiatte at pp. 112-13). No similar article can be found 
under Algerian or Egyptian. C.C.. (See to this effect El Wassit Vol. 4 pp. 617- 
18). Even under French law that rule should not be extended by way of 
analogy to other contracts. (See Ripert, Obligations (1952), p. 568).
In the case of a sale of a 'chose de genre' which has perished in part, the 
buyer -if he so accepted- should pay for what he receives only (ie to pay in 
part). (See Fiatte p p .ll l  to 114). What is important to remember is that the 
question of the risk of the destmction of the thing sold does not arise when 
the thing is only of 'chose de genre' ie not specific. In this case it is the 
debtor (ie the seller) who will bear that risk. (See Mohamed Hassanine, The 
Contract o f Sale (1983), p. 119). Under English law the ownership in a 
contract of sale of unascertained goods does not pass until they are 
ascertained. (See Chitty, Vol. 2. (1983), para. 4185).
V- Temporary Impossibility. In other cases although there is a real 
impossibility this is temporary only.68 In such a case the debtor is not
68 A general principle put by the jurisprudence is to the effect that where there is a 
temporary impossibility, the debtor is not exonerated, and the contract should be 
suspended until that impossibility ceases. See Dame Saurin V. Dame Bonnafous 
Civ.lere.Feb 24th. 198l.D. 1982.479. Benabent 1987, at para. 254. This principle 
has been formulated by the Court of Cassation in the case of Ste d'Assur etc V. 
Guilhem (Ch.Civ.l5th.Feb.l888.1.203. See Radouant at p. 275., and reaffirmed by 
the court of Nimes.Jan 4th.l918.Gaz.Trib.2.313. See Fiatte at p. 58. What should 
also be noted is that the French Code Civil (and the Algerian one apart from the 
suspension provided for in cases of illness and calling up) have not stipulated for the 
case of temporary impossibility. Id at p. 57.
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totally exonerated, but will be exonerated for the delay in performance of 
his contract.69 The effect of such a type of impossibility is to suspend the 
contract which will have its full effects when the obstacle has 
disappeared.70 Thus in (Req. Oct 24th. 1922.D. 1924.1.8 C.Cass), the state of 
war was considered as a cause of suspension of the contract and not a cause 
of termination. The argument given by the Court of Cassation was that 
the war was not a perpetual obstacle to the performance of the 
contract.(See Fiatte at p. 61).
The only requirement in case of suspension, is that the performance of 
the contract after that delay should not become useless for the creditor, 
and that the delayed performance still conforms to the intention of both 
parties 71 that is to say, they do not object to the delayed performance. It 
is so for example in the contract of employment72 and the contract of 
lease.73 In one case the contract was terminated because the obstacle to
69 Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 733, and P. Ghiho (1983), at para. 
643. This means that the debtor will not be held liable for damages for the delay in 
performance. Such damage is called under French law 'dommage-interets moratoires'. 
See Frangois Chabas Encyclopedic Dalloz (1978), under "Force Majeure" at para. 118.
70 Weill (1971), at p. 441, and Ripert (1952), at p. 517, and Benabent (1987), at 
para. 254, and C. Larroumet (1986), at p. 703. See also Dame Saurin V. Dame 
Bonnafous_Civ.lere.Feb 24th. 198l.D. 1982. 479., and Mohamed Hassanine, El 
Wadjiz at p. 121, and Ahmed Lourdjane, Le Droit Civil Algerien at pp. 70-71.
7 1 Weill (1971), at p. 441, and in the (1986 ed), at p. 435, and Ripert (1952), at 
p. 517, and Philippe Malinvaud, Les Mecanismes Juridiques des Relations 
Economiques.Droit des Obligations. (4eme ed., Paris.Librairies Techniques.), at p. 
214, and Fiatte at pp. 60-61. For the same opinion see Houcine Amer, op.cit at p.400. 
Therefore if the creditor can prove that it was in the intention of the parties and it was 
essential that the contract should be performed in that time only, in this case there 
should be a termination of the contract and not its suspension. See Houcine. A, id at p. 
401, and Mohamed Hassanine, El Wadjiz at p. 121.
72 See supra the question of illness, and Ripert (1952), at p. 518.
72 Ripert (1952), at p. 518. If the suspension continues for a long time as to be 
intolerable for the other party, that party is allowed to terminate the contract. See as an 
example art. 1724 esp. para. 3. In case of a contract of employment the employer can 
sack an employee who is frequently ill, or he was ill for a long period. The employer 
will not be liable for having sacked that employee. See Benabent (1987), at para. 254. 
Under Algerian law it has been seen that if the illness of the employee exceeds one year 
(for an ordinary illness) or two years (for those certain types of illnesses), this would 
terminate the contract of employment, art. 20. Ordon. 75-31 op.cit. and see supra 
under Death & Illness1.
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the performance of the contract did not end until after the time in which 
that contract should have been performed. An illustrative example is that 
a travel agency promised to take some passengers to see a certain 
exhibition, but due to an event of force majeure, it could not fulfill its 
promise until the end of that exhibition. In this case the contract should be 
terminated and not suspended. (See Fiatte at p. 68) It should also be noted 
that in the case where the debtor of the obligation which has become 
impossible of performance, is exonerated, the creditor is also exonerated. 
(Fiatte pp. 117-18, and see p. 155 supra).
The question which should be answered now, is in a case of temporary 
impossibility under what conditions could there be a suspension of a 
contract ? and what happens after the end of the impossibility?.(See 
generally Radouant pp. 272 to 304.)
A. The Conditions of Suspension.
At least three conditions are required in order that the contract could 
be suspended. There must be an obstacle to the performance of the 
contract, that obstacle should be temporary, and the obstacle should be 
simultaneous with the performance of the contract.
1. An Obstacle of Force maieure. This has already been discussed.(See 
supra)
2. A Temporary Obstacle. An obstacle is temporary when there is a 
possibility that it will end in the near future. This is true even if this 
possibility is one per cent (1%). Because if there was not such possibility, 
this would mean that there is no prospect that the impediment will end 
before the time in which the contract should be performed. In this case 
the contract should be terminated.74 Thus it was decided in a case that a 
contract of employment of an employee, who was mobilised in 1914, 
should be suspended and not terminated. This is because nothing could 
make it foreseeable that the war will continue during almost five years. 
At the same time, no one could be certain that the employee would not be
74 See Fiatte at pp. 60-61.
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freed a short time after his mobilisation.75 That is to say the period of 
the war and of the mobilisation were uncertain.
3. The Obstacle Should be Simultaneous With the Performance.
This means that no suspension would be allowed unless the obstacle 
arises at the same time as when the contract should be performed. Thus if 
the impediment ceases before the beginning of the time in which the 
contract should be performed, no question of suspension would arise.
It is derived from this condition that, in order for a contract to be 
suspended, the obstacle should cease before the end of the time-limit for 
the performance of the contract.76 Thus if an artist who undertakes to 
decorate a place for a certain celebration, but becomes ill and can not 
therefore perform his obligation before the end of that celebration, his 
contract should be terminated and not suspended.(See Fiatte at p. 64.)
What has been said so far concerns in fact the case where the parties to 
the contract have determined a time-limit for the performance of their 
contract. The problem would be more difficult when no such 
determination exists in the contract. In this case it is the duty of the judge 
to infer, even implicitly, such a time-limit for the performance of the 
contract.(Radouant p. 288, and Fiatte p. 65.)
In determining that time-limit the judge should take into account the 
nature of the contract.77 Thus for example, contracts of sale of goods 
the price of which are subject to great fluctuations should be terminated if 
the performance of such contracts is delayed 78
What should be noted is that where the parties stipulate a time-limit for
the performance of their contract, this does not mean that by the
expiration of that time-limit, the judge must automatically decide for the 
termination of the contract. This, in other words, means that the judge
75 See Radouant at p. 279 (for the e.g. only). An English or a Scottish court may 
decide for the termination of the contract by frustration; since it cannot speculate as to 
the duration of war See supra.
76 See Radouant at p. 273, and Smith J. D, at p. 464.
77 Radouant at p. 287, and Smith J. D at p. 464.
78 See Ripert (1952), at p. 518. it is in this "sense" that the court of Paris gave its 
decision in : Paris. Nov 14th. 1873. Bulletin des arrets de Paris de 1873 p. 142. See 
Fiatte at p. 65. Smith J. D., holds the same opinion at p. 464 (he cited a case as an 
example).
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should decide whether that time-limit was really essential as to justify at 
its expiration the declaration of the termination of the contract, since 
further performance after the time-limit, will be useless.79
Sometimes and especially in cases of a contract of employment in 
which an employee was mobilised, the tribunals refer to the intention of 
parties in deciding whether his contract should be terminated or 
suspended only. Thus in certain cases the decision that the contract should 
be suspended relied only on the fact that the employee who was mobilised 
was not replaced, or that his house was not given to another employee 
when he was mobilised.80 All this means that the employer treated the 
contract as suspended only and not terminated.
B. The Effects of Suspension.
When there is a suspension of a contract, the parties are excused from 
performing it without being at fault. Thus in a contract of employment, 
the employee will not provide his work and the employer will not pay him 
his salary and this during the suspension.8! After the suspension the 
contract should be performed as it was initially concluded.(Radouant at p. 
294). Even if there is a fundamental change (e.g. rising or falling of the 
prices) in the obligation of one of the parties, this will not be sufficient to 
terminate the contract. Especially if the contract has still some usefulness 
for the creditor. (Fiatte pp. 136 to 138).
The question which is worth discussing now is the possible partial 
exoneration of the debtor. This is when the event of force majeure is not 
the only cause of the damage to the creditor by the non performance of the 
contract.
79 See Radouant at p. 282, and see Rungeard etc V. Gail la rd . Ch. des 
Requetes.Feb 13th.l872.D.1871.2.177, and see Fiatte at pp. 74-75.
80 Radouant at p. 292.
81 The suspension in this case is automatic and does not need to be declared by 
the judge. Radouant at p. 274.
160
VI- The Question of Partial Exoneration.82
It may happen that the damage to the plaintiff was the result of an event 
of force majeure as well as of the fault of the defendant. In this case the 
event of force majeure is totally independent of the fault of the defendant. 
That is to say that the damage has two distinct causes. One is the event of 
force majeure, the other is the fault of the defendant. The question which 
may be asked is whether the defendant can be exonerated in part only83 
since the damage was caused partly by his fault, for which he will be held 
liable and partly by an event of force majeure, for which he is asking for 
his exoneration for this part of the damage.
The jurispmdence admitted partial exoneration in the case where the 
damage is caused partly by the fault of the plaintiff (ie the prejudiced party) 
and partly by the fault of the defendant.
In relation to the question with which we are concerned, the Court of 
Cassation in the well known case of "Lamoriciere" Transport Maritime de 
l'Etat V. Brossette etc, (Civ.ComJune 19th. 1951.2 arrets.D.1951.717) decided 
that this type of exoneration was possible. In that case a person was 
carried in the ship called "Lamoriciere", but due to an event of force 
majeure viz a violent storm, the ship sunk and the person died. The 
company of carriage was sued on the base of art. 1384/1 Fr.C.C (as a 
keeper of a thing). The Court of Appeal as well as the Court of Cassation, 
declared that the company was liable for that accident. However, the 
liability was for 1/5 only; which constituted the fault of that company. 
On the other hand it was exonerated for 4/5 which constituted the damage 
caused by the event of force majeure.
This tendency (ie partial exoneration) as established in the above named 
case was followed in subsequent decisions.84 The question is therefore 
whether it is still followed ?.
Looking at a number of decisions85, it can be said that this tendency
8 2 It has been said that this question was raised in cases of 'delictual 
responsibility' and not in 'contractual responsibility'. See Yvaine Buffelau-Landore, 
Droit Civil (3eme ed., Masson. 1986), at p. 259.
83 See Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at pp. 734-35.
84 Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 735.
85 Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 735., and Mazeaud, Legons (1985), at 
p. 637, and M. Le Galcher (1979), at para. 463, where he gives other recent 
decisions:Civ.June 15th. 1977J.C.P.1978.ii. 18780., and C. Larroumet (1986), at pp.
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seems to be abandoned. Thus in four decisions given by the 'chambre 
civile1 of the Court of Cassation in 1970 -although they were concerned with the 
fault of a third party they are nevertheless applicable here- it was decided that:"the 
'keeper (gardien)' of a thing, who has caused a damage, unless he proves it was due 
totally to an event of force maieure. will be fully liable.".86 Therefore there is 
either a case of force majeure and the debtor is totally exonerated, or 
there is no case of force majeure and the debtor is fully liable. (See also P. 
Malinvaud, Les Mecanismes... p. 214, and Yvaine B. L (1986), p. 366). An 
example of a decision of the Court of Appeal is given (ie there was a fault of 
the defendant and a case of force majeure) where it held for a partial 
exoneration, but Yvaine B. L, regards this decision as an inferior one, and 
points out that the Court of Cassation no longer admits such partial 
exoneration where the event is not a real case of force majeure ie that 
event was the only cause of the non performance.(Yvaine B. L (1986), p. 
366) Radouant (p. 249), and Fiatte (pp. 93-94) are also of the general
opinion in not admitting the partial exoneration.
VII- Partial Exoneration and the Predisposition of the Victim87
Another question worth discussing is that it may happen that a debtor 
(a doctor) causes an injury by his fault to the creditor (his patient). However, 
the problem is that, that injury would not have been caused if that person 
himself was not in a state of health which facilitated that injury to him. In
705-06.
86 Mazeaud, Responsabilite at p. 737., and cf to a certain extent with footnote. 
26 chapter one of the first part. The same solution is also admitted under Egyptian law. 
That is to say where the damage is caused by an event of force majeure and by the fault 
of the debtor, there is no partial exoneration and the debtor is fully liable. See El 
Wassit Vol. 1 at p. 907, and Ali Ali Souleimane, Studies o f the Civil Liability in the 
Algerian Civil Law (Algiers. O. P. U. 1984), at p. 147, and Antoine Vialard, Droit 
Civil Algerienf1986), at p. 142, this author is of the same opinion and said that this 
solution should also be applied under Algerian law, and Anouar Soltane, op.cit at p. 
338, and Houcine Amer, op.cit at p. 402, and Mohamed Hassanine, El Wadjiz at p. 
165. All these authors hold the same opinion.
87 See Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at pp. 737-38, and Guy Raymond & 
Pierre Billard, Droit Civil (1986), at para. 353, and see Michel De Juglart (1982), at 
p. 312, see also Jacques Flour et Jean-Luc Aubert, Droit C7vi7.(1981), at para. 780 p. 
306.
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such a case it can be said that the fault of the debtor was not the only 
reason of the injury, but that the predisposition of the patient was also the 
second reason of it. This should lead us to say that the debtor should be 
exonerated in part. The question is therefore whether this solution can be 
maintained ?.
In fact the doctrine is divided on this point. Mazeaud, in Responsabilite 
(1970), rejects this solution88 arguing that:
1)- For humanistic reasons, persons who are ill also have the right to 
be protected as those who are not.
2)- Without the fault of the defendant there would not have been any 
injury, therefore his fault was the only cause of it.
3)- There are a great number of sick people therefore it is not 
unforeseeable that the defendant will meet them.
The jurisprudence is also divided. But in Paris March 5th. 1957.D. 1957. 
299. C.d'App, the predisposition of an ill person was rejected as 
constituting a case of force majeure. The Court of Appeal declared that 
:"The predisposition of a person, if it is not due to his fault, does not reduce the 
liability of the doctor.”. In a recent decision it was decided that the 
predisposition of a victim cannot constitute a case of force majeure 
justifying a partial exoneration from liability. (Mazeaud, Responsabilite 
(1970) p. 738., and see Encyclopedie Dalloz (1978) "Force Majeure" para. 130). As 
to Egyptian law, its jurisprudence has refused to consider the 
predisposition of a victim as a case of force majeure and to exonerate the 
defendant in part only. (See El Wassit Vol. 1. at p. 907 footnote. 1.)
What should be noted concerning the effects of force majeure in 
general, is that where the contract is terminated, this effect would be for 
the future only and has no retroactive effect. Therefore what has been 
previously performed is considered as valid.89 However, when a sum of 
money has been paid in advance for a promise to be performed in the 
future and is not performed because of a case of force majeure, in this 
case the restitution of what has been given is allowed.90
Having studied the effects of the occurrence of a frustrating event (or
88 For the opposite view, see Mazeaud id at p. 738 footnote. 3.
89 Radouant at pp. 267-68.
f l A  riichoidS „  _
90 De Page at p. 816, and Bairyv , French Law o f Contract (1982), at p. 199, 
and Planiol & Ripert (1952), at p. 569.
163
of one of force majeure) under French and Algerian laws, as well as 
under English and Scottish laws, what is worth discussing now is the 
possible inferences which can be made regarding the principles involved 
in those effects.
First, we have seen that the only solution provided by English law in 
cases of frustration is the termination of the whole contract. Under 
French as well as Algerian law, two solutions are provided. These are the 
termination of the contract or its suspension depending on the nature of 
the event of force majeure and of the obligations.
Second, under English, Scottish, French and Algerian laws, by the 
occurrence of an event of force majeure (or frustration) both parties are 
released from further performance. The only point to be made here is 
that whereas under English, Scots and Algerian (art. 121.C.C) laws this is 
provided expressly91, under French law this is inferred (for the exoneration 
of the creditor) from the principle (and its application), of the connection 
between obligations in synallagmatic contracts.
Third, what has been paid in advance for a performance to be made in 
the future but is not made is recoverable under all the laws under 
discussion, English (Law.Reform.Frustrated.Contracts.Act.), Scottish law (see 
supra footnote. 4 this chapter) and French law (see supra p. 163) and this is also 
the solution under Algerian law.
Fourth, as to the question whether a party can claim a remuneration 
for what he has done (ie for labour and materials provided) when he 
partly performs his contract and then is prevented by a frustrating event 
from further performance, the solution given by different laws under 
comparison is similar. Thus under Scots law no claim is to be sustained 
unless the party for whom that work is supposed to be provided, has 
benefited from it. English law is not different since the passing of the 
1943 Act. Because the court, under that Act, can allow with its discretion, 
a remuneration for the party who has provided that work and this if he has 
conferred a benefit to the other contractor. Under Algerian law (arts. 569 
& 570 Alg.C.C. supra p. 40) it is stated that the heirs of the worker who dies 
before finishing the thing he promised to do, are not allowed to ask for a 
remuneration for the work done unless the party for whom that work was
91 See for English law Treitel (1987), p. 688.
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to be done has effectively benefited from that unfinished work. We have 
also remarked, above that if that party has not gained any benefit from the 
unfinished work, no remuneration is to be allowed even if great expenses 
were made in the completion of that work.
Fifth, we have discussed the question of the expenses involved in the 
performance of the contract which has been frustrated. We have said that 
under English law there can be a recovery of those expenses under the 
1943 Act. As to French and Algerian laws it appears that such a question 
is not dealt with. For Scots law see (p. 136 supra).
Sixth, as to the question of advance freight, we have seen that English 
law differs from all other legal systems . We have therefore to rely on 
what was expressed by their Lordships (supra p. 139).
Seventh, we have remarked when discussing the English case of 
Appleby that it has been said that the machinery can be considered as a 
benefit conferred to the other contracting party, even if it was 
subsequently destroyed. Therefore the worker could get a remuneration 
for his work under the 1943 Act. As regards Algerian and French laws, a 
different solution would be given in such a case. Because following art. 
1787 Fr.C.C (and art. 568 Alg.C.C.) the worker whose work before its 
delivery is destroyed by force majeure cannot claim any remuneration 
whether he provided the materials or his skill only. In addition to this, 
when we have said that the heirs of the worker who dies without finishing 
the work he promised, cannot ask for a remuneration unless the other 
contracting party has benefited from it, this is understood to be such while 
the unfinished work is still in existence. Whereas if it was totally 
destroyed, no remuneration is allowed. This would therefore differ 
substantially from the solution which can be held under the 1943 Act. 
Because the argument we cited when discussing that case was that what 
was installed could be sold before frustration, and this is said to be a 
benefit. Such an argument under French and Algerian laws cannot in our 
view be sustained, because the ownership in the unfinished work, as the 
one in Appleby, does not pass to the other contracting party unless it is 
finished and delivered. Consequently no risk is deemed to have passed. It 
derives from what is said, that no question of the possibility of selling that
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work arises while it is still the property of the worker.
Eighth, as to the question already put (at pp. 136-137 supra) to the effect 
that under Scots law, where a person was in the course of constructing a 
building on a land owned by another and then that building was accidentiy 
destroyed before it was finished, and that the builder can ask for a 
remuneration for the work done and the materials supplied. With these 
facts, French law is strikingly the same as the one of Scotland. This 
solution is an application of the principle -and this under both laws- that 
the ownership in the unfinished work passes to the owner of the land on 
the principle of accession. Therefore the maxim res perit domino 
applies here. That is to say the risk of destruction is on the owner.(For 
Scots law see pp. 136-137 supra, and for French law see Mazeaud, Legons Tome. 3, 
Vol. 2 Principaux Contrats (1968), p. 544) This similarity as regards Scots law 
might be explained by what has been said under footnote 2 page. 5 supra.
Ninth, as to the question of partial impossibility, we have said that 
under French as well as Algerian laws, the debtor is released for the part 
which have become impossible, whereas he has to perform the part of the 
contract still possible of execution. As to English law the case of Howell 
V. Coupland discussed above might involve the same question.(See also 
Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), para. 1534)
Tenth, as to the question of part delivery under English law, it has been 
said that when a buyer gets a part only of the goods whereas he has paid in 
advance the full price for the whole quantity, he cannot recover the 
money paid for what remains undelivered. However, we have also 
remarked that there is an opinion saying that he can recover his money on 
another ground. Under Algerian law -as we have said- where there is a 
partial destruction of the goods sold, the buyer has the choice, -if the 
destruction is considered as substantial- between accepting the goods left and 
paying accordingly, or asking for the termination of the whole contract. 
It does not appear that there would be a difference -under Algerian law- if 
the price of the goods was paid in advance. Therefore we see that under 
both laws the buyer pays for what he receives only.
As to the second case where the seller delivers part only of the goods 
sold and the remainder is destroyed by a frustrating event, he receives no 
payment at all. We have said regarding this situation that normally the
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seller has no claim, but it has been pointed out that he can get a 
remuneration of what he delivered on other grounds. As to Algerian law 
what has been said above is also applicable here. But the buyer can either 
-depending on the substantiality of the destroyed goods- accept the remaining 
goods and pay for them, or reject the whole and claim the termination of 
the contract. Therefore both laws are similar in their solution to the 
problem although different principles are used.
Eleventh. (A). We have noted that under Algerian and French laws, 
the risk in synallagmatic contracts is upon the debtor of the performance 
which has become impossible when no ownership of a thing to be 
transferred is involved. That is to say res perit debitori, since he cannot 
ask the creditor to perform his obligation. This is also the solution under 
English and Scottish laws.
(B). As to the cases where there is a transfer of ownership, the rule 
under French law is res perit domino. This is also the solution under 
English law. Algerian law bases the bearing of the risk of impossibility 
not upon the passing of ownership but upon the delivery of the thing sold. 
Thus both French and English laws are similar in this respect
It can be said (and this applies to English, Scottish, French and Algerian laws) 
that by the occurrence of a frustrating event, both parties to the contract 
are released from further performance of it. The risk of the impossibility 
of performance is upon the debtor since he cannot ask the creditor, whose 
performance is still possible, to perform his contract. Another effect is 
that, what has to be paid ceases to be payable and what has already been 
paid for a future performance which cannot be done is recoverable. In 
cases where the contract is performed in part only and what remains 
becomes impossible, no remuneration is to be given to the debtor unless 
the performed part is considered as a benefit conferred to the other 
contracting party. In case of partial impossibility, the debtor is normally 
released for that part. As to the question whether the debtor is still 
required to perform what remains possible, this is in fact what French and 
Algerian laws hold in such a case. In English law this question seems to be 
not yet clearly discussed.(See Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), para. 1534)
The main difference which can be noted under the different laws is 
that, whereas under English and Scottish laws there is only one effect in
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cases of frustration viz either the termination of the contract or its 
enforcement, under French and Algerian laws on the other hand the 
contract can be suspended in addition to the radical solution viz the 
termination of the contract. The "all or nothing" solution provided by 
English law is described as "short sighted, and harmful to business 
relations.". (Neville M. G, (1985) Int'l.Bus.Lawver p. 506 col. 1)
Section Three. Contractual Clauses Concerning Force Majeure and
Fn istratiQfl.
What has been so far examined as to instances of frustration and force 
majeure, as well as their effects, is applicable where no contractual clauses 
are included in order to give new instances of release or to set certain 
conditions not normally found in the legal systems in question. The 
question which is worth studying in this respect is how English and 
French courts deal with such clauses. We will then make a comparison 
between the different laws under discussion and see whether they are rigid 
or not in their constmction of contractual clauses concerning the question 
of exoneration from responsibility.
S.l. Contractual Clauses Concerning Force Maieure.
The parties to a contract are allowed to put in their contract clauses 
which may change the conditions of force majeure or its effects. This is 
because the rules concerning the force majeure are not imperative or 
'd'ordre public’.92
Therefore the parties may stipulate that where the performance of the 
contract has become difficult only and not impossible93, the debtor will 
be exonerated. In other cases the parties may stipulate that the debtor will 
bear the risk of an event of force majeure.
Such clauses are valid94 since in the French Code Civil itself there are
92 Radouant at p. 126, and El Wassit Vol. 1 at pp. 880-81, and Anouar Soltane, 
op.cit at p. 338.
93 Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at p. 742, and Mazeaud, Legons (1985), at 
p. 639, and Weill (1986. ed), at p. 434 footnote. 265 (see Com. July 
8th.1981.Bull.Civ.iv. n: 312), and Radouant at p. 127.
94 Mazeaud, Responsabilite op.cit id. Mazeaud, Legons id, and Philippe
Malaurie (1985), at p. 333, and p. Malinvaud, Les Mecanismes at p. 214, and
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some articles to the same effect, (see arts. 1772, 1773, 1825, 188395, 
1302/296 Fr.C.C, and arts. 178/1 & 168/2 Alg C.C.).
However, the jurisprudence constructs such clauses in a strict manner. 
Thus if for example a clause speaks of impossibility, the jurisprudence 
will not consider the difficulty of performance or the danger in 
performing the contract, as included in the meaning of that clause, 
therefore it will not exonerate the debtor.97 In the case where the clause 
is general in its meaning (or connotations), this does not mean that other 
events not expressly stipulated in the clause, will be included. Thus if a 
clause speaks of 'strikes, lock out or any other impediments'. It cannot be 
concluded from this that 'war' can also be included. This is because the 
two stipulated events are short in time, whereas the war is generally 
longer than that.98
It is also true that any clause which is rigorous for the debtor, as the 
one which makes him bear the risk of any event of force majeure, should 
be express, (see art. 1772 Fr.C.C).99 This solution is applicable to any 
contract.100
The problem with a clause which makes the debtor bear the risk of 
force majeure, is in determining its real sense. That is to say how much of 
the risk will the debtor bear?. According to Marie, reference should be 
made to the intention of both parties to the contract as it is declared in art. 
1156 Fr.C.C. We should also take into account art. 1773. (Marie at pp. 128- 
29) This means that where a clause of force majeure uses the term 'force 
majeure’ without any other precision, this should be understood to mean 
the events of force majeure which are ordinary and not those which are
Radouant at p. 127, and Marie at p. 120, and see Pierre Wigny M, "Responabilite 
Contractuelle et Force Majeure" (1935) R. T. D. C.19. at p. 88.
9^ Mazeaud, Responsabilite (1970), at pp. 742-43. But it should be noted that 
there is a certain limitation on such clauses. See art. 1811 Fr.C.C, and see Marie at p. 
120.
96 Marie at p. 120.
97 Radouant at p. 128.
98 Radouant at p. 129. See also ius generis rule, and cf English law of 
construction.
99 As to Algerian law art. 178.C.C, is not precise whether the clause by which the 
debtor takes the risk of an event of force majeure should be express or can be implied.
100 Marie at pp. 121-22.
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extraordinary, as it is the case in arts. 1772-73, & 1811 Fr.C.C. (Fiatte at p. 
17). However, if there is no clause concerning the bearing of the risk of 
the events of force majeure, it should not be presumed that the debtor has 
taken the risk of force majeure, not even of those which are ordinary. (See 
Wigny, (1935) R. T. D. C p. 88, and see art. 1148 Fr.C.C). But if the event was 
foreseen he will be presumed to have taken its risk.
As to the Algerian law, the Code Civil does not make a distinction 
between events of force majeure which are ordinary and those which are 
extraordinary. Therefore it might be said that, the question as to what 
extent a debtor bears the risk of an event of force majeure is left to the 
discretion of the judge deciding the case in question.
The question which is worth discussing now is whether a tribunal will 
give full effect to the clauses concerning force majeure without looking at 
whether the condition of impossibility is met or not ?. Thus if a clause 
states that in a case of ’requisitioning’ the debtor should be freed from his 
obligation to perform the contract, the question is whether a Tribunal 
should exonerate the debtor simply by the occurrence of the event 
stipulated in the contract, or should it look at the other conditions and see 
whether they are met or not. It can be said that a Tribunal should give 
effect to such clauses. However, this should not be automatic. There must 
be a real obstacle to the performance of the contract, for a Tribunal to 
give effect to that clause of force majeure. This does not mean that there 
must be an absolute impossibility of performance, -doing such a thing would, 
in fact be, a refusal to give any effect to that clause- but it is sufficient that there is
a real obstacle to the performance of the contract.101
§.2. Contractual Clauses Concerning Frustration.
Under English law the question of the effects of contractual provisions 
(or clauses) is not substantially different.
Thus normally, where the parties expressly provided for the
101 Radouant pp. 131 to 136, reference to cases are cited there. This author did 
not discuss the interpretation of the other conditions of force majeure such as the 
inevitability and the unforeseeability, but what has been said, should also be extended 
to the appreciation of the other conditions. As to Algerian law there seems to be no 
reason in not applying this solution.
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contingency, the doctrine of frustration cannot be applied.102 Thus in 
Joseph Constantine Steamship Line.Ltd v. Imperial Smelting Corporation 
Ltd ([1942] A.C.154.) Viscount Simon L.C.referred to the case of Tamplin 
etc ([1916] 2 A.C.397.403,404.) where it has been settled that:
"there can be no discharge by supervening impossibility if the express terms 
of the contract bind the parties to performance notwithstanding that the 
supervening event may occur."
In the Eugenia case ([1964] 2 Q.B.226.) Lord Denning M.R said that 
when deciding cases of frustration we have to look at whether parties 
provided for that contingency. If they have,then the contract will govern 
such a supervening event.103 They may for example stipulate that, some 
instaLments of the performance of the contract will be cancelled, or that, 
the performance of the contract will be postponed.104 In all these 
circumstances their stipulations will prevail, ie the doctrine of frustration 
has no application.
But an exception to this is where the performance of the contract 
involves trading with the enemy.105 Lord Sumner in the case of Ertel 
Bieber And Company v. Rio Tinto Company. Ltd. ([1918] A.C.260.) said:
"Does a suspensory clause oust the application of the general rule? (which is 
-as he explained-):"The rule as to the dissolution of trading contracts on the 
outbreak of war, when they are executory on both sides...(he then said)...if 
upon public grounds on the outbreak of war the law interferes with private
102 Chitty Vol. 1 (25th ed., 1983), at 1537, and see John Salmond, op.cit at p. 
298. This is an application of the maxim expression facit cessare tacit, which means 
that "when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is 
excluded", ie no implication -in the context of frustration- is to be allowed in order to 
dissolve the contract, for contingencies other than those dealt with in the provision. See 
Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance op.cit at 204, and see the speech of Bailhache 
J in Banck V. Bromelev (1920) 37 T.L.R.71, cited in Me Elroy, mpossibility o f 
Performance op.cit at p. 216. See also the speech of Lord Sumner in Bank Line 
[1919] A.C.435, at 455 where he said that when parties make a provision which is 'full 
and complete' dealing with the frustrating event, "it is not for the court to import into the 
contract some other and different provision for the same contingency called by a 
different name.".
103 The Eugenia case at 239.
104 (1940) 56 L.O.R. at 199.
105 Treitel (1983), at pp. 676-77.
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executory contracts by dissolving them, how can it be open to a subject for his 
private advantage to withdraw his contract from the operation of the law and to 
claim to do what the law rejects, merely to suspend where the law dissolves?"
(he then said)...discharge of a contract by reason of the outbreak of war 
between the countries to which the parties...belong should be effected simply 
by operation of law independently of their arrangements ."(Ertel Bieber 288. 
Emphasis is mine.)
Furthermore, the contract may be held frustrated even though no 
question of illegality is involved in its performance and the frustrating 
event was provided for in the contract. This can be explained by the fact 
that, the provision cannot cover the entire effects of the event. In other 
words the provision is limited in extent.106
Therefore parties to a contract are not only required to provide for the 
contingency in question in their contract, but they have to provide for it 
by apt words. It is this which may explain the decision in the case below. 
Thus in Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr And Company .Ltd. 
([1918] A.C.119.) although there was a clause in the contract which granted 
an extension of time, where the performance of the contract is either 
prevented or delayed, and although the event in question fell within the 
terms of that clause it was nevertheless held that the contract was 
frustrated.
Lord Finlay L.C, said that, the clause:
"...does not cover the case in which the interruption is of a such character 
and duration that it vitally and fundamentally changes the conditions of the 
contract, and could not possibly have been in the contemplation of the parties to 
the contract when it was made."10^
106 Professor Ian McNeil says:"No contract can ever be fully planned; every 
contract presents the possibility that events will occur for which the planning was 
incomplete by reason of omission or ineffectiveness, or both.". Cited by Richard E. 
Speidel "Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts about Risk 
Management" (1980) 32 South Carolina Law Review.241. at p. 242, but cf this with 
what Berman says about international transactions (post)!.
The Metropolitan case at 126, and see Fibrosa...[1943] A.C.32, esp the speech 
of Viscount Simon at p. 40 (a provision in the contract does not prevent frustration 
from application)., and see Parkinson ( Sir Lindsay ) & Co LD V. Commissioners of 
His Majesty's Works & Public Building [1949] 2 K.B.632 at 667 per Asquith L.J., a 
provision in the contract "though literally applicable, did not apply to a delay (which is
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In Bank Line Ltd v. Arthur Capel And Cornpany.fr 19191 A.C.435.) 
Lord Sumner said:
"A contingency may be provided for, but not in such terms as to show that 
the provision is meant to be all the provision for it. A contingency may be 
provided for, but in such a way as shows that it is provided for the purpose of
dealing with one of its effects and not with a l l . " ^
Therefore, even an express provision in the contract dealing with the 
frustrating event does not prevent the doctrine of frustration from being 
applied, unless the provision shows that parties intended to be bound 
whatever might be the consequences of that event, even if 'disastrous1. (See 
Fifoot (1986), at p. 564 (reference is made here to the Jackson case)).
However, it has been suggested (Berman) that in dealing with 
international contracts the courts should give effect to the provision of the 
parties in their contract. In other words, if they have provided for the 
contingency and that the contract should be frustrated, then their intention 
should prevail. As to other events not provided for, the writer suggests 
that no release should be given to contracting parties since what is left is 
intended by the parties to be bome by the obligor (ie the debtor).!09 If it is 
supposed -says the same writer- that the parties insert clauses for the events 
A.B.C. and that by their occurrence the contract would be frustrated, if it 
is permitted to courts to release parties by the occurrence of X.Y.Z. 
events, this would make the draftsman who provides for contingencies 
which discharge the contract,
"insert what may be called an anti-frustration clause, stating that neither 
party shall be excused from liability for non performance caused by any event 
not expressly covered by particular contractual provision.". (Ibid at p. 1417).
the contingency in question)...so extreme as to throw the work from the summer into 
the winter months and so revolutionize its character.". This is in fact an application of 
what Lord Justice Scrutton said supra at footnote.7, chapter four.
1°8 Bank Line at 456., see further Acetylene Corporation of Great Britain v. 
Canada Carbide Company (1921) 8 Lloyds Rep.456, and see the speech of Lord 
Justice Bankes at 458.1., and see Tamplin [1916] 2 A.C 397., esp Lord Haldane’s 
speech at 406. And see (1940) 56 L.O.R. at 199.
1°9 See Harold J. Berman, "Excuse for Nonperformance in the light of Contract 
Practices in International Trade" (1963) 63.2 Columbia Law Review. 1413. at p. 1416.
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Even by such clauses the draftsman has further to specify which events 
do not discharge the contract.
A doctrine which gives release even if there is an express provision in 
the contract, can be qualified as being a "liberal doctrine of excuse", and does 
not therefore take into account the fact that businessmen in international 
transactions made their contracts "with open eyes". (Ibid pp. 1417-18). 
Moreover since the parties are from different legal systems, they rely 
more on the terms of the contract than on doctrines of release of one 
country or another.(Ibid pp. 1419-20).
He further says that a:
"return to the spirit of clausula rebus sic stantibus poses special dangers in 
the sphere of international trade, where the parties understand each other 
better...than they understand each other’s legal systems and where they rely not 
upon an equity that overrides contract but upon the equity of the contract itself- 
an equity that has its source in the body of international commercial customs 
which traders throughout the world have developed throughout the 
centuries. ".(Ibid p. 1438)110
However, what Berman says (above) is criticised by M. G. 
Rapsomanikis, who says that what is left by the parties without provision, 
does not necessarily mean that they took its risk, they may have intended 
to terminate the contract by the occurance of that event, or they did not 
provide because of the fear that the contract would not be concluded. (See 
Rapsomanikis, (1980) 18 Duquesne L.Rev at p. 563). Rowlat J, says that 
although there may be a provision in the contract, this does not prevent 
fmstration from being applied, where the effect caused by the frustrating 
event is beyond what is ordinarily contemplated.(Pacific Phosphate Co V. 
Empire Transport Co (1920) 4 L.L.L.R.189, cited in Me Elroy, Impossibility o f 
Performance op.cit at pp. 212-13).
From what has been discussed above it can be said that under English 
as well as French laws, parties are allowed to provide that the debtor will 
not be released even in case of impossibility of performance. Another
H d  See also (1980) 13 Vanderbilt etc at p. 131 (where an event is foreseen 
parties are assumed to have taken the risk of its occurrence.).
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remark concerning English law is that a contractual clause will have its 
effects unless its application would be contrary to public policy. This is 
for example the case where the performance of the contract has become 
illegal because of an outbreak of a war, and a clause stipulates for the 
suspension of the contract only whereas in such a case it should be 
terminated. Such a principle might also be held under French or Algerian 
law.
The other similarity between English, French and Algerian laws, is 
that courts construe those clauses in a strict manner. Thus under English 
law 111, in order that a contractual clause can have its full effects as 
intended by the parties, it should cover all aspects of the event in question 
(ie its effects and any other question related to it). Therefore, generally 
speaking, French law does not appear to be different from what has been 
said under English law. The strictness in construing clauses dealing with 
force majeure and frustration, and especially those which are rigorous for 
the debtors, is certainly in favour to debtors. This might show that courts 
are not reluctant to adhere to the "laisser faire laisser passer" principle 
(intended in its largest sense). This may be supported by what Lord 
Wilberforce said (infra page.210).
H I  See also for the opinion that English courts follow a strict construction of 
clauses dealing with instances of frustration, such as force majeure clauses, Atiyah P.
S., The Sale o f Goods (7th ed., Pitman Publishing. 1985), at p. 256.
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PART TWO
WHERE THE PERFORMANCE IS NOT STRICTLY SPEAKING 
IMPOSSIBLE (frustration stricto sensu)1
Introduction.
What has been so far studied concerns instances where the 
performance becomes impossible in fact -such as death-, or in law -such as 
trading with the enemy-. It has been seen that the contract under these 
instances may be fmstrated depending on the surrounding circumstances 
in each case. However, the doctrine of frustration is not limited to cases 
of impossibility. It can also apply to those instances where the 
performance is literally speaking possible. It is these instances which will 
be studied in what follows.
Contracts which are held frustrated, can be classified under two 
headings. The first one is where the performance of the contract becomes 
valueless to the party who seeks release from his obligation. The second is 
where it becomes burdensome.
As to force majeure we have said that it is devoted to cases of absolute 
impossibility. In what follows the doctrine of frustration will be 
compared with another doctrine dealing with instances of performance 
having become onerous.
As to the cases where the performance becomes valueless (infra) we 
will see that French courts dealt with this question, but the solution in 
those cases was based on other principles and not upon the principle of 
force majeure. As to the question of performance having become 
onerous, we will compare frustration with the theory of imprevision as 
admitted in Algerian law as well as in other laws.
1 See (1944) 60 L.O.Rev at p. 162.
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CHAPTER ONE. WHERE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
CONTRACT BECOMES 'VALUELESS'2 (or the purpose of the
contract being defeated)
The illustrative cases in English law where the performance of a 
party's obligation becomes valueless to the other contracting party, are 
what is called the "coronation cases". These are Krell v. Henry3, and 
Chandler v. Webster. ([1904] 1 Q.B.493.)
In the Krell case, Henry hired rooms for two days excluding 
n ig h ts^ , in order to view the procession of the King Edward VII. Such 
a purpose was not stated in the contract, but there was in fact an 
announcement of the procession and that rooms were to be let, and this 
induced the defendant to enter into the contract. (See the Krell case). The 
defendant (Henry) paid a deposit of £25, but the balance of the rent 
remained unpaid. Owing to the illness of the King, the procession was 
cancelled.5 Therefore the defendant refused to pay the balance, and 
sought to recover what had already been paid. Vaughan Williams LJ, in 
giving his judgement, applied the principle as laid down in Taylor. There 
it was said:
"Where, from the nature of the contract, it appears that the parties must from
the beginning have known that it could not be fulfilled unless, when the time for
2 See (1946-47) 21 Tulane Law Review at p. 604.
It appears that under Swiss law the frustration of purpose does not release a debtor 
from his contractual obligation. Thus following a note under article 97 of the Swiss 
Code of Obligations, the lessee, who is prevented from using the premise he leased for 
the purpose he had in mind because of a prohibition of his activity, cannot claim his 
exoneration. This is true unless the purpose of the lease was stipulated in the contract.
3 [1903] 2 Q.B.740, in such cases there is no real impossibility but there is 
frustration of purpose. See The Juridical Review (1980), at p. 11.
4 Treitel (1983), at p. 666 footnote. 58.
5 If there was a destruction of the room and this before the procession took place 
then this case would fall within Tavlor V. Caldwell principle, and the performance 
would be impossible. Since there was a cancellation of the procession only, there is a 
failure of the purpose of the contract. See Salmond, Principles o f the Law o f Contracts 
(1927), at p. 291. However, -as will be seen- the rule in the Tavlor case ie the excuse 
for non performance when there is an impossibility of performance, was extended to 
cases such as the one under discussion, where a state of things (event), being of the 
essence of the contract in the eyes of both parties, fails to happen. See G. M. Sen at p. 
160.
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the fulfillment of the contract arrived, some particular specified thing continued 
to exist, so that when entering into the contract they must have contemplated 
such continued existence as the foundation of what was to be done; there, in the 
absence of any express or implied warranty that the thing shall exist, the 
contract is not to be construed as positive contract, but as subject to an implied 
condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, performance 
becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without default of the
contractor"(The Krell case at 748.)
And because the Taylor case is limited to instances where performance 
becomes impossible through the perishing of a thing which was in this 
case the subject matter of the contract, his Lordship said:
"...the case of Nickoll v. Ashton^ makes it plain that the English law 
applies the principle (of Taylor case) not only to cases where the performance of 
the contract becomes impossible by the cessation of existence of the thing which 
is the subject-matter of the contract, but also to cases where the event which 
renders the contract incapable of performance is the cessation or non-existence 
of an express condition or state o f things, going to the root of the contract, and 
essential to its performance."?
But because, following the reasoning in NickolL such condition or 
state of things8, has to be expressed in the contract as the foundation9
6 [1901] 2 Q.B.126. It is to be noted that the Nickoll case was decided on the 
basis of the Tavlor principle. This is because in Tavlor the performance of the contract 
depends on the continued existence of a given thing, which perishes, and in Nickoll the 
reference to the 'Orlondo' was considered to be a 'given thing'. See (1940-41) 4 
Mod.L.Rev at p. 242. Furthermore, it is not necessary for the application of the Taylor 
principle that the thing which perishes, must be the subject matter of the contract 
because in Nickoll the subject matter was the cargo carried by the 'Orlondo', and it was 
its stranding (ie of the "Orlando") which frustrated the contract. See Me Elroy, 
Impossibility o f Performance op.cit. at p. 29.
? So his Lordship has extended the principle of Tavlor as stated above in order 
that it would cover the "non-existence of a state of things'Tie the procession in this 
case], even if it is not mentioned in the contract. See (1940-41) 4 Mod.L.Rev at p. 
255. However, what his Lordship said when referring to the Nickoll case was 
opposed as being not the one upon which Nickoll was decided. See (1940-41) 4 
Mod.L.Rev at p. 251.
8 The condition or state of thing in Krell is -as understood from Vaughan
William L.J's speech- the procession of the King, or its occurrence. See (1980)13 
Vanderbilt Jou etc at p. 110.
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of the contract and this was clearly not the case in Krell v. Henry, 
Vaughan William L.J, said that, it was not necessary for the condition or 
state of things to be expressed but can be evidenced by extrinsic evidence. 
By that reasoning his Lordship could really bring the Krell case, within 
the principle of the Taylor case.10
Then his Lordship proposed the test to be used in determining whether 
a contract is frustrated or not. The first step is to determine the 
foundation of the contract (here the procession), and then, whether the event 
which prevented the performance H  of the contract (here the cancellation) 
was of such a character that it cannot be said to be in the contemplation of 
both parties when the contract was made. 12 Having answered these
9 Which means that parties to the contract contemplated the continued existence 
of that condition or state of thing as the basis of their contract without which no contract 
would have been made (see the Tavlor principle). It has also been said that even in the 
Nickoll case the reference to the shipment by the 'Orlondo' was not only express, but 
can be said to be implied. See (1919) 35 L.O.Rev at pp. 86-87.
1° The implication of a term or condition in Krell. following the Tavlor principle 
is described as being a "legal fiction" and not as a "matter of construction according to 
the usual rule,...". See Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance op.cit at p. 202. The 
usual rule of construction referred to here is the one stated by Lush J in Churchward V. 
The Queen (1866) L.R.l Q.B. 173, at 211, where he said:"I think the court ought to be 
extremely cautious before they arrive at a conclusion that the parties intended more than 
they expressed. In order to raise what is called an 'implied' covenant, I apprehend the 
intention must be manifest to the judicial mind, and there must be also some language. 
some words or other, capable of expressing that intention,-not that any formal technical 
phraseology is required, but you must find words in the instruments capable of 
sustaining the meaning which you seek to imply from them.". See Me Elroy, op.cit at
p. 200.
11 Here the performance has to be understood in the sense of the coronation 
cases, in other words, as the purpose of hiring the room, viz viewing the procession. 
Because literally speaking the performance was the payment of money.
12 See the Krell case at 751. But notice that Romer L.J, although agreeing with 
Vaughan William, that the contract was frustrated, nevertheless he said "The doubt I 
have felt was whether the parties to the contract now before us could be said, under the 
circumstances, not to have had at all in their contemplation the risk that for some reason 
or other the coronation procession might not take place on the days fixed;... and 
whether, under this contract, that risk was not undertaken by the defendant. But on the 
question of fact as to was in the contemplation of the parties at the time, I do not think it 
right to differ from the conclusion arrived at by Vaughan William, L.J...". Ibid at 755, 
cited in 4 Mod.L.Rev at p. 250. What Romer L.J., said might concern the case where
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questions in the affirmative, he concluded that parties were excused from 
further performance of the contract.13
The second case viz Chandlery. Webster ([1904] 1 Q.B.493.), is similar 
to the first one in its facts and conclusion. The only difference was that in 
the present case the viewing of the procession was stated in the contract. 
Romer L. J. put the principle upon which this and other similar cases were 
decided as follows:
"Where there is an agreement which is based on the assumption by both 
parties that a certain event will in the future take place, and that event is the 
foundation of the contract and, through no default by either party, and owing to 
circumstances which were not in the contemplation of the parties when the 
agreement was made, it happens that, before the time fixed for that event, it is 
ascertained that it cannot take place, the parties thenceforth are both free from 
any subsequent obligation cast upon them by the agreement...".1^
the cancellation of the procession was a mere probability in the minds of the contracting 
parties. But in fact it is not the probability of the happening of an event which should 
be taken into account to decide whether that event was or was not in the contemplation 
of the parties. There should be some reasons which made it possible that a certain 
event will occur. See to this effect the appreciation of the condition of unforesseability 
under French law supra.
13  Pgr Vaughan William L.J, cited in H. G. Beal at p. 297. It has been suggested 
that the principle in Krell can be applied to a sale of goods. For example if after the 
conclusion of the contract, these become of no use to the buyer, in other words, the 
purpose for which they were bought was defeated, in this case the contract may be 
frustrated, provided that that purpose was, for both parties, the foundation of the 
contract and that it should continue (ie the purpose). See Benjamin's, Sale o f Goods
(1974), at 441. However, it has also been observed that it is a matter of speculation 
whether a certain state of things was or was not contemplated by both parties to be the 
foundation upon which the contract was made. See Me Elroy, Impossibility o f 
Performance op.cit at p. 72.
14 Chandler v. Webster at 501. As regards Scots law, it has been said that the 
question of failure of purpose (as in Krell) is not clearly settled. That is to say whether 
it would frustrate a contract or not. See McBryde, Jur. Rev., op.cit at pp. 12-13, and 
McBryde, The Law o f Contract (1987), at p. 351. This is because in some cases the 
contract was held to be frustrated by failure of the purpose of the contract as in the Tav 
Salmon case 1929 S. C. 593, where the contract of lease of salmon fishings, was held 
to be frustrated because a subsequent law had made the major part of the fishing spaces 
impossible to use and rendering therefore the contract almost 'valueless'. Therefore the 
purpose of that contract viz the fishings, was almost entirely defeated by that law. (see 
also A. E. Abrahams. Ltd V. W. Campbell. 1911 S. C. 353) However, in other cases
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It was in fact the third case viz Heme Bay Steam Boat Company 
v.Hutton ([1903] 2 Q.B.683.), which created a difficulty for this type of 
cases. Being almost similar to the two cases above, it was nevertheless 
decided differently.
The plaintiffs in this case, owners of a steamboat, agreed with the 
defendant, to put the steamship at the defendant’s disposal "to take 
passengers"!5 "for the purpose of viewing the naval Review at Spithead 
and for a day's cruise round the fleet.".!6 These purposes were stated in 
the contract. Later on it was announced that, the naval review was 
cancelled. Therefore the plaintiffs asked the defendant for instmctions, 
since the steamboat was ready to be used. Receiving no reply from the 
defendant they used the steamboat as usual and afterwards claimed the 
balance of the hire, which was not paid.
Before the Court of Appeal, it was held -for the balance sued for- that 
the contract was not frustrated by the cancellation of the naval review. 
Therefore the defendant was held liable to pay the balance, the arguments 
given being that, the naval review was not the basis of the contract!7, and 
that such purpose was the concern of the defendant alone not the 
plaintiff.!8
It was further argued that, the object of the hire of the steamboat was 
not solely the naval review, but a day's cruise round the fleet as well, and 
this was still capable of performance.
To differentiate this case from Krell. it was said!9 that, the example 
of the cabman given in Krell was similar to this one. Thus if a cabman, 
was engaged to drive a person to Epsom on a Derby day to see the race, 
and that was subsequently cancelled, then the contract could not be held
no frustration was held although the purpose of the contract failed.
15 Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), para. 1547.
16 The Heme case at 683.
17  The Heme case at 691, for example the procession of the King in Krell was the 
foundation of the contract whereas the naval review in Heme was a motive only, which 
induced the defendant to charter the plaintiffs vessel. See (1919) 35 L.O.Rev at p. 86, 
and see Konrad Zweigert (1987), op.cit at p. 221.
18 Per Romer L. J., ibid at 690. This suggests that it is the common purpose of 
parties which has to be frustrated and not of one party only. See Schmitthoff, 
Helsinki., at p. 133.
19  Romer L. J (Heme case), cited in H. G. Beale at p. 299.
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frustrated, because the seeing of the race was the purpose of the engager 
alone, and not the foundation of the contract (as the procession of the King 
in the Krell case was). Furthermore, the :
"...cab had no special qualifications for the purpose which led to the 
selection of the cab for this particular occasion. Anv other cab would have done 
as well. "20
Applying this to the Heme case, Romer L.J.said:
"The ship itself had nothing to do with the review or the fleet it was only a 
carrier of passengers to see it, and many other ships would have done just as
well" (See H.G. Beale, at 299 (emphasis is mine)).
And comparing the rooms in the Krell case to the ship or to the 
example of the cabman, it was said that the position of the rooms 
themselves were the foundation of the contract for both parties as well as 
the procession of the King on those days 2i
The decision of their Lordships in the Heme case could be criticised, as 
follows.
a- It has been said that in Heme, the naval review was not considered as 
the foundation of the contract. It was the defendant's concern22, or at 
least it was not the sole basis of the contract, because a day's cruise round 
the fleet was still possible.23 This means that the foundation of the 
contract, was not totally defeated.
To defeat this argument it can be said that, the hirers relied on the 
happening of the naval review as a result of which they could attract
20 Per Vaughan Williams (the Krell case), cited in H. G. Beale, at p. 297 
(emphasis is mine), this distinction (ie the cab and Krell) was described as being "a 
distinction without a difference"., and "why is the lessor (as in Krell) any more 
concerned with the use to which the hirer wishes to put the rooms than the cabman is 
with the purpose for which the hirer wants the cab.". See Ross Anderson, "Frustration 
of Contract in the High Court" (1948-50) 1 Annual Law Review (University of 
Western Australia).50. at p. 68.
2 1 Per Vaughan Williams (the Krell case), cited by H. G. Beale at p. 297.
22 Per Romer L.J (the Heme case), cited in H. G. Beale p. 299.
23 Per Stirling L.J. (the Heme case), cited in H. G. Beale at p. 299.
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passengers.24 If that event did not take place, then the reliance upon 
which the contract was made, was defeated, and with it the foundation of 
the contract.
If we take the case of Taylor (see above), where the Surrey gardens and 
the music hall were let, there the destruction concerned the music hall 
only, but the gardens remained untouched.25 Nevertheless Blackburn .J 
held that the contract was frustrated, and did not say that "...there had been 
no failure of the contract.".(Gottschalk at p. 18.)
b- As to the example of the cabman, by which the court purported to 
differentiate the Heme case from the Krell case, this was described as to 
be not "convincing".26 Furthermore, in that example, the sum to be paid 
by the passenger was - as it appears - a usual one. Whereas in Heme , the 
sum was more than usual.27
Romer L.J in Herne pointed out that the ship had no particular 
qualification for the review, any other ship would have done the same 
thing. But it can also be said in the Krell case that the rooms let, had no 
particular "fitness". Any other room "overlooking the route of the procession", 
could fulfill the purpose of the contract.(Mc Elroy 4 Mod.L.Rev at p. 254.)
It can also be said that, in the Heme case, the ships suitable to take 
passengers to see the review, were limited,28 which means that, the ship 
in Heme was the one suitable in this case just as the room in the Krell case 
was.
These criticisms suggest therefore that the decision in Heme was 
wrong and it should have followed the conclusion reached in Krell. since 
they are similar and the arguments invoked were shown to be not 
convincing.
24 Gottschalk, Impossibility o f Performance at pp. 17-18.
25 Gottschalk -as it is thought- indicates that normally, if we bear in mind the 
reasoning upon which the Heme case was decided, the court would have decided, as it 
was decided in the Herne case, that there was no total failure of the foundation of the 
contract, and that the concerts could have been held in the gardens, therefore the 
contract could not have been held frustrated.
26 Gottschalk p. 17.
27 Gottschalk p. 17., it is here implied by Gottschalk that, if the sum was high, 
this surely meant that the hire was for a particular purpose which both parties knew and 
contemplated, otherwise it would not have been too high.
28 Me Elroy, 4 Mod.L.Rev at p. 254.
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In comparison with the Heme case a totally different conclusion was 
reached in Civil Service Co-operative Society v. General Steam 
Navigation Co. ([1903] 2 Q.B.756). This is a case where in a charterparty, 
the defendant let his boat to the plaintiff for three days, to see the 
procession of the King (as in Herne). The procession being cancelled, it 
was held that the contract was fmstrated and both parties were released 
from further performance. The defendant was not liable to return the 
sums paid to him and to take the plaintiff to see the procession. Earl of 
Halsbury. L.C said (p. 764) that,”...I think that, substituting "naval review" for 
"procession," every word is applicable to the case before the court".
It is interesting to add that Benjamin {Sale o f Goods (1974), para. 441), 
says that a contract of sale the purpose of which can no longer be attained 
(e.g., a subsequent event preventing the buyer from using the goods as he intended) 
will not be fmstrated unless it is proved that the continued existence of 
that purpose is the basis or foundation upon which the parties to the 
contract entered into it. Relying on the Amalgamated case (infra) it should 
be added that the frustrating event must be unforeseeable otherwise there 
can be no frustration even if the condition as stated by Benjamin is met. 
But more generally, it has been pointed out that,:
"Although the actual decision in Krell appears to be justifiable on the 
construction of the contract, the case has scarcely ever been followed in 
England." (Treitel (1983), p. 666.)
Lord Wright in Maritime National Fish Ltd v. Ocean Trawlers Ltd29, 
said -speaking of Krell - that it:
"is certainly not one to be extended: it is particularly difficult to apply 
where...the possibility of the event relied on as constituting a frustration of the 
adventure...was known to both parties when the contract was made, but the 
contract entered into was absolute in terms as far as concerned that known 
possibility. ".30
These remarks seem to have been applied in Amalgamated Investment
29 [1935] A.C.524, 529.
30 Cited by Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), at 1546., emphasis is mine. This might be 
considered as a limitation to the principle held in the Krell case.
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& Property Co.Ltd v. John Walker & Son Ltd.31 There was in that case, 
a contract for the purchase of a property which, the buyer intended to 
redevelop. It was held that the contract was not frustrated, although the 
property was listed as one of "special architectural or historic 
interest".32 This means that any redevolopment was impossible. The 
purpose of the contract being defeated by what occurs, the contract 
became valueless for the purchaser.33 This decision can be explained by 
the fact that the purchasers were assumed to have known that the building 
bought might be listed. In other words that that risk was foreseen by them 
(See Buckley LJ. at 173 the Amalgamated case), and therefore they could not be 
released.
The following French cases might have some bearing on what is under 
discussion. Thus in Aguado V. de Beam.. (Cour de Paris, May 1st. 1875. D. 
1875. II. 204 ) , a party to a contract leased a land for the purpose of hunting 
on it. Due to a subsequent law this purpose was no longer possible to be 
attained (ie the firing of guns in the region being prohibited). That purpose was 
the reason in entering that contract. It was decided that the passing of the 
law constituted a case of force majeure.34 In another case (Seine.March 
24th. 1905.G.des.T. 1905.2.2.436) certain premises were leased (loue), but a 
subsequent law made that contract worthless since the purpose for which 
the premises were leased could not be attained. It was decided that the 
rent should not be paid, and if already paid should be returned. (See Fiatte 
p. 15, and Houcine Amer, op.cit p. 403.)
Following Soc.des Etabl.Barmone V. Fritz (Civ.Soc.Dec 30th. 1954 .D . 
1955.somm. 77., Mazeaud, Responsabilite p.703.) a person who leased a 'fonds 
de commerce' in order to carry on a business, cannot invoke the order of 
closing down of that premise as a case of force majeure exonerating him 
from paying the rent due, if this was due to his fault. (See A. Benabent, Droit 
Civil (1987), para. 252.) Therefore it can be said that if the closing down of
31 [1977] 1 W.L.R.164, cited in Treitel (1983), at p. 666.
32 Treitel ibid.
33 The property’s value was reduced from £1,710,000 to £210,000, which means 
a difference of £ 1,500,000. See (1980) 13 Vanderbilt Jou etc at p. 136.
34 Cited by J. Denson Smith (1936) Yale Law Journal at pp. 456-57. (this author 
says that the foundation upon which the contract concluded had ceased to exist), p.
456., and this is true.
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the premises was not due to the fault of the lessee, he might have been 
released.
In fact looking at the above cases, especially the first and the second, it 
might be said that though there is a failure of the purpose for which the 
contract was concluded that would make these cases similar to those of the 
coronation cases, it is hard to say that the decisions of release were based 
on the fact that the purpose was defeated. The underlying principle in the 
first and the second cases, is the one of the "quiet enjoyment" to be 
provided to the lessee in a contract of lease. Therefore the passing of 
those legislations have made the obligation of the lessor (see art. 1719/3 
Fr.c.c) impossible of performance. As a consequence the obligation of the 
lessee should also be terminated.
Thus the solution to the problem of the purpose of the contract being 
defeated by an event of force majeure, might be found in the theory of 
"cause". The concept of 'cause’ is said to include the purpose or the end 
for which the contract was made.35 Therefore it might be said that 
where such a purpose cannot be attained then the contract should be 
terminated because of absence of ’cause’.
The solution of cases involving the fact that performance has become 
valueless, may similarly be reached under English, French and Algerian
35 See Alex Weill (1971), at pp. 297 & 203, and see Carbonnier (1969), at pp. 90 
& 101. But it is interesting to note that these French authors did not discuss the 
question where the purpose cannot be attained, although they remark that the concept of 
'cause’ includes the purpose for which the contract was made. See also Louis Fyot, 
Essai d'une Justification Nouvelle de la Theorie de Vlmprevision a Vegard des 
Contrats portant sur des Objets Autres qu'une Somme d‘Argent (Dijon. 1921), at p. 
21. If I am right in what I have said, then French courts would also terminate a 
contract as the one involved in the Krell case and release both parties from further 
performance by the application of the theory of ’cause'. This would mean that the 
coronation cases would not be treated -under French and Algerian laws- as involving 
the application of force majeure but the one of 'cause'. P. Ommeslaghe at p. 17., holds 
the same opinion. But Cf Stoyanovitch at p. 114, who gives an example similar to the 
one of the coronation cases (if it is not the coronation cases, because he did not cite any 
reference) when illustrating the condition of generality of the event which may 
constitute a case of 'imprevision', and says that the contract should be terminated. This 
might induce one to say that this author is of the opinion that in such a case it is the 
doctrine of 'imprevision' which should apply. See also A. H. Puelinckx at p. 49 
where he says that in a case like Krell. French courts would enforce the contract, (ie 
there can be no release).
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laws. However, the principle used for that end is fundamentally different. 
Thus English courts regard these cases as ones of frustration, whereas 
French courts would decide them on the bases of the principle of "Cause".
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CHAPTER TWO- WHERE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
CONTRACT IS ONEROUS.
As has been seen when discussing the theory of force majeure and 
frustration, each party to a contract has to perform his obligations and this 
by application of the maxim pacta sunt servanda . However, it has also 
been noted that there is an exception to this rule viz, the maxim to the 
effect that no one is called to perform the impossible impossibilium nulla 
est obligatio. As an outcome of this exception, it has been seen that in a 
case of force majeure, that is where the performance of the contract is 
impossible, the debtor is exonerated from his obligation to perform it. 
The other question which remains to be studied is whether there can be 
any release when the performance would be very onerous for one party to 
the contract. Under French and Algerian laws when discussing this 
question, the theory of imprevision is generally referred to. Thus a 
contract is concluded under certain conditions, or at least under known 
conditions, and in favour -to a certain limit- of both parties to the contract. 
This contract becomes economically destabilised by supervening 
extraordinary events. These events would therefore, radically change the 
conditions under which the contract was concluded. This in other words 
means that the foundation (la base) upon which the expectations of both 
parties is based (ie benefit and loss), is totally destroyed. The position of the 
parties becomes totally opposite. One of them benefits from the 
destabilised contact, whereas the other suffers a great loss. Generally this 
means that the performance of one party (the debtor or the creditor)1 
becomes very onerous although not impossible.
Regarding the problem of destabilisation of contracts it might be said 
that there are two solutions. One is to apply the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda, and therefore the party suffering the loss has to perform his 
contract. The other is to readapt the contract, ie to modify it in order to 
stabilise it again.
1 Therefore the doctrine of imprevision -as will be discussed later- if applied, 
would be claimed either by the debtor or the creditor, that is to say the one who suffers 
the loss in performing the contract. See to this effect Comesse Fernando, Quelques 
Aspects Contemporains de la Theorie de VImprevision (Lyon. 1946), at p. 2 footnote.
1, and see Stoyanovitch at p. 17.
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It should be said from the start that French law rejects the idea of 
release when the performance is onerous and not impossible. As to 
English law it is not very certain that onerousness if it is very extreme, 
cannot frustrate a contract. As to Algerian law, onerousness can be a case 
of release for the contracting party concerned with the hardship.
Before discussing this theory under French and Algerian laws as well 
as under English (ie the performance of the contract being onerous) it is of 
interest to give a brief historical summary of this question in early times.
A Brief Historical Survey.
The theory of imprevision is not a recent theory. Although in Roman 
law this theory was not known, Roman philosophers such as Cicero and 
Seneca, discussed the question of changed circumstances and whether it 
releases a party from his obligation. Seneca for example said that there is 
no breach of contract, if a contracting party does not perform his 
obligation because of a change in circumstances.
The Canonists for their part in the 12th and 13th Centuries were also 
of the opinion that a contractor is not to be blamed for his non 
performance if he relies on a change in circumstances which affects his 
obligation. The Postglossators were also of the same opinion.2
Because of the autonomy of the will theory, and the stress which was 
put on the sanctity of contracts, this theory of 'imprevision' lost its weight 
as a valuable principle in contracts. But due to subsequent circumstances 
such as wars and economic crises, this theory was again revived, and 
many legislators adopted it.3
At the present time it can generally be said that there are two opposite 
positions regarding the theory of imprevision4, one admitting this
2 See Stoyanovitch pp. 214 to 218, and see Comeliu-Mihail Popescu, Essai 
d'une Theorie de Vlmprevisioti en Droit Frangais et Compare (Paris. L. G. D. J. 
1937), at pp. 10-11 (imprevision -he says- has its origin in Canon law), and S. 
Litvinoff at p. 3 (where he says that rebus sic stantibus was recognised by Roman 
writers). See also Abd Arrahim Anbar, Encyclopedia o f Legal Principles in Egypt and 
in the Arab Countries at p. 247.
3 See Abd Arrahim Anbar at pp. 248-49, and Abd El Mounem Faradj Contract 
Theory in the Laws o f Arab Countries (Beirut. 1974), at pp. 480-81, and see Peter 
Hay, "Frustration and its solution in German Law" (1961) 10 American Journal of 
Comparative Law.345. at pp. 345-46.
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theory the other totally rejecting it. As to English law it is not very 
certain whether the theory of imprevision (understood in the context that the 
performance of the contract has become onerous) is admitted or not. These 
different positions as well as their foundations, will be studied in what 
follows.
Section One. The English Position.
The performance of the contract having become onerous is also one of 
the instances -and the last one in this work- of the doctrine of frustration in 
English law. We will show the position of courts when dealing with cases 
of this type (§.1). Then we will consider (in §.2) what is called the 
’theoretical basis underlying the doctrine of frustration’. This would 
explain the decisions of judges when holding a contract either terminated 
or as still subsisting.
S.l. THE PRINCIPLE.
We have seen that a contract may be fmstrated where the performance 
of one party to the contract becomes valueless to the other party, and if, 
following what has been said, the decisions in cases such as Krell (see what 
Lord Wright said supra p. 184) were not to be extended, then we may ask, 
what would be the position where the performance of the contract 
becomes onerous o n l y . 5  Can the party who suffers such hardship, 
claim frustration of his contract and therefore be released from his 
obligation to perform the contract?.
In Carapanavoti & Co Ltd v. ET.Green, Ltd (r 19591 1 Q.B 131.), and 
Societe Franco-Tunisienne D'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A ([1961] 2
4 'Imprevision' means 'unforeseeab ility Its name in French comes from the 
fact that the event or its consequences (ie the destabilisation) is unforeseeable. See Jean 
Auvemy-Bennetot, La Theorie de I'Imprevision. Droit Prive, Droit Administratif, 
Droit Ouvrier. (Paris. 1938), at p. 4, and see Stoyanovitch at p. 117
5 This may be the opposite of what has been discussed under the heading 
'performance becoming valueless', because the negative effects of the subsequent event 
is suffered in the case of the performance becoming onerous by the supplier, and in the 
case where the performance has become valueless by the recipient. See Treitel (1983), 
at p. 665.
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Q.B.278.), the contract was held frustrated. This was as a result of the 
closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 owing to the war between Egypt and 
Israel. Such closure had the effect of making further performance 
burdensome.
In the Carapanavoti case there was a C.I.F.contract dated September 
16th, 1956 for the sale of cottonseed to be shipped from port Sudan to 
Belfast, during October/November. The usual route at that time was via 
the Suez Canal. The contract contained a clause which stated:
"In case of...blockade or hostilities...where the port or/ports of shipment 
named herein is/are situate, preventing fulfillment, this contract or any 
unfulfilled portion hereof so prevented shall be cancelled..."
Owing to the hostilities between Egypt and Israel the Suez Canal was 
closed on November 2nd 1956 and was not reopened until April 9th, 
1957. On December 10th 1956, the sellers claimed that they were 
released from further performance, and that they could rely on the clause 
above and treated the contract therefore as cancelled.
The question was, whether the closure of the Canal put an end to the 
contract, in other words frustrated.
McNair J. questioned this as follows:
"Must the parties have made their bargain on the basis that, if the canal was 
no longer available when the sellers elected to perform, the contract would be 
off? Was the closure of the Suez Canal a circumstance fundamental enough to 
transmute the seller's obligation into an obligation of a different kind, which the 
contract did not contemplate, and which it could not apply? "(Carapanavoti p. 
148.)
Having answered these questions in the affirmative, he held that the 
contract was frustrated, because to impose the contract upon the parties 
would have been to impose on them a totally different obligation6
6 The Carapanavoti case at 149. So the "continued availability of the Suez 
route..., was viewed as a fundamental assumption upon which the contract was 
made.", per McNair J at 149, and its 'closing therefore "transmuted the seller’s 
obligation into an obligation of a different kind.". See also (1980) 13 Vanderbilt etc at 
p. 132. It is to be noted that the distance between port Sudan via the Suez was about 
4,068 miles, and via the Cape -which is the alternative route- about 10,793 m. See
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As to the reliance on the clause (above), it was unnecessary to deal with 
it -said McNair J-.
McNair's decision was criticised, because even if it is assumed that the 
parties intended to ship the goods via the Suez "was there not an ancillary 
implied obligation on the sellers in the emergency which had arisen to co-operate by 
shipping via the Cape". (See (1958) J.B.L at p. 411). This was supported later in 
the case of Tsakiroglou ([1962] A.C.93), where it was said that, where there 
is no customary route through which the ship could proceed, then a 
reasonable route has to be used. In Carapanavoti this would mean, 
proceeding via the Cape of Good Hope. This in fact means that parties to a 
contract have the duty to co-operate in the performance of the contract. 
(See Schmitthoff C. M, "The End of Suez" (1961) J.B.L.184. at p. 185).
Rapsomanikis (Duq.L.Rev) however, is of the opinion that the decision 
of McNair -in Carapanavoti- was justified since it was the first case 
involving such a problem. Therefore the closure of the canal was 
unforeseen. But it is to be noted here that although this author 
disapproves the overruling of the Carapanavoti case (as will be seen), he 
nevertheless approves the decision of Tsakiroglou (infra), because in this 
case the closure of the canal was foreseen. ((1980) 18 Duquesne L.Rev at p. 
585). The same writer also approves the fundamental difference between 
shipping via the Cape and via the Suez as pointed out by McNair. (Ibid at p. 
583). The correctness of what this author says might be doubted since in 
1956 all businessmen foresaw the closure of the Suez Canal (see infra).
In the second case viz Societe Franco etc (supra), the probability of the 
closure of the Suez Canal existed because on July 26th, 1956 Egypt had 
announced the nationalisation of the Canal, whereas the contract of 
charterparty was made on October 18th, 1956. The charterers in this 
case, chartered a vessel called "Massalia", to carry goods from Masulpitan 
to Genoa. On November 20th, 1956, the canal was closed when the vessel 
was on her route to Genoa.
The shipowner therefore alleged that the charterparty was frustrated 
by that event. Since the shipment was only possible via the Cape of Good 
Hope (which he did), he claimed that he should be paid the total freight of 
209s, instead of 134s as agreed.
Schmitthoff C. M, "Frustration and Suez" (1958) J.B.L.409. at p. 409.
192
The charterers replied that the shipowners were still bound by the 
contract at the agreed rate.
The court held that the charterparty was frustrated. It was emphasised 
that, the shipowners were under an obligation to proceed through the Suez 
Canal. This was inferred from a clause in the contract which 
reads:"Captain also to telegraph to "Maritsider Genoa" or on"passing the Suez 
C an a l" .7 Therefore, by the closure of the canal the shipment was 
rendered impossible. It was also said that, the shipment via Cape was a 
"fundamentally different voyage"** from that via the Suez Canal.
Concerning this case it has been observed that in 1956 all businessmen 
were aware of the fact that the canal might be closed. Therefore to decide 
whether a contract can be frustrated or not, we should look at the 
provisions of the contract. If no express terms can be found in "commercial 
understanding relating to the allocation of the risk of non-performance caused by the 
type of contingency that occurred", then the contract should not be discharged. 
((1963) 63.2 Col.L.Rev at pp. 1423-24). If these arguments are right then the 
decision in the Sidermar case is wrong. (Ibid at 1424).
The two cases above were overruled9, Carapanavoti overruled by
7 Per Pearson J at 303, which means that proceeding via the Suez was a 
fundamental assumption upon which the contract was made. See (1980) 13 Vanderbilt 
etc at p. 134, (and this as it was said in the Carapanavoti case).
8 The Sidermar case at 307. See also Schmitthoff C. M, (1964) J.B.L at p. 53, 
where he suggests that this decision should be overruled. But see (1980) 18 Duquesne 
Law Rev at p. 588, where a different view is taken saying that the court -in the 
Sidermar case- reached the 'the fair and reasonable result'.
9 It might be said that the decision in both cases, ie in Carapanavoti and 
Sidermar. was influenced by what Maule J. said in (1850) 9 C.B. at 94:"In matters of 
business a thing is said to be impossible when it is not practicable, and a thing is 
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive or unreasonable cost.". Cited in 
(19401 56 L.O.Rev at p. 552.
However, "there are plenty of cases to show that this idea has gained little, if any, 
hold in English law:...".Ibid at pp. 553-54. This, as will be seen later, is true and the 
overruling of Carapanayoti and Sidermar is an evidence of that. But in other countries, 
like the U.S.A., this idea was favoured . Ibid at 553. As to the submission that the 
decision in Carapanavoti was justified since the alleged frustrating event was not 
foreseen, and that it was foreseen in Tsakiroglou. this cannot be sustained, since the 
foreseeability of an event is not the sole criterion in holding a contract frustrated. See 
supra (under unforeseeability) and see Tatem V. Gamboa [1939] 1 K.B.132 (supral.
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Tsakiroglou & Co.Ltd v. Noblee Thorl G.M.B.H.. ([1962] A.C 93.) and 
Societe Franco etc, by Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporation v. V/O  
Sovfracht.The Eugenia. ([1964] 2 Q.B.226.)
In Tsakiroglou , the goods sold were to be shipped to Hamburg, but the 
usual and customary route via the Suez, was closed. The question 
therefore was whether the contract could be held fmstrated by that event. 
Performance via the Cape would be onerous, but this could not be a 
ground for holding a contract fmstrated.(Per Viscount Simonds p. 115, and 
see Schmitthoff, Helsinki., p. 137.)
In fact sellers did not allege fmstration on that ground but on the 
ground that performance via the Cape would be a totally different 
obligation from that via the Suez Canal. (Per Lord Hudson pp. 128-29.)
In response to this it has been decided that there was "no change of 
circumstances to justify the application of the doc trine ".(Per Lord Guest p. 
133, and see Schmitthoff, Helsinnki.. p. 138.)
Viscount Simonds pointed out (at pp. 114-15) that shipment of the goods 
via the Suez or via the the Cape was immaterial to the b u y e r s .  10 Nothing 
prevented the seller from using the alternative route, unless they were 
impliedly bound to use the Suez Canal route only. Such an implication 
could not be read into this contract11, because the contract "does not say
^  Since it is a C.I.F. contract. See Vanderbilt etc op.cit p. 132.
11 Per Lord Radcliff at 122, he said at 123 that: "A man may habitually leave his 
house by the front door to keep his appointment; but, if the front door is stuck, he 
would hardly be excused for not leaving by the back.". Sellers were in fact bound to 
use the route practicable in the circumstances, since no route was stated in the contract. 
See Fifoot (1986), at p. 563. In response to what Lord Radcliff said above (the 
example) it has been said:" But of course if you live on the 18th floor of an apartment 
house and there is only one door, which is stuck, you aren't expected to jump. Even if 
the door works you might be excused if the elevators were closed down by a strike, 
though it was possible for you to walk down and, (in theory) back up.". Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, International Economic Law Vol. 1 International Private Trade (2nd ed., 
New York. 1981), at p. 67 (italics are of F. Lowenfeld).
^  Per Viscount Simonds at 112. It has been suggested that the conclusion 
reached in this case viz that the contract was not frustrated, can be attained without 
referring to the doctrine of frustration. Since the contract was a C.I.F. contract, the 
transporter, is by "common understanding of merchants of all the countries", the one 
who has to bear the risk of any increase in the cost of transportation of goods. (1963) 
63.2 Col.L.Rev at p. 1422, and see Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law o f Contract
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In the case of Ocean etc, a vessel called The Eugenia was chartered to 
carry goods from the Black Sea to India. Parties to that contract of time 
charterparty were aware of the possibility that the Suez Canal might be 
closed, but they did not make any provisions to that effect in their 
contract.
When the canal was closed the vessel was in that area. She was then 
trapped, although there was a clause in the contract prohibiting her to 
enter into a dangerous area. When the charterers claimed that, the 
contract was frustrated, it was held that they could not rely on a self 
induced frustration/Per Lord Denning M.R p. 237.)
However, charterers alleged that even if they were outside and did not 
get into the canal, the contract would be fmstrated by the mere fact of the 
closure of the Suez Canal, because performance via the Cape would have 
made the voyage a totally different venture from that undertaken in the 
contract.
In response to this allegation, it has been said that, the closing of the 
Suez Canal did not create a "fundamentally different situation".(Lord 
Denning ibid at 240.) In fact proceeding via the Suez would take 108 days 
and via the cape 138 days, therefore the difference was not so "radical"13 
as to frustrate the contract.
In two recent cases viz, Palmco Shipping Inc v. Continental Ore 
Corporation (The " Captain George K.") ([1970] 2 Lloyds Rep 21.) and 
American Trading And Production Corporation v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd 
("The Washington Trader") 019721 1 Lloyds Rep 463)14 it was held,
(1981), where he says at p. 211 that in a C.I.F. contract (like the one in Tsakiroglou) 
the seller pays the freight, but such freight is included in the price of the goods. 
Therefore, the seller bears the risk of any increase in the freight, and when there is only 
one way of performance available (like in Tsakiroglou. the route via the Cape) the 
contractor cannot be released since he has to use the still available route. But in (1980) 
18 Duquesne L.Rev at p. 583, it is observed that the sellers are understood to bear the 
risk of normal increase in the cost of freight, and not to " lock them in the prison of 
absolute liability...", ie to make them bear the risk of abnormal rise in the cost of 
freight.
13 Lord Denning ibid. It made the voyage more expensive but did not create an 
unexpected fundamentally different situation. See (1964) J.B.L. at p. 54.
14 This is an American case decided by the United States Court of New York.
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affirming the decisions in the two last cases above, that the closure of the 
Suez Canal in 1967, by reason of the war did not frustrate the contract. 
The reason, as stated above, was that such an event did not make the 
performance of the contract via the Cape route a thing radically or 
fundamentally different from that via the Suez Canal15, or commercially 
impossible.16
What can be deduced from the Suez Canal cases is that the expectation 
of both parties to a contract, that shipment should be via the Suez Canal 
does not make it a term or condition in the contract, that shipment should 
be via that Canal. (See Hamson C. J, (1960) Cam b.LJou.10. at p. 11) It is of 
interest to note here that Puelinckx (see p. 51) comments on Albert D.Gaon 
V. Societe Interprofessionnelle des Oleagineux Fluide Alimentaire ([1959] 
3 W.L.R. 622., one of the Suez cases)17, where the closure of the canal did 
not frustrate the contract, and says that it was frustrated because the 
routing through the Suez Canal was expressly provided for in the 
contract. Referring to the same law reports we find that the contract was 
not held fmstrated. Apart from this, it can be said that under English law 
when a specific route is no longer available (e.g. the Suez Canal being closed) 
then the contract may be held fmstrated.18
Puelinckx says (at p. 51) when commenting on the Albert D.Gaon case - 
accepting his view that the contract was fmstrated because the route was 
expressly provided for- that such a situation would not be considered 
under French law and also under Algerian law as a consequence as a case 
of force majeure but one of imprevision and the French judges would
15 Per Mocatta J at 30.2 in the Captain George case, but it may be noted that "if 
an increase of fifty seven percent in time and ninety percent in distance is considered 
insufficient to produce frustration, the test of the "radically different" performance 
becomes nothing more than a dead letter.". (1980) 18 Duquesne. L.Rev at p. 594.
16 The Washington Trader case at 467.1. Section 2-615 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, was cited , it is said:" Increased cost alone does not excuse 
performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters 
the essential nature of the performance". Ibid at 467.1.
!7 Puelinckx refers to this case in (1960) 2 Q.B.334 affirmed (1960) 2 Q.B.348 
(C.A.).
See to this effect the speech of Sellers L.J in the Tsakiroglou case ([1960]2 
Q.B. at p. 360., and what Viscount Simonds said at p. 194 supra, and see p. 198 infra 
what Treitel says.
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enforce the contract. It seems that the value of the inference of this author 
is open to question. This is because even under French law, when a special 
method of performance (provided for in the contract) becomes 
impossible, this would constitute a case of force majeure even if other 
methods of performance are still possible for use. (See to this effect Fiatte at 
p. 33., and see footnote. 62 chapter one of the first part).
In the Scottish case Blacklock & Macarthur V. G. G. Kirk (1919 S. C. 
57), a seller promised to supply certain goods to a buyer. The two parties 
had already made previous contracts with each other. In the contract 
made in 1915 the buyer asked for 189 tons of those goods. The seller 
refused to deliver the whole quantity arguing that this was not the usual 
requirement that the buyer made in previous contracts. He also argued 
that because of the war he was unable to supply that quantity. It was held 
that the 189 tons, constituted a usual requirement in comparison with the 
previous contracts and that the seller was not unable to provide that 
quantity, but it was more onerous for him to provide such a supply 
because of an increase in prices of the raw materials. I9
Although it became clear that the mere increase in expenses in 
performing a contract, even inflation20 or currency fluctuation, cannot 
be a ground to frustrate the contract,21 there are nevertheless instances 
where that doctrine could be applied. For example in Tsakiroglou , their 
Lordships pointed out that, if the goods were perishable or that a definite 
date was fixed for the delivery (not shipment22) of goods, the contract may
See also the case of Hong-Kong And Whampoa Dock Co. Ltd V. The 
Netherton Shipping Co. Ltd 1909 S. C. 34.
20 But see National Carriers Ltd V. Panalpina Northern Ltd [1981] A.C.675, 712 
where Lord Roskill said that "inflation which was invoked as a frustrating event, was 
held sometimes to frustrate the contract, and in other circumstances did not have such 
effect.". See Treitel (1983), at p. 665 footnote. 53. In fact all this shows that the 
doctrine of frustration as a whole is a matter of judicial discretion. See Schmitthoff, 
Helsinki., at p. 138.
21 See Treitel (1983), at p. 651, and see the case of Davis Contractors Ltd V. 
Fareham Urban District Council [1956] A.C. 696, commented on in Hudson's 
Building contracts (1970), at p. 358, and see Treitel ibid at 663, and see G. M. Sen, 
op.cit at p. 169, and D. M. Walker, Principles.. Vol. 2 (3rd ed), at p. 136.
22 Chitty Vol. 1 (1983), at para. 1559, and see John Tillotson, Contract Law in 
Perspective (2nd ed., London.Butterworths. 1985), at p. 202.
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be frustrated. (See Anson (1979), at p. 501) Furthermore if the contract 
provided that shipment should be effected through the Suez Canal only or 
"exclusively", then the contract may be held frustrated.(Treitel (1983), p. 
661.)
On the other hand Harman L.J.said that:
"Frustration is a doctrine only too often invoked by a party to a contract 
who finds performance difficult or unprofitable, but it is very rarely relied upon 
with success. It is, in fact, a kind of last ditch, and, as Lord Radcliffe says in 
his speech in the most recent case fDavis Contractors v. F areh am  
U.D.C.ri9561 A.C.696,727] it is a conclusion which should be reached rarely 
and with reluctance"^
Though what has been said above should be taken into account it is 
nevertheless interesting in this respect to say that, when the courts decide 
that there is a fundamental change in the obligation and accordingly hold 
the contract frustrated, such a result is reached by a comparison between 
the obligation as originally undertaken, and the one under the new 
circumstances. What is worth adding is that in Chitty (Vol. 1 (1983), at para. 
1526), it is said that to know whether there is a fundamental change in the 
obligation:
"will depend on the court's estimate of what performance would have 
required in time, labour, money and materials, if there had been no change in 
the circumstances existing at the time the contract was made.".
And this is to be compared with what is required under the new 
circumstances. Therefore, relying on what is said there, it is possible to 
deduce that if the obligation which the debtor is required to perform 
under the new circumstances, would involve more time, labour, money 
and materials, to an excessive extent, then the contract should be 
frustrated. This would mean that the contract is frustrated because its 
performance has become excessively onerous.
Gorman J.J, (Vanderbilt at p. 137) is of a different opinion since he says 
that under English doctrine of frustration it is not clear whether an
23 Per Harman LJ in Tsakiroglou [1960] 2 Q.B.318, 370, cited by Schmitthoff, 
Export Trade at p. 156, and see Schmitthoff, Helsinki., at p. 138.
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increase in the performance of the contract -ie in terms of cost- can frustrate 
the contract. The same writer -speaking of the fact that an increase in expenses is 
no excuse- says (at p. 126) that the "rule of Paradine V. Jane and the deep-rooted 
notion of sanctity of contract are still very evident in the modem English doctrine of 
frustration.". However, it is interesting to note that Denning L. J, in the 
Brauer case ([1952] 2 ALL. E. R. 497, 501), said -as expressed by Schmitthoff, 
Helsinki., (at p. 140)- that:
"... if the price which the seller had to pay to get the licence would have 
been one hundered times as much as the contract price, that would have been a 
fundamentally different situation justifying the court to treat the contract as 
frustrated.".
In another case one of the judges suggested that an 'astronomical' 
increase may frustrate a contract. (See (1980) Vanderbilt etc at p. 137).
After what has been discussed above, one is left with the conclusion 
that a real astronomical and extraordinary increase in prices or costs of 
performance of a contract, which has never occurred before to such an 
extent, may frustrate the contract.(See also McBryde, The Law o f Contract 
(1987), at pp. 346-47) If this is right, then the 'test of the radical change in 
the obligation' is to be considered as an umbrella concept; involving both 
cases of a real impossibility of performance as well as of cases of 
performance having become very onerous. If this is right then the French 
law is the only one -considering the laws under discussion- which does not 
recognise onerousness as a ground to release a party to a contract who 
suffers such a hardship. This is because French courts continually 
emphasise the fact that there should be a real impossibility of performance 
and no mention is made of the possibility that a severe hardship might 
have a certain weight in considering cases of force majeure.
Thus generally speaking in principle both English law and French law 
do not allow any release in such cases (the Algerian solution is totally opposite). 
However, we have remarked that if the onerousness reaches an extreme 
level, English courts might probably decide for the frustration of the 
contract. If this is correct, then in principle English and French positions 
would be different regarding such cases of hardship.
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What should be said concerning the English and the Scottish test to the 
effect that "if the contract is to be enforced, it would be a performance of a radically 
different contract from that undertaken" is that though this test is very useful 
since it gives to courts a valuable tool to use when dealing with cases of 
frustration, its disadvantage lies in that it gives no clear idea of what is 
considered in it when it is used by courts.
$.2. THE THEORETICAL BASIS UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE OF 
FRUSTRATION.
What will be studied under this heading is the different theories 
explaining the ground the doctrine of frustration is based upon. The main 
theories are the implied term theory, the radical change in the obligation 
theory, the just and reasonable solution theory, the disappearance of the 
foundation of the contract theory and lastly the construction theory.24
I- The Implied Term Theory.
This theory -which is the oldest theoretically ((1940) 56 L.Q.Rev p. 173)- 
is well illustrated by Lord Lorebum in F.A.Tamplin Co.etc25. where he
24 it has been seen that in some cases, only one party's obligation is impossible 
but not the other's. The illustrating example is the coronation cases. In these 
circumstances both parties are released from further performance and are not liable for 
their non-performance; ie the contract is held frustrated. It has been pointed out that 
the party whose obligation is impossible, is discharged on the ground of impossibility. 
However, the other party (especially he who has to pay money) is released on the 
ground of failure of consideration and not upon impossibility. That is to say he did not 
get what he bargained for. See generally Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance 
op.cit.
This explanation was rejected by the House of Lords in National Carriers Ltd. V. 
Panalpina ( Northern) Ltd [1981] A.C.675, 687, 702. It is also known that the failure 
of consideration must be total, whereas in cases of frustration many contracts were 
partly performed, nevertheless the contract was held frustrated. To this effect Lord 
Hailsham at p. 687 (the Panalpina case) said:"...many, if not most, cases of frustration 
which have followed Taylor V. Caldwell have occurred during the currency of a 
contract partly executed on both sides, when no question of total failure of 
consideration can possibly arise.". See Treitel (1983), at p. 697.
25 [1916] 2 A.C.397, at 403, cited by Anson (1979), at p. 506. It is upon that 
ground, ie the implication of a term that the case of Tavlor v. Caldwell, was decided. 
See Me Elroy, Impossibility o f Performance at p. 61.
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said:
"A court can and ought to examine the contract and the circumstances in 
which it was made, not of course to vary, but only to explain it, in order to see 
whether or not from the nature of it the parties must have made their bargain on 
the footing that a particular thing or state of things would continue to exist. And 
if they must have done so, then a term to that effect will be implied, though it be 
not expressed in the contract [that it should continue to exist26].... Sometimes 
it is put that performance has become impossible and that the party concerned 
did not promise to perform an impossibility. Sometimes it is put that the parties 
contemplated a certain state of things which fell out otherwise. In most of the 
cases it is said that there was an implied condition in the contract which operated 
to release the parties from performing it, and in all of them I think that was at 
bottom the principle upon which the court proceeded. It is in my opinion the 
true principle, for no court has an absolving power, but it can infer from the 
nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances that a condition which 
was not expressed was a foundation on which the parties contracted...were the 
altered conditions such that, had they thought of them, they would have taken 
their chance of them, or such that as sensible men they would have said, 'if that
happens, of course, it is all over between us'? "27
This means that, although the parties did not expressly provide in their 
contract that, if an event whatever puts an end to the thing contracted for, 
the contract will be dissolved, an 'implied term' to that effect is to be read 
into their contract. Because parties did not intend their contract to be 
absolute, the court will not regard it as absolute. (Treitel (1983), p. 694.)
In other words, as Lord Sumner put it in the case of H irji 
Mu]ji...etc28:
"Frustration...is explained in theory as a condition or term of the contract, 
implied by the law ab initio, in order to supply what the parties would have
26 (1980) Vanderbilt etc at p. 127.
27 See Salmond, op.cit (1927), at p. 295 where he says that parties may have 
intended their contract to be conditional on the existence or the continued existence of a 
state of facts, which was the foundation upon which the contract was made. Then if 
that state of facts is no longer available, the contract is to be at an end. In other words 
the court will read the condition rebus sic stantibus. The res is the thing whose 
continued existence is the basis of the contract, and contemplated by both parties to be 
such. Ibid p. 295. This condition is ascertained from "the terms of the contract...the 
purposes which underly i t , and the circumstances in which it was made.". Ibid at p. 
300.
28 [1926] A.C.497 p. 510, cited in (1940) 56 L.O.R. p. 174.
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inserted had the matter occurred to them../*
So what the court does is no more than to give effect to the "real 
intention"29 of parties when they entered into the contract.^0 Or as 
Lord Sumner said in the Bank Line case:([1919] A.C.435.)
"The theory of dissolution of a contract by the frustration of its commercial
object rests on an implication, which arises from the presumed common
intention of the parties.". ((1940) 56 L.O.R p. 174)
Looking at the passage from Lord Lorebum in Tamplin (above), it can 
be said that there is both a subjective and an objective test.
The subjective one is that, the implication of the term was to give effect 
to the intention of the parties. However this test was criticised as it 
involves "speculation as to the intention of the parties.".3* However, the 
objective test is that, the implication is only what a reasonable man would 
have done in the circumstances of the case.32 Or as Lord Watson, in Dahl 
v. Nelson. Donkin & Co33, said:
29 Anson (1979), at p. 506, which means that if parties have contemplated the 
contingency they would have 'tacitly' agreed to terminate the contract. See Sturge L. J, 
"The Doctrine of Implied Condition" (1925) 41 Law Quarterly Review. 170. at p. 171.
30 That is to say to "...give the parties what they would have given themselves 
had they foreseen the nature of the risk at the time of contracting." Leon E. Trakman, 
"Frustrated Contracts and Legal Fictions" (1983) 46 Modem Law Review.39. at p. 41.
31 Treitel (1983), at p. 696. See also (1983) 46 Mod.L.R at p. 41, where it is 
said that a "fiction underlies this analysis.", and this is because the court "can only 
speculate as to what the parties would have agreed upon when they entered into their 
agreement.". This is supported by what Lord Hailsham said in the Panalpina case infra 
footnote.40.
32 This test is further explained in the case of Re Badische [1921] 2 Ch.331, at 
379, cited in (1940) 56 L.O.R. at p. 175. In that case Russel J said: "If the supervening 
events or circumstances are such that is impossible to hold that reasonable men could 
have contemplated that event or those circumstances and yet have entered into the 
bargain expressed in the documents, a term should be implied dissolving the contract 
upon the happening of the event or circumstances.". It is to be noted that the test of the 
'reasonable man’ is to be used in abstracto not in concrete; which means without 
taking account of the ability and qualifications of that person. See Hamed Zaki, op.cit at 
p. 227. The test as stated by Russel J (above) was favoured and as"Nothing more than 
this test is required. It can be applied to all kinds of contract, in all circumstances,...". 
(1948-50) 1 Annual.L.Rev at p. 63.
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"The meaning of the contract must be taken to be, not what the parties did 
intend (for they had neither thought nor intention regarding it), but that which 
the parties, as fair and reasonable men, would presumably have agreed upon if, 
having such possibility in view, they had made express provision as to their 
several rights and liabilities in the event of its occurrence."
This theory was subject to several criticisms:
It was described as being "artificial and fictitious".34 It is not true that the 
common intention of the parties to a contract, would have been to 
terminate the contract if the frustrating event happens, because parties 
may very often differ in their view, as to the effect of the frustrating 
event.35 For example, a party who is in a strong bargaining position, 
would certainly have refused to terminate the contract. Whereas the 
different view would have been taken by the weaker party to the 
contract.36
Another criticism is that how could they have provided tacitly for 
something which "they neither expected nor foresaw". (Anson (1979), p. 
507)
Even if it is assumed that they did foresee that event, they would
33 (1881) 6 App.Cas.38, 59 cited by Chitty, General Principles Vol. 1. (24th ed. 
1977), at 1409.
34 Chitty Vol. 1 (1977), at 1409, and McBryde, The Law o f Contract (1987), at 
p. 344, and also described as a legal fiction. See (1940-41) 4 Mod.L.Rev at p. 255, 
and see Knut Rodhe, "Adjustment of Contracts on Account of Changed Conditions" 
(1959) 3 Scandinavian Studies In Law. 151. at p. 168.
35 See Atiyah, Introduction To The Law O f Contract (1981), at pp. 207-08.
36 Treitel (1983), at pp. 694-95. Other criticisms are also directed to the use -in 
this theory- of the term 'common intention'. This is because "the court -in saying that- 
is trying to discover an intention as to something which may never have occurred to the 
parties, and is also trying to insist that the intention is common to both parties. The 
blunt truth of the matter is that the court is looking for something which is not there." 
Atiyah, An Introduction To The Law O f Contract (1981), at p. 208. But it is thought 
that where it becomes clear from the terms of the contract that, the parties have made 
their contract on the footing of the continued existence of a thing or the happening of an 
event, whether it is the intention of both parties or of one only , and the other has 
consented to this, then it is possible to say that both parties have, at least tacitly, agreed 
to terminate the contract, when that thing ceases to exist or that event does not take 
place.(CF German law (Geschaftsgrundlage theory).
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p r o b a b l y  n o t  h a v e  a g r e e d  t o  t e r m i n a t e  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  b u t :
"on the contrary, they would almost certainly on the one side or the other 
have sought to introduce qualifications or reservations. ”3^
Furthermore it had already been said that, this theory rests on a 
subjective test. As pointed out this test cannot be sustained; since parties 
very often, will not have a common intention as to the frustrating event. 
But it has been noted that, the theory also rests on an objective test, viz the 
reasonable man. This means that, as reasonable men, the parties would 
have agreed to terminate the contract, if that event were to happen. The 
criticism directed to this latter test was that this theory cannot be sustained 
even by 'objectifying’38 it; because here the reasonable man is in fact the 
court itself. (Anson (1979), p. 507) In saying that, we are far from the aim 
of this theory, viz to give effect to the parties' intention (Treitel (1983), p. 
694.), and not the court's intention, through the device of the reasonable 
man. To this effect Lord Radcliffe said:39
"By this time it might seem that the parties themselves have become so far 
disembodied spirits that their actual persons should be allowed to rest in peace.
In their place there rises the figure of the fair and reasonable man. And the 
spokesman of the fair and reasonable man, who represents after all no more 
than the anthropomorphic conception of justice, is and must be the court itself."
Therefore contractors are left at the mercy of the judges' discretion;
37 Per Lord Wright in Denny Mott & Dickson Ltd v. James B. Fraser & 
Company. Ltd [1944] A.C.265, at 275., cited by Anson (1979), at p. 507.
38 (1983) 46 Mod.L.R at p. 44. Since the idea of the common intention of 
parties ie the subjective test, cannot be sustained, the court has adopted instead of it the 
test of the ’reasonable man’. But even this test can be criticised, because the court here 
is saying what parties as reasonable men should have said, had they thought of the 
possibility of the occurrence of that event, and not what they would have said had they 
thought of it. See Atiyah, Introduction., at p. 208. This means that frustration is 
applied "...irrespective of the individuals concern, their temperaments and 
....circumstances." Per Lord Sumner in the Hirii Mulji case at 510. Therefore speaking 
of the intention of the parties is a misleading term, since it is the court which considers 
what a reasonable man should have said in the circumstances of the case, in other 
words what is reasonable in those circumstances in its eyes. Atiyah, Introduction... at 
pp. 208-09.
39 [1956] A.C.696 at 728, cited by Treitel (1983), at p. 695.
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since all depends on their determination of what is a reasonable result in 
the circumstances. 
This is well illustrated by Lord Wright40, when he said:
"[W]hat is often called an implied term or a term implied by law simply 
means that there is no agreement or intention at all on the point, but the law 
imposes the term in order to do justice."
Another criticism is that, it cannot be said -esp for businessmen- that, the 
frustrating event did not occur to them, because by their experience in the 
field of their business, they could foresee those events. ((1983) 46 Mod.L.R 
p. 52) 
However, it should be noted that the implied term theory does not 
apply when there is an express provision, in the contract. 
To this effect, Lord Sumner said41:
"Where the contract makes (that is, full and complete provision, so 
intended) for a given contingency it is not for the court to import into the 
contract some other and different provision for the same contingency called by a 
different name."(Emphasis is mine)
It might be said -summarising what has been said- that the main idea in 
the implied term theory is that, where it appears from a contract that a 
certain state of facts (e.g. the continued existence of a thing) is the foundation
40 Legal Essays and Addresses (1939), at p. 258. Cited in (1983) 46 Mod.L.R. 
at p. 46. But is it impossible to say that the court in the first stage tries to find the 
intention of parties (ie the common) but if no such intention can be ascertained then it 
uses the test of the reasonable man?. This is because no provision is found in the 
contract, which may compel the court to hold that parties intended to be bound 
absolutely. But see the Panalpina case where Lord Hailsham said at 687 that it is 
impossible to know what would be the position of parties if a frustrating event was 
brought to their minds, "I'have not the least idea what they would have said or whether 
[they] would have entered into the [contract] at all.".
41 The Bank Line case [1919] A.C.435, at 455, cited by Anson (1979), at 508. 
Russel J in Re Badische [1921] 2 Ch.331, 379 said:"The term to be implied must not 
be inconsistent with any express term of the contract.". Cited in (1940) 56 L.O.Rev at 
p. 175. But it might be said -as it appears from the speech of Lord Sumner in the Bank 
Line case above- that the implication of a term to dissolve a contract can be justified 
even if there is a provision in it, and this is where such provision cannot cover fully and 
completely what happens. An illustration is to be found in the case of Metropolitan (see 
supral.
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upon which the contract was made, then an implied condition is to be read 
into that contract to the effect that, if that state of facts ceases to exist then 
the contract should be terminated. This is no more than the real intention 
of parties being considered as reasonable men.
The implied term theory, being described as a ’fiction1 has been 
largely abandoned.42
II- The Radical Change in the Obligation Theory.
This theory has been described as the "most acceptable" theory, and the 
one which "received the warmest commentation".4^ The gist of this theory, is 
explained in Lord Radcliffe's observation in the Davis Contractors 
case([1956] A.C.696.), where he said
"Frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes without default of either 
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because 
the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing
4^ Chalmer's, Sale o f Goods Act 1979 Including the Factors Acts 1889 & 1980 
(1971), at p. 21. Lord Wright in Denny V. Mott.. [1944] A.C.265 said at 275 that the 
implied term theory "has never been acted on by the court as a ground of decision, but 
is merely stated as a theoretical explanation.". See also The Eugenia [1964] 2 Q.B. 226 
at 238-39, per Lord Denning M.R. However, it might be said that it is not incorrect to 
add that this theory, although being a fiction created by courts, "is really a device by 
which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled with a special exception which 
justice demands". Per Lord Sumner in the Hirji Mulii case [1926] A.C.497, at 510, 
cited in Anson's, Law o f Contract (1979), at p. 507. Therefore this theory as used in 
the Tavlor V. Caldwell case had mitigated the harsh rule put in the Paradine case. See
also of the same opinion "La Revision des Contrats Par Le Juge", IN Travaux de la
Semaine Internationale de Droit. (Paris. 1937), at p. 42 (M. Gutteridge's Report).
43 Anson (1979), at p. 511, and see (1982) 2 Legal Issues etc (1982), at p. 52, 
and Chalmer's, Sale o f Goods (1971), at p. 21. Bingham J in The Weniiang [1983] 1 
Lloyd's Rep.400 at p. 404 col. 1 said that this doctrine "met with approval of the court 
of Appeal in Pionner Shipping Ltd V. B.T.P.Tioxide Ltd (The Nemal [1980] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep.339", and also by Lord Hailsham in Panalpina [1981] 2 W.L.R.45, and this may 
be true because it is the prevailing theory or test used actually by courts. For example, 
as has been seen, it was used in cases involving delay (imprisonment, requisition, 
mobilisation, ships trapped, ships damaged..), and also in cases where the performance 
becomes onerous, as in the Suez Canal cases. See also Schmitthoff, Helsinki., at p. 
137, and see G. M. Sen, op.cit at p. 164, and Fengming Liu, "The Doctrine of 
Frustration: An Overview of English Law" (1988) 19 Journal of Maritime Law & 
Commerce.261. at p. 271.
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radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract Non haec in 
foederaveni. It was not this I promised to do"44
In other words the circumstances in which a contractor is called to 
perform his obligation are:
"...fundamental enough (as) to transmute the job the contractor had 
undertaken into a job of a different kind, which the contract did not contemplate 
and to which it could not apply."46
In order to know whether there has been such a change in the 
obligation of one party, we have to ask ourselves46 :
"....Whether the contract which they did make is, on its true construction. 
wide enough to apply to the new situation: if it is not, then it is at an end."4^
44 This can be explained by the fact that since the contract was based on the 
consent of both parties, a contracting party cannot be held bound, where the 
circumstances in which he gave his consent have radically changed since his consent 
was given. See Amin S. H, "The Theory of Changed Circumstances in International 
Trade" (1982) Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial Law Ouarterlv.577. at p. 579.
4 5 P er Asquith L.J. at 667 in Parkinson fSir Lindsay") & Co LD v. 
Commissioners of His Majesty's Works & Public buildings [1949] 2 K.B.632, and 
see (1980) 8 Australian Bus. L. Rev, at p. 370.
46 It is in fact the court which decides whether there has been a radical change in 
the obligation. See (1982) 2 Legal Issues etc at p. 52, and it is indeed a change in the 
obligation not of the circumstances which call for the application of frustration. See G. 
M. Sen, op.cit at p. 163.
4^ Pgr Lord Reid in the Davis Contractors case (above) at 721, cited by Chitty 
Vol. 1 (25th ed., 1983), at 1525. The same test was used in other cases; for example 
the Metropolitan Water case etc [ 1918] A.C.119, where Lord Dunedin at 128 said:"... 
the contract when resumed would be a contract under different conditions from those 
which the contract was begun.". A good illustration of the theory is to be found in the 
British Movietonews etc case [1952] A.C.166, given per Viscount Simon at 185 where 
he said:" The parties to an executory contract are often faced, in the course of carrying it 
out, with a turn of events which they did not at all anticipate - a wholly abnormal rise or 
fall in prices, a sudden depreciation of currency, an unexpected obstacle to execution, 
or the like. Yet this does not in itself affect the bargain they have made. If, on the 
other hand, a consideration of the terms of the contract, in the light of the circumstances 
existing when it was made, shows that they never agreed to be bound in a 
fundamentally different situation which has now unexpectedly emerged, the contract 
ceases to bind at that point....". (Emphasis is mine).
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Further guidance were given by Lord Radcliffe in the D avis  
Contractors case ([1956] A.C.696 at 729) where he said:
"There is no uncertainty as to the materials upon which the court must
proceed. The data for decision are, on the one hand, the terms and the
construction of the contract, read in the light of the then existing circumstances,
and on the other hand the events which have occurred"
The objection made to this theory was that, the determination whether 
the obligation of one party to the contract has become radically changed, 
is "a matter of juridical speculation"48 and has to be left to a skilled man who 
can compare what has happened with what was contemplated by the 
parties. To ascertain this, the court can only make a reasonable guess, 
since the judge was not present when the contract was made, and that 
courts "can merely surmise what degree of change the parties would 
consider to be "radical" in the circumstances."49
HI- The .Tust and Reasonable Solution Theory.
This doctrine has been described as a "radical theory"50, because in 
the altered conditions caused by a supervening event, it imposes on the 
parties to the contract, what is just and reasonable, in the eyes of the 
court.51
Thus Denning L.J. in British Movietonews ([1951] 1 K.B.190 at 201-02), 
said that the courts:
48 (1983) 46 Mod.L.R at p. 48. A further question which may be asked is "how 
fundamental the change in circumstances must be to frustrate the contract". Michael 
Aubrey, (1963) 12 International & Comparative Law Quarterly at p. 1169. However, 
it is to be noted that the same writer at p. 1170 refers to the speech of Lord Radcliff in 
the Davis Contractors (above) and qualifies it as the "best definition", and that the 
question of the fundamental change in the circumstances is a question of degree. See 
also Schmitthoff, Helsinki., at p. 140. For example "a week would not normally be 
enough to frustrate a contract unless time was of the essence whereas a delay of a year" 
would frustrate it. Michael Aubrey, ibid at p. 1173.
49 (1983) 46 Mod.L.R at p. 48. What can be said however, is that, even a skilled 
man can only use his guess since he was not present at that time. Therefore, there is no 
difference between a judge and a skilled man in such a case.
50 Chitty Vol. 1 (25th ed., 1983), at 1531 and Anson (1979), at p. 510.
51 Per Lord Wright, Legal Essays and Addresses, cited in Anson (1979), at p. 
510, and see Fengming at p. 269.
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"...will not allow the words, in which they happen to be phrased, to be 
tyrannical masters. The court qualifies the literal meaning of the words so as to 
bring them into accord with the true scope of the contract Even if the contract 
is absolute in its terms, nevertheless if it is not absolute in intent, it will not be 
held absolute in effect. The day is done when we can excuse an unforeseen 
injustice by saying to the sufferer "it is your own folly. You ought not to have 
passed that form of words. You ought to have put in a clause to protect 
yourself'. We no longer credit a party with the foresight of a prophet or his 
lawyer with the draftsmanship of a chalmers. We realize that they have their 
limitations and make allowances accordingly."
And Lord Wright in the Constantine case ([1942] A.C.154 at 186.), said:
"...the court is exercising its power, when it decides that a contract is 
frustrated, in order to achieve a result which is iust and reasonable.".(Emphasis 
is mine)
Lord Wright52 said:
"This whole doctrine of frustration has been described as a reading into the 
contract of implied terms to give effect to the intention of the parties. It would 
be truer to say that the court in the absence of express intention of the parties 
determines what is just. "(Emphasis is mine)
However, what is to be noted is that holding a contract frustrated and 
imposing what is just and reasonable, because of a mere 'uncontemplated 
turn of events’ as expressed by Lord Denning was rejected in the House of 
Lords.55 To this effect Viscount Simon in the same case (House of Lords) 
([1952] A.C.166 at 185.) said that:
"The parties...are often faced [in performing their contract], with [an 
unforeseen] turn of events.... Yet this does not...affect [their contract]. If on 
the other hand, a consideration of the terms of the contract...shows that 
[parties] never agreed to be bound in a fundamentally different situation which 
has now unexpectedly emerged, the contract ceases to bind at that point- not 
because the court in its discretion thinks it iust and reasonable to qualify the
52 In Legal Essays and Addresses at p. 258, cited in (1940) 56 L.O.Rev at p. 
180.
53[1952] A.C.166, and see Schmitthoff, Helsinki... at p. 135.
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terms of the contract, but because on its true construction it does not apply in
that situation.".^
A different view seems to be taken by Lord Wilberforce in National 
Carriers Ltd v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd55«where he said:
"I think that the movement of the law of contract is away from a rigid theory 
of autonomy towards the discovery -or I do not hesitate to say imposition- by 
the courts of just solutions, which can be ascribed to reasonable men in the 
position of the parties."
As the implied term theory was, this one was also criticised. It gives to 
courts "too much discretion" (Chitty Vol. 1 (1977), at 1411) and the court is 
concerning itself with the harshness caused to one party where the 
contract he made is imposed upon him and without therefore, looking 
whether there has been any radical change in his obligation.(Chitty Vol. 1 
(1977), at 1411). Lord Hailsham in the Panalpina case ([1981] A.C.675 at 687) 
and speaking of the just and reasonable theory said that, although it 
"admirably expresses the purpose of the doctrine, it does not provide it with any
54 Emphasis is mine. It is to be noted that the House of Lords has rejected the 
qualifying power as suggested by Lord Denning, but on the other hand, it has favoured 
the implied term theory. See Grunfeld C, "Traditionalism Ascendant" (1952) 15 
Mod.L.Rev.85. at p. 86, and Atiyah, Introduction etc (1981), at p. 209. The reason 
behind that rejection may be the fear that the use of the qualifying power will create 
"uncertainty as to the sanctity" of the contract. See also Schmitthoff, Helsinki... at p. 
136. But this is in fact untrue; because such power will be used in the light of other 
precedents, which give some guidance to the court, to decide when it is reasonable to 
hold a contract frustrated. It is indeed the use of the implied term theory which creates 
such uncertainty, because it involves a speculation into the intention of the parties, an 
intention that never existed. Atiyah ibid.
55 [1981] A.C. 675, at 696, and see (1982) 132.2 New.Law Journal at p. 796 
col. 1, where it is said that frustration "is now judicially recognised to be simply a 
'device' used by courts to achieve a just and reasonable solution between the parties in 
new circumstances.". Donovan L.J.in The Eugenia [1964] 2 W.L.R 114 said that the 
test to be used is " was there such a fundamental change in the circumstances relevant to 
the performance of the contract that it is just and reasonable that the parties should be 
relieved of their obligations?". Cited by Paul B. Fairest, "Self-Induced Frustration - 
The Implied Term Theory Burried" (1964) Cambridge Law Journal. 186. at p. 188, it 
may be noted that here both the fundamental change theory as well as the just solution 
theory are involved. This can also be found in the speech of Lord Denning in The 
Eugenia [1964] 2 Q.B.226, at 238-39.
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theoretical basis at all.".56
IV- The Disappearance of the Foundation of the Contract Theory.
Where in a contract, it appears that, a set of circumstances57, is 
essential to the performance of the contract and contemplated by both 
parties to be the foundation upon which the contract was made and where 
that set of circumstances ceases to exist, by reason outside the parties' 
control5**, and no provision was made for what is to happen in that 
event59, then the contract is to be regarded as at an end (ie frustrated). This 
is not because of an implied term or condition read into it6*1, but because 
the foundation of the contract has disappeared (Anson (1979), p. 508), and 
with it the contract itself.61
To this effect Lord Wright in the Joseph Constantine case ([1942] 
A.C.154 at 187.) said :
"...I should prefer to rest the principle simply on the true meaning of the 
contract as it appears to the court. The essential feature of the rule is that the 
court construes the contract, having regard both to its language, its nature and 
the circumstances, as meaning that it depended for its operation on the existence 
or occurrence of a particular object or state of things, as its basis or foundation.
If that is gone, the life of the contract in law goes with it, at least as regard 
future performance."6^
56 But see Fifoot (1986), at p. 558 who considers the just and reasonable solution 
theory as being the "more generally accepted view".
57 Russkoe Abschestvo DLiazgstovlenia Dov IVoennick Pripassov v. John stiek 
& sons Ltd [1922] 10 LI.L.R.214. Per Atkin L.J. at 217, cited by Anson (1979), at p. 
509., and see the Tatem v. Gamboa case, the speech of Goddard J. at 139. Cited by 
Anson, op.cit at p. 509.
58 The Tamplin case, Lord Halden's speech at 406, cited in Treitel (1983), at p. 
696.
59 Pgr Goddard J. at 139, the Tatem case, cited by Anson (1979), at p. 509.
6^ Anson (1979), at p. 509 and see the Russkoe case (above) where it is 
said: "There are many positive rules of law imposed upon contracting parties which 
govern the whole creation, performance, and dissolution of a contract which are quite 
independent of the intention of the parties.". Cited by Anson, op.cit at p. 509.
61 Cf the German theory of Geschaftsgrundlage.Infra.
6^ The emphasis is mine. Lord Haldane in the Tamplin case said at 406 that when 
parties enter into a contract in which its performance depends on the continued 
existence of a specific thing [in that case a ship on charter] and that thing ceases to exist
211
This theory was favoured by Goddard J in the Tatem case ([1939] 1 
K B. 132 at 137), where he said:
"That seems to me the surest ground on which to rest the doctrine of
frustration, and I prefer it to founding it on implied terms."
This theory has also been described as being "appropriate" where the 
contract depends on the continued existence of a specific thing and that 
thing is destroyed.63 It can be added that the use of this test is also 
adequate in cases where the performance becomes illegal by a subsequent 
change in the law, or where, in a personal contract, the performance is 
prevented by the death or illness of the performer. However, the test of 
the 'foundation of the contract' is inadequate when it is used in cases other 
than the three instances already cited. This is especially so in cases where 
the performance is still possible, but the contract was held frustrated 
((1948-50) 1 Annual L. Rev at 65,66). In fact that test can also be extended to 
cases of this kind ie like the coronation cases. This is because the contract 
-as in Krell- is made on the assumption that a certain event will take place. 
This is considered as the foundation of the contract, therefore if that event 
does not take place, then the foundation upon which the contract is made is 
destroyed or defeated. (See also Fengming Liu, at p. 268).
It can also be said that, when a contract is said to be disolved and the 
parties released from further performance on the ground of the 
disappearance of the foundation of the contract, this can also be rested on 
an implied condition viz, that the foundation of the contract, shall 
continue to exist.64
by an event beyond the control of parties then the contract is to be treated as frustrated. 
He then said that" although the words of the stipulation may be such that the mere letter 
would describe what has occurred, the occurrence itself may be of a character and 
extent so sweeping that the foundation of what the parties are deemed to have had in 
contemplation has disappeared, and the contract itself has vanished with that 
foundation.". Cited in (1940) 56 L.O.Rev at p. 176.
63 See Treitel (1983), at p. 696.
64 (1940) 56 L.O.R at p. 178, and this can be supported by the speech we have 
referred to in the implied term theory, because there it has been pointed out that parties, 
must have contemplated that that thing should continue to exist and that the continued 
existence was the foundation of the contract. See also Schmitthoff, Helsinki... at p.
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Some doubt however, is raised as to the foundation of the contract 
itself.65 Another criticism is that it is a matter of speculation to tell 
whether or not a certain state of things (see Lord Wright speech in Joseph 
Constantine case at p. 188) was contemplated by both parties to the contract as 
the foundation upon which it was made. (Me Elroy, Impossibility o f 
Performance op.cit at p. 72).
Moreover, if the foundation of the contract can be determined by 
construing the contract (see supra p. 211 the speech of Lord Wright), then there 
is no real difference between this theory and the implied term theory. 
This can be well illustrated by what Lord Lorebum said, when discussing 
the implied term theory, in the Tamplin case:66
"It is in my opinion the true principle, for no court has an absolving power, 
but it can infer from the nature of the contract and the surrounding 
circumstances that a condition which is not expressed was a foundation on 
which the parties contracted.". (Emphasis is mine.)
V- The Construction Theory.
It might be suggested (Treitel (1983), p. 696.) that, all those theories, 
involved a question of construction of the contract.67 For example, 
speaking of the implied term theory, it was said:
134, where he says that the principle underlying the implied term theory and the 
disappearance of the foundation of the contract, is the same which is that frustration 
"rests upon the common intention of the parties....".
65 See also Treitel (1983), at p. 696.
66 [1916] 2 A.C.397 at 404, cited by Treitel (1983), at p. 696.
67 See Donald Keating, Law and Practice o f Building Contracts including 
Architects & Surveyors (London. Sweet & Maxwell. 1955), at p. 81, and see 
Hudson's, Building Contracts (1970), at p. 351.2, and see the British Movietonews 
case [1952] A.C.166, at 183 where Viscount Simon said :"...whether the rule (ie 
discharge of a contract by frustration) should be regarded as arising from an implied 
term, or because the basis of the contract no longer exists. In any view, it is a question 
of construction, as Lord Wright points out in the C onstantine's case [1942] 
A.C. 154,184"., and see the Nickoll case [1901] 2 K.B.126, where A. L. Smith M.R. 
at 131 said"...the question is whether upon its true construction the contract is a 
positive and absolute contract to ship the seed, or a contract subject to any, and what, 
implied condition.".
213
"the contract is not to be construed as a positive contract, but as subject to 
an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach,
performance becomes impossible...".6**
As to the radical change in the obligation theory. Lord Reid in Davis 
Contractors69 said:"...where the contract which they did make is, on its true 
construction, wide enough to apply to the new situation: if it is not, then it is at an 
end.".70 In order to know whether there has been a radical change in the 
obligation, the court will have to ascertain by construing the contract what 
the original obligation was before the occurrence of the frustrating event, 
and then what that obligation would be, after the occurrence of that event. 
Comparing the two the court will hold the contract as frustrated on that 
ground, if there has been a fundamental change in the obligation (and not 
only in the circumstances).(See Chitty (24th ed., 1977), at 1406-7, and see Anson 
(1979), p. 511.)
As to the foundation of the contract theory. Lord Wright in the Joseph 
Constantine case71, said:
"...the court construes the contract, having regard both to its nature and the 
circumstances, as meaning that it depended for its operation on the existence or 
occurrence of a particular object or state of things, as its basis or foundation. If 
that is gone, the life of the contract in law goes with it....".
As to the just solution theory. Lord Wright, in the Denny Mott case72, 
said:
"What happens is that the contract is held on its true construction not to
68 Per Blackburn J in Tavlor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S.826, at 833, cited in 
Treitel (5th ed.,1979), at p. 683. Emphasis is mine. See also Konrad Zweigert (1987), 
op.cit at p. 222, and see footnote. 67 supra this chapter the speech of A. L. Smith MR.
69 [1956] A.C 696, at 721 and see the speech of Viscount Simon in the British 
Movietonews case [1952] A.C 166 at 186. (See supra p. 209).
70 The emphasis is mine., and see Stephen Tromans "Frustration - the Tenant’s 
Release" (1981) Camb.L.Jou.217. at p. 218, where it is said that the construction 
theory was also formulated by Lord Radcliff in Davis Contractors [1956] 
A.C.696,729.
7* [1942] A.C 154, at 187., emphasis in the cited speech is mine.
72 [1944] A.C 265, at 274-75. Cited in Treitel (1983), at p. 697. Emphasis in the 
citation is mine.
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apply at all from the time when the frustrating circumstances supervenes. "(Lord
Wright used the word "just" at p. 275 which justice demands..'1)
As to the comment made on the constmction theory. It was described 
as being "the most satisfactory explanation of the doctrine of frustration." (Treitel 
(1983), p. 697)
However, it might be said that, there is no practical importance in 
basing the doctrine of frustration upon one of the theories so far studied, 
because, the result would be the same.73
It was further submitted74 that all these theories are not inconsistent. 
As to the construction theory, this is not a theory, but a technique used by 
courts.75 For the just solution and the radical change theories, these are 
neither theories nor techniques. The just solution theory, is one of the 
purpose to be attained in using the construction technique.7  ^ However, 
the radical change in the obligation theory, is the condition in which the 
court, when using the construction technique, uses such a technique in one 
way rather than the other.
It might be interesting to draw a general conclusion having regard to 
all these theories. Thus we have noted that it has been said that the 
"foundation of the contract" theory was accurate when used in cases
73 Anson (1979), at pp. 511-12, and Treitel (1983), at p. 697. Viscount Simon 
L.C. in the Joseph Constantine case [1942] A.C.154 at 163 said:"The doctrine of 
discharge from liability by frustration has been explained in various ways- sometimes 
by speaking of the disappearance of a foundation which the parties assumed to be at the 
basis of their contract, sometimes as deduced from a rule arising from impossibility of 
performance, and sometimes as flowing from the inference of an implied term. 
Whichever way it is, the legal consequences is the same.", and see Lord Porter in 
Penny Mott [1944] A.C.265 at 281, cited by Lord Reid in Davis Contractors [1956] 
A.C. at 719, and see Diplock J in the Port Line case [1958] 2 Q.B.146 at 162. It is to 
be noted that when it is said that the result would be the same, it means that the contract 
would be either held frustrated or not. See also Konrad Zweigert (1987), op.cit at p. 
223, and Schmitthoff, Helsinki... at p. 138, and Fengming at p. 285.
74 Atiyah P. S, Essays On Contract {Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1986), at pp. 
272-73, and see the same writer in Introduction To The Law O f Contract (1981), at p. 
211.
7^ See to this effect the speeches where the term 'construction' was used.
7 6 Lord Hailsham in Panalpina [1981] A.C.675, 687 said -speaking of the just 
solution theory- that although it "admirably expresses the purpose of the doctrine it 
does not provide it with any theoretical basis...".
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where the performance depends on the continued existence of a specific 
thing, in personal contracts (death & illness), contracts becoming illegal by 
a change in the law and also cases of frustration of the purpose of the 
contract (e.g.Krell). Generally speaking it can be said that the "implied 
term" theory as well as the "radical change in the obligation" theory can 
also be used in those cases. We have also seen that sometimes the 
"foundation of the contract" theory and the "implied term" theory are 
similarly phrased.77 Therefore, we may say that practically, all these 
theories are the same (see footnote. 73 this chapter the speech of Viscount Simon). 
This possible conclusion brings us to the opinion of Atiyah (see p. l i 5 
supra) when he says that these theories are not inconsistent.
However, what should be observed is that the "radical change in the 
obligation" theory is the one which is now commonly used in deciding 
cases of frustration.
Section Two. The Position of French Law.
We have seen that English courts do not, in principle, allow any release 
when there is a mere increase in the cost of the performance of the 
contract. But we also remarked that it is not very certain whether an 
enormous increase may not frustrate the contract. In this Section we will 
study the position of French law. Since French law rejects the doctrine of 
imprevision, we will try to give the main arguments advanced in order to 
justify this position. This rejection is maintained by the Court of 
Cassation, which refuses any departure from strictly applying the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.
§.1. Doctrinal Arguments Generally Invoked in Rejecting the Theory of
ImpreyigiQn,
There are many arguments which have been put foreward to justify the 
rejection of this theory (ie to adapt the contract to the new situation).
I. The main argument is the one of the pacta sunt servanda
77 See pp. 200-201 the speech of Lord Lorebum, and see footnote. 27 this 
chapter what Salmond says, and see Lord Wright's speech p. 211, and cf it with the 
speech of Lord Lorebum at pp. 200-201 (ie similarly formulated).
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principle.7** Following this principle each party to a contract has to 
perform his obligations and cannot be freed from this unless there is a 
case of force majeure, ie an impossibility of performance.7  ^ This 
principle is formulated in art. 1134 Fr.C.C, which states that:"l/ 
Agreements legally made take the place of law for those who make them. 2 / They may 
be revoked only by mutual consent or for causes which the law authorises. 3 / They 
must be executed in good faith.”. A similar provision is to be found in arts. 
106 & 107. Alg.C.C. As may be seen the legislator has considered the 
contract as the law of the parties to a contract. This in fact reflects the 
theory of 'the autonomy of the will' of the 19th c. This theory -at that time- 
gained a great success. Following this theory the sanctity of the contract is 
the natural consequence of the will of the parties, therefore it is not the 
law which is the basis of that sanctity but it is the will of the parties.80 
The will of parties should be respected, and what has been agreed on 
should not be revoked or changed unless by the will of those who made it. 
Therefore the debtor must perform his contract even if this would ruin 
him.81 Thus any idea of readapting a contract other than by the consent 
of the parties should and must be rejected.
II. The other argument is that to admit the revision of the contract or 
its termination, would surely affect the stability of contracts in general. 
This is because the debtor who for example invokes the theory of 
'imprevision', will lead his creditor to invoke that theory against his
78 This maxim is of a religious source (ie the canonists). See H. Deschenaux, "La 
Revision des Contrats par le Juge" (1942) Revue de Droit Suisse.509. at p. 518, see 
Maurice Tancelin, Des Obligations (1988), at p. 19.
79 See Rene Rodiere et Denis Tallon, Les Modifications .. (1986), at p. 17., Ait 
Ouali Ahmed, La Theorie de I'Imprevision en Droit Algerien (These de Magister. 
Oran. 1982), at p. 8.
80 See Alex Weill, Droit Civil, les Obligations (Dalloz. 1971), at p. 49, and see 
also for a detailed study of this theory Emmanuel Gounot, Le Principe de VAutonomie 
de la Volonte en Droit Prive. Contribution a VEtude Critique de VIndividualisme 
Juridique  (Dijon. 1912), and Veronique Ranouil, L'Autonomie de la Volonte: 
Naissance et Evolution d’un Concept (P. U. F. Paris. 1980), and see id at p. 138.
8 1 "...plai d'argent n'est pas mortelle." says Carbonnier, Droit Civil 4/ Les 
Obligations (1969), at p. 249, and see Auvemy. B., at p. 2, this is also the opinion of 
M. Esmein., cited in Jean Quesnel at p. 20.
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creditors and so on. This would therefore affect the whole world of 
contractual relationships.82
III. Another argument related to the disadvantage of admitting the 
revision of contracts is that, the contractor, who knows that in a case of 
any difficulty of performance there will be an intervention to modify it, 
will lose his willingness to perform the contract. Such a feeling would not 
exist if that party to the contract knew that his non performance would 
make him liable for damages.83
However, it is possible to say that the party, who knows that where 
there is an unforeseeable destabilisation of his contract he will be allowed 
to ask for its readaptation, will do all that is possible to perform it since he 
is not concerned about any bad turn of events affecting his contractual 
rights. In other circumstances, the only way to perform the contract is by 
its readaptation, because otherwise there would be no performance at all
(ie  a breach o f contract). 84
IV. Other authors say that ’to contract is to foresee1, therefore if the 
revision of a contract is allowed this would contradict its nature.85
§.2. An Illustration. (The Court Of Cassation).
This is in fact the best example which represents the position.86 The
82 See Anouar soltane (1983), at p. 234., and see J. L. Mouralis, "Imprevision" 
(1978) 4 Encyclopedic Dalloz. Repertoir de Droit Civil, at para. 26, and see Ait, op.cit. 
at p. 8, and R. Rodiere et D. Tallon, op.cit at p. 17.
83 See C. Fernando, op.cit at p. 59, and Auvemy. B, at pp. 40-41.
84 See to this effect Carbonnier (1969), at pp. 224-25, a same opinion is 
expressed by Ramdane Zerguine, "Le Code Civil et l'Adaptation Judiciaire du Contrat" 
(1982) 19 Revue Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques Economiques et Politiques.291, at 
p. 292.
85 s ee t0 this effect Ait, op.cit at p. 11, and Auvemy at pp. 36-37.
86 As regards other laws it appears from the Quebec civil code of 1866 (and now 
the 1988-89 Civil Codes) that the theory of imprevision is rejected. Litvinoff p. 56, and 
Fabien p. 317. Tancelin M., holds the same opinion, but he said that art. 1024 C.C is 
the basis of a strong argument in admitting the theory of imprevision (ie in the case the 
jurisprudence opted to admit this doctrine) at pp. 145-46. No general provision 
however, is to be found in the law of Quebec for cases such as economic crises. This 
means that the legislator has preferred to intervene where such perturbations occur. 
Fabien p. 318, for examples of such legislations see pp. 318 et seq.
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Court of Cassation rejected this theory (ie of imprevision) in 1876, in the 
well known case of Canal de Crapone (Civ.6 March. 1876.1.193, S. 1876.1. 
161.). In 1560 and 1567 contracts had been entered into between a 
landowner and an enterprise, by which the former promised to pay a 
certain sum of money in return of a supply of water to be provided by the 
latter. Three centuries later, that fixed sum became derisory. The 
enterprise claimed the readaptation of its contract. The lower court 
allowed an increase of the fixed price. The Court of Cassation rejected 
this saying that:
"In no case is it open to the courts, no matter how equitable their decision 
may seem to be, to take time and circumstances into account in order to modify 
the agreement of the parties and substitute new terms for those which have been 
freely accepted by those parties.".8^
The Court of Cassation has maintained that position up till now, basing 
it on art. 1134 Fr.C.C. Although in the meantime there was the war of 
1870 and the first as well as the second world wars and the problems 
which they created, all these have not effected its initial position.88 
Therefore, in the case where there is no clause providing for the 
modification of the contract, or where the law does not authorise such a 
modification, the contract should be performed as it was initially
concluded. (Carbonnier (1982), op.cit p. 253.)
Regarding the French Civil Code89, on which the Court of Cassation 
based its position, it can be said that there is no express provision which
8^ See Barry Nicholas, French Law o f Contract (1982), at pp. 202-03, and see 
R. Rodiere et D. Tallon, op.cit at pp. 14-15, and Jean Carbonnier, Droit Civil A. les 
Obligations (P. U. F. llem e ed., 1982), at p. 253. Certain authors try to prove that 
the theory of imprevision might be admitted on the foundation of some specific articles 
in the Civil Code (these are: 953- 1150- 1244- 1889Fr.C.C) which themselves admit - 
as they allege- this theory. Stoyanovitch responds to this allegation that those articles 
cannot be said to admit this theory, and therefore they cannot constitute a foundation for 
the admission of this theory. For more details see that author at pp. 262 to 278.
88 See Auvemy at pp. 31-32, and see Andre Louveau, Theorie de VImprevision 
en Droit Civil et en Droit Administratif (Rennes. 1920), at p. 10, and p. 45. For 
examples where the performance of the contract has become very onerous and the civil 
jurisdictions reject any claim for a modification of the contract., see Louveau at pp. 26 
et seq.
89 What follows will be mainly based on Stoyanovitch's thesis.
219
clearly adopts or rejects the theory of imprevision. (Stoyanovitch p. 229) 
To understand the situation one should look at the period before the 
drafting of the Civil Code.
At that time, French authors were divided on this point. Thus we find 
that some authors discussed the theory of imprevision and were in favour 
of it, (Stoyanovitch pp. 219 & 221 et seq) whereas others such as Domat and 
Pothier, (17th & 18th C) who had great influence on the drafters of the 
Code Civil, did not. (Stoyanovitch at p. 220)
Stoyanovitch explains this silence amongst French authors regarding 
this theory by the prevailing economic stability at that time (Stoyanovitch 
id) and the belief that no major changes would happen in the future.90
It can also be said that one of the most influential ideas exerted upon 
the drafters of the Civil Code was that the Code Civil should be a complete 
legislation. That is to say the drafters thought that with this Code they 
provided all the solutions to every case which may arise in the future. 
Therefore this Code was considered as eternal and its provisions to cover 
everything prevailing at that time or subsequent to it. The idea was 
therefore that no substantial changes would occur after its promulgation. 
The rigidly drafted article 1134.C.C. (the contract is the law of the parties) 
reflects this idea. Therefore what is left outside of a provision such as the 
admission of imprevision (which supposes a substantial change in the situation 
under which the contract was concluded), should be ignored and the principle of
pacta sunt servanda should prevail.91
The second factor which influenced the drafters was the philosophical 
theories of the autonomy of the will' of the 19th century. Thus the will of 
the contracting parties should prevail in all the stages of a contract. That 
is to say in its conclusion as well as its termination. No other will (e.g. of
90 At that time in other countries e.g. Italy and Germany, because of economic 
changes, the doctrine of imprevision was discussed. Thus in Italy there were Mantica 
(died in 1614) and Luca (1614-1683) who discussed the theory of 'imprevision'. They 
determined its sphere of application (ie to be applied to successive contracts) and its 
conditions (there should be an exorbitant loss) and its effects (either the termination of 
the contract or its adaptation to the new circumstances). See to this effect Stoyanovitch 
at p. 220 footnote. 1, and p. 221 footnote. 1.
91 Stoyanovitch pp. 232 to 240, and see Veronique Ranouil (1980), at pp. 80 &
85.
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the judge) should intervene for whatever reason (e.g. subsequent changes in 
circumstances making the performance of a contract ruinous). Therefore the one 
who speaks contractually speaks justly. Because -as Rousseau- says:
"when a person decides something for another, he might be unjust towards 
him. But no injustice is reasonable when someone decides for himself [as by 
making a contract].".
Article 1134 Fr.c.c is also an acknowledgment of this idea. 
(Stoyanovitch pp. 241 to 247, and Ranouil pp. 86 & 90)
However, such an idea cannot be sustained since the contract itself may 
sometimes be a source of injustice. Thus by the supervening of certain 
events, the performance of the obligation of the debtor may become 
ruinous for him. The debtor cannot even claim the unjust enrichment 
since that enrichment is said to be a result of the contract itself, and the 
one who speaks contractually speaks justly. Therefore, the enrichment is 
just.(See Mouhye Eddine Ismaiil Alam Eddine p. 394, and Ranouil p. 133).
Other ideas also influenced the drafters such as the "let him go let him 
pass" (laisser faire laisser passer) in the economic field.92
All these ideas influenced the drafters in the way they formulated the 
Code, that is to say, with no mention of the theory of a change in the 
circumstances. There was a stability which was thought to continue 
forever, and the parties to a contract were obliged by it as if they are 
obliged by the law. All these ideas were reflected in the Code Civil.
9^ Thus the following passage written in 1926 may perhaps reflect such ideas:
A diligent businessman should know that there might be a change in the economic 
or monetary situations, therefore he inserts in his contract certain clauses in order to 
protect himself from such changes. However, the negligent businessman does not take 
into account the possibility of such changes and therefore omits to protect himself. The 
consequence of this would be his disappearance from the market (ie because of his 
ruin). This in fact is a good thing for the trade itself; since businessmen who are weak 
will disappear whereas those who are strong enough will remain. This last category 
will benefit from such a happening. That is to say they will take into account that 
trading is not only about gaining benefit but also that they are faced with the risk of a 
total ruin. Therefore the rigidity of maintaining a contract although there is a change in 
circumstances (and which make the weaker party disappear, and the stronger remain ie 
the maintaining of the pacta sunt servanda principle) is a pedagogic role for 
businessmen." Stoyanovitch pp. 248 to 250.
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Having said that, it remains now to decide whether what was in the 
thought of the drafters was correct or not. As to the thought that the Code 
Civil provides a solution for every eventuality, this is in fact a fiction, and 
no more should be said about it. (Stoyanovitch p. 315)
As to the supposed stability which would -in the thought of the drafters- 
continue forever after the promulgation of the Code Civil, this was not 
correct either. Many fundamental changes, whether economic or social 
or political or monetary, occurred after its promulgation. (For more details 
see Stoyanovitch p. 336 et seq.l. Maurice Tancelin says (at p. 22):
"la force obligatoire du contrat [a sa] limite...[e]lle n'est concevable en outre 
que dans une societe relativement stable, comme celle du XIX siecle. Mais si 
cette condition n'est pas remplie ce qui semble bien etre le cas a notre epoque. la 
force obligatoire devient une source d'injustice."93.
All this proves therefore that the provisions of the Code Civil -including 
art. 1134- which were designed for a situation of stability should not be 
applied in cases of such fundamental changes. This means that there is no 
reason in not admitting the theory of imprevision in cases of such changes 
since the Code Civil itself does not clearly admit or reject it. (See 
Stoyanovitch p. 342) Thus Hauriou says :"toutes les situations juridiques sont 
etablies sur la base de la vie normale. Le droit est fait pour le normal et non pas pour 
l'exceptionnel." 94 It can therefore be said that looking at the provision of 
the Code Civil, nothing prevents the jurisprudence from adopting the 
theory of 'imprevision'.95
Among other arguments given in rejecting this theory it was said that 
admitting imprevision will have a bad effect on the stability of contracts. 
This argument is in fact unfounded. Thus a representative of the 
'Federation des Industriels et des Comme^ants Francais’ said , and this
^3 Emphsis is mine. The above quotation means that :"The sanctity of contracts 
has its limits. It is conceivable in a relatively stable society as the one of the 19th C. 
However, if this condition is not met as is the present time, that sanctity becomes a 
source of injustice.".
94 Cited in Jean Foulan, Le Caractere Provisoire de la Notion d'Imprevision 
(Paris. 1938), p. 123
95 See Stoyanovitch p. 315, and Alex Weill, Droit Civil Les Obligations (1975), 
p. 414, and Carbonnier (1982), p. 261, and R. Rodiere, Les Mociflcations.. p. 17.
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after the promulgation of the "Loi. Failliot", which admitted the theory of 
imprevision for certain types of contracts be it temporarily, that the 
position of the Court of Cassation in rejecting this theory and clinging to 
the principle of pacta sunt servandais a "... cause d'inquietude... " and 
that "... elle va contre les besoins... de la situation actuelle du commerce et de 
rindustrie... ". Therefore as can be seen it is in fact the position of the 
Court of Cassation which affects the stability of contracts. (See Stoyanovitch 
pp. 378-79)96
Even Failliot who introduced the Loi Failliot 1918, said that :"Notre 
proposition a eu pour but de faire cesser le desaccord entre le droit actuel et les besoins 
legitimes de l'industrie et du commerce...". (Stoyanovitch p. 474, emphasis is mine)
Another argument which can be added in favour of the theory of 
imprevision, is that if this theory is against public interest (interet general) 
then there would not have been any law which adopted this theory when 
there was a destabilisation of economic situations. However, we see that 
the Loi Failliot and the ones subsequent to it are examples of such type of 
laws. (Stoyanovitch p. 381) Therefore it is the public interest which 
requires the admission of the theory of imprevision in cases of changes in 
circumstances which may destabilise certain contracts. (Stoyanovitch p. 396)
The legislator -as has been said- intervened many times in order to 
mitigate the harshness caused to debtors because of the difficulties they 
faced in performing their contract. That is to say because of those 
difficulties the performance of their contracts became onerous and would 
ruin them if nothing was done to help. One example of those 
interventions is the above mentioned Loi Failliot 1918 under which 
certain types of contracts which had became onerous were terminated. 
Other subsequent laws for the same purpose were enacted and provided 
for the suspension or the revision of contracts which had become ruinous 
for one of the contracting parties.97
Having reached the conclusion that an intervention is necessary in 
order to help a party whose performance becomes ruinous, it remains to 
determine whether one should opt for a judicial or a leg isla tive
9^ See also Auvemy at p. 3 and Alex Weill (1971), at p. 388, where it is said that 
this position led in certain cases to some injustice.
97 For a discussion of these laws see: Louis Fyot, op.cit at pp. 134 et seq. and 
Auvemy at pp. 132 et seq. and J. Radouant, op.cit at pp. 311 et seq.
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intervention.
As regards French law, it has been seen that the intervention was 
through passing of temporary laws. The French author A. Hauriou says 
that: "La justice ne se realise vraiment que par des decisions particulieres, en des cas 
d'especes.". As a consequence of this, to know whether in a particular case 
there is real injustice caused to one party to a contract (whether a debtor or a 
creditor) there should be a consideration of all the circumstances of that 
case. Obviously this cannot be done except by a judge. Therefore the 
disadvantage of admitting imprevision by temporary laws is that a whole 
category of debtors -presumed to have suffered a loss in the performance of their 
contracts- are treated similarly and without distinction. That is to say the 
law in question treats them as if they were all in the same position and 
suffering the same degree of loss which is considered as an unjust loss. 
Whereas it may happen that some of the debtors are not suffering a big 
loss as to make it unjust for them to perform their contacts without 
revision. Despite the disadvantages of this solution -ie legislative intervention- 
the French law has nevertheless adopted it. Relying on what Auvemy 
Bennetot says (at p. 151) -commenting on those laws-, instead of resolving the 
bad economic conditions created by the war and the crises, the laws did in 
fact aggravate it and the "legislateur n'est pas, ou ne s'est pas montre', un 
excellent expert economique.". This can be an argument against those who 
consider the judge as incompetent for such a task (ie the revision) because as 
they allege, this can only be done by someone who has an overview of the 
whole economic situation of the country, in order that he can give an 
appropriate remedy for any economic destabilisation. That person is, as 
they say, the legislator and cannot be the judge.98
The fact that French law rejects any idea of modifying the contract 
especially by giving the power to the judge, can be explained by what 
Ripert (in Semaine Internationale de Droit.Paris (1937), p. 216) says to the effect 
that:
"Nous sommes moins sures de nos magistrats (ie judges) que vous l'etes
98 See Abd Arrahim Anbar, op.cit at p. 250. A French adage said " God save us 
from the justice of the parliament", Auvemy added at p. 153 " and of the legislator". 
But this concerns these laws such as Failliot etc., and see Louveau at pp. 50-51.
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des votres (speaking of Swiss law which admits the revision of the contract by 
the judge), et je ne sais pas, si on laissait les tribunaux libres de reviser les 
contrat au gre des circonstances economiques, s'ils n'abuseraient pas de ces 
pouvoirs.".
It appears therefore that the rejection of imprevision is not related to 
the fear of the destabilisation of economic relationships but to a fear 
regarding French judges themselves. For other legal systems there is no 
reason in not admitting imprevision, even through judicial intervention; 
because though judges have a large discretion in considering cases of this 
type, they are in fact very prudent in using this power. (See to this effect R. 
Rodiere, Les Modifications.. at pp. 188-89)
It would seem from what has been said about French law that the best 
solution would be to admit the revision of contracts by a general provision 
in the law and then it would be the duty of the judge to consider each case 
of imprevision and to give the appropriate solution as to revise the 
contract or to enforce it.99 This is in fact what the Algerian legislator 
adopted in the Algerian Civil Code. Its provision will be studied after a 
brief survey of the theory of imprevision in French administrative law.
S«3 The Position of The Conseil d'Etat, or The Theory of Imprevision 
under French Administrative Law 10°
I- Definition of Imprevision.
An example may illustrate the circumstances in which this theory may 
apply. (A) makes a contract with an administration in order to run a 
public service (e.g. supply of gas to a c ity ).l° l Due to exceptional events
99 Stoyanovitch at p. 187 holds the same opinion.
100 por a summary of this theory see: Mazeaud, Legons T. 2. ler Vol Obligations 
(1973), at p. 763 , and Alex Weill, Droit Civil (1971), at p. 395, and the same writer 
in the (1975) edition, at p. 413, and Jean Carbonnier, Droit Civil. 4/ Les Obligations
(1982), pp. 260 et seq. and M. Planiol & G. Ripert, Tome. 6 Obligations lere Partie. 
(1952), at p. 529, and see J. L. Mouralis, Encyclopedic Dalloz. (1978), at para. 56 et
seq-
101 The theory of imprevision does not apply solely to this type of contracts. For 
other contracts to which it may apply see M. Walline, Droit Administratif (9eme ed., 
Ed. Sirey. 1963), at p. 623.
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beyond the control of (A), the performance of the contract becomes 
ruinous to him and threats him with an exorbitant loss exceeding what has 
been envisaged when concluding the contract. In such a situation there are 
two solutions. The first is to oblige (A) to perform his contract although 
he is suffering that loss. The consequence of this would be the ruin of (A), 
and will oblige him sooner or later to stop the performance of his 
contract. This in turn means the interruption of the public service. The 
second is to help the contractor (A) in his performance of the contract 
either by modifying the contract so as to stabilise it, or by awarding a 
certain indemnity which would compensate him for the loss he suffered 
and this in order not to interrupt the public service which is in the public 
interest.102
In almost a similar situation the Conseil d’Etat has given its well known 
decision in the case of Gaz de Bordeaux March 24th 1916 (S. 1916.3.17., 
Concl. Chardenet, note Hauriou). It was in that decision that the theory of 
imprevision, as it is now settled under administrative law, has been clearly 
defined and determined.103 In other words almost all the important 
principles of imprevision were determined in that case. Subsequent 
decisions of courts have added other principles, and clarified the ones 
already settled.(J. Foulan, op.cit at p. 15.)
II- The Principles Underlying the Admission of Imprevision.
The main reason underlying the admission of imprevision in 
administrative law, is the necessity of continuing the running of the public
102 See De Laubadere, Traite de Droit Administratif (6cme ed., Paris. L.G.D.J. 
1973), at p. 368, para. 639. In fact ’compensation' is not used in its real juridical 
meaning; since it does not compensate for the loss suffered, but it is more accurate to 
say that it is a contribution from the administration in order to stabilise the contract. See 
J. L. Devolve, "The French Law of Imprevision In International Contracts" (1981) 2 
International Con tract.3. at p. 5 col. 2. Or to restore "the altered equilibrium of the 
contract". See Saul Litvinoff, op.cit at p. 16.
103 See Jean Foulan at p. 13, and see Michel Rousset, Driss Basri, Ahmed Belhaj, 
Jean Caragnon, Droit Administratif Marocain (4eme ed., Rabat. Imprimerie Royale. 
1984), at p. 365. This does not mean that the solution of giving an indemnity 
(indemnity under imprevision is given to the party asking for its application) to the 
contractor who faces great difficulties in performing his contract was not known before 
that case. For such examples see M. Walline, op.cit at p. 622, see also Barry 
Nicholas, French Law o f Contract op.cit p. 203, and see Saul Litvinoff at p. 15.
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service which is in the public interest. 104 It is for this reason that the 
administration with which the contractor concluded the contract accepts 
to modify the contract in order to stabilise i t , or that the judge awards the 
indemnity of imprevision. However, other ideas may also explain its 
admission such as the principle of equity or even good faith. But all these 
are not the main or the principal reasons.105
HI- The Sphere of Application of the Theory of Imprevision.
This theory is solely concerned with administrative contracts (e.g. 
public service, public work etc).106 Therefore private contracts, whether 
concluded between private parties or between an administration and a 
private party, are excluded from its sphere of application. The main 
reason of this is that private contracts are in the competence of civil 
jurisdictions, as opposed to administrative ones and these reject the theory 
of imprevision in private contractual relationship s. (See to this effect De 
Laubadere, Contrats... p. 570.)
This theory can be applied in the case when the contract is an 
administrative one and concluded between a private party and an 
administration, or between two public bodies.(See De Laubadere, id pp. 573-
104 See Andre De Laubadere & Franck Modeme & Pierre Devolve, Traite des 
Contrats Administratifs (2eme ed., Paris L. G. D. J. 1984), at pp. 562-63, and see M. 
Walline, op.cit at p. 623, and see Andre De Laubadere, Traite de Droit Administratif 
(1973), at p. 366, and see Comesse Fernando (1946), at p. 58, and Rene Rodiere, 
Les Modifications op.cit. at p. 40, and see Jean Frangois Lachaume, D ro it 
Administratif (4eme ed. Collection N. Themis P. U. F. 1987), at p. 299. Therefore if 
by the happening of an exceptional event the interruption in the continuity of the public 
service is not involved, the theory of imprevision will not be applied. See Rodiere, Les 
Modifications at p. 43 The adoption of the theory of imprevision by the 'Conseil 
dEtat1 of France is for reasons of public interest such as the continuity of the public 
service, whereas in other laws (e.g. Arab civil codes) it is admitted -in civil matters- for 
reasons of justice and in consideration of the position of the contractor who suffers that 
hardship. See Mouhye Eddine I. A. E at pp. 395-96.
1°5 See De Laubadere, Contrats... op.cit at p. 564, and M. Walline, op.cit at p. 
732, and J. L. Devolve, "International Contracts.." op.cit at p. 6 col. 1 & 2., and 
Rodiere at p. 42, and Lachaume at p. 300.
106 m. Walline, op.cit at p. 623, and De Laubadere, Contrats... op.cit at p. 570. 
For a short definition of administrative contracts, see J. L. Devolve, op.cit at p. 5 col. 
1, and see Lachaume at p. 299.
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74-75)
IV- The Conditions required for the Application of Imprevision.
Four conditions are required in order that this theory can be applied. 
The first is that the event which destabilises the contract must be 
unforeseeable. Secondly it must not be imputable to the party who 
contracts with the administration. Thirdly there must be an economic 
destabilisation of the contract. Lastly the event should happen between the 
conclusion of the contract and before the end of the time-limit in which 
the contract should be performed. 107
The destabilisation of the contract should have an economic character 
(e.g. rise or fall of prices). However, the event itself which causes that 
destabilisation may be economic, natural or an order issued by a public 
body.l°8
A- An Economic Event.
It may happen that there is an increase in prices of materials and this 
may be due to the mles of supply and demand, or because of a shortage of 
materials. In such a case there is an economic destabilisation.
B- A Natural Event.
The destabilisation of the economy of the contract may also be due to a 
natural event (e.g. earthquake etc...). In this case the theory of imprevision 
may apply.
C- The Intervention of a Public Authority.
It may also happen that the contract concluded becomes destabilised 
because of the intervention of the administration which is either the party 
to the contract in question or another administration or that this 
destabilisation is caused by a passing of a legislation. In such a case the 
theory of imprevision may apply if all the other conditions of imprevision 
are met.
Let us now consider the conditions of Imprevision already cited.
l^ 7 See J. Foulon, op.cit pp. 13-14, and De Laubadere, Contrats... op.cit at pp. 
578 et seq. and Rodiere at p. 41. See also for the conditions of imprevision: Lachaume 
at pp. 297 to 299.
108 gee generally De Laubadere, Contrats... pp. 579 to 582, and M. Walline, 
op.cit at pp. 732-33.
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1- The Event Must Be Unforeseeable.
The event which destabilises the contract must be unforeseeable at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract.109 Examples of such events are: 
war, a devaluation of money, and more generally economic crises.11° 
The Conseil d'Etat applies the theory of imprevision either when the event 
itself is unforeseeable, or its consequences are as such, although the event 
itself may not be unforeseeable.111
2- The Event Must Not he Imputable to the Person Who Contracts With
the Administration.
This condition is so formulated because the administration itself may 
by its acts destabilises the contract it made with the other contractor as to 
be ruinous for him. Therefore this condition concerns the contracting 
party who invokes this theory against the administration. That contractor 
should not be involved directly or indirectly with the supervening of the 
destabilising event.112
3- The Event Must Destabilise The Contract.
The event in question must affect the financial equilibrium of the 
contract concluded with the administration. This means that the 
contractor would suffer an exorbitant loss in performing his contract with
109 De Laubadere, Contrats... op.cit at p. 586, and De Laubadere, D ro it 
Administratif p. 367, and Georges Vedel, Droit Administratif (3eme ed., P. U. F. 
Paris. 1964), at p. 607, and see M. Rousset at pp. 365-66.
110 De Laubadere, Droit Administratif at p. 367. Depending on the circumstances 
of a given case the examples given might acquire that condition.
111 For an example of this type see J. Foulon, op.cit at p. 24, and De Laubadere, 
Contrats... at p. 587, and see the examples he gives of passing of legislation and war 
and other events pp. 588 et seq. and see Rodiere, Les Modifications..who says that 
the Conseil d'Etat no more requires the unforeseeability of the event and accepts the 
unforeseeability of the consequences of the event (id at p. 44, he refers to a case 
decided in 1948 where, although the event destabilising the contract viz a passing of a 
legislation, was anterior to the conclusion of the contract, and the parties themselves 
provided for that contingency, nevertheless the C.E based its decision on the fact that 
the destabilisation caused by that event, was beyond what was reasonably foreseen by 
the contracting parties when making their contract).
112 De Laubadere, Contrats... pp. 590 to 593, and J. Foulon at pp. 13-14, and De 
Laubadere, Droit Administratif at pp. 367-68, and see M. Rousset at p. 365.
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the conditions as initially settled and may be forced to interrupt the 
running of the public service.
An important fact to be remembered when considering the loss 
suffered due to that event is that any contractor, in concluding his 
contract, must expect some loss. This loss constitutes in fact what -he 
expects- would exceed his cost price in concluding his contract. 
Therefore any contractor should reasonably expect an extra-cost price. 
This is the foreseeable loss to be bome by him. But where the event which 
detabilises the contract increases that loss above what was foreseeable and 
expected, which is called under French administrative law an extra- 
contractual loss (charge extra-contractuelle), the theory of imprevision should 
apply. It is for this type of loss that the contract with the administration 
should be revised or what is called an 'indemnity of imprevision' should 
be granted .113
The theory of imprevision applies when there is a real loss. If the 
consequences of the event were to prevent the contracting party only from 
getting any benefit (without making him suffering a loss) then no question of 
Imprevision can be raised. 114
V- The Effects of Imprevision.
The contract being destabilised, the contractor must continue the 
performance of his contract although he suffers that loss. Only in this 
case he can ask for the application of the theory of imprevision.115 The 
first effect of the application of this theory is that the parties are invited by 
the judge to renegotiate the contract in order to stabilise it again, and this 
by modifying its initial conditions. If such an agreement is not reached, 
the administrative judge grants what is called an "indemnity of 
Imprevision" to the contractor by which his loss will be lessened, since its
i 1^ See to this effect De Laubadere, Contrats... pp. 595 to 597, and De 
Laubadere, Droit Administratif p. 368, and M. Walline, op.cit at p. 730, and G. Vedel 
(1964), op.cit at p. 607, and Georges Vedel & Pierre Devolve, Droit Administratif 
(lOeme ed., P. U. F. 1988), at p. 1150.
114 See to this effect De Laubadere, Droit Administratif p. 368, and M. Walline, 
op.cit at p. 735, and Rodiere at p. 41, and see M. Rousset at p. 366.
115 De Laubadere, Droit administratif op.cit at p. 368, and De Laubadere, 
Contrats... pp. 604-05, and Rodiere at p. 44, and see Lachaume at p. 299.
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major part will be bome by the administration.
As it is only the parties who can modify their contract, it is not open to 
the judge to do so.116
In awarding the indemnity the judge must determine three preliminary 
questions.II7 Firstly of all he should determine when the extra- 
contractual situation starts, that is, the time in which the loss resulting 
from the running of the public service goes beyond what was reasonably 
expected by the contractor. Secondly he should determine the extra loss 
in that period (ie in the extra-contractual period). This is generally determined 
by comparing the revenue and the expenditure made in that period. 
Thirdly he should determine the amount of loss-bearing by both the 
contractor and the administration. Generally the administration bears the 
major part of the loss (from 80 to 90 %) and the contractor is left with the 
minimum amount of loss.1!8 All this is in order that the public service 
continues to be effective.
What has been said above about the effects of imprevision concern the 
case where the loss suffered by the contractor in performing his contract 
is temporary only.1!9 Therefore the solutions provided by the theory of 
Imprevision are for temporary detabilisations. As a consequence of this, 
when the destabilisation is permanent, both parties are entitled to ask the 
judge for the termination of their contract.120
! !6  M. Walline, op.cit at p. 734. What is worth noting is that the party suffering 
the destabilisation of his contract can ask for that indemnity either when the 
destabilisation occurs in the course of the performance of the contract or after having 
performed the contract. See G. Vedel (1988), at p. 1152.
117 Generally the judge refers to experts in determining them. See J. Foulon, op.cit 
at p. 22.
118 See De Laubadere, Contrats... p. 623, and M. Walline, op.cit at p. 737, and 
G. Vedel (1964), op.cit at p. 607, and J. Foulon at pp. 26-27 (for secondly only), and 
G. Vedel (1988), at p. 1151, and Rodiere at p. 45, and see Lachaume at p. 299.
119 This supposes that the period of imprevision causing to the contractor that loss 
is temporary only and will cease. This may happen either by the disappearance of the 
event which has destabilised the contract, or that the parties reach an agreement by 
which they stabilise their contract. De Laubadere, Contrats... pp. 626-27, and see G. 
Vedel (1964), op.cit at p. 608, and J. Foulon pp. 17 to 20, and G. Vedel (1988), at p. 
1152, and see Lachaume at pp. 298-99.
120 De Laubadere, C ontrats... pp. 627-28, and De Laubadere, D r o i t  
Administratif p. 370.
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VI- The Effect of Contractual Provisions regarding the state of
Imprevision.
In fact any contractual clause which prevents the contractor from 
claiming the application of the theory of imprevision, should be 
considered as void, since it is contrary to "ordre public". As imprevision 
concerns the continuity of the public service, therefore it is the public 
interest which is involved. However, when the contractual clause is to the 
effect of readapting any destabilisation of the contract, such a clause is 
valid. Therefore, if that clause covers the whole effects of imprevision, 
that is the new situation which has arisen, this would exclude the 
application of the theory of imprevision. Whereas, if it covers only a part 
of the effects of imprevision, there seems to be no reason in not applying 
the theory of imprevision in order to supply what is left unprovided for 
by that clause.121
Where the contracting party has taken the risk of any destabihsation of 
the contract, he cannot thereafter claim the application of imprevision, 
because such a contractual clause is valid.122
It can be seen from what has been studied that the Court of Cassation 
and the Conseil d'Etat have adopted opposite positions regarding the 
theory of imprevision. The Conseil d'Etat considers the public interest 
(consisted in the "service public") as a principle which must prevail over the 
pacta sunt servanda (ie the sanctity of contracts) whereas the Court of 
Cassation regards the latter principle as the one which must prevail over 
private interest (private contracts). No matter therefore, how many debtors 
are sacrificed in the application of the pacta sunt servanda principle, a 
rigorous application of it, is supposed to keep the stability of contractual 
relationships. The Algerian legislator in this respect, has not followed - 
and he is indeed right in his position- the French legislator, and instead adopted 
the doctrine of imprevision by a general stipulation applicable to all cases 
of imprevision.
121 See to the same effect De Laubadere, Contrats... pp. 599 to 601, and G. 
Vedel (1988), at p. 1151, and De Laubadere, Droit Administratif p. 366, and see 
Lachaume at p. 300.
122 See J. Foulon at p. 26 where he gives a case as an example of th is.
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Section Three. The Position of Algerian Law and other Systems of Law.
Algerian law as well as other laws have adopted the theory of 
imprevision not only in administrative contracts as the Conseil d'Etat has, 
but extended it to civil and commercial contracts. The other fact is that 
the power to revise the contract is given to the judge. Therefore the 
position of Algerian law is in this respect totally different from the one of 
French law. In what follows we will give the arguments which are 
generally referred to in founding the admission of this theory. Then we 
will study the Algerian law as an example of the laws which admit the 
revision of contracts because of an economic destabilisation, reference to 
other laws will also be made while discussing the different aspects of this 
theory under Algerian law.
§.1. Doctrinal Arguments.
Before discussing doctrinal arguments, it should be pointed out that it 
has rightly been said that there is no need -under Algerian law- to justify 
the theory of 'imprevision' by invoking principles such as "good faith" or 
"clause rebus sic stantibus". This is because this theory is based on an 
article of the Civil Code, viz art. 107/3. Therefore, there is a legal 
justification for this theory under Algerian law.123 However, this does 
not mean that the theory cannot be founded on those principles.124
Before discussing the arguments founding imprevision, it should be 
said that, under Swiss law the theory of imprevision is admitted in several 
articles of the "Code des Obligations". This code provides for the 
termination of the contract because of 'grave' circumstances which render 
the performance of the contract intolerable, such as in the contract of 
'bail' (arts. 269 & 291 C/O). (See H. Deschenaux, (1942) Revue de Droit Suisse . 
at p. 524).
Article 250/2 C. O (concerns donations) provides that the person who 
promises to give a thing can be discharged of his obligation if after his 
promise, his financial situation was modified in such a manner so that the 
donation has become much more onerous for him. (See M pp. 525-26) But
123 See Ali Bencheneb, Theorie Generate du Contrat (1982), at p. 86.
124 See N. Terki, "L'Imprevision et le Contrat International dans le Code Civil 
Algerien" (1982) 8 International Trade Law & Practice.9. at p. 12. This is true 
especially for the concepts of good faith and equity.
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in this case the judge can only reduce the promisor's obligation and not 
release him completely. (M p. 526)
Another provision where the judge can terminate the contract or 
revise it, is art. 373/2 C. O (contract of ’entreprise') which states that:"... if the 
performance of the work is hindered or has been rendered excessively difficult by 
extraordinary circumstances, and impossible to foresee, the judge can either raise the 
stipulated price or terminate the contract". 12^
Thus the judge is entitled to modify the contract either by raising an 
obligation or by reducing it, and this in order to adapt the contract to the 
new circumstances which has arisen. Therefore it is the destabilisation of 
the economy of the contract which has induced such an intervention in 
order to bring the contract into its initial equilibrium.126
The problem with such a special applications of imprevision is that, in 
cases not expressly provided for by the law, judges have to look for other 
principles which may justify its application. This is in fact what happens 
in Swiss law.
Generally speaking (ie not specifically speaking of Swiss law) many 
principles have been provided to justify the adoption of the theory of 
imprevision, these are:
I- The Clause or Condition rebus sic stantibus.
This clause was used in the middle ages by the canonists to justify the 
modification of a contract when the obligation of one of the parties 
becomes onerous. Canonists stated that in any contract in which the 
performance does not follow immediately its conclusion, there is a tacit 
clause stating that the contract should be performed as it was concluded as 
long as the economic conditions under which it was concluded do not 
substantially change.127 Canonists applied this doctrine because they
!25 H. Deschenaux, Revue., p. 526. This is as the Algerian law., and see Travaux 
de l'Association Henrie Capitant pour la Culture Juridique. Vol.83 "Les Effets de la 
Depreciation Monetaire sur les Rapports Juridiques Contractuels" (Journees 
d'Istambul) Faculte de Droit d'Istambul. (1973), at p. 568 and see H. Lesguillons at p. 
528.
126 For examples of other articles to the same effect, see: P. Ommeslaghe at p. 34.
122 See Stoyanovitch at pp. 435-36, and see Alex Weill, D roit Civil. Les 
Obligations (1975), at p. 407.
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thought that the party to a contract who benefits from the loss of the other 
party (ie whose performance has become onerous), is committing a religious sin 
and should be prohibited. The only way to prevent such a sin was by 
modifying the contract as to stabilise it again.128 Thus it can be said that 
under this doctrine the consent of the parties to the contact was based on 
the prevailing conditions, and if they foresaw that there would be such a 
change in the previous conditions, they would not have contracted, or at 
least they would have contracted differently.129
This might apply to French as well as Algerian law because it is said 
that in interpreting the intention of the parties according to art. 1156 
Fr.C.C130 (and art. 111/2. Alg.C.C), it is possible for a judge to say that the 
parties intended the clause rebus sic stantibus to be included in their 
contract. However, the problem with this argument is that since the 
parties have not included in their contract a clause to revise it, this may 
mean that they have accepted to run the risk of any destabilisation of the 
contract.131 Alex Weill says that even if this clause is intended, it is in fact 
the party whose performance has become onerous (ie the debtor who for 
example has to provide certain goods or services) who may have such an intention 
and not the other, whereas in interpreting the intention of the parties to a 
contract we should take into account the intention of both parties (see art. 
1156 Fr.c.c, and art. 111/2.Alg.C.C, which speak of common intention), and not
only one of them (ie the one whose performance is onerous).132 But the 
problem with this is that, it cannot be said that that intention was that of 
the party whose performance has become onerous; since we do not know - 
at the time the contract is concluded- who will suffer a hardship in the future
1.28 e i  Wassit Vol. 1. at p. 633, and see Abd El Mounem Faradj Essada (1974), at 
p. 479.
129 See J. L. Mouralis, Encyclopedic Dalloz op.cit at para. 11, and see C. 
Fernando, op.cit at pp. 25-26.
!30 That article stipulates that:"The common intention of the contracting parties 
must be sought in agreements rather than to stop at the literal sense of terms.".
See R. Rodiere & D. Tallon, op.cit at p. 17, and Ait, op.cit at pp. 13-14.
132 Alex Weill (1971), at p. 389. See also for the fact that the interpretation should 
concern the common intention of the parties and not one of them only: Auvemy at p. 
11, H. Deschenaux, Revue, op.cit at pp. 530-31, Louveau at pp. 53 to 55, and 
Stoyanovitch pp. 435 to 442.
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performance of the contract.
Another criticism in relying on the interpretation of a contract on the 
basis of art. 1156 Fr.C.C, is that this article is only applicable when there 
is an ambiguity in the terms of the contract. Whereas if they are clear, no 
interpretation is allowed and the contract must be performed as it is, even 
if it becomes onerous. (See Comeliu at p. 63)
Under Swiss law the use of the clause rebus sic stantibus as a 
foundation to modify the destabilised contract was rejected by the 
"Tribunal Federal Suisse".133
II- The Principle of Good Faith.
It has been said that imprevision can be justified by reference to the 
principle that contracts should be performed in good faith (see art. 1134/3 
Fr.C.C, and art. 107/1 Alg.C.C). This means that the creditor who claims the 
performance of the contract from his debtor in the knowledge that the 
performance would be ruinous to him, is in fact acting contrary to good 
faith as required in any contract.134 However, this argument -as the first 
one- was also criticised in that the principle of good faith itself requires 
the parties to a contract to perform as was agreed and not to give the judge 
the power to modify it. Therefore the creditor who is asking for the 
performance of the contract is not breaching the principle of good 
faith.(See C. Fernando pp. 43-44, and Auvemy pp. 8-9, and Louveau p. 56.)
Swiss law however, does consider such an act as a breach of good faith. 
This principle is provided for in art. 2 of the Code Civil, and It constitutes 
the general provision which justifies the admission of imprevision. This 
article concerns both the debtor and the creditor. Thus even the right of 
the creditor in asking the debtor to perform his contract should be used in 
accordance with the good faith principle.135 Good faith under Swiss law
133 Deschenaux, Rev.Droit Suisse op.cit at p. 531. For a discussion of other 
theories though said not to base 'imprevision' under Swiss law, see id  at pp. 529 £1 
seq . and see Hans Smit "Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Study at 
Consolidation" 58 (1958) Columbia Law Review.287. at pp. 289-90., and Cf with 
German law infra.
134 See Ait, op.cit at pp. 14-15, and R. Rodiere & D. Tallon, op.cit at p. 17, and 
El Wassit Vol. l .a tp .  634.
!35 Deschenaux, Rev.D.Suisse., p. 545 and see Leo M. Drachsler, "Frustration 
of Contracts: Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies in Cases of Supervening
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places the parties to a contract as if they were partners. Thus they have to 
act together in order to reach the common end in mind and not make that 
end illusory, (Deschenaux Revue.. M p. 547) nor that the obligation derisory 
and this without any modification. (See P. Ommeslaghe p. 35) There should 
also be a certain equivalence between the undertaking of each party.(See 
Deschenaux Revue., id p. 549) In general if the contract is destabilised by 
supervening events it is not considered as acting in good faith, if one party 
asks for the performance of it. In this case he is considered as abusing the 
use of his right, and the abuse of right is not protected by law as 
formulated in art. 2/2  C.C. (Deschenaux Revue., p. 549 and see P. Ommeslaghe 
p. 35)
The same principle of good faith is also referred to in the 
establishment of the conditions of revision as well as the process of 
adjusting the contract. (Deschenaux Revue., p. 551)
HI- The Principle of Abuse of Right
It might be said that the creditor who asks for the performance of the 
contract, though the performance has become onerous, is in fact misusing 
his right. However, this argument can be criticised by saying that there is 
no abuse of right in asking for the performance of the contract which is in 
itself a right of the creditor. In this case if the creditor does not ask for 
the performance of the contract, he will bear the consequences of that non 
performance (ie he will bear the damage of the non performance), and there is no 
reason why the creditor should bear that risk instead of the debtor.136
IV- The Principle of Equity.
Other authors have said that it is in fact equity which is the basis of the 
doctrine of imprevision; therefore when there is a destabilisation of the 
contract due to unforeseen events, equity requires that the party who 
suffers such a loss should be helped. This in other words means that the
Illegality" (1957) 3 New York Law Forum (Now called N.Y.Law Schl.Law.Rev).50, 
at p. 77
136 Comesse Fernando at p. 43. A French author viz Albert Wahl says th a t"... 
rien n'est plus legitime... que le fait de se reclamer d'un droit qui a ete stipule.". See
Comeliu at p. 66„ and see Louveau at p. 55.
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equity in such circumstances should prevail over the sanctity of contracts. 
This is because, the "autonomy of the will" as understood in the 19th.c., 
has its limits and it is not therefore true to say that the "one who speaks 
contractually speaks justly ." .137 Therefore it is not always the strict 
performance of the contract which makes it equitable.13** This principle 
seems to be the one which supports the theory of 'imprevision' under 
Algerian law more than the previous ones. This is clear when the 
legislator prohibited loan with interests between private parties to a 
contract. The Algerian legislator was also inspired by the rules of Islamic 
law which is basically based on equity.139
§.2. An Illustration. (Algerian Law).
The laws of many countries such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Sudan, 
Kuwait,140 Iraq141, Algeria, Swiss, Germany and United States of 
America (ie the doctrine of impracticability) have expressly adopted this 
theory. This might also be the case under Louisiana law, since it is said 
that a foundation can be found for the theory of imprevision and this in 
many articles of the Civil Code (which concerns the frustration of the purpose, or 
the disappearance of the reason for which the contract was made).14^ It is also 
adopted by the Italian civil code of 1942.143 In the following study of this
!37 Said by Fouille. See Alex Weill (1971), op.cit at p. 49.
!38 See generally Ait, op.cit at pp. 17-18, and Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 479, 
and El Sanhoury, El Moudjez op.cit at p. 307, and Alex Weill, Droit Civil.Les 
Obligations (1975), at p. 408, and Stoyanovitch at pp. 150 & 419, who says that the 
theory of imprevision is based on equity which means that no one should suffer.
139 See Ait, op.cit at p. 18, and N. Terki, "International..." (1982), op.cit at p. 12.
140 Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 477.
141 Abd Arrahim Anbar, Encyclopedia at p. 252.
142 See Litvinoff at p. 23, it is to be noted that the articles to which this writer is 
referring are similar to the ones found under the French Civil Code. Under French law 
authors have tried to find a basis for the admission of the theory of imprevision by 
reference to such articles (footnote. 87 supra this chapter), but they failed to convince 
the jurisprudence or even the other French authors. However, speaking of Louisiana 
law Litvinoff says that even without the need for a doctrine dealing with the occurrence 
of unexpected change in the circumstances, Louisiana courts -through interpretation of 
contracts- have released parties to contracts where the performance of their contract has 
become excessively burdensome. See Litvinoff at pp. 51-52.
143 See El Wassit Vol. 1 at p. 641, and J. L. Mouralis, op.cit at para. 19. It is to 
be noted that the Polish Civil Code of 1933 adopted the theory of imprevision in article
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theory, although Algerian law will be the example, references to other 
laws will be made.
Before discussing the Algerian doctrine of imprevision it is of interest 
to give a brief summary of this doctrine under German law.
Generally speaking, German courts have used several concepts for 
releasing a party from his obligation where the effects of supervening 
events have not made the performance impossible.
Thus the concept of clausula rebus sic stantibus, although not 
embodied in the B.G.B,144 was nevertheless used by courts for this 
purpose. Therefore, where, because of a substantial change in 
circumstances, the performance of the contract has become economically 
radically different from what was intended by the parties when 
concluding the contract, the performance of that contract can no longer be 
asked for.145
The principle of good faith as formulated in art. 242 B.G.B., was also 
used to grant relief for the debtor, 146 and this in cases where the 
performance has become a hardship, such as in the case of a change of 
legislation or in cases of frustration of purpose.(Norbert H, p. 19.)
Another concept was also used by courts and this during the period of 
inflation, when there has been a depreciation in the value of money. That 
concept was called the equivalence of values. Thus in a reciprocal 
contract, each party's performance should be equal in value. That is to 
say there should be "a relationship of adequacy between the performances of both
269, but this Code is now abrogated. See M. Fontaine, (1976) 2 International Trade 
Law & Practice at p. 11, and A. Puelinckx at p. 54.
I 4 4  See Joachim Meinecke, ’’Frustration in the West German Law of Contract”
(1978) 13 Irish Jur.N.S.83. at p. 84, and Horn Norbert, "Change in Circumstances 
and the Revision of Contracts in Some European Law and in International Law" (1985)
3 Studies In Transnational Economic Law (Netherlands). 15-29, p. 19, and Peter Hay 
at p. 358, and Dalhuisen H. J, "Changed Circumstances and the Role of the Judiciary" 
(1975) 'T Exempel Dwinght. Opstellen aangeboten aan Prof mr. I.Kisch.Zwolle.49. at 
p. 60 footnote. 35.
l 4^ See Joachim p. 91, but cf Rodiere (where it is said that the jurisprudence - 
before 1923- could not refer to the clause rebus sic stantibus concept since it was 
expressly rejected when drafting the BGB in 1900 (see at p. 128)., and cf with the 
English common test supra.
l 4^ Joachim p. 91.
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parties". The Supreme Court itself treated a case as one of impossibility, 
where there was a lack of such adequacy. 147 Thus in one case the court 
(R.G) declared that the promisee was acting contrary to good faith in 
claiming the performance of the contract, although the promisor would 
not receive an equivalent for his performance.!48
Therefore, as can be seen, until the development of the doctrine of 
Geschaftsgrundlage by Oertman ((1921). See S. Litvinoff p. 19 footnote. 67) - 
which is another concept used by courts to release a party, because of a 
change in circumstances-149 the above concepts existed side by side and 
were used by courts.(Joachim p. 92.)
The theory of Geschaftsgrundlage is based on the idea that where the 
supervening events affect the basis or the foundation of the contract, this 
should be a ground to release the debtor from his obligation. This in 
other words means that the continued existence (see Peter Hay p. 361) or the 
coming into existence of certain circumstances are assumed by one party 
to the contract as to be the basis of the contract or the foundation upon 
which the contract was entered into. That assumption must be shared by 
the other party. This is so when the other party knows about that 
assumption or where it is obvious to him that those circumstances 
constituted the basis of their contract. 150 if  that foundation has collapsed 
because of supervening events, then the contract should either be adapted 
to the new situation or terminated. Such a collapse of the foundation may 
occur when there is a fundamental di sequilibrium of the contract, which 
leads to undue and unanticipated hardship for the concerned party.151
H 7 See J. Cohn p. 19, and Joachim p. 92, and Litvinoff p. 21, See Peter Hay at p. 
359.
148 Joachim p. 92. it is to be noted that the principle of nominalism is rejected by 
German law. Id pp. 98-99.
149 Texas p. 294, Geschaftsgrundlage is said to be the base of the present German 
doctrine of frustration: Peter Hay at p. 361, it is also said that this theory combined the 
concepts in existence and defined frustration as being a collapse of the foundation of the 
contract Peter Hay id.
J. Cohn pp. 20-21, and see Joachim pp. 93 et seq. and H. Deschenaux, Revue 
at pp. 533-34, and Litvinoff p. 19.
151 See Norbert p. 19, and Ole Lando, "Renegotiation and Revision of 
International Contracts an Issue in the North-South Dialogue" (1980) 23 German 
Yearbook of International Law.37. at p. 49, and Peter Hay at pp. 361 & 363, and
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The collapse of the foundation may also happen when the purpose for 
which the contract was concluded can no longer be attained.152 An 
illustration of this is given by Cohn J. Thus:
"[a]n industrialist orders coal for a factoiy to be delivered regularly during a
certain period. During that period his factory is closed down by order of the
government for reasons of national emergency.".155
Therefore the basis of the contract in this example is destroyed.
That d» sequilibrium may be due to several causes, for example to a 
depreciation of money or a change in legislation.154
In one case (A) made a contract with (B) by which the former 
promised to produce a certain machinery for the latter. (B) intended to 
sell the machinery in East Germany. After the conclusion of the contract 
the import of the machinery into East Germany was no longer possible 
due to the Berlin Blockade. It was held by the B.G.H that the buyer's 
intention, that is to sell the machinery in East Germany, constituted the 
basis of the contract and assumed by both parties to be as such. The buyer 
was therefore freed from his obligation to accept the machinery and to 
pay for them. However, an adjustment of the contract was also decided, 
by which the buyer had to compensate the seller for the expenses he 
incurred in performing his contract, and this by application of the 
principle of good faith.(Joachim pp. 103-04.)
Yet, if the other contracting party does not share that assumption 
(concerning the coming into existence or the continued existence of certain 
circumstances), this doctrine cannot be applied.(J. Cohn p. 22.)
We should bear in mind that the decision of the Federal Court 
(Budesgerichtshof) (reported above) has been almost unanimously criticised. 
This is because it is an established rule under German law that the buyer 
who acquires merchandise in order to resell it with profits, should bear 
the risk of this resale contract. Thus if he wants to share this risk with the
Texas p. 294.
152 See P. Van Ommeslaghe p. 25., this might be similar to the English concept of 
frustration of purpose. Thus the English coronation cases would probably be decided 
by German courts as to involve a frustration of purpose and be held as terminated.
153 J. Cohn p. 21.
154 See Rodiere pp. 130-31.
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seller he should insert an express clause to that effect. It is also said that 
this decision is the only one which can be considered as a deviation by the 
Federal Court. (See Peter Hay at p. 363, and R. Rodiere p. 130).
In another case in which the court RG referred to the doctrine of 
Geschaftsgrundlage. a seller entered into a contract for the sale of a piece 
of land which he did not own at the time of concluding the contract, but he 
hoped to acquire it from its owner. The price of the sale was based on the 
prevailing market conditions at that time. Later on the price of land 
sharply increased due to a currency devaluation. The seller claimed that 
he was no longer bound by the contract. The RG gave effect to his claim 
on the ground that the "continuation of the equivalence of performance and 
counter-performance had been assumed by the contracting parties at the conclusion of 
the contract" as to be the foundation of their contract.155 It should be noted 
that in this case the seller was not freed from his obligation, but had to 
accept a higher price which is determined by the judge, in accordance 
with the current land prices. This process would therefore avoid the 
termination of the contract. However, where the buyer refuses the new 
price, then the seller is entitled to claim the termination of the 
contract.(Joachim p. 95)
Another important point is that the doctrine of Geschaftsgrundlage is 
not only used in cases of hardship, but also in cases where the 
performance has become worthless. Thus if a money lender gets his 
money in a depreciated money, he can claim the application of this 
doctrine since he should not be obliged to accept to be paid in a 
depreciated money.(See Litvinoff p. 20, and Manual o f German Law p. 49.)15^
It can be seen from what has been said that both Swiss and German 
courts refer to general principles of law when admitting the theory of 
imprevision. As to the Algerian legislator, he declares in art. 107/3 of the 
Civ.C that:"
Where following exceptional, unforeseeable, general events, the
I 5 5  Joachim pp. 94-95. In fact this does not seem to differ from the concept of 
rebus sic stantibus. That is to say the parties contracted on the basis that the conditions 
upon which the contract was concluded will not change as to affect the value of the 
performance of one of the contracting parties.
15^ As to the effects of this type of impossibility see infra.
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performance of contractual obligations becomes excessively burdensome even 
though not impossible, in such a manner so to threaten the [debtor] with an 
exorbitant loss, the judge may according to the circumstances and after 
considering the parties' interests, reduce, in a reasonable manner the obligation 
which has become excessive. Any agreement to the contrary is null and
void." 157
This article is similarly formulated in the Civil Code of Egypt, Libya, 
Syria, Sudan and the Code of Commerce of Kuwait.158 As may be seen 
from that article, the judge has the power of modifying the contract in 
order to stabilise it and this by reducing the party's obligation which has 
become very onerous.
If we compare this doctrine with other laws, we see that for example 
U.S.A law also provides a release when the performance of the contract 
has become onerous. To this effect "impracticability" (U.C.C §.2-615): is 
the doctrine by which the debtor will be discharged if the cost of 
performance has become excessively and unreasonably burdensome. 
Section 2-615 (a) Uniform Commercial Code provides:
"Delay in delivery or non delivery in whole or in part by a seller... is not a 
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been 
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of 
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made..." (see Texas 
p. 280, and Berman, Helsinki (1961) p. 36).
Some examples were given in the official comments made on this 
subsection in order to give an idea of those contingencies. These are, 
severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such 
as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shut down of major 
sources of supply .(See Texas p. 283)
In one case a court said: "... a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at 
an excessive and unreasonable cost.".159
157 N. Terki, op.cit at pp. 12-13. This article can be said to be the general 
principle of the doctrine of ’imprevision’, as admitted under Algerian law. However, 
there are other articles which are particular applications of the theory of ’imprevision’. 
See for example arts. 510/2 & 513 Alg.C.C. We may also note that in these two 
articles the event of ’imprevision’ has not a general character as required in the general 
principle put by art. 107/3, but concerns the debtor himself.
15^ Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 477.
15^ See John N. S. Kirkham, "Force Majeure -Does It Really Work?" (1984) 30
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But it is noted that it is not a mere increase in the cost of performance 
(ie the performance has become more onerous), which releases the debtor from 
his obligation. In fact the rise in the cost should alter the essential nature 
of the contract (which in fact means an unreasonable and excessive 
increase in the cost of performance (Vanderbilt...p. The Supreme
Court of California said that an increase in cost of ten or twelve-fold is 
sufficient to constitute impracticability. (See Vanderbilt., p. 113) But an 
increase of 14 % and 23 % and even of a 1/3 was not considered as 
impracticability. (See Vanderbilt., pp. 119-20)
Again that rise in cost if it amounts to impracticability should be 
unforeseeable otherwise there could not be any release. (See Vanderbilt, p. 
116)
The court in the case of Maple Farms Inc V. School District of the City 
of Elmira (76 Misc.2d.1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup.ct.1974)) stated the 
difficulty in defining the concept of impracticability by saying that:
"There is no precise point, through such could conceivably be reached, at 
which an increase in the price of raw goods above the norm would be so 
disproportionate to the risks assumed as to amount to 'impracticability1 in a 
commercial sense." 161
Thus the common conditions found in the U.S.A doctrine of 
impracticability and the Algerian art. 107/3.C.C., are that the contingency 
destabilising the contract should be unforeseeable and that the 
performance should become excessively onerous.
Regarding art. 107/3 Alg.C.C three questions might be asked. Firstly, 
to which type of contracts does art. 107/3 apply?. Secondly what are the 
conditions of application of this article ?. Thirdly, what are the effects of 
the state of imprevision , that is to say the process of revising the contract
Rockv Mountain Mineral Law Institute.6.1. at p. 6.11, and Texas p. 281, and Richard 
W. Duesenberg, (1977) 32 Business Lawyer, at p. 1093 footnote. 10 (a case decided 
in 1916) and see Rockv pp. 6-11.
160 See also Berman p. 35, and Texas p. 281, and Vanderbilt p. 113, and 
Duesenberg pp. 1094-95, and see (1946-47) TulL.Rev p. 604.
161 See Vanderbilt., p. 120, Alphonse Squillante at p. 9 col. 1 holds the same 
opinion, and Duesenberg p. 1093.
244
a n d  t h e  r e l a t e d  p r o b l e m s ? .
I. The Sphere of Application of Art.107/3 Alg.C.C.
Following this article, any contract governed by the Civil Code is 
subject to the application of the theory of 'imprevision'. This is because 
the provision of this article does not put any restriction as to the types of 
contracts to which the theory may apply.162
Another important point -though not provided for in the Code but it is 
obvious- is that there should be a certain length of time between the 
conclusion of the contract and the performance of the contract.163 This is 
required because the event which will destabilise the economy of the 
contract, should take place after the conclusion of the contract and before 
its performance. As a consequence, where the performance of a contract 
follows immediately its conclusion, no question of 'imprevision' arises. It 
is such where (A) sells his car to (B) on a certain day, and the latter takes 
delivery of it on the same day (ie at the same time the contract is concluded). 
Such a condition is also required under Swiss law.(See P. Ommeslaghe p. 36)
It can be said that where there is a possibility that an unforeseeable 
event, which may destabilise the contract, may occur, the theory of 
imprevision can always be applied.
The problem which may arise in applying this theory is what is called 
'contracts of chance' ("contrats aleatoires" see art. 1964 Fr.C.C). An example
162 See Ait, op.cit at p. 32, and N. Terki, op.cit at p. 15, and Stoyanovitch at p. 
17. It was so formulated in a decision of the Court of Cassation of Egypt (1962). See 
Abd Arrahim Anbar, Encyclopedia at p. 254.
163 N. Terki, op.cit at pp. 13-14, and El Wassit Vol. 1 at p. 642, and Anouar 
Soltane, op.cit (1983), at p. 235, and see abd El Mounem F. E., op.cit at pp. 482-83, 
and Mohamed Abd Arrahim Anbar, Encyclopedia op.cit. at p. 250, and Louis Fyot at 
p. 125. What should be noted is that the time separating the conclusion and the 
performance of the contract, may be so because of the nature of the contract, or because 
the parties agree to separate the conclusion and the performance of their contract. Two 
Italian authors writing in the 17th Century, required this condition. See Stoyanovitch at 
p. 220 footnote. 1. It was also required by the Canonists when admitting imprevision. 
See El Fazary (1979), at p. 244. The Italian Civil Code in giving examples of contracts 
which are subject to the application of the theory of imprevision involve a time 
separating the conclusion and the performance of the contract (See El Fazary at p. 248) 
However, where this time is due to the fault of one of the parties that party cannot claim 
the application of imprevision. See Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 483.
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of these is the contract of insurance (see art. 619 Alg.C.C). In contracts of 
this kind what the two parties to the contract give and receive cannot be 
determined (or at least for one of them) at the time the contract is entered into, 
since this depends on an uncertain future event (or if it is certain its date cannot 
be known e.g, death). Thus for example in a contract of insurance the 
insured party knows the amount of money he pays when concluding the 
contract, but he cannot know how much he will receive from the insurer, 
since this depends on the occurrence of the event insured against. 
Therefore the two parties are exposed to a considerable benefit or loss.
This situation (contracts of chance) has divided the opinion of authors. 
Some say that the theory of imprevision cannot apply to a contract of this 
kind164, because the two parties are assuming the risk of a [great] benefit 
or a [great] loss. Others on the other hand, say that it applies to this kind 
of contracts.165 An example may be given to illustrate the possibility of 
its application to such contracts. The insurer, who has to pay a certain 
amount of money upon the occurrence of the event insured against, may 
suffer a great loss because of an increase in the value of money, whereas it
164 See Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 483, and the majority of Arab authors are of 
this opinion. See Hassbou El Fazary at p. 270, footnote. 1 & p. 271. A part of the 
Italian doctrine is of the same opinion. El Fazary id, and Stoyanovitch at p. 26.
165 See N. Terki, op.cit at p. 15, and Hassbou E. F., op.cit at pp. 272-73. This 
author is of this opinion. See at p. 274. The Court of Cassation of Syria, in a judgment 
of 1955, adopted the same view. See N. Terki, op.cit at p. 15. Stoyanovitch is of the 
opinion that the doctrine of imprevision can be applied to speculative contracts. The 
argument he gives is that even in speculative contracts the risk of a considerable loss or 
benefit -which is of the essence of this type of contracts- has its limits. Therefore if the 
change in circumstances had an exceptional effect on the contract, this should allow the 
application of imprevision. He also gives another argument to the effect that the Loi 
Failliot 1918, was applied to contracts which were speculative in character. Id at p. 29 
However, it is thought that where a contract is a speculative one, the theory of 
imprevision cannot be applied. It has been seen that under the English doctrine of 
Frustration the speculative character of a contract prevents the debtor from claiming the 
frustration of his contract. We have also seen that under the French doctrine of Force 
Majeure, when a contract is speculative there cannot be any exoneration (see footnote. 
14 chapter four). Another argument is that under a speculative contract, parties are 
expecting a big loss or a big benefit, therefore the destabilisation is not unforeseen. 
Whereas one of the conditions of imprevision is that the event or its consequences 
should be unforeseen. All these prove or at least sustain the idea of rejecting the 
application of imprevision in speculative contracts.
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is the insured party who will suffer that loss if there is a decrease in the 
value of money, at the time of the payment of that sum to him. Therefore 
it should be permitted to both parties to claim the application of the theory 
of imprevision, in order to stabilise the contract by its modification.166
IL The Conditions of Imprevision.
Article 107/3 Alg.C.C, states that:"W here, following exceptional. 
unforeseeable, general events, the performance of contractual obligations become 
excessively burdensome even though not impossible in such a manner so to threaten the 
party with an exorbitant loss...”. As may be seen, four conditions must be met 
before the debtor can ask for the revision of his contract. These are that 
the event is exceptional, unforeseeable, general, and that it renders the 
performance of the contract onerous and not impossible. Another 
condition is also required, although it is not expressed, -and this is because 
it is obvious- that is the non-imputability of the event to the party who 
claims the revision. This condition was also required in a decision given 
by the Court of Cassation of Egypt (1963). (See Abd Arrahim Anbar, 
Encyclopedia p. 255)
Apart from the condition of exceptionality, the above conditions are 
also required under Swiss law.167
This article does not give any indication as to the event which must 
have the conditions set above. It could be therefore any event whether 
natural (e.g. earthquake, fluding, volcanoes...) or human (e.g. war, strikes, a 
passing of laws...),168 and the event may be permanent or temporary. In
166 See in general Ait, op.cit at pp. 45-6. However, one restriction on the 
application of the theory of 'imprevision', should be noted as formulated in art. 95 
Alg.C.C ( see to the same effect art. 1895 Fr.C.C, and art. 134 Egyptian C.C.), which 
states that where the object of the obligation is a sum of money, the obligation " is 
always only the numerical sum stated in the contract " independently of anv " increase 
or diminution of the currency " " at the time of payment ". Therefore as can be seen, 
the debtor has to return the same amount of money he received, and this at the time of 
payment. This article is clearly a derogation to the theory of 'imprevision'. See Ait, 
op.cit at pp. 47-8, and Anouar Soltane, op.cit at p. 235. Thus the example of 
application of the doctrine of imprevision to contracts of chance, cannot be sustained 
under Algerian law, and this relying on art. 95 Alg.C.C.
167 See also for these conditions P. V. Ommeslaghe at pp. 35 et seq.
168 See El Fazary, op.cit at p. 235, and Abd Arrahim Anbar at p. 254.
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this last case the revision of the contract will be the suspension of the 
contract, until the event, which has made the performance of one of the 
parties to the contract onerous, has ceased.(El Fazary at p. 296.)
The destabilisation of the contract may be due to one event only, or to 
several events. In this second case the destabilisation of the contract may 
be caused by a number of the events coming together, though no such 
destabilisation would have occurred had one or two of the events 
happened. El Fazary rightly says (at p. 294) that the conditions of 
exceptionality, unforeseeability, and generality etc, should be met for all 
these events and if one of them does not have one of these conditions, there 
could be no application of the theory of imprevision, though all the 
conditions are met in the other events. It is also possible that though there 
are several events, nevertheless the conditions of destabilisation can be 
met by any one of them. Therefore, the theory of imprevision will apply 
for the event which has all the conditions stated above.
However, the author El Fazary says (at pp. 307-08), that in the case 
where there is a decrease in the value of money (this is an example he gives), 
this may be due to several events or factors (economic, political or social). 
It may happen that one of these factors does not have the condition of 
"exceptionality", nevertheless if there is a destabilisation of the contract 
due to those factors together, the theory of imprevision should apply. In 
this example , no imprevision should be allowed because of the absence of 
one of the conditions of imprevision viz the exceptionality. To say the 
contrary would contradict the provision of art. 107/3.
Let us now consider the conditions set above.
A. The Exceptionality of the Event.169
Article 107/3 of the Alg.c.c, divides events into two categories, those
1^9 The law of Italy requires this condition. See El Fazary at p. 305.
Deschenaux in Revue de Droit Suisse at p. 557 says that the character of 
exceptionality does not add anything to that of unforeseeability. This opinion might be 
reasonable, but cannot be said that the Algerian legislator distinguishes between:
(1) events which are unforeseeable and exceptional and,
(2) events which are unforeseeable but not exceptional.
Thus, whereas under force majeure he requires the second, under imprevision 
however, he requires the first?.
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which are exceptional (ie not ordinary in their happening), and those which are 
ordinary. An exceptional event is one which does not frequently happen. 
An example of this is war, or flood in a region not normally subject to 
such an event. Regarding this article it is the event which should be 
exceptional.
When it is said that the exceptionality concerns the event, the problem 
which arises -says El Fazary- is that, sometimes there is no exceptionality 
of the event in the case under consideration, and yet the theory of 
imprevision is applied. Thus in the French case of Canal de Crapone -in 
which the lower court allowed an increase in the price fixed- the only problem was 
that the fixed price in 1567 became derisory three centuries later, and 
there was no exceptional event in that case.
Another illustrating example is the case where (A) and (B) enter into a 
contract during war time. The price being fixed, it may happen that when 
the war ceases, that fixed sum becomes very onerous as to be intolerable 
for the debtor. In this case the debtor can ask for a revision of his 
contract. The exceptional circumstance in this case is the time in which 
the contract was concluded (ie the war-time), peace-time (after the war was 
stopped) being the ordinary circumstance. Therefore the obligation of the 
debtor becomes onerous not because of an exceptional event (the war) but 
because of an ordinary event (the peace-time).
Another example is that a hospital contracts with a firm to provide 
medicines to combat an epidemic. The price fixed is high. It may happen 
that the epidemic disappears and the obligation of the hospital becomes 
very onerous. In this case the hospital can surely ask for the application of 
the theory of imprevision, in order to stabilise the contract. According to 
El Fazary the application of the doctrine is required because of an 
ordinary event (ie the disappearance of the epidemic) and not an exceptional 
one (ie the epidemic itself).
It is for these reasons that he suggests (at p. 307), that the exceptionality 
should concern the effect of an event and not the event itself. Therefore, 
in the second example, the event of the war coming to an end has given 
rise to an exceptional situation which is the onerousness of the obligation. 
It is also for this reason (ie the problem created by saying that the exceptionality 
concerns the event itself) that some authors have said that the condition of
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unforeseeability of the event (see infra) is sufficient and that there is no 
need for the condition of exceptionality.170 Two Algerian authors are 
also of the same opinion.(See N. Terki, op.cit at p. 17, and Ali Bencheneb, op.cit 
at p. 88.)
Two remarks should be made regarding what El Fazary says. First, 
his understanding of the exceptionality of the effects of the event and not 
of the event itself, is an express contradiction of art. 107/3 (and also art. 
147/2 Egy.C.C).171 Secondly, in the examples he gives (see above) the 
author takes it for granted that where the obligation has become onerous, 
there should be a revision of the contract. Whereas this is not true; 
because the onerousness of the obligation is only one of the conditions for 
the application of the theory of imprevision. There must be the other 
conditions present. The examples which the author gives, are not cases 
decided by courts; if they were brought before a court, they could have 
been decided as if there was no case of imprevision, since the 
exceptionality of the event was not met, and the fact that the obligation has 
become onerous, is not sufficient for the application of the theory of 
imprevision. However, even if it can be said that these examples involve 
cases of imprevision, the exceptionality might be the ending of the war, 
had the parties foresee a longer time for its end (ie of the war). The same 
thing can be said for the example of the hospital. Thus -we may assume that- 
parties may have contracted on the expectation that the epidemic will 
continue for at least 6 months, whereas it ended a month after the contract 
was made. Therefore its end at that time is an exceptional and 
unforeseeable event. I7 2  Therefore, imprevision will apply because of an 
exceptional event and not because of an ordinary one.
What may further be argued in this context is that, there is no 
exorbitant loss where a debtor agrees to buy a thing at a very high price 
(say ten times its initial price) and then, because of subsequent events, that
17 0  See for those authors El Fazaiy at p. 335, and see for the same opinion Abd El 
Mounem, op.cit at p. 484.
171 See also for the opinion that the exceptionality concerns the event itself, Abd El 
Mounem F.E., at p. 483, and El Sanhoury, El Wassit Vol. 1 at p. 643.
172 El Fazary himself at p. 308, says that the theory of imprevision would apply if
the end of those events (war and epidemic) were unforeseeable.
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thing is available in the market and can be bought at a veiy low price. 
Since the buyer accepted that high price assuming that it would last for a 
long time (6 months), it cannot be said thereafter that that same price 
should be considered as an exorbitant loss. However, El Fazary (at p. 377) 
says that even such a circumstance can be considered as a hardship or an 
exorbitant loss.
B. The Unforeseeabilitv of the Event.173
As in the case of force majeure, the event which renders the 
performance of the contract onerous must be unforeseeable at the time the 
contract is c o n c l u d e d .  1^4 Therefore if that event was foreseen by the 
debtor, or although not foreseen by him, should have been so, regarding 
other persons in the same position as his (ie consideration of the unforeseeability 
in abstracto), and yet that debtor entered into that contract without putting 
any clause for the revision of his contract (or any other clause to the same 
effect), he is either presumed as having taken the risk of his performance 
becoming onerous,175 or that he is at fault in entering that contract. In 
fact he should have refused to do so. Therefore the theory of imprevision 
in this case cannot apply.176
The unforeseeability of the event is considered in abstracto ,177 or 
what the French law call in relation to a "bon pere de famille" '. The 
contrast (ie of the debtor) should be made with an ordinary person taken 
from the same class as the debtor.178 We have to determine whether an 
ordinary person could have foreseen the event in question or not. In the 
case where that person should have foreseen that event, the debtor cannot
175 As to the Civil Code of Italy there is no mention of this condition there, but El 
Fazary says that it is nevertheless required. El Fazary at pp. 328-29.
174 See N. Terki, op.cit at p. 18.
175 See El Fazary, op.cit at p. 330, and see Mazeaud, Responsabilite... (1970), at 
p. 689 para. 1575.
176 See Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 484, who holds the same opinion.
177 Anouar Soltane, op.cit at p. 236. The Court of Cassation of Egypt considers 
this condition in abstracto. Id.
178 Ait, op.cit at p. 63, and Stoyanovitch at p. 120. Thus an industrialist and an 
astronaut and a farmer, all these do not have the same ability to foresee different events. 
Stoyanovitch id. See also for the required standard of foreseeability, footnote. 57 
chapter one, what Bianca says.
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claim the application of the theory of imprevision. Thus if the debtor 
were a businessman, we should look at other businessmen in the same 
position as his, and determine whether they could have foreseen that event 
or not. If the answer is yes, then the debtor must have foreseen that event. 
This means that there will be no case of imprevision, since the event 
should have been foreseen by the debtor. What has been said above 
applies also to Swiss law. (See Deschenaux Revue p. 555)
As may be noted we are talking of the unforeseeability of the event. 
Other authors however, are of the opinion that the unforeseeability should 
concern the effects of the event. Therefore, if there is for example a war 
and this has caused an increase in the value of money so as to destabilise 
the contract, we should look at that increase and determine whether it was 
foreseen or not, and not the war itself (which is the event). This is because 
the war itself may be foreseen at the time the contract was concluded, but 
its effects (ie the increase in the value of money at such a high rate) may be 
unforeseen.179
Although this may be true in some circumstances, it is not a sufficient 
reason to say that we have to ignore totally the concept of the 
unforeseeability of the event.180 Because sometimes a person (a debtor for 
instance) cannot foresee the effects of an event, unless he has at least an idea 
about the event which may cause those effects.181 Thus consider that (A) 
enters into a contract with (B) who lives in a city 100 KM away from the
179 See for this opinion A. Bencheneb, op.cit at p. 87, and Ait, op.cit pp. 56 to
58.
180 See also Stoyanovitch at p. 125 who says that the unforeseeability may concern 
the event itself or its consequences., and see for the opinion that the unforeseeability 
concerns the event, Abd El Mounem F.E at p. 484, and El Sanhoury, El Wassit Vol. 1 
at p. 644. It has been said (supra) that some authors are of the opinion that the 
condition of unforeseeability is sufficient and there is no need for the condition of 
exceptionality. Abd El Mounem F.E (at p. 484) is also of the same opinion. It should 
nevertheless be said that it is very hard to distinguish between an event that is 
exceptional and one that is unforeseeable. During the preparatory works of the Egyptian 
Civil Code, when the discussion concerned the conditions of imprevision, an example 
was given to the effect that the spread of one specie of worm, is not an event which is 
exceptional since it is foreseeable. This may induce one to say that the conditions of 
exceptionality and unforeseeability are closely related if not synonymous.
^ 1  The same opinion is held by Stoyanovitch at p. 125 who says that it is not 
possible to foresee the effects without knowing their cause.
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city of (A). The contract is for the supply of certain goods to (B) and this 
during a period of three years. Suppose that there is one road only to B's 
city, and no other way (ie railway or a river or whatever). It may happen that 
there is an earthquake in the city of (A) (that city has never had an earthquake). 
That event destroys the road linking the two cities. (A) is therefore 
obliged to go to other cities which are linked with B's city. He has to 
travel 300 KM from his city to B's city. In this example, it cannot be said 
that those effects (ie that there will be an earthquake which will interrupt the traffic 
by road, and that in such a case he should make about 300 Km in order to get to B's 
city) were unforeseen whereas the catastrophic event (an earthquake) is not. 
As can be seen the concept of the unforeseeability of an event is not 
without value, and should not be ignored, because it may give a guidance 
as to whether the effects were foreseen or not at the time the contract was 
concluded.
* Is the Condition of Irresistibility required under the Theory of
Imprevision.
The majority of Arab authors are of the opinion that for the theory of 
imprevision to apply the condition of irresistibility should be required.182 
However, two Algerian authors do not discuss this condition at all.183
This condition is that either the event or its consequence, were 
inevitable, but at the same time, did not put the party in an impossibility to 
perform his contract. Thus for example, if the Canal through which the 
debtor intended to carry the goods sold was closed, although that event 
(the closing) was inevitable since the debtor could not prevent it, it did not
I 82 See Mohamed Abd Arrahim Anbar, op.cit at p. 249, and Anouar Soltane, 
op.cit at p. 235, and Abd El Mounem, op.cit at pp. 484-85, and El Wassit Vol. 1 at p. 
644, and Ait, op.cit at p. 76, and El Fazary, op.cit at p. 346, who says that there is a 
unanimity between Arab authors about the requirement of this condition, and that even 
the Arab jurisdictions apply it. He then gave an example of a decision of the Court of 
Cassation of Egypt in a case decided in 1964. In that case that court decided that in 
order that the theory of imprevision can be applied, the delay in performing the contract 
should not be due to the fault of the debtor. Id at p. 347. As may be seen, what that 
court declared, concerns the condition of non imputability of the non performance to the 
debtor and not the irresistibility of the event.
These are N. Terki, op.cit at pp. 17 et seq. and A.Bencheneb, op.cit at pp. 87
et seq.
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make his performance of the contract impossible. This is because he 
could use other routes which would make his performance more onerous.
El Fazary, is amongst the authors who require this condition. Another 
example is of a debtor who undertook to supply goods by using roads. 
But it happens that a flood has interrupted the traffic by roads. In this case 
there could be no imprevision; since that debtor could use the railway or 
the carriage by sea or by river. As is seen in this example, although that 
event was irresistible (or insurmountable) it did not put the debtor into an 
impossibility of performance, since he has other possibilities to perform 
his contract, he should use them and cannot claim imprevision. What is 
noticeable in the Civil Code of Egypt as well as all the other Arab Codes 
which adopted the theory of imprevision, is that there is no disposition 
regarding the condition of irresistibility.184
What should be bome in mind is that the condition of irresistibility in 
respect to this theory should not be treated as the one required under force 
majeure. We have seen for example that under French law the condition 
of irresistibility is synonymous to the one of impossibility. Under 
imprevision the condition of irresistibility should mean that there was no 
other way by which the debtor could perform his contract without 
incurring big losses by the fact that his obligation has become very 
onerous. He should also have done what was possible in order that the 
event in question did not affect the contract he made, ie by rendering it 
more onerous. (See Stoyanovitch p. 128, and Louis Fyot p. 81 footnote. 3). The 
condition of irresistibility -understood in this way not as in French law- is 
therefore, required.
C. The Generality of the Event.185
This condition is provided for in art. 107/3 Alg.C.C, and it is also 
provided for in art. 147 Egy.C.C,186 and other Arab Civil Codes.187 It is
184 See El Fazary, op.cit at p. 346. This condition is not mentioned in the Civil
Code of Italy. Id It is not mentioned also in the discussion of authors considering
Swiss and German laws.
18^ This condition is not required under the Italian Civil Code. See El Fazary at p. 
312.
186 See El Wassit Vol. 1 at p. 643.
187 See El Fazary, op.cit at p. 309.
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also required under Swiss law.188
It means that the event should have a general character and not only 
concern the debtor himself.189 Examples of such events are war, 
earthquake, flooding and economic crises.... This does not mean however, 
that that event should affect the whole population of a country. It is 
sufficient therefore if it affects an important part of it or a certain region 
in that country190, or a great number of a special profession such as the 
industrialists of a region or its farmers. Having said that, we should 
exclude events related only to the debtor such as his death or illness or 
bankruptcy or the destruction of his harvest (recolte agricole).(Abd El 
Mounem, op.cit at p. 484, and N. Terki, op.cit at p. 20)
It is worth noting that, during the preparatory works of the Egyptian 
Civil Code and when discussing art. 147 (which is exactly the same as art. 107/3 
Alg.C.C), the condition of "general" did not appear at first. But it was 
suggested there, that such a condition should be added in order to restrict 
the cases in which the theory of imprevision can be invoked. This means 
that it is not just any event which entitles the debtor to claim the application 
of the theory of imprevision. This condition will therefore give greater 
force to the pacta sunt servanda principle, or to the sanctity of 
contracts.191 This condition puts another difference between the concept 
of force majeure, in which the condition of generality is not required since 
a personal event such as the death or the illness of the debtor may 
exonerate him, and the theory of imprevision.192
188 See H. Deschenaux, "La revision des Contrats en Droit Suisse" (1948) 30 
Journal of Comparative Legislation 3rd S. parts 3 & 4. 55, at pp. 59-60
189 See Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 484, and Stoyanovitch at p. 114, an example 
is the coronation cases ie the death of Edward affected many persons. Id-
190 Ait, op.cit at p. 52.
191 See El Wassit Vol. 1 at p. 630.
192 Ait, op.cit at p. 54, and Stoyanovitch at p. 114. It is to be noted that El Fazary 
is of the opinion that this condition (ie of generality) should not be required. He 
qualifies it as unjust, because the debtor will be refused any adaptation of his contract 
merely because the event which rendered his performance more onerous is not general, 
and this although he suffers an exorbitant loss. He suggests that the other conditions 
are sufficient. Islamic law -he says- does not require the generality of the event. Id at 
pp. 315-16.
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D. The Performance Should Become Onerous.193
Art. 107/3 of the Alg.C.C, states that: "the execution of the contractual 
obligation, without becoming impossible, must become excessively burdensome and 
thereby threaten the debtor with an exorbitant loss...". As may be seen, it is this 
condition which clearly differentiates force majeure from imprevision. 
This is because in the former the performance becomes impossible 
whereas in the latter it becomes onerous only.
In order to understand this condition, three questions should be 
studied. These are, the definition of the concept of "the performance 
becoming onerous”, the "criterion used to decide whether there is an 
onerous performance or not", and "when the onerousness should be 
considered?.".
I. Definition of the Onerousness of the Contractual Obligation.
It can be said that this condition means that there should be an 
economic (or financial) destabilisation of the contract. This in other 
words means that the debtor finds great difficulty in performing his 
contract, and that difficulty would cause him a great loss regarding the 
contract he made.194
Under Sw iss law this theory would also be applied when the 
performance has become valueless for the party who is now claiming the 
application of the theory of imprevision, such as in the case where there is 
a depreciation in the value of money (e.g. the price stipulated in the 
contract), and this in addition to the cases where the performance of the 
contract has become onerous. In order that the modification of the 
contract can be admitted because of the destabilisation, the contract should 
be an executory one when the destabilising event happens. This means 
that if the contract has already been performed, no question of 
imprevision is raised.195
195 This is also required under the Italian Civil Code. See El Fazaiy at pp. 360 et
seq.
194 El Fazary, op.cit at p. 366, and Stoyanovitch at pp. 138-39, Thus 50 KG of 
coffee in 1913 costed 60 frs whereas in 1920 it costed 393 frs. For a list of this type of
examples see id at p. 139. The condition o f " exorbitant loss 1 was in fact required in 
the writings of two Italian authors in the 17th century who are Mantica and Luca. See 
Stoyanovitch at p. 221 footnote. 1.
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2. The Criterion of Onerousness.
It is to be noted that the majority of Arab authors are of the opinion 
that the onerousness of an obligation should be considered objectively and 
not subjectively.196 That is to say the judge should look at the contract 
itself to determine whether there is a real exorbitant loss threatening the 
debtor or not. Therefore he does not have to take into account what the 
debtor may possess in his patrimony to see whether he has suffered that 
loss. Thus for example if a state company has concluded a contract, but 
because of an event, the performance of the contract has become onerous 
as to threaten that company with an exorbitant loss. In this case that 
company (which can be considered as the state) can ask for the application of 
the theory of imprevision, even if the loss in the contract is minor 
regarding the state’s (ie the state company) budget.(El Fazary at p. 368.)
The Court of Cassation of Egypt declared in one case in 1962 that the 
loss should be determined in relation to the contract itself. This opinion is 
also adopted by the jurisprudence in Sudan and Iraq. In one case (in Sudan) 
it was decided that an increase of the price of one type of goods from £70 
to £94 (ie of £24) cannot constitute a threat of loss for the debtor.197 One 
court in Egypt also decided that a decrease in the value of a piece of land 
from £100 to £70, cannot cause the obligation to become onerous as to 
threaten the debtor with a big loss.
Thus the Arab jurisprudence is using the objective criterion in 
deciding whether there is a loss or not.(El Fazary pp. 369-70.)
What is important here is that, it is not any loss which entitles the 
contractor whose performance has become onerous to claim the 
application of imprevision. This is because each party to a contract is 
supposed and he himself expects to bear a certain loss. It is therefore the 
loss which exceeds that risk limit which should give him the right to 
revision. This would mean that there must be an abnormal loss exceeding 
what was expected at the time the contract was concluded.198
19^ See Deschenaux, J.C.L. p. 60. This is therefore different from the French 
administrative law supra (ie the doctrine of imprevision).
196 El Fazary at p. 367, and Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 85, see also generally 
Mohamed Hassanine, El Wadjiz (1983).
197 El Fazary at p. 369.
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3. When is the Condition of the Performance becoming Onerous to be
Considered.
El Fazary says that authors and Arab jurisprudence are unanimous in 
the view that no question of imprevision (and therefore of the performance 
becom ing onerous) can arise after the contract has been totally 
p e r f o r m e d .  199 Therefore the debtor whose performance has become 
onerous is entitled to claim the application of this theory while he is 
performing his contract. In this situation the judge can readapt his 
contract. This is also the position of the Court of Cassation of Egypt.(El 
Fazary p. 375)
However, that author rightly says that there is no reason why the 
debtor cannot be entitled to claim the application of this theory after the 
conclusion of the contract and before the performance of his contract, if 
he knows that this performance would be onerous and would threaten him 
with a big loss.
The 'Conseil d'Etat' of France awards an indemnity of imprevision, 
even after the performance of the contract has finished, whereas this - 
following what El Fazary says- this solution is not applied by Arab 
jurisdictions and not accepted by Arab authors. El Fazary rightly 
observes that the solution of the "Conseil d'Etat" should be followed by 
Arab jurisdictions. Thus if a debtor has suffered a big loss in performing 
his contract but has nevertheless performed it, he should be entitled to ask 
for the application of the theory of imprevision, and that loss should be 
divided between him and his creditor.(See El Fazary at pp. 375-76.)
* What Happens When the Debtor is Compensated for his Loss by Other 
Means than the Revision of his Contract
An example may illustrate this situation. (A) sells 100 tons of certain 
goods to (B). (A) has also concluded a contract with (C) for the carriage
198 See to this effect N. Terki, op.cit at p. 21, and Stoyanovitch at p. 141. What is 
abnormal risk is left to the judge since its determination depends on the facts of each 
case (ie the period in which the contract was concluded, its nature etc). Id at p. 148. As 
regards Swiss law see for the condition of onerousness, Deschenaux, J.C.L.. at p. 62. 
Under Swiss law if this condition is met, as well as the other ones, then the contract 
may either be terminated or adjusted.
199 El Fazary at p. 374. Swiss law is to the same effect see supra.
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of those goods in his boat. The government has issued an order to seize all 
the boats. (A) has therefore to use the railway to transport the goods. 
This would make his performance more onerous as to threaten him with a 
big loss. The government has also awarded a compensation to (A) because 
of the loss due to the carriage by the railway. The question is whether (A) 
can ask for a revision of his contract because of the loss he suffered, 
although he got that compensation.
Both the Civil Code of Tunisia and Iraq (which adopted the theory of 
imprevision) do not apply this theory when the person whose performance 
has become onerous has received a compensation from an insurance 
company.200 The Court of Cassation of Egypt also does not apply this 
theory when the person whose performance has become onerous has 
received compensation, because of that onerousness in the performance of 
his contract.(El Fazary p. 379.)
Although this solution seems to be equitable as well as acceptable, it 
should be applied when the person (debtor or creditor) whose performance 
has become onerous, has received the compensation in relation to the 
contract he made. Whereas if the compensation was awarded to him 
because of a separate contract and not related to the one which has become 
onerous, in this case this solution should not apply. This is because, as has 
already been said, the onerousness of the obligation is considered 
objectively, that is to say, without taking into account the patrimony of the 
debtor (whether he is rich or not) whose performance has become onerous. 
In the example already given, if the compensation received was because of 
a different contract (if we suppose it to be so), in this case it should be 
considered as part of his patrimony and has no relation to the loss suffered 
in the other contract for which he claims the application of the theory of 
imprevision.
It should be noted that it is the party who claims the application of the 
theory of imprevision, who has to prove that there is an event which has 
rendered the performance of his contract onerous,201 and to prove all the 
other conditions as set above.(See El Fazary pp. 397 to 402.)
200 El Fazary at pp. 377-78.
201 See N. Terki, op.cit at p. 21.
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E. H ie Non Imputabilitv of the Event to the Debtor.
This is -as has already been said- an obvious condition, therefore it is 
not expressed in art. 107/3 Alg.C.C.202 What can be said about this 
condition is that the event which has rendered the performance of the 
contract onerous, must not be due to the fault of the party who claims the 
application of imprevision. More generally, he must not be involved -in 
any way- in the supervening of that event, otherwise he will be refused the 
revision of his contract.
Thus if the performance of a contract is delayed because of the fault of 
the debtor and then an event supervenes and renders, as a consequence, the 
performance of the debtor's obligation more onerous, in this case the 
debtor cannot claim the application of the theory. Because if he had 
performed the contract in time that event would not have affected the 
contract he c o n c lu d e d .2 0 ^  But it should be noted that the fault of the 
party which prevents him from claiming the application of imprevision, 
must have some influence on the destabilisation. (Cf with French law in cases 
of force majeure (supra), where it was said that the fault of the debtor should have 
some influence.)
in . The Effects of Imprevision.
In what follows we shall study the process of revising or readapting 
the contract. Art. 107/3 Alg.C.C, states that where the conditions of 
imprevision are met, "the judge may, according to the circumstances and after 
considering the parties’ interests, 'reduce' in a reasonable manner, the obligation which 
has become excessive. Any agreement to the contrary is null and void.".
Three questions should be studied in order to understand this 
provision: Firstly, the power of the judge regarding a case of 
imprevision. Secondly, the process of readjusting the destabilised 
contract and thirdly, the contractual provisions as to the effect of 
imprevision.
202 It is neither expressed in the other Arab laws, nor in the Italian Civil Code. See 
El Fazary. op.cit at p. 318.
2°3 El Fazary at p. 321, an see Ait, op.cit at p. 74. See also to the same effect for 
Swiss law Deschenaux, J.C.L. p. 60, and Revue p. 561.
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A. The Power of the Judge regarding a case of Imprevisioii.
Article 107/3 states that the judge "may...". Does this mean that the 
judge has the power to refuse any revision even if the conditions of 
imprevision were met ?. Strictly speaking, this article allows such an 
interpretation. However, it has rightly been noted204 that it would be 
incomprehensible to say that the judge has a total discretion in accepting 
or rejecting the application of the theory of imprevision although its 
conditions are met, and disposing at the same time that any stipulation 
contrary to art. 107/3 Alg.C.C. is void. From this it should be concluded 
that the judge possesses a power to appreciate whether the conditions of 
imprevision are met or not, but has no power to refuse the revision if they 
are met.
B. The Process of Readjusting the Destabilised Contract.
The French version of art. 107/3 uses the word "reduce", whereas the 
Arabic version uses the word "render". Therefore , following the former 
version, the judge can only reduce the obligation which has become 
onerous. This would mean that if the hardship caused to one party can 
only be lessened by increasing the obligation of the other party, or by 
suspending the whole contract, such a solution would be dismissed. This 
logical interpretation would certainly be contrary to the foundation of the 
theory of imprevision, which is to resolve equitably the situation which 
has arisen.
However, as it is known, the Arabic version is the official one, and the 
Arabic word used there has a general meaning. That is to say, it means to 
readapt or to readjust the contract. Therefore the judge has a total 
discretion as to the manner by which he can lessen the hardship caused to 
one of the parties to the contract. This would mean that he may reduce the 
obligation of the party whose performance has become onerous, or 
increase the reciprocal obligation (ie of the other party), or suspend the 
contract.205
204 See A. Bencheneb, op.cit at p. 89, and N. Terki, op.cit at pp. 22-23.
205 §ee n . Terki, op.cit at p. 24, and A. Bencheneb, op.cit at p. 89, and Anouar 
Soltane, op.cit at p. 236, and El Wassit Vol. 1 op.cit at p. 646. During the 
preparatory works of the Egyptian Civil Code, the word "reduce" was also used in the 
article concerning imprevision (which is the same as art. 107/3 Alg.C.C), but since the
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Under Swiss law it is open to the contracting parties to claim the 
termination or the revision of their contract when the conditions of 
imprevision are met. However, the one who claims the application of the 
theory of imprevision must do all that is possible in order to minimise the 
effects of that supervening event. This is considered as an application of 
the principle of good faith. (Deschenaux J.C.L. p. 60) The revision may take 
the form of increasing an obligation (see ait. 373/2 C.O) or reducing it.(See 
to this effect Association H. Capitant p. 570) The law itself has provided for the 
termination of contracts in certain circumstances (e.g. arts. 269 & 373 C. O), 
and the jurisprudence has extended this right of termination to other 
contracts. (Deschenaux J.C.L. p. 64) Where there is a termination of the 
contract the party for whom the termination was decided, has to pay a 
compensation to the other one. This is because that party has to bear a 
part of the loss resulting from the destabilisation of the contract.(See 
Association H. Capitant p. 570, and Deschenaux Revue., p. 607)
It is worth noting that the revision is only possible when the parties 
have agreed to maintain their contract. (See Deschenaux J.C.L. p. 65, and 
Association H. Capitant p. 568, and M. Fontaine p. 45) Therefore if such an 
agreement is not reached then the judge can terminate the contract. 
(Association H. Capitant p. 570)
German law is not substantially different in the means of adjusting a 
destabilised contract. But it should be noted that the legislator intervened 
in 1939, and again after the Second World War in 1952, issuing certain 
regulations providing for adjustment of contracts entered into prior to 
June 21st 1948. By those regulations contracts may be terminated or 
adapted through "judicial d ecree" .206 Generally speaking -and this in 
comparison with Anglo-American law- when the contract can no longer be 
performed according to its initial terms (and this as to honour the pacta sunt 
servanda principle), then its termination can be pleaded by the suffering 
p a r ty  .207 In such a case although there is a termination of the contract, we
real meaning intended was the readaptation rather than the reduction only, that word 
was replaced by the word "render" as in art. 107/3 Alg.C.C, which means in general 
readjusting. See to this effect El Wassit Vol. 1 op.cit at p. 646.
206 gee Joachim pp. 99-100, and Rodiere p. 133, and see for these legislations 
Peter Hay at pp. 366 et seq.
207 xhe termination has a retroactive effect. That is to say each party has to return
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are nevertheless concerned with a change in circumstances (and not 
impossibility). This termination can be decided when, because of the change 
of circumstances, the contract has become insignificant. But if the 
contract still has some utility for both parties, then the contract should be 
adjusted.208 What should be also noted is that the adjustment made by the 
judge concerns extra-contractual risks only (or extra-contractual hardship) and 
not those which are normally borne by parties.20^
Adjustment (ie the revision) of the contract is also provided by the
application of the principle of good faith as formulated in art. 242 B.G.B. 
210
The adjustment of a contract may take several forms. It may for 
example be in the form of a delay in the performance of the contract, or a 
reduction in the performance of one party, or an increase in the obligation 
of the other contracting party.2! 1 In one case for example, which 
concerns a lease of a property, a lessee intended to use it for construction. 
A subsequent regulation prohibited construction on that leased property. 
The lessee asked for a reduction of the rent. It was decided by the court - 
although the lessor stressed the fact that the lessee gave up his plan of construction on 
the leased property- that the lessee was to be granted that reduction of the 
rent; since to enforce the contract without reduction would violate the 
principle of good faith as expressed in art. 242 B .G .B .212
In addition to the above mentioned means of adjusting contracts, 
another way of adjustment may take the form of sharing either the loss or
what he received from the other. If that return is impossible, then compensation is 
provided. Sometimes that retroactive effect goes back to the time of conclusion of the 
contract. In others it goes back to the time when it is decided that there has been a lapse 
in the basis of the contract, and this when applying the doctrine of Geschaftsgrundlage. 
See J. Cohn p. 21.
208 P. V. Ommeslaghe p. 5.
2°9 Id p. 26 (this is similar to French administrative law (ie the doctrine of 
imprevision "la charge extra-contractuelle").
21° See Lesguillons pp. 530-31, and Joachim pp. 108-09. It should be noted that 
the revision of contracts is not provided for by legislation. It is therefore the 
jurisprudence and the doctrine which have developed these concepts. See Rodiere p. 
124.
211 See Lesguillons p. 532, and Peter Hay at p. 364.
212 See Lesguillons id, and Joachim p. 109.
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the profit resulting from the contract, and this between the contracting 
parties.
In one case (A) sold a house to (B). (A) had paid mortgages in inflated 
currency. Because of subsequent revalorization laws, (A) had to make 
further payments to the mortgagees. In this case the basis of the contract 
viz "that the mortgages had been paid off" had lapsed. The Supreme Court 
decided that (A) has a claim against (B) by which the latter should 
contribute to the further payments. If (B) refuses, (A) can claim the 
rescission of the contract of sale.212 Other examples where there might 
be a relief, are a change in legislation, and frustration of the purpose of 
the contract.(See Horn N, p. 19.)
However, it should be remembered that the intervention of courts is 
limited, since they must not alter the purpose of the contract or radically 
change the content of the contract.214 Other exceptions are that there 
could be no release for the concerned party, in the case of a change of 
circumstances, where the contract is a speculative one, or that the risk was 
foreseeable to the party and he could have protected himself by a special 
clause.2!5
Considering Algerian law the following examples will illustrate how 
the different means of adjustment may be used in case of a destabilised 
contract.
1. The Process of Reducing an Obligation.
Consider that a seller promises to deliver 3 tons of sugar to a buyer. 
Because of a war, the import of sugar is stopped, and therefore its price 
within the seller's country (supposing that both the seller and the buyer live in the 
same country), has sharply increased as to threaten the seller with an 
exorbitant loss. In this case the judge may reduce the quantity which the 
seller promised. But what should be taken into account are the
2 12 See J. Cohn p. 22 [for the case only].
214 See Joachim p. 109.
215 See Rodiere p. 131, and P. Y. Ommeslaghe p. 22, see also Norbert H. at p. 19
Cf Texas where it is said that whereas French law and the United States laws base their
solution (in the field of impossibility of performance) on unforeseeability, German law
bases its theory on good faith.
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9 1 6circumstances of the case as well as the interests of both parties/10 
Having reduced that quantity to a certain limit, the debtor has to deliver 
that new quantity and cannot refuse such adjustment.(See El Wassit Vol. 1 p. 
648)
2. The Process of Increasing an Obligation.
The judge may also increase the obligation of the other party whose 
performance has not become onerous. Thus (A) promises to deliver - 
during a period of three years - a certain quantity of rice to (B), at 20 
pence per kg. It happens that because of an event of imprevision, the price 
increases to £4 per kg. The judge may in this case increase the price as 
initially fixed. However, in increasing that obligation the loss expected to 
be bome by the seller should be taken into account, that is to say, the loss 
which has been called ’the normal loss'. This is because it is the aim of the 
theory of imprevision to divide the loss between the two parties to the 
contract and not to put it on one party alone.217 This is also the case under 
Swiss law (See Association H. Capitant p. 570) and German law (see supra).
In the example given, if the seller expects an increase of £1, this should 
be bome by him alone, because it is a 'normal loss', expected by any 
contractor. Whereas the remainder ie £3 (4-3) is considered as 'abnormal 
increases'. This latter loss would be divided between the two parties. For 
example the buyer would pay not the 20 pence as initially fixed, but 20p + 
£1.50 = £1.75 per kg.218 It is up to the judge to decide how this abnormal 
increase will be divided, since no article of the Civil Code, imposes on 
him a certain way of division219 or allocation of the loss. However, it has 
been said that the judge cannot impose upon the creditor this new
2^6 See Abd El Mounem Faradj, op.cit at p. 487.
217 See Stoyanovitch at p. 183. This would differentiate the concept of force 
majeure from the one of imprevision. That is under force majeure the contract is 
generally terminated, and it is therefore the debtor -in a synallagmatic contract- of the 
performance which has become impossible, who bears the risk of force majeure. In a 
unilateral contract, it is the creditor who bears that loss. However, under the theory of 
imprevision, the loss is bome by the two parties. See Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 
486.
2 18 See to this effect Abd El Mounem, op.cit at p. 487.
219 See Ait, op.cit at p. 96, and N. Terki, op.cit at p. 26.
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p r i c e . (See El Wassit Vol. 1 p. 647.)
3. The Process of Suspending the Contract.
Sometimes the readaptation of the contract is achieved by suspending 
the destabilised contract. This is so when the effects of Imprevision are 
temporary only. The utility of the contract after this suspension should 
also be taken into account, that is, whether it is always useful to perform 
the contract after the suspension.220 Thus a contractor promises to build 
a plant and deliver it in 2 years time, but the price of materials of 
construction increases temporarily. In this case the contractor will suffer 
a hardship in performing his contract. Therefore the judge may, 
regarding the temporary character of the increase in prices, suspend the 
contract until the event which caused that increase ceases, and then the 
contract should have its normal effects. But the delivery of the plant will 
naturally be delayed.(See El Wassit Vol. 1 pp. 646-47)
The revision of the contract concerns the period in which the event 
happens and destabilises the contract. Therefore, if that event is over and 
the prices become normal as they were, the contract should be performed 
as it was initially concluded. This means without applying -in the normal 
period- the revision made by the judge, since the revision concerns the 
period of destabilisation only, and this is now over.(£/ Wassit Vol. 1 p. 
648.)
Having seen the three possible means of readjusting a destabilised 
contract, the question which might be asked is whether the judge , in the 
context of readjusting the contract can terminate it when there is no way 
of such a readjustment, or that the destabilisation of the contract is 
permanent. We have seen that Swiss and German laws consider the 
termination of the contract as another mean for the adjustment of the 
destabilised contract.
However, considering Egyptian law, most of its doctrine is of the 
opinion that the judge cannot terminate the contract, because the aim of 
imprevision is to divide the loss between the parties, whereas the
220 Stoyanovitch at p. 181. There appear to be nothing which prevents the judge 
from applying the two means of adjustment of a contract (viz reducing one obligation 
and increasing the other) at the same time. See to this opinion Abd El Mounem F. E at 
p. 488.
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termination of the contract would put the whole loss on the creditor.221 
Another argument is that the Egyptian article concerning imprevision, 
does not give such a power to the judge. Therefore, there should be an 
express article which gives him that right.222 Even the Egyptian 
jurisprudence rejects the idea of terminating a contract because of 
imprevision.(See Ait p. 115.)
The same arguments set above applies to Algerian law. However, 
some authors are of the opinion that the termination of the contract, 
should be allowed under Algerian law.223 One author gives as an 
argument art. 561/3 Alg.C.C.224 That article is a special application of 
the theory of imprevision, concerning contracts called "contrats 
d'entreprise" (ie contracts of hire of work and skill), by which a person 
promises to do work for another in return for a certain remuneration. It 
may happen that the foundation upon which the remuneration in that 
contract was determined, disappears by an unforeseeable, exceptional and 
general event. In this case, the judge may either increase the 
remuneration of the worker (entrepreneur) or terminate the contract.225 
The better solution might be that the creditor should be allowed -if he so 
wishes- to claim the termination of the contract instead of any adjustment.
After having stated the conditions under which a party can claim the 
revision of his contract, article 107/3 Alg.C.C provides that Any 
agreement to the contrary is null and void.". As may clearly be seen any 
contractual stipulation, limiting or totally barring a party from using his 
right for the application of the theory of imprevision, is void. Any clause 
which is less rigorous than the stipulation of that article should also be 
considered as void.226
The logical question which can be asked, is the reason for making that
221 El Wassit Vol. 1, p. 648, and see Ait, op.cit at p. 114.
222 See Ait id- An example is article 658/4 Egy.C.C, which gives the judge the 
right to terminate the contract (this article concerns imprevision.).
223 See N.Terki, op.cit at pp. 27 et seq.
224 Which is the same as art. 658/4 Egy.C.C, see El Wassit Vol. 1 op.cit at p. 
651 footnote. 1, and similar to art. 373/2 of the Swiss C.O.
225 por other examples see also Mohamed Hassanine, El Wadjiz op.cit.
226 The majority of Arab laws make the provision concerning imprevision 
imperative, and any clause to the contrary is void. See El Fazary, op.cit at p. 275.
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article imperative in character. Some authors have argued that by this 
disposition, the legislator tries to protect the weaker party from the other 
contracting party who may be in a strong contractual position, and 
therefore forces him to accept to renounce his right of claiming the 
application of the theory of imprevision.227 Following this opinion, the 
clauses which may be void are those made at the time the contract is 
concluded. Therefore when the event causing the destabilisation of the 
contract happens, it is open to the parties at that time to provide for the 
non application of the theory of imprevision.22  ^ This is because -as it is 
argued- at that time the party who is in the stronger contractual position, 
cannot influence the will of the weaker party.
However, this argument does not seem to be convincing 229 This is 
because it is not certain whether the will of the weaker party will not be 
influenced, such as in the case where he is obliged to keep the contractual 
relationship with the party who is in the stronger position.
The other problem raised by this article, is that whereas it is 
imperative and any provision to the contrary is void, we find that the 
legislator has allowed such clauses in the case of force majeure. That is to 
say, the debtor can -by a contractual clause- bear the risk of being in an 
impossibility to perform his contract. It is obvious that a case of force 
majeure is more important than the one of imprevision, since there the 
performance is impossible, whereas under imprevision, it is onerous 
only. Therefore the imperative provision should be made for the case of 
force majeure rather than that of imprevision.230 Some authors have 
tried to explain the difference, but it should be said, they are not 
convincing. The legislator should have allowed such clauses under 
imprevision in order to harmonise the articles governing force majeure 
and those governing imprevision, since no clear reason seems to justify 
the difference in effect.(See to this effect El Fazary pp. 282-83.)
However, although the imperative character of article 107/3 Alg.C.C 
may be justified when there is a clause which prevents a party from
227 See El Wassit Vol. 1 op.cit at p. 649 footnote. 2.
228 pi Wassit Vol. 1 footnote. 2 page. 650.
229 See El Fazary, op.cit at p. 285.
230 See El Fazary, op.cit at pp. 281-82.
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claiming the application of the theory of imprevision, or limits this right, 
it is less justifiable when the parties themselves provide for a process of 
revision of their contract by which the destabilised contract would be 
equitably readjusted. Such provisions may in fact guide the judge in 
finding the best way of readjusting equitably the contract.231 Therefore 
the legislator should have limited the prohibition to the clauses which 
either limit or prevent a party from claiming the application of the 
provision of article 107/3, and not to those which envisage a process of 
readaptation which might be more advantageous to both parties and 
especially to the weaker party.
From what has been discussed in this chapter, it can be seen that many 
laws (German, Swiss, U.S.A, Italy, Algeria and the other Arab laws) do not follow 
the rigid rule to the effect that unless there is case of absolute impossibility 
no release can be provided for the contractor who finds it difficult if not 
ruinous to perform his contract. This rigid rule is also adopted by 
English law but it is possible to say that courts can adopt a more flexible 
position towards problems of excessive onerousness when the case is one 
which satisfies the common test as explained above. The French legislator 
started with the same rigid rule but instead of conferring to judges the 
power to modify contracts detsabilised by supervening events, he 
preferred temporary legislative intervention in cases of economic 
destabilisation of private contracts. The reason behind such a position is - 
as has already been said- the reluctance to trust judges in their 
appreciation of cases of hardship. It is hard to comprehend why the 
judges are trusted when dealing with cases of force majeure (ie a total release 
of debtors) and not in cases concerning an increase or a decrease -in term of 
cost- of the obligation of one of the parties to the contract.
231 See to this effect N. Terki, op.cit at p. 11, see also M. Fontaine (1976) 2 
Int'l.T.L & P.. at p. 10
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General Conclusion.
In the study regarding the English doctrine of frustration, it has been 
seen that early English law starts with a harsh rule to the effect that 
impossibility of performance cannot discharge the debtor from his 
contractual obligation. The position of French and Algerian laws is 
totally different in this aspect. "A l'impossible nut n'est tenu" was the 
prevailing principle. However, as has been remarked, English courts 
departed from that principle and admitted the release of the debtor in 
cases of impossibility. English law continues in its development while 
French law maintains the aforementioned principle. It has been pointed 
out that under English law the release of a debtor is even extended to cases 
of possibility (e.g. the Coronation cases). The common test developed by 
courts to the effect that "if the performance of the contract is to be 
enforced it would be a performance of a radically different contract from 
the one undertaken" can also be used and is in fact used for cases other 
than those of impossibility. French law requires an impossibility of 
performance in order that a debtor can be discharged from his obligation. 
This position is continually emphasised by the Court of Cassation. Its 
arguments are -as has been said- not very convincing; since nothing really 
prevents it from adopting a more flexible position such as the adoption of 
the theory of imprevision. As regards English law, from a probable 
interpretation of the speeches of the judges, it can be said that the 
onerousness of an obligation might be considered as a frustrating event. 
Certain countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Swiss, Germany and even 
U.S.A, considered that, to require an impossibility of performance in 
order to release a debtor from his obligation was too narrow, and adopted 
frankly the theory of imprevision. The adoption of this theory can not 
constitute a threat to the sanctity of contracts. An example is the 
widespread use of "Hardship clauses" in international contracts. It is in 
fact the principle pacta sunt servanda which causes injustice in certain 
circumstances.
The doctrine of force majeure as admitted in French law is very 
narrow if compared with the English and the Scottish doctrine of 
f r u s t r a t i o n .232 But comparing the latter doctrine with that of Algeria,
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Egypt or Swiss laws, it can be said, that frustration is more limited in 
extent than in the above laws.
Looking back to the comparison made during this study between 
English, Scottish, French and Algerian laws on the subject of 
impossibility of performance it is clear that the required conditions (such 
as non-imputability, unforeseeability) of frustration or force majeure are 
similar. It was also seen that the legal solutions in cases like Taylor V. 
Caldwell. Appleby and Howell can similarly be reached under French and 
Algerian laws. Concerning the cases involving a delay in the performance 
(e.g. requisition, seizure, temporary impossibility, mobilisation..), under 
English and Scottish laws the length of the delay is very important in 
order that a contract can be held frustrated. Under French and Algerian 
laws on the other hand the delay itself has no relation to the question of 
exoneration from liability. Consideration is given to the length of the 
delay when opting either for the suspension or the termination of the 
contract. It has also been seen that both English and French courts 
construe the clauses concerning force majeure and frustration in a strict 
manner. Where the effects of force majeure or frustration are not 
regulated by the parties then both laws provide special rules to govern 
these effects. Generally speaking the debtor is discharged from further 
performance and can recover what he paid for if the payment was made 
for a future performance which did not materialise.
In the course of this work we have given, as far as possible, our 
opinion on certain questions without purporting that they are the only and 
the certainly right deductions. Constantinesco says (at pp. 264-65) that a 
comparative study of the doctrine of impossibility, frustration, force 
majeure and imprevision will be of great benefit. We hope that our study 
is one step further in such a task.
See Constantinesco, p. 488.
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